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Supply Chains Behaving Badly:  
A Dynamic Model of Interorganisational  
Supply Chain Exchange Behaviour under  
Rational, Relational and Chaotic Paradigms 
 
By Mark M.J. Wilson 
 
Supply chain exchange relationships are complex and sometimes chaotic sociological and 
organisational phenomena.  This complexity is compounded by the boundary spanning necessity 
of forming supply chain partnerships that are further exacerbated by goal divergence and 
asymmetric information.  One of the main questions for consideration is how these dyadic 
exchange relationships are maintained and develop over time in response to the various channel 
behaviours of the actors (the buyer and seller)?  In particular, exchange relationships are theorised 
to be sensitive in some degree to attempts at economic appropriation, and conversely coordinative 
efforts.  Such efforts manifest themselves into the mutually opposing forces broadly labelled as 
opportunistic and collaborative behavioural paradigms.   
 
Drawing from the concepts of Systems and Chaos/Complexity theories, it is theorised that the 
movement from one form of relational arrangement to another is enacted in a non-linear and 
dynamic manner with periods of relational equilibrium disrupted by bifurcations resulting in the 
emergence of new levels of relationship.  However, not all exchange relationships are susceptible 
to constant change, rather, there should be some threshold barrier or relationship inertia that must 
be overcome before a bifurcation occurs.  Yet what is not known is how strong these bonds are to 
the enactment of opportunistic and collaborative partner behaviours.  
 
Hence, 189 manufacturing supply chain relationships were survey-interviewed in order to 
determine the impact that collaborative and opportunistic behaviours have on supply chain 
relational movement.  The results show that generally exchange relationships do in fact change in 
response to these enacted behaviours, and that actual levels of supply chain behaviour over a 
range of 12 variables could be measured.  Indeed, the level of opportunistic behaviour 
experienced by the sample was disturbing.  In addition, the level of tolerance (zone of tolerance) 
for specific behaviours was measured for the first time in the field.  Overall, it was found that 
supply chain exchange relationships do indeed evolve in a non-linear dynamic manner in response 
to opportunistic and collaborative manoeuvres by the dyadic actors. 
 
Finally, these ideas were summarised in the Dynamic Relational Development (DRD) concept 
that explains how supply chain relationships dynamically change.  In addition, the dualistic nature 
of the collaborative versus opportunistic behaviour choice for exchange actors is tentatively 
reconciled by the deontological approach of the Supply Chain Citizen theory offered in this 
research.   
 
Key Words: Supply Chain Management, Dynamic, Exchange, Relationships, Movement, 
Opportunism, Collaboration, Relational and Rational Schools, Chaos and Complexity theory, 
DRD Concept, Supply Chain Citizen Theory. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
1 Thesis Introduction 
1.1 The Importance of Exchange Relationships 
In August 2006 Gary Paykel, the Chairman of Fisher and Paykel Ltd, a very successful and 
innovative whiteware and health equipment manufacturer, was bemoaning the high prices 
of the current matériel supply market as the worst he had seen since the 1973-74 world oil 
shock.  Matsushita, a Japanese firm who have supplied Fisher and Paykel with their critical 
compressors for 30 years, had recently suggested that they would break a formal contract 
to supply if Fisher and Paykel did not start paying more for the compressors over and 
above the current contract price.  Gary Paykel said that this was unheard of and was aghast 
at the prospect, he stated; “they’ve said, if you don’t pay more, we’re not going to supply 
you.  I know these people well, and in all my years here, I’ve never heard them say that” 
(Vaughan, 2006, August 26, p. E8).  Clearly, despite the trust, commitment and the level of 
respect and normative behaviours built up over 30 years, this seemingly stable and reliable 
supply chain relationship is undergoing dramatic and unexpected change.  Given the length 
of the relationship with the Japanese supplier, their behaviour seems quite extraordinary 
and opportunistic, and clearly has come as quite a surprise to the Fisher and Paykel team.  
This situation poses some important questions, what does Fisher and Paykel think of their 
supplier now? will this relationship break? and if so at what point will it break? and what 
of the future supply arrangements?   
Commonly, a firm’s ability to compete is strongly tied to their business-to-business 
relationships, and strong coordinated relationships are essential for competitive advantage 
(Barney, 2002; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Tuominen, 2004).  Understanding how to establish 
and grow successful supply chain relationships is a critical competency.  Generally, supply 
chain relationships develop over time, and once established various norms of behaviour 
and expectations will emerge that to a large degree will help determine the pattern of future 
exchange interactions.  These relationships maintain a form of stability or happy 
equilibrium until disrupted by either exogenous shocks or unexpected partner behaviours 
that threaten the very existence of long-run trading relationships.  In the Fisher and Paykel 
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example, the risk of relationship termination and subsequent expensive legal action is not 
out of the question.  Indeed, their position as a market leader is under threat if they are 
unable to supply their key customers due to component unavailability as a result of a 
recalcitrant supplier.  Clearly, supply chain exchange relationships can change in quite 
dramatic and unexpected ways in response to events and behaviours perpetrated by an 
exchange partner.  It is the purpose of this thesis to examine this phenomenon, and how 
supply chain exchange relationships respond dynamically to the behaviours of the dyadic 
exchange partner.              
1.1.1 The Importance of Supply Chain Management 
Supply chain management (SCM) comprises of firms in a channel “…collaborating to 
leverage strategic positioning and improve operational efficiency” (Bowersox, Closs and 
Cooper, 2002, p. 4).  Consequently, any subsequent supply chain relationship decision 
reflects the strategic choices of the firm.   SCM is often referred to as the value chain or the 
demand chain, and Ayres (2004) describes it as the “…life cycle processes supporting 
physical, information, financial, and knowledge flows for moving products and service 
from suppliers to end users” (p. 15).  Essentially, a SCM strategy is a specific channel 
arrangement that is based on interfirm dependencies and relationship management.  Supply 
chain operations require managerial processes that span the boundary space between firms 
in order to link functional areas and independent firms across organisational boundaries.  
Few can dispute the need for collaborative supply chains to reduce waste and improve 
value across the whole chain (Cooper, Lambert and Pagh, 1997; Croom, Romano and 
Giannakis, 2000; Hines, 2004; Min and Mentzer, 2004; Skjoett-Larsen, Thernoe and 
Andersen, 2003).     
In the current business environment many of the success factors for an organisation occur 
outside the boundaries of the firm, that is they are trans-organisational in nature (Achrol, 
1997).  In other words, many firms derive value and rents from supply chain activities that 
occur outside of the organisation, yet are not directly controlled by the focus firm.  The 
major dilemma for management who wish to appropriate the rents from the supply chain, 
is how to create, maintain, and enhance the value activities and resources that are 
controlled by other firms.  Increasingly, managers are turning to SCM paradigms to 
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achieve these aims, taking particular notice of the techniques of interorganisational 
relationship management.  Nevertheless, most boundary spanning definitions in 
management and social science research are fraught with problems (Achrol, 1997).  
Simplistic reasoning, and unilateral actions tend to produce suboptimal results in the 
supply chain (Macbeth, 2002).  Rather, a multi-paradigmatic approach is used in this 
research to gain a clearer insight to this boundary space management problem (Lewis and 
Grimes, 1999).        
SCM can be seen as an interdisciplinary subject that joins economics with aspects of 
organisational theory, sociology and socio-psychology, and contract law (Williamson, 
1979).  SCM concerns itself with the quantification of costs associated with exchange 
relationships and determining the most appropriate governance structure for the said 
exchange (Knemeyer and Murphy, 2004).  In addition, it also seeks to balance these costs 
against exchange relationship benefits and performance requirements for success.  All 
these goals are to be achieved in an environment where exchange actors unilaterally seek 
to extract their own self-serving portion from a limited value pool.  Cooperation itself can 
also be seen in this light, as the emergence of cooperation in the channel is due to its ability 
to increase the overall size of the value pool (Axlerod, 1990).  Yet each exchange actor 
must still compete to gain a portion of the enlarged share.  Essentially, inter-organisational 
relationship management seeks to balance these competitive and cooperative forces within 
a turbulent and dynamic environment of competing dualistic behaviours.  
In the early 1980’s, researchers Stern and Reve (1980) illustrated that SCM channel 
research was fragmented into two distinct epistemological frameworks, namely the 
economic approach and the behavioural approach to exchange relationships.  The first 
attempts to apply a micro-economic analysis to what is ostensibly a commercial-
behavioural paradox by examining such variables as costs, design and rationality.  The 
second stream attempts to focus on the socio-political orientation of the channel by 
examining such variables as power, dependence, trust and commitment.  From these two 
main ideologies, one can see the outworking of the paradigms in terms of exchange actor 
behaviours.  The economic actor would seek to maximise their returns through the 
operation of opportunistic behaviours, conversely the behavioural actor would seek to 
maximise their returns through collaboration.  This juxtaposition of seemingly competing 
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theories needs some form of reconciliation, and they should actually be viewed as 
complimentary rather than contradictory.  For this research, these two streams of thought 
will be conceptualised into two broad ideologies.  The first, titled the Rational school, 
examines the economic and rationality imperative, whist the second, called the Relational 
school, examines the behavioural assumptions of exchange.  In addition, these two schools 
are positioned within a dynamic environment that attempts to encapsulate the interaction 
and interdependencies of system complexity and relationship development.     
1.1.2 The Importance of a Dynamic View   
Capturing relationship complexity is a difficult task and creates all manner of 
methodological problems in research.  Traditional theories assume away much of this 
complexity, and this has resulted in a continuing disconnection between theory and 
practice.  For example, important theories like Transaction Cost Economics (Coase, 1937; 
Williamson, 1979), Agency theory (Carlos, 1992; Eisenhardt, 1989), Game theory of 
exchange (Axlerod, 1990; Camerer, 2003; Dixit and Skeath, 2004; Thaler, 1992) Resource 
Dependence theory (Barney, 1991; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), and Relational Exchange 
theory (MacNeil, 1980a; Webster, 1992), are not sufficient to fully explain exchange 
relationship development as they tend to focus almost exclusively on governance 
mechanisms in a reductionist sense (Stump and Heide, 1996).  Rather, what is needed is a 
holistic, systemic and dynamic view of supply chain relationships.  Therefore, this research 
will included the chaos/complexity paradigm (Gleick, 1988; Lorenz, 1993) in order to 
assist in the explanation of dynamic exchange relationship development as a process.  
Naude and Turnball (1998) have stated that “…in studying inter-firm interactions, it is 
often concluded that an inter-organisational relationship is dynamic because of its process 
nature” (p. 50), and relationship processes will be the focus of this thesis. 
In human decision making processes, qualitative assessments of observable and non-
observable events are continually being made.  These assessments are based on what is 
currently happening as well as our expectations of the future that in turn are shaped by our 
experiences of the recent past.  These complex cogitative feedback loops influence our 
qualitative judgements of the present with the past, thus future actions are predicated or 
influenced to a degree on past events.  In this way, an economic actor can never truly be 
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entirely rational, and these effects are not well documented in the supply chain exchange 
literature.  For supply chain managers, neat optimal rational solutions are rare indeed.  
Instead, they usually face multiple solutions or outcomes in far from equilibrium 
conditions with time dependent feedback loops.  These issues are symptomatic of non-
linear dynamic systems (Peters, 1991), and thus any potential solution or explanation must 
be framed in a non-linear dynamic manner.      
Therefore, if inter-organisational relationships develop over time, it follows then that they 
do so in an unpredictable dynamic way (Macbeth, 2002).  Geser (1992) finds that supply 
chain relationships are “polymorphic… [and are] …variable over time” (p. 444).  It is 
argued that initially supply chain relationships are organised and implemented in a 
relatively precise and premeditated manner, such as during the evaluation and selection of 
a new supplier (Ellram, 1991).  However, relationships are respecified according to the 
exigencies of the prevailing strategic conditions or by any unplanned undesired events.  In 
other words, relationships and their governance mechanisms dynamically adapt in response 
to the various enacted behaviours.  In doing so, they adapt or generate new social and 
relational norms of behaviour to help govern in the new relational context including any 
formal structures.  Generally, the less formal the relationship structure, the more flexible 
they tend to be and more adaptive to the dynamic environment.  Rigid formal contracts 
tend to be less flexible and adaptive as capturing all possible future contingencies is an 
impossible task (Lambert, Emmelhainz and Gardner, 1996).  Certainly, renegotiating the 
contract in response to every phase of adaptation is cost prohibitive.  Hence, supply chain 
relationships must be thought of as a dynamic learning and adaptive process (Hallen, 
Johanson and Mohamed, 1987).  
While the literature on the nature of inter-organisational relationships is rich, one area that 
has received little attention is that of relational adaptation or degree of bonding strength.  
One measure of relational strength is how adaptations are accommodated between the 
partners of a dyadic exchange in response to dynamic perturbations (Easton and Araujo, 
1986).  In essence, the strength of a relationship can be measured by the degree of 
accommodation made or the resistance shown to these change events.  Previous authors 
have thought that relationship strength is measured in terms of the direct dollar value of the 
exchange (Iacobucci and Hopkins, 1992).  Others think that the strength of the relationship 
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is determined by the ‘value’ of the relationship (Tuominen, 2004).  One interesting concept 
was proposed by Easton and Araujo (1986) who argue that relationship strength is 
determined by its ‘bond strength’, going on to define this term as “…the capacity to 
withstand a disruptive force” (p. 12).  This ‘bond strength’ can conceivably be linked to the 
length or duration of a supply chain relationship, in that the longer the relationship, the 
greater the bonding between the partners (Wilson and Mummalaneni, 1986).  Hence, inter-
organisational relationships are said to be somewhat ‘tolerant’ to disruptive forces or 
perturbations (Hallen et al., 1987).  Tellingly, what has not been investigated is the nature 
or the degree of bonding strength, or relational tolerance.  It is currently unclear what 
impact supply chain behaviours have on inter-organisational relationships.  This is 
seemingly important oversight has some critical theoretical and managerial implications.  
For example, how can you manage a relationship when you are unsure of how your partner 
will react to certain behaviours?  How far can you opportunistically extract value and 
benefits from a relationship without serious ramifications?  Also, what happens if you push 
a critical supplier too far?  How can you demonstrate that you wish to implement 
collaborative value generating initiatives?  How is trust and commitment in a relationship 
demonstrated?  And finally, how do relationships handle dynamic adaptations?  Such 
questions are the motivation and focus of this research. 
1.2 Objectives of this Research 
One of the major reasons for studying supply chains is so managers can appropriately 
design and control the channel for optimal performance.  An appropriate analytical 
framework is essential as important elements of channel design and management processes 
could be overlooked, resulting in suboptimal performance over time.  It should be 
recognised from the outset that the concept of interdependence is central in understanding 
this framework.  Due to the extreme interdependence present in all supply chains and the 
value of specialisation of its members (Coughlan, Anderson, Stern and El-Ansary, 1996), it 
is critical that any framework for analysis pay due attention to the system of design and 
relationship attributes influenced by the character of the channel under study.  If all 
members of a supply chain do not perform appropriately, then the entire channel effort 
suffers.  Hence, while relationship marketing in industrial organisations has been well 
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served in the literature, it only hints at the complexities of managing inter-firm 
relationships.  The magnitude and difficulties of governing these exchange relationships 
has its root in five fundamental questions applicable to the theorist and the practitioner 
alike: 
• What motivates independently owned firms to form cooperative relationships in the 
supply chain? 
• How does an exchange actor balance self-interest and partnership mutual-interest?    
• How should one act within the exchange relationship to meet multiple expectations? 
• How is cross-dyadic behaviour perceived by the non-acting party, and what is their 
reaction to this perception? 
• How do inter-firm relationships change over time?   
 
These critical questions are yet to be fully discussed or explored in the discipline.  
Therefore, this research and the resulting discussion and emerging concepts are offered as 
an exploratory attempt in answering these questions, and also in reconciling the dualistic 
ideologies that have so far governed exchange relationships. 
1.3 Contributions of this Research 
The development of theory must be accompanied by strong programs of empirical 
investigation in order to understand marketing and channel relationships more completely.  
Webster (1992) notes that “…top priority should be given to analysis of the forces and 
factors that cause firms to move along the continuum from transactions to long-term 
relationships to strategic alliances, and perhaps back again” (p. 13).  Despite this early 
appeal to the research community, little has been achieved since.  Therefore, it is hoped 
that this research will in a small way address some of the theoretical, methodological and 
managerial issues that currently perplex supply chain actors and researchers. 
This study will make a number of contributions to the field.  Firstly, it offers new 
perspectives on both collaborative and opportunistic behaviours in exchange relationships.  
It does so by reconceptualising both these major behaviours into new typologies, and then 
formulating appropriate measurement instruments and scales.  For the new typology of 
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opportunism it is necessary to extend the current definition prevalent in literature to allow 
for a finer granulated view of the construct.  Conversely, for the new collaborative 
typology it is necessary to merge a number of loosely related constructs into a consolidated 
typology that allows for a more holistic measure of the construct.  In addition to these two 
new continua, new multi-item scales will be developed and tested to measure the 
behavioural dimensions.  It will also be necessary to create two new measurement 
instruments that will be used to capture the collaborative and opportunistic behaviours of 
the exchange partner. It is proposed that the reconceptualisation of these two major 
behavioural ideologies will capture more of the dynamism and complexities inherent in 
exchange relationships.    
Theoretically, this research will add new perspectives on supply chain behaviours and 
relationships by adapting the chaos/complexity nomenclature to describe relational 
adaptations and change.  Taking this perspective should aid managers and researchers in 
articulating and understanding some quite complex and multifaceted exchange behaviours.  
As a result, practitioners and researchers will be able to empirically measure the strength or 
adaptive levels of their supply chain relationships, and will be able to manage their 
portfolio of exchange relationships with a much greater degree of awareness and alacrity.  
These ideas are summarised in the Dynamic Relational Development (DRD) concept 
offered in this research that conceptually and empirically links behaviours to relational 
outcomes.  
Finally, an attempt will be made to rationalise the two competing ideological paradigms of 
collaboration and opportunism in supply chain exchanges.  Hence, the Supply Chain 
Citizen theory is offered here as a deontological approach, and the most appropriate way to 
reconcile these opposing behavioural paradigms.  This theory will provide a way forward 
for theoreticians and practitioners alike.  
1.4 Organisation of the Thesis 
This thesis will be divided into seven chapters reflecting the major stages of this type of 
empirical research.  Firstly, the current chapter has introduced the topic and outlined in 
very broad terms the objectives and contributions of the research.  The second chapter 
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proceeds to discuss the relevant theoretical literature published in the field.  It does so by 
first introducing the concept that a dichotomy exists in the literature, and that supply chain 
behaviours are essentially an outworking of this dichotomy.  This chapter will then use a 
metatriangulation methodology for multiple paradigms (Lewis and Grimes, 1999) to 
provide a road map of the relevant theories that underpin the conceptual foundations of this 
research.  The chapter will then divide each of the major theories into either one of two 
broad behavioural ideologies.  Firstly, the Rational school will cover those theories that 
use the efficient market hypothesis, rationality and utility maximising as their core 
assumptions.  Secondly, the Relational school is based on normative cooperative and 
sociological assumptions that dictate behaviour.  In addition, Systems theory and 
Chaos/Complexity theory are used to demonstrate the complexities and dynamics of 
relational exchange movement.  The last part of chapter two discusses the nature of 
different supply chain relationships, and identifies different relational levels on a 
unidimensional continuum.   
Chapter three furthers the literature review by examining the operationalisation of generic 
supply chain behaviours.  In particular, it addresses opportunistic behaviours, collaborative 
behaviours, supply chain strategic behaviours, and then it introduces dynamic behaviours.  
Initially, it establishes the foundational concepts and methodological issues surrounding 
the behaviours of opportunism and collaboration.  This chapter in both cases 
reconceptualises the behaviours into new constructs that will be used in the data gathering 
process.  The formation of supply chain strategic behaviours recognises that exchange 
actors make decisions in accordance with both organisational level, and macro-
environmental level exigencies.  Finally, new theoretical insights for the discipline will be 
derived from the application of Chaos/Complexity theory as a means of interpreting the 
relationship development process.      
Chapter four will introduce the aim and research questions, the general research model, 
and the hypotheses used to examine the phenomena under scrutiny.  The logic of each 
hypothesis will be argued and then testable questions are stated.  The hypotheses section is 
divided into four major parts, the main research hypotheses, the zone of tolerance 
hypotheses, the bifurcation hypotheses and the strategic behaviour hypotheses.  The 
chapter will conclude by linking each hypothesis to the original research questions.  
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Chapter five deals with the philosophical, epistemological and methodological approaches 
that will be used in this study.  It will outline the development and testing stages of the 
scale items and measurement instruments that will be used in the data gathering phase.  
This chapter will also address reliability and validity issues, as well as sampling and design 
issues.   
Chapter six will cover the analysis of the data and the hypotheses testing phase of this 
research.  Initially, the analysis will provide an overview of the demographic data of the 
respondent firms, and it will go on to provide descriptive statistics of the major constructs 
and behavioural dimensions.  The hypotheses testing phase will use a range of parametric 
statistical tools (for example, the GLM ANOVA, MANOVA and bivariate correlations) to 
examine each hypothesis in turn and will subsequently report the results.  The assumptions 
of the statistical tests used will be examined where required, and any variances or 
violations of these assumptions will be explained.  The chapter concludes with a detailed 
table summarising the results of the hypotheses testing phase.   
Finally, chapter seven will report on the results in detail, and it will also discuss the 
theoretical and managerial implications.  These findings will provide the basis for the 
emergence of the Dynamic Relational Development concept and the conceptual foundation 
and operationalisation of this idea will be discussed in detail.  Next, the contributions to 
theory and managerial practice will also be discussed.  Importantly, an attempt to reconcile 
the opposing dualistic behavioural paradigms of opportunism versus collaboration will be 
made through the conceptualisation of the Supply Chain Citizen theory.  This research will 
conclude with a discussion of the research limitations and the implications for future 
research agendas. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
2 Supply Chain Theories, Structures and Behaviours; 
A Review of the Literature 
2.1 Introduction 
The body of knowledge that has thus far been accumulated concerning channel exchange 
relationships is contained in a disparate body of academic literature.  This chapter will 
review the relevant literature to more closely identify the theoretical foundation upon 
which this research effort rests.  It will aim to address Croom’s, et al, (2000) concerns that 
the supply chain management literature has suffered in the past from the lack “…of a 
significant body of a priori theory” (p. 75).  Hence, this chapter will review the key 
theories from neo-classical economics, psychology, social-psychology, organisational and 
behavioural theories, and also socio-political themes.  Included in this review are theories 
that introduce complexity and dynamic perspectives that have been previously only 
tentatively addressed by researchers and theorists in the field.  Therefore, this review will 
take the form of a meta-analysis to re-examine the associated theories in order to 
synthesise what is useful and relevant in explaining the phenomena under study.  The 
intent is to take a much wider, multi-lensed view of the theoretical domain.  This 
multiparadigmic approach provides a fresh offering in this field todate.        
This review uses a metatriangulation (Lewis and Grimes, 1999) approach to provide a 
taxonomy of the theoretical underpinnings of supply chain theories, organisational 
mechanisms (such as governance), and supply chain behaviours.  Preceding the review is a 
section that discusses the dilemma of conflicting competitive and cooperative behaviours 
in the supply chain.  The dichotic nature of competition and cooperation appears to be a 
universal theme throughout all the major channel theories.  Firstly, this review discusses 
the rational economic paradigms, of Transaction Cost Economics, Agency theory and 
Game theory.  Following this, the behavioural and relational paradigms of Resource 
Dependence theory, Relational Exchange theory and the Political and Economic Paradigm 
are reviewed.  To compliment these two major schools, systemic and dynamic perspectives 
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are introduced through General Systems Thinking and Chaos/Complexity theories.  
Finally, as all these theories impact on the type, nature and level of supply chain 
relationships that can be formed and developed over time, a typology of supply chain 
relationships is presented.  Drawing from this typology, it is suggested that relationship 
movement can be measured by assessing the nature and premise of the specific exchange 
relationship under scrutiny, and any subsequent changes to that relationship archetype.   
2.2 Metatriangulation of Multiple Paradigms 
Prior to proceeding with the review, it is important to outline the research methodology 
used when dealing with the literature.  Early on it was apparent that the area of research 
was subsumed within a complex and paradoxical world of dynamic and complex 
organisational and inter-personal behaviours.  As a result, it became obvious that no single 
paradigm was able to completely provide a set of workable overarching assumptions on 
which to ground this research.  Hence, it is necessary to adopt a multi-paradigmatic lens 
through which to view the phenomena under study (Lewis, 2000).  Useful in this area was 
Lewis and Grimes (1999) suggestion that metatriangulation be used to examine the 
boundaries and zones between the theories to sensitise the researcher to certain 
conceptualisations in order to foster divergent insights for theory building.  They 
distinguish metatriangulation as consisting of three different forms or stages that 
compliment each other.  Firstly, multi-paradigm reviews consist of examining the literature 
to expose the often-taken for granted assumptions through either bracketing or bridging 
techniques.  Secondly, multi-paradigm research moves beyond the review stage and 
attempts to apply the multi-paradigms in an empirical setting of some form.  This can be 
achieved by applying the various paradigms to the phenomena in either a parallel or 
sequential manner.  Finally, meta-paradigm theory building is a higher level of abstraction 
that helps the researcher to manage their bounded rationality by allowing the 
accommodation of opposing views within a single perspective (Lewis and Grimes, 1999).  
This later stage gives a sense of not an ‘either-or’ approach, but rather allows a ‘both-and’ 
perspective where conflicting views are held in companionable tension because each offers 
partial truths yet in differing contexts.  Lewis and Grimes (1999) argue that the goal of 
meta-paradigmatic theory building is to provide “…a rich, holistic and contextualised 
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purview” (p. 675).  However, Lewis and Grimes (1999) warn that “metatriangulation is not 
a substitute for single-paradigm theory building, but rather an alternative for exploring 
complex phenomena from disparate theoretical and epistemological perspectives” (p. 685).     
This current research will progress through all three stages of the metatriangulation 
process.  Initially, in this chapter and the next1 a multi-paradigmatic review of the literature 
will be conducted as we seek to understand the underlying multi-dimensional behavioural 
assumptions that impact on supply chain behaviours.  Secondly, we move to a multi-
paradigmatic research approach by conducting an empirical study based on the 
operationalisation of the various paradigms and behaviours2.  Finally, when interpreting 
the results, a meta-paradigmatic theory building process is used in the final chapter3 to 
propose a new concept of inter-organisational multi-behaviour in a dynamic and complex 
exchange context.  Utilising this holistic strategy, it is proposed to contrast and account for 
the various anomalies in the underlying paradigms and schools of thought.  Thus, with 
fidelity, exploring their disparities and interplays, hence arriving at “…an enlarged and 
enlighten understanding of the phenomena of interest, as well as the paradigms employed” 
(Lewis and Grimes, 1999, p. 676).  
 
                                                 
1
 Chapter Two: Literature review, and Chapter Three: Supply chain behaviours. 
2
 Chapter Four: The research question and hypotheses, Chapter Five: Methodology, and Chapter Six: Results. 
3
 Chapter Seven: Discussion of results and theoretical and managerial implications. 
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2.3 The Dichotomy of Supply Chain Behaviours  
A reflective review of business history shows that while there has been an 
acknowledgement of the benefits of cooperation between firms (Boyce, 2001), this desire 
has always been subordinated within a competitive framework.  The concepts of cost trade-
offs, lowest total costs of transactions and acquisitions and other monetary driven actions 
have logical appeal to managers, and create a powerful frame of reference for business 
decisions (Cavinato, 1992).  Yet, while the monetary/cost concept appears to be 
deceptively simple, it is often hard to identify, measure and implement processes that 
achieve the total minimisation of costs (Bowersox et al., 2002).  Consequently, the drive 
for economic returns, at times, compels firms to behave or to take actions that appropriate 
rents by means that could be either seen charitably as ‘hard headed business’ or by others 
as underhanded or even illegal.  Under the economic imperative, at some point opprobrious 
behaviour manifests itself in various guises, such as the overt exercise of power or 
unconscionable acts of opportunism.  Conversely, cooperation or in its fullest extent 
collaboration, seems on the surface at least, to be counterintuitive to the economically 
rational mind.  At its broadest level, collaboration occurs when separately owned 
companies work together in some manner to realise mutual benefit (Ohmae, 1989).  
Further, since there are globally very few examples of industries possessing completely 
vertically integrated supply chains from raw materials to the end consumer, then some 
form of effective inter-firm relationship or cooperation with a range of external entities is, 
concomitantly, a matter of necessity.  Coyle, Bardi and Langley (2003) assert that supply 
chain “…collaboration goes well beyond vague expressions of partnership and aligned 
interests” (p. 589).  They emphasize that collaboration, while a strategic concept, must take 
some form of day-to-day operationalisation in the workplace so that together firms can 
perform better than they did separately.  In essence, collaborative actions outwardly seem 
diametrically opposed to the cost economising, rent accruing of the economically rational 
mind.  Yet, collaboration can create synergistic business environments in which the sum of 
the parts is greater than the whole, and this can facilitate the generation of new or 
alternative streams of appropriable economic rents (Dyer, 1997; Tuominen, 2004).       
However, collaborative initiatives must be positioned within a competitive framework to 
make commercial sense (Cox, 1999).  Altruistic motivations are rare indeed in business 
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(Phelps, 1999).  Thus, the dichotomy seems unsolvable, yet collaboration can and does 
emerge even under these constraints.  One of the striking things about supply chain 
collaboration and opportunistic behaviours is that both are motivated by the same thing; 
that of self-interested seeking, yet it is achieved in two quite distinct ways.   
In his seminal work on the theory of the evolution of cooperation, Robert Axlerod (1990) 
staged a computer tournament with entrants attempting to provide optimal solutions to 
what is know as the Prisoner’s dilemma.  Essentially, the Prisoner’s dilemma examines 
how the self-interested actions of individuals (and by implication organisations as a 
socialised groups of individuals) without a central coordinative authority impact on the 
system as a whole.  Interestingly, the dilemma is based on the premise that self-interested 
behaviour would lead to supernormal rents in the short term (the next move), yet sub-
optimal outcomes for all parties over the long term4 (the iterative game).  Therefore, the 
theory posits that cooperation will eventually develop between self-interested individuals 
without centralised direction, but primarily due to the motivation of accruing higher rents 
for themselves.  The paradox being that in the end the actors are still appeasing their own 
self-interests even whilst cooperating.  Importantly, it seems that cooperation can exist if 
there is something in it for the participants, and this view goes some way to making logical 
and practical sense to the reality of supply chain behaviours.  However, as the prisoner’s 
dilemma demonstrates, there will always be a tension between hard monetary, cost driven 
facts and figures of the economically rational mind, and the more relationally driven 
esoteric concepts espoused by the proponents of collaboration.  As an example, Donaldson 
(1996) shows how the competitive practices of buyers (competitive tendering for 
purchases) have undermined long-term buyer-seller relationships even despite the presence 
of specific collaborative intentions and initiatives from the buying firm.  Hence, supply 
chain decisions are riddled with compromise.  These seemingly opposing behavioural 
paradigms can trace their origins to the rich sources of exchange theory literature, and this 
review begins with an outline map to guide the research.       
                                                 
4
 See Figure 2-2 this chapter for the possible payoff options in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. 
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2.3.1 Theoretical Roadmap 
For a fuller understanding of these diametrically opposing forces, it is necessary to 
investigate their theoretical underpinnings, as well as the commercial environment and 
structural context that may delimit these actions.  Acknowledging our indebtedness to 
those researchers who have gone before, this research attempts to ‘stand on the shoulders 
of giants’ (Sir Isaac Newton, 1675) by examining several relevant theories concerning 
exchange relationships, and will synthesise the salient ideas of each into a new concept of 
Dynamic Relational Development (the DRD Concept).  Before progressing in detail, the 
following provides a ‘roadmap’ of the impending theoretical journey, this being 
represented in Figure 2-1 below.  It outlines the major theories that are reviewed, and their 
fit within the hierarchical continuum.        
Figure 2-1 Hierarchical Continuum of the Major Contributing Theories 
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Exchange
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Transaction Cost
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2.4 Exchange Relationships – Two Schools of Thought  
For this research the literatures were allocated into homogenous groups based on their 
underlying philosophical premise or position as it relates to channel exchange behaviour.  
The resulting two major groupings were formed based on the major theories or paradigms 
that over the years have helped explain transactional or exchange behaviour but in different 
ways.  The two major groups are, firstly, those literatures that emphasised the 
economically rational mind and how this explains exchange relationships under the 
assumptions of rationality, equilibrium analysis, linearity and utility.  Secondly, those 
literatures that emphasise the resource acquisition and socio-political-behavioural aspects 
of the exchange relationship through forms of cooperation and coordination as an alternate 
path.  These two major schools can be labelled according to their differing philosophical 
approaches in understanding exchange relationships.  As such, the ‘Rational School’ 
incorporates the economic and power dominated theories, and the ‘Relational School’ 
subsumes the socio-political-behavioural and resource exchange theories.  While these two 
schools provide eloquent explanations of exchange behaviours, they seem to be lacking a 
holistic and dynamic interpretation of exchange relationship development.  Further, both 
schools tend to understate the complexity of exchange for a variety of reasons, thus it 
seems necessary to incorporate some ‘systems’ concepts from General Systems Thinking 
and also Chaos/Complexity Theory.  The contribution of each of these two schools, plus 
the addition of Systems and Chaos/Complexity theories, will now be reviewed, along with 
their role in understanding exchange relationship behaviours.  Further, this work will 
attempt to synthesize these contributions by developing a new understanding of the nature 
of dynamic relational movements in supply chains. 
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2.5 The Rational School – Economic Paradigms 
The first school of thought examines the economic premises for exchange relationships.  
This area has a rich research history and the first theory to be examined, Transaction Cost 
Economics (TCE), can trace its origins back to the Theory of the Firm, wherein the costs of 
a transaction is the primary determinant if an exchange will take place in the first instance 
(Coase, 1937).  The economic perspective introduces the idea that market driven forces 
form the basis of exchange.  A fundamental assumption for this school of thought is that 
human or organisational actors will invariably attempt to maximise their rents, and are 
assumed to involuntarily behave opportunistically to achieve this whenever they can 
(Williamson, 1979).  Key themes within this school are the mechanics of the economising 
decisions made in the exchange relationship and how these decisions, assumed to be made 
with full information, impact on the nature and form of the exchange relationship.     
Paradigms borrowed from economic literature have had a powerful influence on the 
formation of marketing channel theory.  Hence, supply chain relationships or inter-
organisational exchange transactions (such as dyadic, chain and network exchange) have 
traditionally been viewed as fundamentally economic in nature.  As such, supply chain 
theory development has focused primarily on TCE (Dwyer and Oh, 1988; Heide and John, 
1992; Williamson, 1975, 1979, 1985), Agency theory (Carlos, 1992; Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Schulze, Lubatlin, Dino and Buchholtz, 2001; Walsh and Seward, 1990) and more recently 
Game Theory being rationally based, yet adding a new cooperative twist (Axlerod, 1990; 
Hill, 1990; Luce and Raiffa, 1957; Nalebuff and Brandenburger, 1996; Smith, 1982).  Each 
of these theories has made their own unique contributions to marketing channel literature 
in general, and supply chain behaviours in particular.  Yet each does not, and cannot in-of-
themselves fully explain channel behaviour.  The first theory in this school to be examined 
is that of Transaction Cost Economics championed by Oliver Williamson (1975; 1979; 
1985; 1996)        
2.5.1 The Theory of Transaction Cost Economics  
It can be argued that the origins of the discipline that is now commonly known as ‘supply 
chain management’ had its beginning in the 1960’s when industrial dynamic tools were 
applied to physical distribution and transportation problems (Forrester, 1961), and also 
Chapter Two – Literature Review 
 
19 
with the Total Cost approach to logistics adopted by Heckert and Miner in (1953) and 
Heskett, Glaskowsky, and Ivie in (1964).  Both of these approaches were notable as early 
attempts at avoiding the problems of reductionism by focusing on the system as a whole to 
improve logistics effectiveness (Croom et al., 2000), hence they gave rise to the wider 
‘whole supply chain’ theme that is common in literature today.  They were, however, 
strongly influenced by an economic philosophy of the rational actor prevalent at the time, 
and in this sense were in part a forerunner of the well known TCE theory that helps explain 
why commerce takes place in the first instance.     
TCE theory (Williamson, 1975, 1979) implicitly argues that conducting any exchange has 
inherent associated costs, and that these costs, known as ‘transaction costs’ are to be 
minimised (Zajac and Olsen, 1993).  Hence, one can view a current exchange relationship 
as one that is the result of previous cost economising efforts.  There is some contention as 
to whether this process of transaction cost economising is the result of a natural 
evolutionary5 process (the absence of an effective central logic, but the presence of a 
natural ecological-competitive process), or a deliberate goal-seeking analytical process (the 
application of effective logic over natural processes) (see Buckley and Chapman, 1997 for 
an in-depth discussion).  Notwithstanding the form of adaptation, there is no doubt that the 
presence of transaction costs are self-evident, and have to a large degree been measured 
with some certainty (Buckley and Chapman, 1997; Maher, 1997).  These costs have a 
notable impact on the form of the exchange relationship and its governance.  Hence, TCE 
deserves attention as one of the building blocks of this research.      
In particular, TCE focuses on price signals, costs and forms of exchange governance 
structures, and is an amalgam of organisational theory, economics and contract law 
(Bakkeland and Berthon, 1997; Dyer, 1997; Williamson, 1979).  TCE offers plausible 
explanations as to the organisational structures selected by managers and their ability to 
coordinate exchange.  However, TCE implies that the limited ability of managers to make 
rational decisions, ‘bounded rationality’ (Simon, 1979), plus their propensity to pursue 
actions that support self-interest by behaving opportunistically, all create an environment 
of uncertainty and complexity, such that the cost of transacting under these conditions 
involves additional risk and expense (Moschandreas, 1997).  These additional transaction 
                                                 
5
 A form of Darwinian ‘natural selection’. 
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costs can be incurred; ex ante to the exchange in such activities as negotiating, drafting 
contracts and implementing exchange structures; concurrent with the exchange relationship 
by absorbing maladaption costs incurred through conflict resolution, insurance bonding 
and ongoing monitoring; and ex post the exchange through renegotiation, exit and hold-out 
costs.  Hence, the theory attempts to propose different governance structures that minimise 
these transaction costs (Brown, Dev and Lee, 2000).  It posits that if the costs of an 
exchange are minimised through direct ownership control, then vertical integration will 
occur.  Conversely, if the costs are minimised through market based exchanges, then 
channel relationships will be preferred due to flexibility and efficiency reasons.  Indeed, 
the form of channel relationship governance is a critical outcome of the TCE theory, and 
can range from infrequent exchanges, to forms of contracting, through to models of 
ownership and hierarchical company structure (Arrighetti, Bachmann and Deakin, 1997; 
Maher, 1997).  It can be seen that the form of governance structure selected to minimise 
costs can dictate to a large degree the types of behaviours permissible within the 
relationship.  Specifically, TCE attempts to attenuate opportunism as a key behavioural 
concern in exchange relationships.      
2.5.1.1 Neo-Classical Supply Chain Behaviour within TCE    
The key supply chain behaviour in the TCE framework is that of opportunism, and it is 
assumed under the theory to be all pervasive.  Described by Williamson (1985) as 
behaving in a ‘self-seeking manner using guile’, or similarly, the ability to change or 
terminate the exchange relationship without the prior knowledge of the unfortunate partner.  
Moschandreas (1997 p. 41) contents that opportunism is the ‘sine qua non’ of transaction 
cost economics as it provides the rationale for; the internalisation of labour, the alleged 
superiority of hierarchies, limits the size of the firm, and is the reason for the wide spread 
adoption of the M-form structures6 due to their allocative advantages and ability to control 
for opportunism.  In essence, the justification for internal structures is derived exclusively 
                                                 
6
 M-form Structures are drawn from Oliver Williamson’s M-form hypothesis that posits that multidivisional structures 
have lead to improvements of resource allocation.  However, Hill’s (1985) critique shows that Williamson's theory is 
generally only valid as an explanation of the superior business efficiency due to a specific set of organizational 
characteristics (i.e. the M-form).  Hill notes that the theory fails to consider the impact of top executives who pursue 
goals other than neoclassical ones (i.e. relational), and thus the theory is an imperfect predictor of economic efficiency 
and competitive behaviour (Hill, 1985).  
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from their efficiency and assumed ability to assuage opportunistic tendencies 
(Moschandreas, 1997).     
However, while TCE is the theory that most openly attempts to control for opportunism, 
the construct is limited to acts of self-interest akin to self-seeking with guile or 
deceitfulness (Williamson, 1979, 1996).  Its insistence that actors behave opportunistically 
all the time is a narrow and pessimistic view derived from the economist theorist’s 
assumption of the ‘rational man’.  Indeed, even Williamson (1975) concedes that not all 
individuals behave opportunistically all of the time, rather some behave opportunistically 
some of the time.  Further, the TCE definition of opportunism is simply too narrow to 
accommodate all the other exchange motivations and behaviours (Brown et al., 2000; 
Moschandreas, 1997).  Given this, opportunism as a construct has not yet been fully 
explored in TCE, and this issue will be addressed further in chapter three where 
opportunism will be investigated in detail.    
Within the TCE framework, scant attention has been given to collaborative behaviours.  In 
fact, collaboration is not defined at all and is simply assumed to be limited to the 
mechanics of the basic exchange (Bakkeland and Berthon, 1997; Maher, 1997).  According 
to the rational economising mind, collaboration simply occurs because it is economic to do 
so (Joshi and Stump, 1999).  As such, any collaboration is more the result of the 
efficiencies of the monitoring and governance mechanisms rather than cooperation being 
the antecedent of more efficient transactions in the first instance.  In fact, Zajac and Olsen 
(1993) have argued that the question should not be how to minimise transaction costs, but 
rather how to maximise transaction vale through ex ante collaboration.  In this sense, there 
is scope for collaborative behaviours that reduce transaction costs (see Dyer, 1997, for 
empirical support), and these efforts have become more promising as the limitations of the 
original TCE framework become apparent (Buckley and Chapman, 1997; Joshi and Stump, 
1999; Madhok, 2002; Skjoett-Larsen, 2000).  Therefore, while TCE is extremely useful 
and has significant empirical support (Maher, 1997), it is only one part of the wider 
picture, and as such, this review now turns to Agency Theory for further enlightenment.        
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2.5.2 The Governance of Intermediatories and Agency Theory 
Agency theory is another economic based paradigm that is closely aligned to TCE.  The 
point of divergence is that while TCE focuses on market based and hierarchical forms of 
organisational structure to govern exchange relationships (Williamson, 1996), Agency 
Theory focuses on the types of incentives and contracts used to govern independent entities 
or agents (Axlerod, 1997; Eisenhardt, 1989; Lassar and Kerr, 1996; Zsidisin and Ellram, 
2003).  It seems that the development of Agency Theory in the literature has 
overwhelmingly been from an economic perspective (Prat and Rustichini, 2003), hence its 
classification in the Rational School.  Meanwhile, Shapiro (2005) laments the dearth of 
sociological theory development around what is fundamentally a humanistic activity 
between a principle and an agent.  It can be seen that many supply chain relationships take 
the form of the principal-agent arrangement (Ross, Anderson and Weitz, 1997), and hence 
this theory is extremely relevant to the study of exchange.  Again, this theory discusses 
market driven behaviours and also how to attenuate opportunism.     
Agency theory, or the principle-agent problem, broadens the risk sharing emphasis 
explored by economics in the 1960’s and early 1970’s (Axlerod, 1997; Carlos, 1992; Celly 
and Frazier, 1996; Eisenhardt, 1989; Williamson, 1993).  It is another economic theory that 
has been adapted in an attempt to conceptualise exchange relationships.  Whereas TCE 
problems use either market or hierarchies as a control mechanism, Agency Theory 
explicitly focuses on the forms of contract that are useful in providing agent motivation 
and controlling their opportunism.  The basic premise of Agency Theory is that a principle 
or contractor establishes a contract with an independent party or an agent (the contract 
metaphor).  The theorem is concerned with two major problems with this type of 
contractual relationship.  Firstly, adverse selection where the agent presents themselves as 
having certain capabilities, credentials or resources when they in reality do not.  Secondly, 
moral hazard problems where the agent may behave opportunistically (self-interestedly) 
during the course of the contract (Logan, 2000; Zsidisin and Smith, 2005).  Moral hazard 
and adverse selection problems arise in Agency relationships due to goal divergence 
between the two parties, and also the asymmetry of information and relationship 
commitment (Ross et al., 1997).  The theory puts forward two types of contract incentives 
or contractual governance mechanisms to counter agency problems.  The first is outcome 
Chapter Two – Literature Review 
 
23 
based contracts where goal divergence and information asymmetry is low, and the focus of 
the principle is on the end results not the actual behaviours of the agent used in achieving 
these results.  The second is behaviour based contracts (Eisenhardt, 1989; Lassar and Kerr, 
1996) where the principle is primarily concerned with agent opportunism, and instigates 
monitoring and information gathering mechanisms to ensure that the agent follows the 
desired behaviours (as stipulated) to achieve the principal’s goals.  The costs of these 
monitoring mechanisms can be high, and similar to TCE, Agency theory is concerned with 
selecting the most efficient incentives that minimise these transaction costs (Zsidisin and 
Ellram, 2003).  An overview of the theory has been provided by Eisenhardt (1989) as 
follows. 
Table 2-1 An overview of the assumptions of Agency theory 
Key idea • Principle-agent relationships should reflect efficient organisation of 
information and risk-bearing costs. 
 
Unit of analysis • Contract between principal and agent (independent actors) 
 
Human assumption • Self-interest 
• Bounded rationality 
• Risk aversion 
 
Organisational assumptions • Partial goal conflict among participants 
• Efficiency as the effective criterion 
• Information asymmetry between principal and agent 
 
Information assumption • Information as a purchasable commodity 
 
Contracting problems • Agency (moral hazard and adverse selection) 
• Risk sharing 
 
Problem domain • Relationships in which the principal and the agent have partly 
differing goals and risk preferences (e.g. compensation, regulation, 
leadership, impression, management, whistle-blowing, vertical 
integration, transfer pricing). 
Source: Eisenhardt, (1989, p. 59) 
 
It can be seen that under Agency theory, supply chain behaviours become much more of an 
issue than under the previous TCE concept, yet the behaviour is still assumed to be 
rationally and opportunistically based.  The next section will examine the behavioural 
outcomes of a supply chain operating under the Agency theory paradigm.  
Chapter Two – Literature Review 
 
24 
2.5.2.1 Supply Chain Behaviours under Agency Theory 
Outcome based contracts are founded on trust and commitment issues where the agent is 
trusted to produce the desired results, and the behaviours required are not directly 
stipulated.  Conversely, behaviour based contracts require the behaviours to be clearly 
prescribed in detail by the principal (usually in the contract) and are used to control agent 
opportunism (Ross et al., 1997; Zsidisin and Ellram, 2003).  Again as with TCE, the main 
focus is on opportunistic behaviours.  While the literature on the theory has made some 
attempt to define opportunistic behaviours, the results are not comprehensive as they focus 
purely on agent opportunism with definitions such as ‘self-seeking with guile’ that are 
predictably similar to TCE.  Typically, Agency literature does not specify the types and 
forms of agent opportunism (see Griesinger, 1990 as an exception). In addition, 
collaborative behaviours are not specifically addressed in Agency theory at all, except that 
information sharing is implied as reducing both risk and opportunism (Lassar and Kerr, 
1996), and also that exchange risk can be better reduced through improved communication 
and open processes (Zsidisin and Smith, 2005).  Interestingly, while the theory focuses on 
the opportunistic actions of the agent, some authors argue for an analysis of principle 
opportunism as an extension to the theory (Carr and Brower, 2000; Logan, 2000).  Clearly, 
poor behaviour is not limited solely to the agent, or restricted to only one side of the dyad.  
Agency theory can provide significant insights into the economic basis for the formation 
and control of channel relationships.  This is due to the theory’s clear delineation of the 
risks, incentives and costs amongst the interdependent parties to a contract.  Further, it is 
able to identify areas of key divergent interest, and it provides a means through which 
those interests can become aligned.  Nevertheless, some authors (Barney and Ouchi, 1986; 
Donaldson and Barney, 1990; Shapiro, 2005) reject the notion that all actors are self-
interested utility maximisers. In many organisational settings actors may very well be 
other-centred for a variety of reasons.  They also fault classic Agency theory on its 
inattention to normative cooperative and social aspects of interorganisational relationships.  
Acknowledging these drawbacks, the next theory in this school provides an alternative 
explanation as to how cooperation can evolve within economically competitive systems.          
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2.5.3 Cooperation and Competition – Contributions from Game Theory 
The last theory classified within the Rational school is Game theory.  This theory has been 
included as it makes similar behavioural assumptions as TCE and Agency theory in that 
actors will behave in a rational, self-seeking utility maximising way, whilst other variables 
are also held as a constant.  It takes a classic reductionist approach to exchange behaviours.  
Hence, it is highly amenable to mathematically conceptualisation and analysis to determine 
the optimal payoff under different game conditions (see the seminal work of Luce and 
Raiffa, 1957).  Where it differs to the other two theories is that Game theory explicitly 
demonstrates that, as well as opportunistic behaviours, cooperation can also be a source of 
higher payoffs (Prat and Rustichini, 2003).  In addition, it shows that behaving 
opportunistically all the time (as assumed by TCE and Agency theory) can also produce 
suboptimal returns.  Game theory has been used widely in such applications as business 
strategy (Camerer, 2003; Dixit and Skeath, 1999; Watson, 2002), negotiations and 
bargaining theory (Muthoo, 1999; Shelton, 1997), evolutionary concepts and processes 
(Smith, 1982; Vega-Redondo, 1996), economics (Gibbons, 1992; Stähler, 1998), dynamic 
systems (Gintis, 2000) and refreshingly, sociological and biological sciences (Colman, 
1995).  Game theory has also been popularised for business readers in a book titled Co-
opetition (Nalebuff and Brandenburger, 1996) whose title plays on the twin paradoxical 
themes of cooperation and competition.  Concerning channel relationships, there have been 
several applications of Game theory to strategic alliance relationships (Parkhe, 1993; 
Serapio and Cascio, 1996) and supply chain relationships (Donaldson, 1996; Hill, 1990; 
Palmer, 2002).             
Game theory, originally a branch of mathematics7, is a study of conflict of interest between 
individuals and organisations.  Referred to as a ‘game’, each individual (the player or 
actor) has more than one course of action (the strategy) available, and the outcome (the 
payoff) of the game depends on the interactions and strategies pursued by all the players 
(Shelton, 1997).  Games come in different forms, but the most well known game is the 
prisoner’s dilemma (Axlerod, 1990; Luce and Raiffa, 1957).  In this game two players are 
accused of a major crime (yes they are guilty), are imprisoned and held incommunicado.  
                                                 
7
 The Hungarian born John von Neumann is generally credited as being the father of Game theory, and along with Oskar 
Morgenstern published the influential treatise Theory of Games and Economic Behavior in 1944.  
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The dilemma is that each must decide weather to cooperate with the authorities or not, 
without knowing what the other co-accused will do.  However, the authorities only have 
enough evidence to secure a minor conviction without a full confession from one of the 
accused.  Thus, if both players stay quiet then both will draw a light sentence (mutual 
cooperation - MC).  If one confesses, then they will go free (unilateral defection – UD), 
while the other non-confessor will receive a severe sentence (sucker’s payoff - SP).  If both 
confess, then both will draw a moderate sentence (mutual defection - MD).  The possible 
payoffs for Player A are shown in the following figure (Figure 2-2). 
Figure 2-2 Player A’s Possible Payoffs in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game 
   Player B 
  
Cooperation Defection 
Cooperation 
 
MC = 3 
Reward for mutual 
cooperation 
 
 
SP = 0 
Sucker’s payoff 
 Player A 
Primary 
Perspective 
Defection 
 
UD = 5 
Reward for unilateral 
defection 
 
MD = 1 
Punishment for 
mutual defection 
              Source: Adapted from (Palmer, 2002, p. 23) 
 
The dilemma is that no matter what the other players does, the selfish choice will yield a 
higher payoff than cooperation, yet if the same logic is applied by the other player and both 
defect, then they both would be worse off, hence the motivation to cooperate increases.  Of 
course this basic model assumes that the two players will never meet again (a one-shot 
game).  However, this is not necessarily the case for supply chain relationships where 
many exchanges involve a history of transactions (even if not directly between the two 
players, then by reputation), and an expectation that further transactions (known as an 
iterative game) will occur in the future (Palmer, 2002).  In this iterative game then, both 
parties would calculate the likely returns if they extended acts of cooperation as opposed to 
defection over the long-term, and this form of game is examined next.   
Game theory is played with the assumption that all the players (single individuals or 
organisations ) are rational, intelligent, and have perfect recall of earlier moves, such that it 
forms the ‘common knowledge’ of the extensive form of the game (Hausman and 
Values: 
5 = Being set free 
3 = Light sentence 
1 = Moderate sentence 
0 = Heavy sentence 
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McPherson, 1996).  Game theorists usually take rationality as expecting to maximise one’s 
utility, and for most economists cooperation must be understood instrumentally.  Hence, 
they use Game theory to model the interactions among the participants whose interests 
partly conflict and partly converge.  Accordingly, both cooperative and opportunistic 
behaviours can in effect be supported by rational behaviour premised on essentially the 
self-interest of the actors.  In Game theory terminology, cooperation can be sustained only 
as a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (Lyons and Mehta, 1997), yet, iterative games can 
produce non-Nash equilibrium results (Axlerod, 1997).  Hence, economic actors only look 
for the payoffs at the end of the game tree, and are not particularly concerned at how they 
get there.  As such, cooperation can only be understood to the extent that the actors expect 
such behaviour to yield a higher return either presently or in the future.     
As seen for the above, the structure of game theoretic interactions resembling a prisoner’s 
dilemma need not prevent self-interested rational actors from cooperating if the 
interactions are repeated.  Indeed, Game theory and its decision strategies show quite 
clearly that cooperation can emerge within a competitive environment (Axlerod, 1990; 
Dixit and Skeath, 1999; Guth, 1999).      
2.5.3.1 Exchange Behaviour and Game Theory 
The incentive to behave opportunistically is a powerful force if the perceived payoffs 
reward such behaviour.  The contribution of Game theory is that it shows in a probabilistic 
and mechanistic fashion that such behaviour does not always produce the expected 
payoffs.  Hence, the theory also examines cooperation and how this behaviour improves 
the quasi rents for all if cooperation is extended over a longer time horizon.  
When two actors play a one-shot game or are destined never to meet again, then the 
expected reaction of the two players is to defect or act opportunistically, despite the 
knowledge that if they cooperate both could achieve higher returns (Palmer, 2002).  This is 
a situation that could be encountered in lower forms of relationships where exchange is 
intermittent and short-term in focus (Robicheaux and El-Ansary, 1975).  However, where 
there is an expectation that the two actors would continue playing an iterative game, then 
the game strategies clearly demonstrate that cooperation will produce higher payoffs over 
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the long term (Axlerod, 1997; Camerer, 2003).  Thus, it can be surmised that defection and 
opportunistic behaviours would generally predominate in lower levels of supply chain 
relationships, whereas cooperation would be prevalent in higher order, longer-term 
relationships.       
Axlerod’s (1990; 1997) iterative game tournament produced many different strategies with 
varying effectiveness.  However, what consistently came through were those player’s 
strategies that achieved the greatest payoffs (including the tit-for-tat strategy) possessed the 
properties of never behaving opportunistically first.  Conversely, those that had the lowest 
payoffs were those strategies where one player tried to exploit the other via opportunism 
(Hill, 1990).  The conclusion is that opportunism, if used in a peremptory manner to 
exploit a situation, will be punished or sanctioned by the other player, primarily as it 
depresses returns for all.  Axelrod (1990) further noted that even poorly scoring rules could 
be improved if the other player forgave the action in an attempt to re-establish cooperation.  
Hence, there are strong normative natural sanctions against behaving opportunistically.  
For one, the returns are diminished (Donaldson, 1996), reputations will be irreparably 
damaged (Shelton, 1997), or the actor may be ostracised by the community of players and 
eventually disappear (Hill, 1990).  Game theory also shows that there are strong incentives 
for behaving cooperatively, if one can trust the other player to reciprocate.  
Further, it should be noted that not all Game theory problems have the same structure as 
the prisoner’s dilemma.  Hausman and McPherson, (1996) suggest that at times social 
cooperation can simply be a matter of pure coordination, and uses the example of deciding 
on which side of the road to drive.  It seems that it does not matter which side of the road 
one drives on, but it matters a great deal that everyone drives on either the right or the left.  
In a similar manner, supply chain exchanges can at times resemble, not complex games, 
but simple coordinative issues where the payoffs are obvious to both players and the 
solution is self-evident and self-enforcing, hence the imperative for the emergence of 
cooperative behaviours for communal or citizen reasons.     
The three theories noted above all contribute in some manner to the Rational school of 
supply chain behaviour thought.  The nature of the school’s contributions will be 
summarised in the next section.   
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2.5.4 Contributions of the Rational School Theories 
The literature on the three theories of the Rational school has been reasonably consistent.  
In some cases there has been support for the combining of two or more of these theories as 
an extension of rational thought.  For example, the two economic theories of TCE and 
Agency theory have been combined into a new theory called organisational economics 
first proposed by Barney and Ouchi (1986).  Given this previous synthesising, the 
following attempts to drawn out in clear statements the main contributions of the Rational 
school as concerned with supply chain behaviour and relationships. 
As such, the Rational school…      
1. Is philosophically positioned on the economic and rational side of the exchange 
continuum. 
2. Provides the pecuniary imperative for the existence of exchange relationships in the 
first instance. 
3. Defines the human actor as rational, intelligent and in possession of full information, 
hence any decision or strategy applied attempts to maximise one’s own utility in the 
exchange.  
4. Are mathematically tractable due to reductionist and linearity assumptions that allow 
complex equations that analyse the efficiency equilibrium, particularly the 
measurement of exchange transaction costs.  
5. Emphasizes the relentless use of economic logic to address all decisions. 
6. Provides theoretical explanations for the different exchange structures seen in 
organisations such as vertical integration and outsourcing arrangements. 
7. Provides different theoretical explanations for alternative incentive structures for 
contractual relationships used to control or modify exchange behaviour.    
8. Acknowledges the threat of opportunistic behaviour, yet fails to explore in depth its 
impact on exchange relationships. 
9. Proves that cooperation can emerge even under rational thought, but generally only 
for economic reasons. 
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One of the major contributions to this research of the Rational school is the 
conceptualisation of opportunistic behaviour, and how the school provides several 
alternatives for its mitigation and management.  However, the Rational school of thought is 
not without its critics. 
2.5.5 Critique of the Rational School Theories 
This critique of the Rational school of thought will deal with the main issues in the 
theoretical application of the school to supply chain management issues, it is beyond the 
scope of this research to critique in detail the technical and conceptual problems inherent in 
each of the three theories.       
Firstly, one of the major problems of school is that almost any decision context has been 
completely rationalised through the application of suitably specified transaction costs or 
possible payoffs.  Here, all other considerations are deliberately subordinated to the 
predominant issue of costs or payoffs.  Therefore, it seems that the decision context is 
overly simplified, and ignores any ‘system’ effects or unexpected perturbations of the 
decisions made (Senge, 1990).   
In a similar manner, this over simplification leads to another problem, in that the school’s 
heuristic models of matching governance structures with the commercial transaction is 
unable to account for behavioural issues such as trust and it’s role in governing 
relationships (Maher, 1997).  It seems that while the school’s relentless logic does provide 
ways of explaining transactions, this rationality smoothes over or ignores the socialisation 
or relational interaction that occurs in many of the intermediate exchange structures.  These 
relationships are situated between the school’s two extremes of internalising transactions 
versus pure market transactions.  Thus, the school can be said to under-socialise the 
exchange (Boyce, 2001).  Yet this should be of no surprise as both TCE and Agency theory 
have contract and property as their organisational building blocks (Helper, MacDuffie and 
Sabel, 2000).  These issues subsequently constrain their theoretical usefulness, especially 
when conceptualising social and behavioural aspects.  It appears that even while 
propounding the benefits of hierarchical governance, Williamson (1975; 1979) was unable 
to capture aspects of the exchange and ongoing relationship that go beyond hierarchical 
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control.  Indeed, this is a critical problem with the whole school even despite the 
cooperative contributions of Game theory.   
Also Williamson’s (1975) framework “…has a static, equilibrating character that focuses 
on the internal transacting efficiency of each institutional arrangement” (Boyce, 2001, p. 
6), and as such does not attempt to explain any dynamics of institutional or relational 
change.  Rather, it only offers a snap-shot of exchange forces moving to some equilibrium.  
There is little in the way of explanation for any subsequent shifts in existing social 
arrangements.  It would appear that the school’s explanatory framework is also silent on 
the scale of the decisions to be taken, and when they should be taken.  At what level of 
decision making should the economics of the transaction costs be calculated – small or 
large investments or potential losses?  Do actors functioning under the school’s 
assumptions make discrete or continuous calculations of the costs of ongoing relationships, 
and at what point should a change of form or relationship occur?  Clearly, the Rational 
school provides a powerful explanatory framework for determining what form or 
governance should be implemented with new investments and relationships, but what 
about exploring the efficiency of existing exchange relationships?  What happens to an 
existing relationship when the sums are added and the transaction costs exceed some 
threshold?  Indeed, the school is completely silent on this point, and the silence is 
revealing.     
Further, how are the costs calculated of many of the hybrid-intermediate forms of 
exchange governance8 that incorporate many economic as well as relational factors?  What 
degree of asset specificity, frequency or bargaining scope will induce a change from 
market mediation to internalised exchange?  These questions address the dilemmas facing 
organisations attempting to operate under the static Rational school paradigm, and thus 
expose its limitations when viewed from both a relational and dynamic perspective.   
Importantly, the economic assumptions of linearity and rationality are still assumed as 
being explicit within the school’s framework, even though TCE addresses uncertainty by 
suggesting that actors are afflicted with bounded rationality (Chaserant, 2003).  Yet, while 
                                                 
8
 For example, collaborative initiatives that are not pure market exchanges nor are they forms of integrated ownership 
such as; new product development efforts (NPD), Efficient Consumer Response (ECR), or Just-in-Time (JIT) 
initiatives (Stock and Lambert, 2001). 
Chapter Two – Literature Review 
 
32 
attempting to make decisions with restricted information and analytical capacity, the actors 
are still assumed to make purely rational and economic decisions, albeit bounded by their 
constraints.  The school assumes that these decisions are based on an assessment of 
potential transaction costs, and game payoffs.  More subtle advantages derived through 
relational exchange and the development of mutual trust leading to closer cooperation 
tends to be unquantifiable, and therefore excluded from the calculations of payoff under 
this framework.  The longer-term relational benefits of mutual growth, trust and 
commitment, social exchange leading to joint learning, investing and sharing of 
complimentary investments, and other non-pecuniary benefits are difficult to place within 
this economic, rational, static and non-dynamic framework.    
Similarly, the analysis within Agency theory focuses on the type of contract that is crafted 
to control the exploitation of asymmetric information and agent opportunism.  Hence, the 
form and content of the contract becomes the unit of analysis.  However, this offers a 
rather sparse view of economic action, and has been criticised as being ‘austere’ and 
‘under-socialised’ by ignoring the context and interaction of the exchange actors with their 
environment (Boyce, 2001).  Its behavioural assumptions are open to interpretation, as 
literature demonstrates that some cultures and organisations are more open to cooperation 
than others (Shung, 1985), and this tends to reduce the reliance on information for 
monitoring and control.  Further, the rigid ex-ante assumption of self-seeking behaviour 
and a propensity for opportunism by the agent as espoused by economic theorists, has also 
been brought into question by the development of ex-post mutual trust and cooperation that 
evolves from the original control mechanisms established to control the exchange in the 
first place (Morgan and Hunt, 1994).  For example, Boyce (2001) cites a historical case 
study of agency agreements and cooperative arrangements between ship-owners and 
shipping agents from the period 1870-1939 that rely heavily on a culture of trust, and are 
difficult to explain given the premises of the school.  Literature shows that over time 
common values and socialising norms reduce the effect of imperfect information, and may 
give rise to more cooperative governance mechanisms (Burchell and Wilkinson, 1997).  
Thus, the focus on the contract as a controlling tool should be reduced, and formal contract 
arrangements should evolve and develop additive cooperative elements as the relationship 
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becomes more prominent and less formalised.  As an explanatory tool for this aspect, again 
the school is relatively silent.   
The explanation that actors will axiomatically behave opportunistically unless controlled or 
threatened with penalties is based on the assumption of a zero-sum game (i.e. that the 
outcomes are based only on a win–lose scenario).  Vermillion, Lassar and Windsor, (2002) 
have suggested that the total value generated by an exchange under Agency theory will 
remain constant, and that the two economically minded actors (the principle and the agent) 
will come into tension as they attempt to acquire their portion of the value, or even conflict 
if they attempt to acquire a portion of the other’s value.  Under Agency theory, if one 
wishes to increase their total value, they can do so only at the expense of the exchange 
partner.  Thus, the assumption of a zero-sum game is inherent in this school, pointing to 
another of its major limitations, as generating additional value through mutual 
collaboration is not specifically addressed.  Further, Vermillion et al., (2002) states that 
“Agency theory is incapable of accommodating or explaining any form of cooperation or 
collaboration between the principle and agent toward a mutually enriching outcome” (p. 
273).  This proposition is at variance with relational exchange literature that suggests that 
long-term marketing relationships are based on a ‘win-win’ approach by both parties to the 
exchange (Axlerod, 1997; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Gundlach, Achrol and Mentzer, 1995).  
As a result, the theory is conceptually limited when dealing with collaborative behaviours, 
and in essence, provides no insights into any form of relational or dynamic benefits for 
change.  
Next, the concept of control or governance in the school is also unidirectional.  The 
theories posit that ‘function of control’ usually resides with the organisation or principle, 
which in channel literature, tends to be the contracting party further up the stream of the 
supply chain such as the buyer or manufacturer (Vermillion et al., 2002).  With such an 
outlook, the school provides insights into how to structure the governance, and control the 
costs, of a contract or agreement proffered by the principle and accepted by the agent.  This 
is essentially a one-way autocratic dyadic relationship, and the principle’s primary concern 
is to monitor and control the opportunism of the other party.  What is surprising is that the 
school is relatively quiet on the form and nature of principle opportunism (Logan, 2000) 
which tends to be present in many buyer-seller situations,  Further, its unidirectional 
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governance orientation has difficulty dealing with bidirectional exchanges and feedback 
episodes such as is required for cooperation.  Thus, the school assumes that the locus of 
power resides with the focal organisation or principle, usually an upstream member of the 
supply chain.  However, this is not always the case as the power can sometimes reside with 
the agent (Morgan and Hunt, 1994), or those downstream members of the supply chain 
closest to the customers (Holden and O'Toole, 2004; Kent and Mentzer, 2003).  There is a 
noticeable shift in terms of power toward the retail end of the supply chain (Clarke, 2000b; 
Hollingsworth, 2004)  Therefore due to its unidirectional nature, the school cannot offer 
much in the way of controlling dynamically evolving supply chain relationships where 
bidirectional information flows, feelings, norms, resource allocation, misunderstandings, 
conflicts, and investments occur on a regular basis.  What is needed is a more dynamically 
based explanation for opportunism, control, and the rise and fall of supply chain 
relationships as they develop over time.  Eisenhardt (1989) notes for Agency theory that it 
only presents a partial view, and although it has much validity, it also ignores a good deal 
of the complexity of organisations and relationships.  Thus, the addition of sociological 
and dynamical components would do much to correct the limitations of this economic 
theory.            
Concerning Game theory, Hausman and McPherson, (1996) note that “…if controversy 
simmers in the theory of rational choice in circumstances of uncertainty, it boils in game 
theory” (p. 188).  The same criticisms that have been levelled at TCE and Agency theory 
can also be applied to Game theory.  Again, the theory assumes away most of the dynamic 
variables and problems, as this then leaves only the quantifiable variables that are 
amenable to mathematical formalisation.  Even so, Game theory is a mathematical science 
that is used to explain human decisions and behaviours, and as such was one of the first 
theories to attempt such a feat (Luce and Raiffa, 1957).  Yet, it is clear that it suffers in 
terms of contextual richness and depth due to terminal reductionism.   
Perhaps the greatest criticisms of the Rational school’s practicability are aimed at its core 
assumptions of the rationally minded actor with full and perfect information who only 
seeks self-interested utility at any cost.  Clearly, these assumptions do not stand even a 
cursory examination and have been criticised in depth by many social scientists (Brian, 
1994; Tversky and Kahneman, 1986).  These criticisms do not require further in-depth 
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analysis, as it should be obvious that not every actor behaves in a purely rational way 
(Quinones, Hayes and Hayes, 2000), nor has full and perfect information all of the time 
(Heribert and Silke, 2002), and not everyone acts in a purely selfish manner (Phelps, 1999; 
Simon, 1993).  Hence, the Rational school’s assumptions are economically extreme, and 
do not provide a full and valid explanation of supply chain behaviour and dynamic 
evolution.  As a result, not one of these theories should be expected to be a panacea, yet 
their contributions are important in understanding the cumulative theoretical foundations 
on which supply chain relationships stand.       
Finally, while the economic paradigms provide a useful insight into the nature and forms 
of exchange relationships, they are tempered by their assumptions of linearity, rationality 
and market driven sentiments.  The Rational school, in the final analysis, demonstrates the 
strict self-seeking foundation to exchange relationships (Lyons and Mehta, 1997).  Yet this 
selfish motivation need not be the only mechanism at work.  Rather, it can be viewed as 
one part of a larger equation.  Henceforth, this review will next deal with the more social 
and behavioural theories that will provide a broader view of exchange relationships and 
movement.  In particular, behavioural theories introduce the concept of collaboration and 
relational norms as being valuable, and are offered as an alternative means of exchange 
governance.  These theories are reviewed in the next section.  
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2.6 The Relational School – Behavioural Paradigms 
Competitive forces are compelling firms to look for more innovative and flexible means of 
meeting the competition.  In response, many firms are turning to relational marketing 
concepts seeking to build collaborative relationships with key suppliers and customers in 
their supply chain (Doney and Cannon, 1997; Foster and Cadogan, 2000).  For this school, 
while rent appropriation issues are still of concern, relational exchange shifts away from 
economic rationality towards a position emphasising social phenomenon such as 
behavioural and relational interactions between organisations and individuals.  The first 
theory to be discussed in the Relational school is Resource Dependence theory, also known 
as the Resource Based View (RBV)9 of the firm.  This theory provides the basis for 
viewing collaborative exchange behaviour as being a valuable resource in its own right, 
and also as a means of accruing non-proprietary resources through collaborative rather than 
competitive actions.  Secondly, Relational Exchange theory (RET) defines exchange 
relationships as different forms of governance mechanisms, and this theory provides the 
sociological insights missing from the Rational school.  RET defines various levels of 
relationships, and it also provides a basis for measuring relational movement over time.  
Finally, the Political and Economic Paradigm (PEP) situates the exchange relationship 
within the wider firm and market environmental contexts.  Hence, for the Relational school 
no longer are issues addressed in purely efficiency terms, rather behavioural aspects take 
precedence (Knoppen and Christiaanse, 2004).   
2.6.1 Relationship Power and Resource Dependence Theory 
During the 1960’s and 1970’s the dominant theoretical frameworks in organisational 
theory were drawn from sociology and social psychology that relied heavily on the concept 
of power (Barney and Ouchi, 1986).  In particular, the RBV is predicated on this power 
perspective (Clark, 1996).  This theory argues that the need to acquire resources creates 
dependencies (assumed to be an unfavourable position) between organisations, and the 
degree of dependence is governed by the degree of scarceness or uniqueness of the subject 
resource (Barney, 1991; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Rumelt, 1984).  
Further, the underlying theoretical approach of the RBV sees the organisation not in terms 
                                                 
9
 The term Resourced Based View or (RBV) will be used for the rest of this thesis. 
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of its position within the industry structural mix [as conceptualised in Porter’s diamond 
(1980)], but rather it views the firm as a unique bundle of tangible and intangible assets 
(Barney, 2002; Wernerfelt, 1984).  The value the RBV is that it focuses the analysis on the 
internal resources of the firm, and how these resources are acquired and developed over 
time.  It suggests that each firm’s history of resource acquisition will always be different, 
thus the pattern of accumulated resources will make each firm unique, and offer distinctive 
opportunities and constraints for management (Barney, 1991; Rumelt, 1984; Wernerfelt, 
1984).  These idiosyncratic resources can be both tangible and intangible in nature and to a 
large degree dictate the firm’s current and potential capabilities.  This then constrains the 
range of strategic options open to the firm, otherwise known as ‘path dependence’ 
(Wernerfelt, 1984).  While the RBV looks internally for critical resources, the theory also 
recognises that important resources may lie beyond the boundaries of the firm (Dyer and 
Singh, 1998), and that access to these resources require different forms of inter-firm 
relationships involving degrees of collaboration.  The underlying assumptions of the theory 
are that resources are both heterogeneously distributed among competitors, and are not 
perfectly mobile (Dess, Gupta, Hennart and Hill, 1995).  Thus, the RBV also implicitly 
posits that intangible resources such as inter-organisational collaboration can be viewed as 
valuable and a source of competitive advantage.  Yet the quantification of such 
intangibilities creates some measurement difficulties within the theory (Day and Wensley, 
1988).     
From the theory’s two basic hypotheses concerning global competition (i.e. path 
dependence, and intangible assets as a source of sustainable competitive advantage), 
complex social phenomena such as collaboration within inter-organisational channel 
relationships can be held as a central concept and a viable management strategy (Collis, 
1991; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).  Therefore, by extension the RBV posits that 
“…idiosyncratic inter-firm linkages may be a source of relational rents”10 (Dyer and 
Singh, 1998, p. 661).  This thinking is diametrically opposed to the Rational school’s 
economic price signal viewpoint with its assumptions of rationality.  The contributions of 
                                                 
10
 As noted by Dyer and Singh (1998), the term relational rents is used, although technically speaking trading partners 
generate quasi-rents that denote the concept of the returns being non-permanent in nature.  Relational rents refer to 
additional profits that are jointly generated by the exchange relationship, and cannot be generated individually.  The 
author sees the benefit of using a term that links intangible relationship benefits with actual economic returns, and will 
use the phrase relational rents in this context for the rest of this research. 
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the RBV are that it firstly, recognises intangible resources, secondly, that such resources 
can be supply chain relationships that add value to a firm (relational rents), and lastly, that 
these relationships and behaviours would necessarily be collaborative in nature. 
2.6.1.1 Resource Acquisition and Supply Chain Behaviour 
First and foremost, it should be noted that the “…resource dependence perspective is 
rooted in sociology” (Ulrich and Barney, 1984, p. 472).  It follows then that supply chain 
behaviours under this paradigm will also been seen in this light.  
At its base level, the RBV suggests that organisations can reduce their uncertainty levels 
by engaging in coalition activities with suppliers such as forming social links with 
influential suppliers to embed partners (Ulrich and Barney, 1984).  The motive for such 
collaborative initiatives is ‘resource dependence’ that is outworked in a twofold manner; 
firstly to acquire control over resources to minimise one’s dependence on others, and 
secondly, to acquire resources so that others must depend on one’s own firm (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978).  Therefore, the motivation for collaboration is the acquisition of power or 
seeking a position of dominance in the supply chain.  Hence, RBV theorists characterise 
inter-organisational links as a set of power/dependent relations based on the exchange of 
resources.  Consequently, collaboration is underpinned by this somewhat dark incentive, 
yet the motivation for collaboration under this paradigm is no different than what is seen in 
the Rational school.  Namely, that collaboration and opportunism are both actions that seek 
the appropriation of quasi-rents (as opposed to relational rents) for survival and self gain.  
This definition it is argued, comes the closest to explaining realised supply chain behaviour 
particularly collaboration, as experienced by business.      
Concerning behavioural governance, the theory posits that these links or transactions can 
be governed by three different mechanisms, namely; ‘market’, ‘bureaucracy’ and ‘clans’ 
(Ouchi, 1980; Ulrich and Barney, 1984).  The first two (markets and bureaucracy) are 
adaptations from TCE and have already been covered in the Rational school.  What is of 
interest for this school is the description of ‘clans’ and how they are used to control 
behaviour in an exchange.  Clans, as originally defined by Ouchi (1980) who borrowed 
from anthropology, have their strength in behaviours that minimise goal incongruence and 
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at the same time are able to tolerate high levels of uncertainty.  Clans are able to reduce the 
differences between individual members and organisational goals, thus providing common 
communal ground on which normative behaviours and actions are formed.  As such 
opportunistic behaviours are not socially acceptable, yet beyond that clans do not require 
explicit performance evaluation.  In fact, other forms of control are seen as intrusions and 
are rejected (Mayrhofer, 1998).  For example, the conflict arising from the imposition of a 
formal contract document over the top of a long-term informal exchange relationship that 
so far has been functioning well.  Indeed, due to the close and social nature of the 
relationships built within a clan, the norm of reciprocity becomes a basic social mechanism 
and is predicated on a give-and-take pattern.  Thus, any predilection towards opportunism 
will be rejected from the exchange network.  When viewed in this light ‘clan behaviour’ 
can be seen as a euphemism for relational socialisation and collaborative behaviour, and 
this behaviour is used to moderate the exchange relationship as a governing mechanism.  
This point has important ramifications when interpreting the results of this research.  
The RBV provides this research with the idea that collaborative inter-organisational 
linkages (such as clans) have a value, and that they can be used to achieve joint goals for 
mutual benefit.  However, the RBV is still incomplete in the context of defining exchange 
relationships, and determining the behaviours that are viewed as valuable.  Next, this 
review will turn to Relational Exchange theory.            
2.6.2 Behavioural Control Mechanisms and Relational Exchange Theory 
Relational Exchange theory (RET) seeks to investigate the levels and types of relationships 
that govern and operate in marketing channels.  As opposed to the Rational school theories, 
RET broadens the concept of governance by including relational behaviours and norms, 
and their influence on the governance mechanisms employed (Bakkeland and Berthon, 
1997; Berthon, Pitt, Ewing and Bakkeland, 2003; Gundlach et al., 1995; Heide and John, 
1992).  The theory moves away from market/structure design, to consider governance 
mechanisms ranging from discrete to relational, and thus tends to capture more information 
about the dimensions of the relationship (Peterson and Wysocki, 1998; Webster, 1992).  
RET emphasises the interdependencies, interactions and reciprocities of the buyer-seller 
relationships.  It widens the market domestication perspective by extending the viewpoint 
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to all exchanges between an organisation and its environment (Bechtel and Jayaram, 1997).  
Achrol (1997) argues that relationship mechanisms can be defined by their “…density, 
multiplexity and reciprocity of ties and a shared value system defining membership roles 
and responsibilities” (p. 59).  This definition is remarkable similar to Ouchi’s (1980) 
version of ‘clans’.  Hence, this approach focuses on the long-term relationship (Ganesan, 
1994) in which each transaction is embedded in the context of wider relational exchange, 
and thus extends and synthesizes the economic and behavioural foci of previous theoretical 
paradigms. 
Relational exchange theory investigates the nature of the relationship type and the structure 
of the exchange (MacNeil, 1980b; Webster, 1992).  It introduces concepts of long-term 
coalitions and partner selection focusing on such important criteria as the degree of 
interdependence, complementarity and structural fit.  Thus, combining previous work on 
structure, such as the RBV, and relationships (Batt and Purchase, 2004).  The theory 
suggests that ongoing relationships with a partner (i.e. a supplier) should focus not only on 
their current performance, but also on long-term issues such as their capability for 
development in terms of physical resources, knowledge, experience and skills.  It provides 
a framework where it recognises that “…organisations more-or-less explicitly form 
networks of long-term cooperation, partly as a result of their own initiatives and partly as a 
result of outside pressure” (Arndt, 1979, p. 74).  This theory suggests that channel 
relationships can be structured into types and typologies (Knemeyer, Corsi and Murphy, 
2003; Lambert et al., 1996), that they operate in a complex environment (Dooley and Van 
de Ven, 1999; Ritter, Wilkinson and Johnston, 2004), that they evolve over time (Hoyt and 
Huq, 2000), and finally, that they have behavioural elements of a collaborative as well as 
an opportunistic nature (Arino, de la Torre and Ring, 2001).  All these aspects are of 
importance to this research, and will be discussed when the dynamic evolution of exchange 
relationships is reviewed.     
2.6.2.1 Behaviour and Relational Exchange Theory 
This theory argues that relational norms are used to promote collaboration and proscribe 
opportunism.  The unique feature of social and relational norms as a governance 
mechanism is that, unlike market and hierarchies, they are an endogenous method of 
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control (Joshi and Stump, 1999).  As such, supply chain behaviours under this paradigm 
are moderated not through direct incentives (control through markets), nor through direct 
ownership (control through bureaucracy), but by internalisation of norms and moral control 
(Larson, 1992).  Gundlach et al., (1995) argues that behaviours between the exchange 
partners are controlled by both mutual and self-regulatory means.  This contention is 
supported by empirical results as described by Joshi and Stump (1999) who found that 
relational norms did in fact increase relational commitment, and decrease the instance of 
opportunism in exchange dyads.  These results were obtained by using specifically worded 
process explanations for different behavioural scenarios, and it demonstrates the difficulty 
in operationalising such vague concepts.  Nevertheless, the norms of fairness, honesty and 
reciprocity have a persuasive role to play in controlling exchange relationships.  Add to the 
mix the parts played by pre-existing relationships (Bhattacharya, Coleman, Brace and 
Kelly, 1996; Larson, 1992), trust and commitment (Moore, 1998; Morgan and Hunt, 1994), 
ethics (Vermillion et al., 2002), long-term orientations and expectations (Dwyer, Schurr 
and Oh, 1987; Ganesan, 1994; Kalwani and Narayandas, 1995), concern for preserving 
reputations (Larson, 1992), and we see a much richer and fuller explanation of supply 
chain behaviours.   
Finally, it is becoming increasingly obvious that the neo-classical economic theories are 
less able to explain relationship control and supply chain behaviours.  These sparse 
economic explanations are found even more wanting when viewed in the light of the 
evolving forms of exchange that are currently being encountered in hybrid, network and e-
commerce exchange relationships (Angeles and Nath, 2003; Golicic, Davis, McCarthy and 
Mentzer, 2002; Swaminathan and Tayur, 2003).  Clearly, RET is an important addition to 
the traditional neo-classical market and hierarchical understanding of exchange control.  
As such, the range of supply chain behaviours now encompass a wide array of human 
emotions and responses, and adds a more humanistic and sociological perspective.  Thus, 
the theory also provides an intuitive feel where value-normalisation, together with business 
and economic activities can be understood as a conjoint phenomena.  
However, there is one final element that has been overlooked so far by both the Rational 
and Relational schools, and this is the impact of internal political motivations and 
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exogenous macro/microeconomic considerations on supply chain behaviours.  The next 
framework explicitly addresses these shortcomings.           
2.6.3 Behavioural Context in the Political Economic Paradigm (PEP) 
In an attempt to shed new light on the structure of marketing channel relationships, Stern 
and Reve (1980) proposed a new framework based on both political and economic 
considerations.  This was an attempt to bring together the previously disparate economic 
and behavioural approaches to marketing channel research.  What became known as the 
Political Economic Paradigm (PEP) was subsequently the focus for further theoretical 
development in terms of the strategic and structural aspects that influenced the exchange 
relationship (Achrol et al., 1983; Dwyer and Welsh, 1985). Yet it seems that research 
interest quickly dissipated, and while its theoretical usefulness was acknowledged, little 
confirmatory empirical work was conducted.  Nevertheless, this new integrative 
framework complemented other works by positioning various exchange paradigms within 
a political or economic context in order to understand the complexities of channel 
relationships.  Essentially, PEP views marketing channels as complex socio-economic 
interrelations of major economic and socio-political forces that shape collective channel 
behaviour and influences performance.  The theory is opposed to simple cause-effect 
mechanisms such as those between power / conflict, and also channel design / cost 
assumptions (Stern and Reve, 1980).    
The PEP theory places some emphasis on understanding the impact of both internal and 
external economic and political forces that help shape channel behaviour, thus it takes a 
wider ‘supply chain’ view of the phenomenon.  Further, it explicitly insists that economic 
and socio-political forces not be analysed in isolation (Stern and Reve, 1980).  The major 
variables or behaviours of the PEP theory that are theorised to affect channel relationships 
are: 
• The Internal economy – the economic forces and decisions within the channel such 
as transaction type, vertical arrangements, and terms of trade (i.e. transactional) 
• The External economy – the prevailing economic or market environment described 
by the nature of its vertical or horizontal (input and output) markets (i.e. structural).  
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• The Internal polity – the internal micro socio-political forces within the firm 
analysed in terms of the socio-political structure and processes (i.e. firm culture, 
behaviours, norms and reactions to opportunism and/or collaboration). 
• The External polity – the extant external macro socio-political forces described by 
the collective (channel wide) organisation, and the use of power resources among 
external actors and their prevailing sentiments (i.e. firm opportunism and 
collaboration). 
Adapted from: Stern and Reve, (1980). 
 
The contribution of PEP to this research is the acknowledgment of the internal and external 
socio-political and economic forces at work within the channel (Dwyer and Welsh, 1985).  
In particular, it acknowledges the influence of variables such as conflict, 
power/dependence, cooperation, as well as the influence that the prevailing macro and 
micro economic factors have on channel relationships.  These forces shape the context and 
appropriateness of the behaviours of opportunism and collaboration.  Essentially, socio-
political forces represent the relational/collaborative variable context, and economic forces 
represent the opportunistic variable context.  More recent work by Grewal and 
Dharwadkar, (2002) has added to the theory by defining three institutional processes 
namely, regulatory institutions (e.g. laws and statutes), normative intuitions (e.g. 
professions), and cognitive intuitions (e.g. habitual behaviours and norms).  These 
institutional pressures, it is argued, influence channel structures, processes of exchange and 
related behaviour.  Hence, the importance of the paradigm is found in the formalisation and 
the positioning of the exchange relationships within a wider socio-political and 
environmental context, suggesting that exchange relationships and behaviours are modified 
by these forces.  In addition, the theory also underpins the conceptualisation of ‘strategic 
behaviour’ as a construct used in this research in an attempt to conceptualise these PEP 
forces11.  The Relational school has made some important contributions, and these will be 
summarised in the next section. 
                                                 
11
 See chapter three for the full conceptualization of the strategic behaviour variable. 
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2.6.4 Contributions of the Relational School Theories 
By now the distinctions between the Rational and the Relational schools should be clear.  
The faults in the premises of the economically based Rational school have in a large part 
been complemented by the socio-behaviourally based Relational school.  Yet the 
Relational school is not without its faults in its basic premises, and these will be explored 
in the next section.  However, prior to this, it is appropriate to summarise briefly the main 
contributions of the Relational school to supply chain channel behaviour.  In particular, the 
Relational school…       
1. Is philosophically positioned on the relational side of the exchange continuum. 
2. Suggests that collaboration can give rise to additional quasi-rents or ‘relational rents’ 
over and above those expected in short-term rational exchange.  
3. Avoids the narrow economic explanations of actor behaviour by drawing on 
sociology, social psychology and anthropology as additional frameworks. 
4. Expands on the imperative for collaboration introduced by the Rational school by 
suggesting that collaboration in itself can provide competitive advantage. 
5. Suggests that normative behaviours and models can be an alternative form of 
governance mechanism that compliments the Rational school’s bureaucracy and 
market modes of governance.   
6. Provides a much richer and more intuitive explanation of supply chain behaviours, 
and it could argued, a more realistic view. 
7. Acknowledges that extrinsic cooperative behaviour can be a valuable ‘resource’ in its 
own right to be owned, developed or utilised as required. 
8. Does not hold contextual environmental issues such as internal and external socio-
political, micro and macroeconomic forces as a constant, nor does it assume them 
away in a random error term.  Rather, the Relational school attempts to incorporate 
their influence in its models and hypotheses.  
9. Provides new explanatory metaphors of exchange behaviour, such as ‘clans’ as a 
helpful euphemism for collaborative networks and cooperative exchange networks. 
 
Chapter Two – Literature Review 
 
45 
As suggested above, the Relational school cannot be accepted without a critical 
examination of its underlying premises and assumptions, and this critique follows.  
2.6.5 Critique of the Relational School Theories 
While the Rational school at one extreme can be faulted for its narrow definition of a 
rational economising actor, on the other extreme the Relational school could be faulted for 
implying that all exchange actors should assume cooperative postures all of the time.  
Indeed, while the Relational school does propagate the sociological and normative 
viewpoint, it does so at the expense of understanding the economic rationale for the 
exchange in the first place.  It seems to have sociologically overcompensated somewhat for 
the previous narrow economic view point.  At best, it confuses the relational reasons for 
the exchange with the economic, so that no clear understanding of the reasons for 
collaboration are offered except for some vague promises of improved performance.  
However, while there is some weight in this argument, it is perhaps a too severe view, and 
this criticism is not terminal for the school. 
Concerning social and relational norms, one disconcerting issue for the Relational school is 
the discontinuity between the objectives of individuals and the organisations, and how the 
performance of a supply chain relationship is measured.  Social norms are predicated on 
individuals in a group or community following a set pattern or group objective 
(Grannovetter, 1985).  As any practitioner would testify, the members of an organisation or 
in this case a supply chain do not always share the same selfless devotion to a common 
objective or norm (Heide and John, 1992).  Indeed, common chain wide objectives are 
almost never achieved, instead localised or dyadic type objectives are far more common 
(Fawcett and Magnan, 2002).  The question remains as to how socialisation and normative 
behaviours develop if no common objectives are set?  Early work by Mayo (1945) last 
century showed that craft based apprenticeships were indispensable vehicles for 
indoctrinating individuals in accepting craft and organisational objectives through forming 
strong normative bonds.  Yet many of these normalising vehicles have been made obsolete 
in modern organisations, and obtaining acceptance of a common objective by the 
individual or firm without normative bonds is problematic for the school.   
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In addition, given that collective normative objectives are hard to agree on in the first 
instance, they are also subsequently hard to measure.  This ambiguity as to the appropriate 
measure for the performance of the exchange relationship and the individual leads to 
information asymmetry and goal incongruence, such as the incongruence between the 
employee’s and employer’s goals.  Ouchi (1980) notes that where such conditions exist, 
there is little value in the control mechanisms of markets, bureaucracies or even clan 
structures.  This then provides fertile ground for opprobrious behaviours to be enacted that 
hence go unmoderated or censured.  Conversely, he argues that where there is little 
ambiguity over performance, the parties can tolerate relatively high levels of opportunism 
or goal incongruence (Ouchi, 1980).  Thus, the high levels of ambiguity that are 
traditionally associated with social and relational normalising seen in the Relational school 
can lead to objective and performance dissonance.    
Another area in the Relational school that poses a serious weakness is the process 
explanation as to how relational norms actually regulate behaviour in the first instance 
(Joshi and Stump, 1999).  The issue stems from the fact that relational norms have been 
described in very broad terms, almost to the point of becoming indistinguishable from the 
actual behaviour themselves.  Macneil (1980b) states that the regulated behaviours 
(allowable or unsanctioned) become part of the definition of the relational norms rather 
than the consequence of them, and as such behaviour then becomes enmeshed in the 
method of control.  Macneil’s (1980b) argument lends support to Ouchi’s (1980) own 
criticisms of clans as control mechanisms.       
Further, in the case of the RBV, it is noted that this theory takes quite a narrow view of 
social behaviour.  The theory conceptualises the acquisition of resources as being enacted 
by the application of ‘power’ in a relationship (Gaski, 1984; Molina and Dyer, 1999), in 
that one persuades, cajoles, or bullies the external entity to provide the targeted resources.  
In this sense, the RBV focuses too much on power aspects of social arrangements.  For 
example, some authors have taken this view to the extreme and propose that all dependent 
relationships in a supply chain are based on the use of power, and that power alone 
explains observed supply chain behaviour and relationship change (Cox, 1999, 2001; Hunt 
and Nevin, 1974).  Power and its exercise can be closely correlated with opportunistic 
behaviour, and represents the agenda of researchers who delve into what is bad about 
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supply chain relationships, a problem that this researcher seeks to avoid.  Morgan and Hunt 
(1994) challenges this position buy stating that “…if marketing science should turn toward 
explaining relationship success – and we believe that it should – power cannot be the 
central construct” (p. 34).  In support, Williamson (1996) notes that ‘dependence’ is the 
obverse of ‘power’, and that when dependency issues are addressed in socio-economic 
terms, power considerations largely vanish.  Hence, a more enlightened view would hold 
that supply chain behaviour is much more than just power in action (Holden and O'Toole, 
2004; Narayandas and Rangan, 2004; Stuart, 1997), thus this unnecessarily narrow view 
does a disservice to the RBV theory and its contribution to this school.  
By focusing on the internal resources of the firm, the RBV is also precluded from forming 
hypotheses on the sources of value derived from external collaborative linkages.  This 
seems to be a serious omission, and one would be justified in questioning the inclusion of 
the RBV in the Relational school.  However, some studies have highlighted areas where 
relational rents can be derived from external collaboration (see for example Dyer and 
Singh, 1998)12, and the RBV does concede that these intangible forms of behaviour can in 
fact represent value and a critical resource.  Hence, while the internal resource view is 
conceptually deficient, it does qualify for inclusion to the Relational school. 
In conclusion, as the school suffers from the esotericism of attempting to define 
relationships and behavioural norms, the school’s theories could be seen to be more 
descriptive than predictive (Clarke-Hill, Li and Davies, 2003).  This has profound 
theoretical as well as methodological implications.  The operationalisation of some of the 
school’s relational norms and variables are not particularly amenable to certain techniques 
such as quantitative measures.  Rather, they are more suited to qualitative methods such as 
in-depth case studies and interviews (Yin, 2003).  This has lead to some rigorous debates 
in literature concerning method and the resulting interpretation when measuring supply 
chain behaviours (Bagozzi, Yi and Phillips, 1991; Bryant, 2000; Yauch and Steudel, 2003).  
Yet this all depends on one’s own philosophical viewpoint, and divergences remain at this 
stage difficult to fully reconcile.  Nevertheless, this research does attempt to address the 
                                                 
12
 These major areas are: relationship specific assets, knowledge sharing routines, complementary resources and 
capabilities, and effective governance (p. 663). 
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problems of measuring intangible concepts by offering several constructs new to the 
literature in this field.       
While the economic and behavioural paradigms when viewed together provide a rich 
insight into the nature of exchange relationships, they do so only in a static sense.  Most 
empirical research in these areas tends to be cross-sectional in method, and while this 
provides a snapshot into the makeup and character of exchange relationships, it falls short 
when considering relational development over time.  As this research will attempt to 
understand exchange relationship change, it is necessary to next review developmental or 
evolutionary theories that provide the theme of relationship movement, something that 
Halinen (1998) notes is generally missing from marketing and supply chain studies.   
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2.7 The Dynamic View – Evolutionary Paradigms 
It is clear from the literature reviewed above that the theoretical development of each of 
the two major schools (rational and relational) can be reduced to three fundamental 
concerns for the channel exchange context.  Firstly, the economic paradigms are 
characterised by appropriation concerns, or the degree that the exchange partner 
appropriates assets or the benefits of any subsequent exchange (Gulati and Singh, 1998).  
Secondly, the behavioural and relational paradigms are characterised by cooperative 
concerns, namely the fundamental problems of exchange coordination, communication, 
decision making and the decomposition of tasks between exchange partners (Knoppen and 
Christiaanse, 2004).  The third fundamental problem for exchange partners are adaptive 
concerns, or how the exchange relationship will evolve, change and operate over time 
(Cannon and Perreault, 1999; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Webster, 1992).  These adaptive 
concerns relate to how the changing environmental contingencies as well as the 
unanticipated exigencies affect the exchange relationship during its existence.  In 
particular, the nature of exchange relationships are theorised to be sensitive to attempts at 
economic appropriation as well as coordinative initiatives.  The appropriation of economic 
benefits can be achieved by either broadly labelled opportunistic and collaborative 
behaviours. However, cooperative concerns can only be achieved through collaborative 
behaviours, with opportunistic behaviours arguably having an adverse effect (Hill, 1990).  
Indeed, every behaviour has a dynamic impact on the type of exchange relationship and its 
associated governance.   
Hence, to further our understanding of exchange behaviours and their effect on supply 
chain relationships, it is vital to incorporate a more dynamic, as opposed to static, view that 
can offer greater evolutionary insights.  In an industrial example, Bhattacharya, Coleman, 
Brace, and Kelly (1996) note that unlike the collaborative Japanese keiretsus, Western 
supply chains seem to be evolving in an ad-hoc rather than planned fashion.  This can be 
attributed to not only cultural reasons, but also to the drive for the redistribution of 
functions by outsourcing in pursuit of cost benefits, without the due attention to the 
structure of the supply chain relationships and their value boundaries.  Accordingly, an 
informed rather than a laissez fair approach to the evolution of supply chains is critical, 
hence the need for theory development encompassing economic, relational and dynamic 
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paradigms is paramount (Arndt, 1979).  In this respect, Systems theory and 
Chaos/Complexity theories both offer some unique insights into how complex systems, 
such as exchange relationships, can evolve, change and self-organise over time in response 
to various stimuli.  These theories are briefly reviewed below and are used not only to help 
develop the research model and hypotheses, but also to introduce systemic and dynamic 
metaphors and nomenclature into supply chain management and relationship development 
parlance.       
2.7.1 A Holistic Approach – General Systems Theory 
General Systems theory, or ‘systems thinking’ has been developing steadily since the 
1950’s in parallel with the other rational and relational school theories reviewed above 
(Forrester, 1958, 1961; von Bertalanffy, 1968).  This systems approach places the 
emphasis on the importance of “…connectivity and multivariable closed-loop, cause and 
effect relationships” (Fowler, 1999, p. 182).  It attempts to provide a way of cognitively 
thinking about complexity that had traditionally been ignored by those organisational 
managers and academics who preferred a more reductionist approach.  Hence, system 
thinking is thus purported to be highly germane for dealing with systems and problems 
such as those found in complex supply chain arrangements (Rigby, Day, Forrester and 
Burnett, 2000).    
There are two pairs of ideas that form the fundamental premise of systems thinking, 
namely; emergence/hierarchy, and communication/control (see Checkland, 1993, pg 92).  
These two themes provide the basis for a notation or a language that can be used to 
describe the world around us.  Taken in tandem these two ideas outline a ‘systems’ 
approach that accounts for the universe and its problems, and is diametrically opposite to 
reductionist philosophies embodied in the method of many scientists.  These system 
approaches and interpretations can be found in many different disciplines, and together 
these efforts may be termed the ‘systems movement’ (Checkland, 1993).  This movement 
seeks to explore consequences, not in reductionist terms, but rather with holistic thinking 
and explanations.  Senge (1990) argues that systems thinking is a movement that tests the 
conjecture that holistic approaches will be able to tackle problems that current methods of 
science find so difficult, particularly the problem of organised complexity. 
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As system thinking is rooted in the cognitive decision making processes (Dickson, Farris 
and Verbeke, 2001), the appropriate paradigm to use in this research is that of adopting a 
‘world view’ thus seeing things holistically and being interconnected.  Having stated this, 
Manni and Maharaj (2004) argue that translating the system paradigm into measurable 
constructs has proved elusive and problematic, and this applies equally to supply chain 
dynamics.  One notable attempt was made by Richmond in (1993) who proposed a set of 
‘thinking skills’.  He later added and elaborated on this generic list of thinking skills in 
1997.  The approach that Richmond (1997) took was to suggest that a system thinker had 
to operate on at least seven different levels simultaneously, namely through the following 
seven thinking skills;13  
1. Dynamic thinking (the problem is framed in terms of patterns over time). 
2. System-as-cause thinking (determining plausible explanations from the behaviour of 
the system under consideration). 
3. Forrest thinking (thinking in terms of the ‘big picture’ overview). 
4. Operational thinking (determining causality from the systems behaviour, how one 
variable affects others). 
5. Closed-loop thinking (identifying closed-loop and feedbacks effects on the ‘causes’). 
6. Quantitative thinking (identifying the patterns through facts). 
7. Scientific thinking (the application of heuristic tools to system causes). 
 
Systems thinking is being adopted increasingly as a response to complexity, as our default 
understanding and responses to complex problems often do not lead to the most optimal 
solutions (Luna-Reyes and Andersen, 2003).  However, despite the general acceptance of 
our need for a more holistic approach, most individuals appear to have a great deal of 
difficulty in thinking systemically (Maani and Maharaj, 2004).  Not only is Richmond’s 
(1997) requirement to think seven different ways simultaneously an onerous task beyond 
the capabilities of many, but also our ‘local’ default perspectives and certain ‘habits of 
                                                 
13
 It is not the intent of this section to review in detail each of the seven types.  It is sufficient to demonstrate that systems 
thinking is a complicated process.  See Maani and Maharaj (2004) and Richmond (1993, 1997) for a fuller definition of 
the seven different types of thinking. 
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thought’ have enabled the manager to cope so far, thus providing powerful cognitive 
barriers to adopting new ways of thinking (Maani and Maharaj, 2004).        
One area that is providing promising new insights is that of Soft System Methodology 
(SSM) (Checkland, 1993).  SSM requires the manager to not only construct what the 
problem is, but also how it will be solved.  This method emphasises the analysis of human 
activity in its models, and thus allows managers to incorporate complex human dimensions 
and constant learning feedbacks in to supply chain planning and management (Bechtel and 
Jayaram, 1997).  Nevertheless, holistic SSM thinking is too generic to be of any use 
without a general set of guiding principles.   
As a consequence, Clayton and Gregory (2000) have suggested a more easily digestible set 
of four principles to assist in applying SSM thinking to organisational problems.  Firstly, 
the study of organisational forms and problems (such as supply chains) must consider all of 
the interacting component parts under ‘the system’.  Or, as the paradigm suggests, ensure 
that you are looking at the whole system, not just one of its parts.  To achieve this, the 
second principle states that a ‘boundary critiquing’ (Ulirch, 1994) exercise should be 
conducted to delimit the scope of the system.  Here, questions are continually asked as to 
who is involved and what demarcation lines are to be drawn and where, to establish what is 
outside of the system, what is contiguous to it and what is included in the system.  This 
exercise establishes the relevancy of the whole investigation, as any problem definition 
that does not scope the entire system will only perpetuate or compound the systemic 
problems.  Thirdly, the manager must reflect on the most appropriate method to use in the 
intervention.  This means that the possible methodological impact of the intervention must 
be judged against the organisational interest, the human reactions and the relationships 
between them all.  Finally, the system intervention must be ‘goal orientated’ in that clear 
directions and specific action plans must be provided to gain ‘buy in’ from the members of 
the system (Clayton and Gregory, 2000).                  
These guiding principles help to demystify the problems of system thinking and complex 
environments.  Further, this theory has helped formulate not only the guiding philosophy 
of this research, but has also assisted in development of an interpretative framework for 
examining the results.  Hence, adopting a systems viewpoint should avoid the traps of 
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reacting to events in a discrete and isolationist manner that ignores potential related issues 
that have a direct impact or feedback on the system/s that are under examination or change.   
Overall, systems thinking allows one to “…collectively process complex characteristics…” 
(Fowler, 1998 , p. 1028).  In this respect, it can be argued that supply chain behaviours are 
the result of the complex, interconnected, closed-loop, multivariate human and 
organisational circular interactions, and it is expected that these behaviours will feedback 
and change the system as a whole over time.  Thus, supply chain relationships should be 
viewed as dynamic, complex and changeable systems, not static linear systems.  The tenets 
of systems thinking are often related with Chaos/Complexity theory that also examines 
seemingly random phenomena in a system.  Therefore, to complete the dynamic 
perspective this literature review will now draw on the powerful ideas and metaphors of 
these theories.     
2.7.2 Chaos/Complexity Theory and Bifurcation Points 
Given the failure of the exchange literature reviewed above to provide a robust and holistic 
explanation of supply chain behaviour, it is considered necessary to turn to 
Chaos/Complexity theory in an attempt to explain the form and nature of dynamic 
relational changes.  Traditionally, much of the research on supply chains has focused on 
simple, steady-state equilibrium systems where the whole can be explained by the study of 
the aggregate behaviour of its parts.  However, the study of complexity in supply chains 
seeks to investigate those systems displaying dynamic interactions between many 
independent variables exhibiting both chaotic and emergent order behaviours (McIntyre, 
1997a).  Similar to General systems theory, these systems must be studied at a level of 
description at which the complexity of the system is preserved.   
Chaos is a new and relatively controversial area of study.  Chaos, as a phenomenon 
emerged from work by Edward Lorenz who observed chaotic behaviour when studying 
simple mathematical models of weather systems in the 1960’s.  The results he produced 
were unusual, and Lorenz subsequently reported two fundamental observations.  Firstly, 
some seemingly simple equations and systems gave rise to some surprisingly complex 
behaviour, and secondly, the behaviour of the system is very dependent upon initial 
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conditions, in that very small initial changes later induced large fluctuations (Pritchard, 
1992).  This second idea gave rise to the curiously named Butterfly Effect where it was 
theoretically thought that the flap of a butterfly’s wings (a small change in the initial 
conditions) could influence the course of a typhoon in another part of the world (Lorenz, 
1993).  Lorenz (1993) himself notes that the terms ‘chaos’ and ‘complexity’ have been 
used interchangeably by the literature (i.e. such as this research).  He suggests that chaos 
and complexity, while separate disciplines, are complimentary and that chaos should refer 
to irregularity in time and complexity to the irregularity in space.  However, the two are 
often found together such as when observing the flow dynamics of turbulent fluids.  
Accepted science of the day would note that data sets should exhibit two fundamental 
states, either orderliness or randomness.  However, chaos theory added a third state, that of 
chaos, possessing the appearance of randomness, yet alternating between periods of chaos 
and periods of order through self-organisation (Stewart, 1989).  This theme was picked up 
by another scientist who had a suspicion that complexity was not just random, not just an 
accident, that it too had meaning.  Subsequently, Benoît Mandelbrot (1924 - present) added 
his spectacular offering, that of fractal geometry. 
Associated with the development of chaos in the 1960’s and 1970’s, yet developing 
separately, was a new branch of mathematics capable of describing and analysing the 
structured irregularity observed in the natural world.  When Benoît Mandelbrot feed 60 
years of cotton prices through an early IBM computer he unexpectedly found what at first 
appeared to be random changes in daily or annual price curves where in fact perfectly 
matched when daily curves were scaled to the annual curves (Gleick, 1988).  To 
Mandelbrot this order in complexity could be seen in many other applications, and the 
underlying unifying dimension as he saw it was scaling.  What absorbed Mandelbrot were 
the new geometric shapes that this form of self-similarity across scale produced.  He was 
the first to plot these new geometric forms and coined a new term fractals to describe them 
(Mirowski, 1990).  Computer applications were able to iterate simple differential equations 
millions of times and print the resulting shapes.  The results were stunning, and the 
descriptive power of the images provides an intuitive framework for understanding the 
nature of complex behaviour.  The basic form of the shape depends on the equation 2Z C+  
iterated many times (where Z is a complex number that is allowed to vary, and C is a fixed 
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complex number).  The computer then plots those numbers that converge into infinity in 
white, and those numbers that remain finite, no matter how many iterations, in black.  
When repeated millions of times the resulting picture shows a ‘gingerbread man’ or a 
Mandelbrot set (see earlier work called Julia14 sets) as shown in Figure 2-3.   
Figure 2-3 Basic Mandelbrot Set showing increasing levels of complexity at the ‘Edge of Chaos’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The striking feature about these Mandelbrot sets is that they are incredibly complex even 
when highly magnified, and that the basic shape of the Mandelbrot set is present no matter 
the scale.  The edge of the Mandelbrot set represents that position in phase space where a 
change occurs, or where order changes into chaos.  This area is commonly called ‘on the 
edge of chaos’ and represents threshold space, or the area of change or bifurcations (Briggs 
and Peat, 1990; De Vree, 1997; Shone, 2002).  Essentially, the sequence of movement is 
that order changes through a series of bifurcations into chaos.  However, that is not the end 
of the issue, as chaotic systems will eventually self-order (Nicolis and Prigogine, 1977) in 
to a new path as it realigns itself to a new strange attractor (Lorenz, 1993).  All these new 
metaphors represent the change process that can be observed in complex natural systems.  
                                                 
14
 The work of Gaston Julia and Piere Fatou both French mathematicians in the 1940’s showed that simple mappings of 
complex numbers could give rise to monstrously complex shapes. 
      
 
    
A series of fratual images zooming in on a Mandlebrot set (in the first picture), and after a series of magnifications seeing 
the set remerge from the apparent chaos.  Each picture is magnified by a factor of five from the last, with the centre 
remaining in the middle of the picture.  The first picture is the top left, progressing right, and finishing with the bottom right 
picture.   
 
Adapted from: Burbanks (1972). 
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Stewart (1989) suggests that fractals appear in science in two different ways, firstly, they 
occur as a primary object, a descriptive tool for studying irregular processes and forms, and 
secondly, as a mathematical deduction from an underlying chaotic dynamic.  It is the 
underlying behaviours and descriptive tools seen in the first of these two suggestions that 
will be helpful for this research.     
The application of chaos and complexity paradigms to organisational and managerial 
literature is not new.  Areas such as strategy (Dickson et al., 2001), operations management 
(Fowler, 1999), decision making (Maani and Maharaj, 2004), business process 
reengineering (Fowler, 1998), change management (Clayton and Gregory, 2000), small to 
medium sized enterprises (SME’s) (Winch and Arthur, 2002), and even supply chain 
management (Holmberg, 2000) have all introduced Chaos/Complexity theory and systems 
thinking as part of their explanatory frameworks.  These examples show that 
organisational, societal and exchange systems display a level of complexity characterised 
by rapid unpredictable changes, and that deterministic standard linear explanations fail to 
capture the true chaotic nature of these dynamic systems (Briggs and Peat, 1990; Davis, 
1999; Dooley and Van de Ven, 1999; Lambe, Spekman and Hunt, 2002; Levy, 1994; 
Lorenz, 1993; Mirowski, 1990; Murray, 2003; Peak and Frame, 1994).  For non-linear 
dynamic systems the assumption of one-to-one cause and effect associations that are 
implicit in most human logic do not hold (Gleick, 1988; Wilding, 1998).  Ford (1980) 
highlights the dynamic nature of exchange relationships by noting that “…each episode 
affects the overall relationship, and a single episode can change it radically” (p. 341).  
Essentially, Ford (1980) argues that there are negative and positive feedback loops in the 
dyadic relationship where interactions affect the relationship through episodic and discrete 
actions, sometimes causing dramatic changes in the relationship.  This brings into question 
the traditional management assumption of linearity and causality (i.e. if A is present then B 
will follow), as the reality of business is very different (Macbeth, 2002).  Hence, standard 
explanations of organisational change and traditional assumptions should not hold, rather a 
non-linear perspective needs to be adopted to assimilate dynamic movement in exchange 
relationships.        
Supply chain relationships are not as straight forward as simple, sequential exchanges of 
products, cash and information in the dyad or network (Gattorna and Walters, 1996).  
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Further, exchange relationships should not be seen as being held constantly in a state of 
perfect equilibrium15 (Dwyer et al., 1987; Macbeth, 2002; Morgan and Hunt, 1994).  
Hence, where system equilibrium is the expression of ‘balance’ in an inert mechanical 
system, complexity and episodes of chaos are the signatures of interacting dynamic 
systems such as supply chain relationships (Black and Edwards, 2000; Potts, 2000).  
Importantly, when we consider non-linear relationships, one could ask why total chaos and 
chaotic states are not observed more often, this being particularly true of natural systems 
such as supply chains (Hearnshaw, Cullen and Hughey, 2005).  A plausible explanation is 
that natural systems will attempt to avoid chaos and self-organise toward a new strange 
attractor and achieve a new steady state were possible (Hearnshaw et al., 2005).  Thus, 
chaotic states are not the default position for supply chain relationships, rather they are 
episodes that occasionally occur, as stimulating events push the relationship to the ‘edge of 
chaos’ during evolutionary fissures.  It is this transition from order, through a bifurcation 
into chaos, and the process of self-organisation back again into order again on a new 
trajectory that most aptly describes the changes in supply chain relationships over time.  
Whilst in general, most relationships are held in a steady state for the majority of the time 
(De Vree, 1997), exchange relationships should be viewed as gradually evolving 
punctuated with episodes of major disturbance or change.  This can be likened to the 
Kuhnian view (1970) of science where scientific paradigms enjoy stable growth until 
completely disrupted (bifurcated) by a new scientific discovery or revolution.  Hence, it 
can be argued that supply chain relationships display chaotic properties with bifurcation 
change events.  These events are of particular relevance to this research and will be 
addressed next.         
2.7.2.1 Dynamic Relationship Changes – Bifurcation Points 
One aspect of Chaos/Complexity theory that has important implications to the evolution of 
exchange relationships is the concept of bifurcation points.  A bifurcation point represents 
a critical value where equally viable alternatives exist, and where a new direction with a 
different behavioural pattern may be selected (Nijkamp and Reggiani, 1992).  In other 
                                                 
15
 This is not to assume that a state of equilibrium in an exchange relationship cannot exist.  On the contrary, most 
exchange relationships will exhibit a form of equilibrium, or if not exact equilibrium, a state of gradual or steady 
change over a long period could be said to be indistinguishable from exact equilibrium.  It is an issue of scale.   
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words, a qualitative change in the relationship occurs ex post a bifurcation.  Black and 
Edwards (2000) suggest that social systems respond to bifurcations differently than do 
physical systems.  A good definition of a bifurcation in a social system is provided by Potts 
(2000, p. 89); 
“A bifurcation is a critical point whereby a deterministic trajectory is 
split into two or more possible paths, and which path eventuates is 
decided, as it where, by factors external to the factors descriptive of the 
trajectory.  Which is to say that a critical decision is made in the path of 
the system, and this decision is determined by local and historically 
contingent circumstance.” 
Here, an existing exchange relationship may be disrupted by an abrupt transition (a 
bifurcation) whereby the current relationship equilibrium is disturbed.  Thus, from a steady 
relationship a new state of ‘being far from equilibrium’ (Gleick, 1988) is experienced, and 
eventually new order emerges ex post a bifurcation or multiple bifurcations.  In the 
exchange relationship context, new levels of inter-organisational exchange materialise.  
One of the critical questions concerns the causes of bifurcations in the first instance (Black 
and Edwards, 2000).  Do exchange relationships change dramatically in response to a 
single event or a behaviour, a culmination of actions over time, or do they evolve gradually 
without abrupt states of disequilibrium?  Also, are they random responses, or are the 
bifurcations a result of deliberate management actions?  The answers to these questions are 
not clear in literature (Larson, 1992; Murray, 2003; Nijkamp and Reggiani, 1992).  Yet 
what can be determined is, as noted by Potts (2000), bifurcations and the emerging new 
direction (or relationship level) can be predicated, at least in part, by local and historical 
contingent circumstances that existed prior to the event (Black and Edwards, 2000; Potts, 
2000).  Further, the speed of bifurcations in social systems can be either sudden or gradual 
change, as opposed to physical or natural systems where bifurcations are normally sudden 
and catastrophic (Gleick, 1988). 
The number of bifurcations to reach a state of chaos is only three (Gleick, 1988; Peak and 
Frame, 1994), however, the number of calamitous perturbations within a social system 
does not need to reach this number for a form of chaos to emerge, as a single event may 
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suffice.  Further, it is doubtful if a social system such as a supply chain would ever reach a 
true state of ‘chaos’ as defined by the theory.  Rather, social systems possess many 
inhibitors that may prevent a state of true chaos from emerging, such as social linkages and 
conflict resolution processes.  Nevertheless, while the relationship and its problems may 
exist on the edge of chaos for a period, it will generally self-organise into a new relational 
form prior to reaching true chaos (Webb and Hogan, 2002).  Yet, if the event or 
circumstances that caused the initial bifurcation are overwhelming or persistent, further 
and more rapid bifurcations may occur, thus plunging the relationship into a state of chaos 
(or even termination) that more truly reflects the theory’s definition.  
All exchange relationships are continuous processes and new interactions lead to new 
decisions that are feedback to keep the system in continuous motion.  Thus, all logistics 
and supply chain management systems are made up of series of feedback control loops 
(Wilding, 1998).  Indeed, insights into collaborative behaviours may be derived from the 
concepts of self-organisation amongst complex structures as systems move from 
individualism to collectivism (De Vree, 1997).  Therefore, much can be learned from the 
study of Chaos/Complexity theory in exchange relationships.  As it is a science of the 
global nature of systems, Chaos/Complexity theory cuts across the lines that currently 
separate some scientific disciplines.  It also allows for a dynamic, systemic, and evolving 
view (Gleick, 1988; Senge, 1990).  Hence, Chaos/Complexity theory provides a basis on 
which to view dynamic systems in action, and a frame of reference for conceptualising and 
interpreting the theme of relational movement and development in supply chain exchange 
relationships.   
2.8 Synthesising the Literatures – A Metatriangulation 
Approach 
Given that this review has covered a number of different economic and organisational 
theories, one could argue that the light treatment thus accorded to each of these theories 
does them a disservice, and this limitation is acknowledged.  Yet, such an approach was 
demanded due to the emergence of supply chain management as a new critical business 
strategy, and the recognition of the levels of complexity involved (Achrol, 1997; Gattorna 
and Walters, 1996; Tan, Lyman and Wisner, 2002).  Essentially, supply chain management 
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demands a metatriangulation treatment (Lewis and Grimes, 1999) of its underlying multi-
paradigms due to the following fundamental changes in current thinking: 
1. The supply chain is now viewed as a single entity, not fragmented organisations or 
functional silos. 
2. As such, the supply chain consists of a series or network of independent entities each 
with their own goals and objectives. 
3. Organisations in a supply chain must be integrated not merely interfaced. 
4. As a direct result of the above points, the management of a supply chain calls for 
strategic decisions made in increasingly complex environments. 
5. Hence, supply chain management requires a new integrated perspective to address 
system complexity and organisational behaviours. 
  
As a result of the above imperatives, this research has utilised a multi-paradigmatic 
approach to examine supply chain behaviours and dynamic relational development.  Lewis 
and Grimes (1999), and Lewis (2000) recommend this approach as it entails the 
examination and comparison of opposing theoretical perspectives.  This approach allows 
the exploration of the duality, complexity and paradox of seemingly opposite exchange 
behaviours such as collaboration and opportunism and their base theories.  As these 
behaviours have been frequently observed in empirical settings (Boyce, 2001; Hill, 1990; 
Joshi and Stump, 1999; Skjoett-Larsen et al., 2003), comment has been made concerning 
the paradoxical tension in which these behaviours exist.  Clarke-Hill et al., (2003) suggest 
that one ideology is assumed to hold sway at any one time and then the other, and that they 
are mutually influenced over time as behaviours oscillate from one extreme to the other.  
As long as one remains acutely aware of the contradictions and anomalies inherent in the 
competing theories, and one does not take each of these theories or schools in isolation, 
then generally speaking, the pitfalls and criticisms of any one school should not prove 
problematic to gaining a much wider and more balanced view of the exchange behaviour 
paradox.  
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Since the economic suppositions espoused in the previous major theories tend to focus on 
rational and linear assumptions, particularly that of self-seeking between exchange 
partners, a broader theory base is required to accommodate the more relational, 
sociological, political and dynamic influences.  This broader perspective is required, 
indeed demanded, as the notions of mutuality or reciprocity transcend those theories of 
simple self-seeking in economic transactions.  While the assumptions of self-seeking are 
still maintained, they are relaxed somewhat to accommodate mutually collaborative 
behaviours as a means for increasing overall value.  
Under the economic exchange paradigm, the focus was on the fundamental process of how 
to maximise cooperation and how to minimise conflict in the channel.  Achrol (1997) notes 
three dominant variables under this paradigm.  Firstly, cooperation - viewed as forms of 
contractual mechanisms, secondly, conflict - defined as a disagreement over roles and 
responsibilities and duties between partners, and finally, opportunism - viewed as a 
fundamental problem in exchange to be controlled.  Achrol (1997) then discusses the 
sociology of channel networks, and how mutually reinforcing and long-term relationships 
are formed.  Along these lines, Achrol (1997) notes that traditional thinking focuses on 
preventing relationship disintegration and how to cajole inherently apathetic or 
opportunistic channel members to cooperate.  All these forces were assumed to be 
destructive or have negative outcomes.  Conversely, relational exchange cultures assume 
that the forces should be positively weighted, and that these channel networks should 
possess loyalty and dialogue along horizontal relationships.  Relational networks introduce 
the key variables of trust, relational commitment and social norms of behaviour (Achrol, 
1997; MacNeil, 1980b; Morgan and Hunt, 1994), all emerging out of a competitive 
environment.  Thus, each paradigm, and both the Rational and Relational schools have all 
made valuable contributions to the body of knowledge on supply chain exchange 
relationships.    
Developments in Chaos/Complexity theory in conjunction with General systems theory 
have attracted renewed interest in dynamic and system concepts with particular reference 
to the effect of non-linearity, and its impact on the dynamics of complex networks of 
organisations, such as supply chains (Fowler, 1999).  In essence, Systems theory and 
Chaos theory bring together the two major schools of thought by providing an alternative, 
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or at least, a complementary explanation of supply chain behaviours and relationship 
change.  They do so by introducing metaphors and definitions such as; dynamic, holistic, 
multivariate, complexity, non-linear, bifurcations, order/chaos, and self-organisation.  It 
can be argued that, in conjunction with the rational and relational theories, this new way of 
viewing supply chains results in a much more complete and holistic understanding of the 
interplay between economic, socio-relational and dynamic motivators for supply chain 
behaviours.    
In summary, the economic paradigms focus on market based transactions and the means 
for attenuating opportunism through either firm structure or contract.  Conversely, the 
behavioural paradigms provide an alternative view and suggest that socialised 
collaboration can promote or govern exchange relationships.  Separately, they provide only 
narrow perspectives of exchange relationship governance, yet in combination they provide 
a much richer conceptualisation of supply chain exchange.  Add to these two major schools 
the interpretative framework of systems thinking and chaos theory, and one is left with as 
complete a picture of supply chain behaviours as one could achieve given our present level 
of epistemological knowledge.  Hence, the preceding conceptualisations aptly demonstrate 
the requirement to adopt a more comprehensive multi-paradigmatic approach in reviewing 
base theories in general, and supply chain behaviours in particular.  In fact, exchange 
behaviours cannot really be understood without adopting such an approach.  Along these 
lines Wathne, Biong and Heide (2001) suggest that “…documenting specific sources of 
perceptual difference across a dyad is a promising area for further research” (p.64), and it 
is hoped that this research will go someway towards addressing this anomaly.  However, 
documenting these differences requires a measure or gauge on which one can assess any 
changes or movements. As exchange behaviour impacts the overall exchange relationship 
(Robicheaux and El-Ansary, 1975), it seems appropriate to use the level of relationship as 
a proxy measure.  To this end, the next section will conceptually develop the different 
levels of exchange relationship as the dependent variable used in this research.     
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2.9 Supply Chain Exchange Relationships 
2.9.1 Governance Mechanisms and Exchange Relationships 
Expanding the theoretical basis explored in the literature review, several researchers have 
provided descriptions of various organisational forms that exist under market or hierarchy 
conditions.  It has been suggested that the different forms of supply chain relationships can 
be described in terms of a continuum (for example, Williamson, 1985, uses an economic 
perspective).  Governance structures can be arrayed on this continuum with the extreme 
polar anchors based on pure market (discrete relations) at one end, and hierarchal 
ownership (embedded behaviours) at the other.  Closely aligned with this theory is the idea 
that many of the higher order behavioural and relational dimensions are highly correlated, 
and can thus be overlaid onto the underlying governance structure continuum, thus 
highlighting its complex but essentially unidimensional nature (Cannon and Perreault, 
1999).  One of the first efforts to conceptualise the various forms of relation exchange on 
this continuum was MacNeil (1980a) who suggested that there were a range of 
relationships exhibiting similar core components, yet of varying strengths.  Similarly, Sako 
(1992) suggested an industrial purchasing relationship continuum ranging from Arm’s-
length Contractual Relationships (ACR) to the more relational Obligational Contractual 
Relationships (OCR).  Another such example is from Knemeyer et al., (2003) who anchor 
their continuum with ‘arm’s length’ at one extreme to ‘vertical integration’ relationships on 
the other.  There is a strong common thread throughout empirical and conceptual literature 
to support the conceptualisation of a relationship continuum describing various types of 
exchange relationships, and hence by implication, the associated governance mechanism 
(Cannon and Perreault, 1999; Donaldson and O'Toole, 2000; MacNeil, 1980a; O'Toole and 
Donaldson, 2000; Webster, 1992; Wilson, 1995).        
Extending this idea that relational archetype can be used as a proxy for understanding the 
underlying governance mechanisms, we can see various forms of structure being 
associated with different types of relationship.  As an example, Agency theory, would 
suggest an outcome or relational based contract when the actor’s trust is high and social 
and relational norms govern the behaviours of each.  Conversely, a behavioural or 
hierarchical based agreement is needed when the behaviour of the other actor cannot be 
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trusted and elaborate governance structures are needed to control the relationship such as 
vertical integration.  Again, under Relational Exchange theory a ‘partnership’ type 
relationship may be governed by either a formal contract document (Peterson and 
Wysocki, 1998) or a simple verbal agreement (Arrighetti et al., 1997).  Nevertheless, the 
behaviours of each would indicate that a form of ‘partnering’ has been achieved, and that 
governance is predicated on the establishment of socio-cultural norms and relationship 
commitment between each partner.  Further, the exchange dyads could be controlled by 
purely relational behaviours (such as Ouchi, 1980 'clan' structures), or even trilateral 
governance where a third party mediated arrangements could be employed (Boyce, 2001).  
Such arrangements say a considerable deal about how exchange relationships are governed 
and managed, of course governance being a key concern for supply chain theory 
development.  Subsequently, the idea that exchange relationships can be categorised into 
different levels of relationships has proved to be extremely useful for formalising 
governance strategies, and for much subsequent research (Donaldson and O'Toole, 2000).  
Indeed, the concept extends beyond the simple grouping of constructs into categories, to 
providing an ordered set of relationships based on theory and empirical research.  This new 
conceptualisation reconciles some of the dichotomies of the various streams of literature, 
and should provide a clearer focus for structural, relational, and process management in 
future supply chain management research efforts.  
2.9.2 Temporal Aspects of Relationship Development  
Supply chain relationships develop and change over time.  Arndt (1979) notes that ongoing 
relationships periodically transition, and that these transitions are “…planned and 
administered instead of being conducted on an ad hoc basis” (p. 70).  MacNeil (1978) 
provides one of the earliest discussions on relational exchange movement.  He draws from 
a legal perspective to conceptualise staged contractual exchange arrangements.  
Developing on MacNeil’s (1978) ideas, Dwyer et al., (1987) provided a discussion on 
relational exchange in a marketing environment.  Both of these theories discuss various 
situations and characteristics whereby a relationship can move away from the discrete end 
of the continuum, to exchanges involving more relational elements (Noordewier, John and 
Nevin, 1990).  The theory espoused by Dwyer et al., (1987) suggests that exchange 
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relationships develop through five general phases identified in the following table (Table 
2-2). 
Table 2-2 Five stages of relationship development 
Sequence. Stage of Development Description of the Changes 
 
1.  Awareness Recognition of compatibility as potential partners. 
 
2.  Exploration Potential exchange partners conduct initial exchanges. 
 3.  Expansion Increasing interdependence as mutual benefits accrue from the exchange.  
 4.  Commitment Implicit or explicit pledge of exchange continuity that excludes 
other potential exchange partners.  
 
5.  Dissolution Dissolution (abrupt or phased) has been implicit at each stage. 
              Dotted line indicates that at any stage a relationship could bifurcate towards a termination. 
 
Source: Adapted from Dwyer, Schurr and Oh (1987). 
 
The transition from one stage to the next depends on the successful negotiation of the 
current stage.  Relational commitment and mutual benefits increase in each of the first four 
stages, thus moving along the relationship continuum.  However, the potential for 
relationship termination is implicit at any stage (Noordewier et al., 1990).  Developing 
more than a simplistic static view of relationships, Coughlan, et al., (1996) proposed an 
alternative model detailing a number of phases in the development of a relationship.  They 
have likened this process to that of the product life cycle concept that is standard in many 
marketing text books.  Nevertheless, while these two frameworks are useful, what is not 
clear is what causes the relationship to increase, decrease or even terminate in the first 
place?  How do exchange relationships change?  What is the catalyst for change?  These 
important questions currently remain unanswered, yet the answers should have a profound 
impact on exchange relationships, and more importantly exchange governance structures.       
Given this, the dynamics of change in supply chain relationships is an important area of 
study as it directly affects fundamental issues such as the make-or-buy decisions of 
manufacturers and purchasers (Hoyt and Huq, 2000), other economic and relational 
concerns, and organisational structures.  As such, determining the level of relational 
development over time is one area that has been relatively untouched in literature.  Further, 
as an exchange relationship level tautologises its underlying variables, it makes for a robust 
dependent variable in the proposed research model to measure the dynamic movement 
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from one level of relationship to another.  It is not the intent of this research to develop a 
new relational level typology, rather existing typologies (Knemeyer et al., 2003; Lambert 
et al., 1996; Webster, 1992) will be combined and simplified to derive the dependent 
variable for this research.  
2.9.3 Partnerships versus Strategic Alliances 
Prior to developing the forms of partnering used as the dependent variable, there are other 
forms of supply chain relationship/governance, in particular a strategic alliance, that differ 
from a ‘partnership’ as used in this research and hence need clarification.  There are some 
examples of supply chain cooperation/partnership that perform so well that the customer 
thinks that they are dealing with a vertically integrated company.  In fact, some supply 
chain members collaborate more closely than do different functional areas within the same 
company (Coughlan et al., 1996).  So what then is the difference between a well 
functioning collaborative partnership and a strategic alliance?  Generally, a strategic 
alliance will exist between two or more independent organisations that forge economic, 
legal or interpersonal connections that are aligned with a jointly developed goal or interest.  
Typically, strategic alliance connections are intended as enduring and are substantial, 
cutting across inter-firm and intra-firm boundaries, thus substantially altering each 
member’s behaviour to fit the joint objectives (Coughlan et al., 1996).  Usually found 
underlying a strategic alliance is a complex and detailed legal contract (Parkhe, 1993), and 
this is a key differentiator between a strategic alliance and a partnership.  However, while 
partnerships can also be based on contractual arrangements, they are more likely to be 
based on implicit understandings and historical trading patterns.  Thus, the level of 
resource, legal, management and emotional commitment for a strategic alliance would tend 
to be greater than in a partnership.  Strategic alliances have been described under various 
labels such as close relationships, partnerships, relational governance, vertical quasi-
integration, hybrid governance, and relationship commitment (Kale, Singh and Perlmutter, 
2000; Parkhe, 1993; Serapio and Cascio, 1996; Stuart, 1997; Varadarajan and 
Cunningham, 1995).  Hence, there remains some confusion.  However, another important 
difference is that strategic alliances are seen as critical to the future prospects of a business, 
while a partnership may be very important, but it is not seen as vital (Das and Rahman, 
2001).        
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Perpetuating the confusion, the term ‘alliance’ has been overused in the popular and 
practitioner press.  Even some academic definitions tend to attribute close partnerships as 
an alliance, when in effect the agreement is really just a tactical arrangement that happens 
to suit the channel members for a particular time, or even a relationship that displays little 
conflict or negative behaviours (Das and Rahman, 2001; Greco, Jul/Aug 1997; Stuart, 
1997; Varadarajan and Cunningham, 1995).  The power of the partners in an alliances is 
balanced and their respective influence is high, as each side could exert considerable sway 
over the other (Frazier, 1999).  This is not necessarily the same where two partners of 
unequal size and power decide to cooperate in a partnership.  Hence, as partnerships tend 
to be much more common and less well researched than formal strategic alliances, this 
research will focus on these types of arrangements observed in exchange relationships.    
2.9.4 Types of Partnership Relationships   
While the literature identifies several typologies of supply chain relationships and their 
various descriptive levels (Donaldson and O'Toole, 2000; Dwyer et al., 1987; Lambert et 
al., 1996; MacNeil, 1980a; Wilson, 1995), all these typologies are based on a common 
continuum that can be anchored at one extreme by, no relationship or transactional 
relationships, and at the other end by higher forms of alliances or ownership.  The middle 
portion usually represents true partnerships where actors collaborate to various degrees 
due to commercial and mutuality reasons despite having no equity interest (or at least a 
passive equity interest) in each other.  Since various forms of vertical integration and joint 
venture arrangements all involve a degree of ownership by each firm, they cannot be truly 
classified as a partnership of independently owned organisations working together.  Thus, 
dyadic partnerships with any obvious form of ownership will not be investigated in this 
research, similar to Heide and John’s approach (1990).16      
Moreover, for ease of construct development this research will simplify the various 
typologies and limit the investigation to true partnership type relationships.  Deriving the 
                                                 
16
 This research will be limited to those firms that are obviously not connected through some form of ownership to the 
partner firm.  The logic for this is that since the holding of a single share in the partner firm can technically be called a 
form of ownership, the actual governance influence is virtually non-existent.  In fact, even a large share holding in the 
partner firm may still not constitute a form of ownership governance if the investment is treated passively.  However, 
governance through vertical integration and joint ventures tend to be a feature of the organization, and inevitably there 
will be some form of obvious operational and governance integration.      
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conceptualisation of ‘partnership relationships’ for this research is predicated on well 
published prior research.  Initially, Webster’s (1992) relationship continuum describes a 
seven point continuum anchored by the lowest form of relationship as transactional and at 
the highest end as vertical integration.  The first four types of relationship on this 
continuum correspond to various forms of partnership.  Webster’s (1992) initial 
conceptualisation has been further refined by Lambert et al., (1996) who argued that there 
are in fact three different types of partnerships.  These are described as: 
Type I Partnerships: Initial recognition as partners in the exchange relationship on 
a limited basis, with transactions being coordinated and planned to some degree.  
They have a short term focus, and involve only a few areas within each organisation. 
Type II Partnerships: Involves organisations that have progressed beyond 
coordination, and are starting to integrate their activities such as joint planning to 
avoid variance and to deconflict objectives.  Typically, they take a longer term view 
toward the partnership and involve more areas of each organisation. 
Type III Partnerships: Involves organisations that share significant levels of 
operational and strategic integration, such that changes can be made without the need 
to renegotiate with the other partner.  These partnerships are viewed as not having an 
end date, and that each firm perceives the other as an extension of their own firm 
together providing unique synergies and competitive advantage.      
 Adapted from:  Lambert et al., (1996, pp. 2-3)        
However, Knemeyer et al., (2003) empirically tested the distinction between these three 
levels of partnership, and found little discriminatory support for the differences between 
Type II and III partnerships.  They found that they were in fact highly correlated.  The 
respondents did however find it easier to distinguish between a Type I and a higher level of 
partnership.  This simplification is represented in the following figure (Figure 2-4). 
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Figure 2-4 Conceptualisation of the relationship level dependent variable 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.9.4.1 Common Types of Exchange Relationships 
As previous research has operationalised the levels of relationship into two discrete 
categories of arms-length type transactional relationships and collaborative partnerships, 
the descriptions provided by Dyer and Singh (1998) of the extremes of the relationship 
continuum will provide the basis for the operationalisation of the two levels (see Table 2-3 
below).    
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This figure represents the extraction of the ‘partnership’ based mode of supply chain relationship from the wider typologies of 
Webster (1992), and Lambert, et al., (1996).  The partnership concept has been simplified for ease of construct development.    
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Table 2-3 Definitions for transactional relationships and collaborative partnerships 
Continuum of Partnership Exchange 
 Types of Partnership Exchange  
Exchange Element Transactional Relationships Collaborative Relationships 
Assets No specific investments in assets. Investments in relationship specific 
assets. 
Information / 
Communication 
Minimal information exchange.  Prices 
act as the coordinating signal by 
transmitting all relevant information. 
Substantial exchange of knowledge that 
results in joint coordination. 
Functional Systems Separate technological and functional 
systems within each firm.  Characterised 
by low levels of interdependency 
between firms, standard buyer / supplier 
sales contacts, no joint development 
and separate business (duplicated) 
processes. 
Multiple functional and operational 
interfaces.  The combination of 
complimentary resources or capabilities 
creating synergies. Complex 
interdependent operational systems and 
business processes. 
Governance  Third party enforcement (i.e. 
contractual).  Minimal investment in 
governance structures, low transaction 
costs, but high monitoring costs.     
 
Self enforcing agreements (i.e. relational 
norms).  More investment in governance 
structures, but lower monitoring costs.   
Adapted from (Dyer and Singh, 1998) 
 
 
Similar to Dyer and Singh’s (1998) descriptions, the two most common categories of 
relationships in marketing channel and inter-organisational literature can be generally 
defined as ‘arm-length transactional’ type relationships, and ‘partnership’ type 
relationships (Golicic, Foggin and Mentzer, 2003; O'Toole and Donaldson, 2000; Peterson 
and Wysocki, 1998; Sethuraman, Anderson and Narus, 1988).  These summative 
categories incorporate several dimensions that have been discussed at length in various 
empirical and conceptual research (Wilson, 1995).  Both these relationships include those 
that are governed by contracts and other formal obligations (Golicic et al., 2003), as well as 
those where the locus of power is wielded by one partner over the other in the exchange 
relationship (Cannon and Perreault, 1999; Hunt and Nevin, 1974; MacNeil, 1980b).  These 
two types of relationships will further defined as follows.      
2.9.4.2 Transactional Relationships  
Transactional or arm’s-length relationships can be described as the ‘invisible hand’ 
coordination of Adam Smith (1776) where individual economic actors pursue self-
interested relationships.  These can be defined as, “…short-term, opportunistic, limited 
information sharing, flexible and preserving of the actor’s independence” (Peterson and 
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Wysocki, 1998, p. 3).  The overall coordinative efforts are low and the barriers to 
switching are also low meaning that exchange actors can switch relationships with little 
difficulty or expense.  Indeed, a high degree of relationship mobility is evident within this 
type of relationship.  The following table presents the key descriptors of the transactional 
relationship (Table 2-4).   
Table 2-4 Transactional relationship descriptors 
 Descriptors Source 
1 Short term focus (Wilson, 1995) 
2 Includes relationships where one party is 
dominant (Donaldson and O'Toole, 2000) 
3 Both parties wish to go no further than having 
an efficient reliable supply arrangement (Donaldson and O'Toole, 2000) 
4 Basic buying and selling behaviours (Cannon and Perreault, 1999) 
5 Limited coordination (Bask, 2001) 
6 Opportunistic, limited information sharing, 
flexible (Peterson and Wysocki, 1998) 
7 Preserving the actor’s independence (Peterson and Wysocki, 1998) 
8 Low barriers to switching (Knemeyer et al., 2003) 
   
 
2.9.4.3 Partnership Relationships 
Conversely, partnership relationships have been described as a form of ‘managed 
coordination’ (Peterson and Wysocki, 1998).  Describing this managed coordination, 
Peterson and Wysocki (1998) posit that the relationship is built on the mutual interests of 
the exchange actors who tend to pursue relationships that are long-term, sharing in benefits 
and risk, open to information exchange, stable and supportive of interdependence.  The 
following table presents the key descriptors of the transactional relationship (Table 2-5). 
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Table 2-5 Partnership relationship descriptors 
 Descriptors Source 
1 Long-term orientation, no end date (Fawcett and Magnan, 2002) 
2 Includes relationships where one party is 
dominant (Donaldson and O'Toole, 2000) 
3 Openness and sharing of information (Cooper et al., 1997; Kent and Mentzer, 2003) 
4 High trust and commitment (Doney and Cannon, 1997) 
5 Shared investments (Bensaou and Anderson, 1999; Dyer and Singh, 1998) 
6 Implicit understanding of the relationship and 
development of social and relational norms (Heide and John, 1992) 
7 Extensive coordination (Simatupang, Wright and Sridharan, 2002) 
8 Sharing of benefits and risk, stable and 
supportive of interdependence. (Peterson and Wysocki, 1998) 
   
 
These two major types of exchange relationship are relatively common in business and 
heterogeneous in nature (Bhattacharya et al., 1996; Ellram, 1991, 1995; Lambert et al., 
1996).  Hence, movements from one form of relationship to another should be reasonably 
distinguishable.  Therefore, this research will use the Type I partnership as the initial 
anchor point, labelled as Transactional relationship, and a combination of the Type II and 
III descriptions to form the higher end point for the research continuum labelled as 
Partnerships relationships.  The new continuum will form the dependent variable for this 
research and is shown in the following figure (Figure 2-5). 
Figure 2-5 Transactional and Partnership exchange relationships - Dependant variable to measure 
dynamic relational movement. 
Transactional
Relationships
Partnership
Relationships
Relationship Termination
Forms of
Ownership
One-Off Discrete
Exchange
Relational Movement in Response to Behavioral Stimuli
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2.10 Chapter Summary 
In summary, having reviewed the literature on the theoretical basis of this research, we find 
that the economic paradigms of the Rational school provide the concepts of exchange 
relationships based on market forces and efficiency terminology.  This school also places 
an emphasis on the attenuation of opprobrious behaviour or its potential as a key concern 
for organisational and governance design.  It implies clearly that opportunistic behaviours 
have the potential to change exchange relationships and structures.  Next, the Relational 
school theories argue for a more behavioural based approach taking a more relational view 
to the concept of exchange governance.  It relaxes the hierarchical approach to governance 
and introduces sociological based behaviours that compliment and further the narrow 
economic definitions of the previous school.  It also suggests that collaboration can emerge 
even within a competitive environment, and that collaboration has value for those who 
participate.  Nevertheless, it is clear that these two schools have taken a philosophically 
static or cross-sectional view to exchange relationships, and that each theory does not 
contribute much to the understanding of an evolving and dynamic relational paradigm.      
These two seemingly opposing schools were somewhat reconciled through the efforts of 
researchers in the integrative theories by taking a more dynamic view.  General systems 
theory proposes that supply chains should be seen as complex systems with multiple 
feedback and control loops that are constantly changing and evolving.  Systems thinking 
offers powerful arguments against taking a reductionist point of view to supply chain 
relationships by suggesting that all actions or behaviours have intended and unintended 
consequences, and each by default changes the nature of the relationship over time.  
Furthering this dynamic view are the powerful metaphors derived from Chaos/Complexity 
theory.  They introduce the states of equilibrium and chaos, and that the road from one to 
the other is through bifurcation events or a change in state from stability to chaos, and even 
back again through self-organisation.  It is clear from literature that most exchange 
relationships exist in a state of equilibrium for the majority of the time.  Yet it is also clear 
that relationship change, splitting, termination or promotions are observable events.  
Hence, these adaptive concerns relate to how the changing environment, as well as any 
unanticipated exigencies affects the exchange relationship during its existence.   
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Having established the theoretical basis for exchange governance and behaviours, it is now 
hypothesised that these behaviours have the ability to impact on formed exchange 
relationships and change them over time.  This review has established the conditions for 
measuring any impact on the different levels of relationship.  Hence, the relationship level 
will be used as a dependent measure of dynamic exchange relationship change, and will be 
benchmarked ex ante and then measured ex post in response to various stimuli.  The next 
important step is to examine in more detail, in the next chapter, the two major supply chain 
behaviours of opportunism and collaboration. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
3 Supply Chain Behaviours 
3.1 Introduction  
Supply chain exchange relationships are embedded in complex organisational and social 
systems.  The mechanistic functions of exchange are embellished with a diverse variety of 
behaviours and socio-political motivated interactions that create a rich and deep context to 
explore.  Yet, each exchange event and its related behaviours are subordinated within an 
overarching control mechanism.  The Rational school literature would suggest that supply 
chain behaviours can be controlled or governed by market forces, hierarchies, and 
bureaucracies (Eisenhardt, 1989; Williamson, 1975, 1979, 1985).  However, Joshi and 
Stump (1999) note that in reality, many of the new organisational and exchange forms do 
not reflect conventional governance theory.  These new forms of governance found in 
practice have been variously described as assorted types of partnerships, joint ventures, 
strategic alliances, relational exchange, networks and virtual organisations (Arndt, 1979; 
Kartseva and Tan, 2004; Knoppen and Christiaanse, 2004; MacNeil, 1980a; Webster, 
1992).  The Relational school theories provide the logic that supports these modified 
behavioural exchange forms.  Nevertheless, there is a common thread running through both 
the Rational school’s conventional governance, and the Relational school’s hybrid 
governance forms.  That is, for efficient exchange, both schools require that actors behave 
collaboratively and refrain from opportunistic acts.  These two dominant themes 
continually reoccur throughout the literature.  Frequently they are deconstructed and 
analysed in isolation, and todate a comprehensive study of the impact of these two 
behaviours on supply chain relationships is conspicuous by its absence.  Given the 
centrality of these two major behaviours, it is no surprise that they are predicted to have a 
major influence on exchange relationships.  Hence, this chapter seeks to define supply 
chain behaviours, examine their original conceptualisations to determine their 
appropriateness, and where found deficient, to propose new definitions for these important 
supply chain constructs.        
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To achieve this, this chapter is broken into four major sections.  The first deals with 
opportunism, and the principle task of this section is to outline the perceptual differences 
between previous descriptions of opportunism and the new conceptualisation offered in 
this research.  It therefore attempts to recast the notion of opportunism beyond the limited 
‘self-seeking with guile’ (Williamson, 1985) definition common in theoretical literature, to 
one that encompasses a much boarder range of behaviours or ‘exchange transgressions’.  
The second section introduces collaborative behaviours in the supply chain and seeks to 
establish workable definitions for the dimensions of collaboration.  It also proposes a new 
consolidated typology of various collaborative behaviours that are said to positively 
influence exchange relationships.  Thirdly, the section on strategic behaviours positions the 
exchange relationship within a wider socio-political and macroeconomic environment that 
modifies behaviour by delimiting or approving certain actions according to the specific 
context.  Finally, the section on dynamic behaviours examines the nature of relationship 
movements in supply chains, and the concept of relationship bifurcations is introduced.  
Further, dynamic movements are positioned in terms of ‘threshold effects’ and ‘zones of 
tolerance’ that are hypothesised to exist around the relationship equilibrium.  The 
breaching of these zones would lead to a relationship bifurcation, and it is postulated that 
enacted collaborative and opportunistic behaviours would initiate this dynamic change.          
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3.2 Supply Chain Opportunistic Behaviours 
3.2.1 The Threat of Opportunism 
To say that opportunism is the only motivating force in exchange relationships is some 
what of an overstatement.  In fact, most Transaction Cost Economic (TCE) economists 
admit that the construct of opportunism is simply too narrow to account for the complete 
range of motivational assumptions of human behaviour (Moschandreas, 1997).  Not all 
individuals have Machiavellian tendencies all of the time, rather some individuals may 
behave opportunistically only some of the time (Wathne and Heide, 2000).  However, the 
mere possibility of, or the potential threat of someone behaving opportunistically is enough 
to have a significant influence on organisational design (Williamson, 1975), and 
interorganisational control mechanisms (John, 1984).  As such, costs of establishing 
control mechanisms, monitoring of work effort and behaviour, and preventing opportunism 
accounts for why some exchange relationships occur and others do not.  These additional 
transaction costs subsequently raise concerns about the efficacy of the control systems and 
structures built on the assumption of unbridled opportunism.  In fact, Moschandreas (1997) 
notes that,  
“Such systems incorporating auditing, monitoring and the adoption of 
administrative lines of authority and subordination that may have serious 
adverse effects on the work atmosphere, encouraging perfunctory, rather 
than cooperative behaviour.  More seriously, perhaps, the lack of trust 
and confidence associated with the expectation of opportunism may 
actually encourage individuals to behave in the postulated opportunistic 
fashion” (pp. 42-43).         
Hence, it seems that the mere expectation of opportunism may in fact actually perpetuate 
the behaviour.  In an attempt to mitigate opportunism, Information and Communication 
Technologies (ICT) and computerisation have been put forward by many supply chain 
researchers as a panacea to solve the TCE and Agency opportunism problems (Angeles 
and Nath, 2003; Batt and Purchase, 2004; Heribert and Silke, 2002; Ritter et al., 2004).  
They argue that the transparency of exchange through the use of real-time information 
systems and applications will negate the need for other forms of governance or 
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organisational control such as hierarchal or contractual.  Yet, there is some evidence to 
show that this somewhat blind allegiance to the coordinative power of information systems 
to control opportunism may be unfounded, at least in the short term.  For example, 
Bunduchi and Gerst (2004) have found in an empirical study of an well known Internet 
based trading market site, Covisint (established by major U.S. car manufacturers and their 
Original Equipment Manufacturers), that the use of the technology actually increases 
transaction costs, and that transaction risks have not been reduced.  On the contrary, asset 
specificity that has been linked to opportunism increases in the short to medium term.   
Thus, the treat of opportunism is sufficient to have a considerable effect on the design and 
control of exchange relationships.  Nevertheless, how opportunism impacts exchange 
relationships over time has yet to be investigated.  Further, the form or guises it takes 
remains centred on ‘guileful acts’ in literature, and a comprehensive typology of 
opportunism remains unfulfilled. 
3.2.2 The Controversy of Opportunism  
The mitigation of opportunism plays a central role in the Rational school theories of TCE, 
Agency theory, and opportunistic defection is a prime concern for Game theory.  For TCE 
opportunism is most often discussed in terms of an ‘ever present malevolent spectre’ 
(Bakkeland and Berthon, 1997; Brown et al., 2000; Bunduchi and Gerst, 2004; Hill, 1990; 
Joshi and Stump, 1999).  Indeed, one of the central motivations for the formulation of the 
Rational school theories in the first instance was the need to control for opportunism in 
economic exchange.  These theories proposed various safeguards that are adapted 
according to the nature of the exchange17.  However, opportunistic behaviour and how it is 
defined has proven to be a controversial topic (Williamson, 1993).  The classic definition 
of opportunism has been provided by Oliver Williamson (1985) who describes it as 
“…self-interest seeking with guile” or in other words, human behaviour comprising actions 
that are “…calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate or otherwise confuse” 
(p. 47).  According to Williamson (1979; 1985), the essence of opportunism seems to be 
some form of deliberate, deceitful act or omission that advances the position of the initiator 
                                                 
17
 As discussed in chapter two. 
Chapter Three – Supply Chain Behaviours 
 
79 
in some way or manner, either individually or for the organisation18.  The proclivity of 
actors to seek their own advancement in the eyes of their superiors by being seen to do 
well, save costs, or clinching an important deal has powerful appeal, even if the cost of 
achieving it is to behave opportunistically.  Consequently, John (1984) has formed a rather 
pessimistic view of human nature by asserting that “…human beings will behave 
opportunistically whenever such behaviour is feasible and profitable” (p. 278).  Further, 
opportunistic behaviours are usually initiated by individuals as they perform their duties, 
who in turn are influenced by their environment and power arrangements extant in the 
exchange relationship (Joshi and Arnold, 1997; MacNeil, 1980b).  Williamson (1979) 
notes that long-run exchange relationships are vulnerable to opportunistic behaviours due 
to asset specificity and small numbers that reduce market based moderating influences.  
Overall, given this brief synopsis it seems that opportunism is a multifaceted, pervasive 
and complex construct and is worthy of further exploration, particularly given its history of 
research in supply chain exchange relationships (Brown et al., 2000; Hunt and Nevin, 
1974; John, 1984; Lyons and Mehta, 1997; Williamson, 1975).  Naturally, the first step is 
to conceptually capture the domain of opportunistic behaviours by examining some 
common definitions, and types and forms that are present in literature.    
3.2.3 Opportunism in Research – Definitions, Forms and Evidence 
Opportunism as a construct appears in microeconomics as part of the prevailing 
behavioural assumption.  However, the consequences of opportunistic acts were never 
completely developed in the economic models of firms and markets.  Under the 
conventional assumptions of rationality and information symmetry, opportunism was in-
effect disallowed as a rule.  The economic actors were never permitted to embezzle, rob 
banks, nor transgress contractual or social bounds in seeking better deals for themselves or 
their firms (Williamson, 1975).  Indeed, it is self evident that such behaviour does in fact 
exist in markets and organisations.  Subsequently, opportunism was recognised as 
possessing a “…rich variety of forms, and is made to play a central role in the analysis of 
markets and hierarchies herein” (Williamson, 1975, p. 7).  Williamson (1975; 1979; 1985) 
essentially championed the cause of opportunism as a concept, and it has been included as 
                                                 
18
 It should be noted that opportunistic acts initiated to advance the cause of the company or organization could be linked 
to the self motivated desires of individuals, for example, career advancement. 
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a construct in many subsequent research efforts in areas such like, organisations (Carr and 
Brower, 2000; McHugh, Humphreys and McIvor, 2003), markets (Bensaou and Anderson, 
1999; Hill, 1990; Williamson, 1975), contracts (Chaserant, 2003; Lyons and Mehta, 1997) 
and marketing channels (Pilling and Zhang, 1992; Wathne and Heide, 2000).  While an 
important variable in these studies, surprisingly it is usually measured only by a single 
construct often utilising multi-item measures.  The reported validity of these measures of 
opportunism appears adequate (John, 1984; Provan and Skinner, 1989), it still only 
represents a single construct attempting to measure a very complex behaviour.     
Further, one of the most enduring definitions of opportunism refers to the “…self-
interested seeking with guile” offered by Oliver Williamson (1975, p. 26).  This classic 
definition has been cited as the founding conceptualisation of opportunism in many studies 
(see for example, Hill, 1990; John, 1984; Provan and Skinner, 1989).  Most researchers 
have used this quote as foundational, yet some have sought to widen the definition arguing 
that Williamson’s idea is too restricted.  However, todate their efforts have not been 
conclusive. 
A sociologist, Grannovetter (1985), extends Williamson’s definition by arguing that 
opportunism is the rational pursuit by economic actors for their own advantage with all 
means at their command, including guile and deceit.  He argues that the economic 
definition ignores relational pressure to either initiate acts or conform to proper social 
norms.  Griesinger (1990) has suggested that negative opportunism in exchange 
relationships takes the form of three distinct behaviours; “…dishonesty, infidelity and 
shirking” (p. 486-487).  While for supply chain alliances, opportunism has been defined by 
Das and Teng (1998) as consisting of “…cheating, shirking, distorting information, 
misleading partners, providing substandard products/services and appropriating partner’s 
critical resources” (p. 492).  It is clear that these definitions offer only slight variations or 
modifications to the original theme of ‘self seeking with guile’.  Hence, in terms of the 
marketing channel and economic literature, all current conceptual and empirical definitions 
of opportunism closely resemble Williamson’s (1979; 1985) original conceptualisation.  
Indeed, that no comprehensive attempt to axiomatically examine the depth on this 
construct todate is curious given the centrality of this behaviour to many theories.  This 
research attempts to address this point in the following sections.      
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3.2.3.1 Sins of Commission and Omission both Explicit and Implicit  
John (1984) contributes to the area by highlighting some opportunistic behaviours such as 
“…withholding or distorting information, and shirking or failing to fulfil promises or 
obligations” (p. 278).  John’s (1984) point is that opportunism can comprise acts of 
commission as well as acts of omission.  However, he has perhaps unwittingly introduced 
other dimensions when he describes actions such as ‘breaching promises and obligations’, 
yet, he remains silent on their form or nature.  Certainly, most actors would recognise a 
deliberate breach of a contractual obligation as falling clearly in the opportunist camp.  
Yet, what about breaching other forms of obligations, such as personal promises, or private 
understandings? or even actions that are contrary to the prevailing social and relational 
norms of the exchange?  While clearly not as serious as breaching formal contracts, these 
other forms of ‘exchange transgressions’ can nonetheless be opportunistic if done in a 
deliberate and self-centred manner.  As described by John (1984), Morgan and Hunt 
(1994), and Williamson (1975), the essence of opportunism is the presence of deceit in the 
action, and thus can be viewed as guileful, deceitful and corrupt behaviour, either legally, 
morally, socially, or relationally.  Indeed, John (1984) refines the definition of opportunism 
by describing it as “…the deceit-oriented violation of implicit or explicit promises about 
one’s appropriate or required role behaviour” (p. 279).  The interesting thing about this 
definition is that John (1984) is introducing the element of ‘appropriateness of behaviour’ 
with regard to implicit or explicit promises.  The conclusion to be drawn here is that John 
(1984) could be suggesting that implicit promises (common understanding, non-verbalised) 
are as important and as equally valid as explicit promises (verbalised or formalised).  This 
potentially opens up a range of new implicit behaviours to be incorporated under the 
opportunistic construct.   
Not only does this definition support the contention that deliberately breaching an explicit 
promise is opportunistic, but also that breaching some unstated common understanding or 
implicit norm is also opportunistic, if attended with the same self-seeking motivations.  It 
should be noted that self-enforced commitments or pledges of specific promises or 
behaviours that are implied in channel contracts and relationships often cannot be 
explicitly secured ex ante.  Thus, one of the major dilemmas of channel managers is 
discerning whether implicit promises made during negotiations, relationship formation or 
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continuance are in fact sincere or made with a casual intent, opening the possibility of 
opportunistic behaviours ex post the underlying agreement.  Hence, classifying 
opportunistic behaviour is very context dependent (i.e. implicit or explicit).  A given action 
can be classified as opportunistic according to the context within which it is performed.  A 
fundamental question here is whether any particular action is contrary to the spirit or 
principles of the relationship in which it occurs (Wathne and Heide, 2000).  If it is, then it 
could potentially be classified as opportunistic.        
3.2.3.2  Types and Forms of Opportunism 
Barney and Ouchi (1986), under the TCE and Agency paradigms, have classified 
opportunistic behaviours into three specific forms; adverse selection, moral hazards, and 
hold-ups.  Adverse selection concerns pre-contractual opportunistic behaviours that 
attempt to exploit asymmetric information about future performance.  Moral hazards 
exploit asymmetric information post-contract, and is concerned about current performance.  
Finally, hold-ups concern holding relationship specific assets and investments hostage in 
order to exploit the other partner’s dependence.  While these provide an outline of when 
one could expect opportunistic actions, the forms are quite generalised and do not indicate 
specific behaviours or actions.  Wathne and Heide (2000) are more specific, and offer a 
matrix of opportunistic actions based on active or passive behaviours19 in either existing or 
new circumstances.  Their conceptualisation of types and forms of opportunistic 
behaviours is reproduced in Figure 3-1 following. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19
 Active behaviours could conceptually relate to explicit promise, and passive to implicit promises. 
Chapter Three – Supply Chain Behaviours 
 
83 
Figure 3-1 Forms of opportunism and possible outcomes 
 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wathne and Heide’s (2000) matrix is one of the few attempts in literature to extend the 
definition of opportunism beyond Williamson’s (1979; 1985) classic ideal.  It identifies a 
conceptual difference between active and passive opportunism, and it also attempts to 
describe some types of opportunism by the labelling of the quadrants.  Yet it is still lacking 
in specific behaviours.  Also, given that it was a conceptual paper, the differences 
described in the matrix have not been empirically validated. 
3.2.3.3 Evidence 
Despite the important insights that have been provided in literature, opportunism and 
opportunistic acts have only been addressed in a piecemeal fashion and the concept is 
incomplete in certain respects.  The following Table (Table 3.1) attempts to group the 
extant literature under major themes that are descriptive of the components, elements and 
actions of opportunism.   
1. Evasion
Cost effect:
Decrease for O (short-term)
increase for E (long-Term)
Revenue Effect:
Decrease for E, S (long-term)
2. Refusal to Adapt
Cost effect:
Minimal
Revenue Effect:
Increase for O (short-term), decrease
for E and O (long-term, forgone
revenues due to maladaptation)
3. Violation
Cost effect:
increase for E (long-Term)
Revenue Effect:
Increase for O (short-term),
decrease for E, S (long-term)
4. Forced
Renegotiation
Cost effect:
Increase for E (haggling and
concessions)
Revenue Effect:
Increase for O (short-term from
concessions), decrease for E and O
(long-term, forgone revenues due to
maladaptation)
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O = Party engaging in opportunistic behaviour:  
E = Exchange partner:  
S = System (e.g. other parts) 
Source: Wathne and Hide, 2000, p. 41. 
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Table 3-1 Opportunism, Concepts, Behaviours and Actions 
Element Related Authors   
Betrayal of Trust (Elangovan and Shapiro, 1998)   
Breaching Norms – Social and 
relational 
(Berthon et al., 2003) (Heide and John, 1992) 
(Anderson and Weitz, 1992) 
(Lambe et al., 2002) 
Broken Promises  (Donaldson, 1996) (John, 1984) (Knemeyer and Murphy, 2004) 
Coercion  (Predue, 1992)   
Conflict:  Channel (Gaski, 1984) (Anderson and Narus, 1990) (Morgan and Hunt, 1994) 
Conflict:  Functional (Morgan and Hunt, 1994) (Dwyer et al., 1987)  
Dishonesty (Knemeyer and Murphy, 2004)   
Distortion of Information  (Williamson, 1975) 
(Klein, 1996) 
(Williamson, 1993) 
(Knemeyer and Murphy, 2004) 
(Joshi and Arnold, 1997) 
(Hill, 1990) 
Enhancing own Ego (the Buyer) (Webster, 1972)   
Fear of Loss (economic) (Humphries and Wilding, 2001) (Chaserant, 2003)  
Hold-Outs  
(Holding relationship specific 
investments to ransom) 
(Helper et al., 2000) 
(Bensaou and Anderson, 1999) 
(Wathne and Heide, 2000) (Williamson, 1979) 
Illegality  (Moore and Cunningham, 1999) (Hill, 1990): stealing and cheating  
Manipulation of Facts by Buyers (Predue, 1992)   
Myopic Opportunism  
(short term goals and orientation) 
(Chaserant, 2003)   
Obtaining Personal Favours  
(the Buyer) 
(Webster, 1972)   
Power – The exercise of  
(Legitimate, Expert, Referent, 
Coercive, Reward) 
(Reve and Stern, 1979) 
(John, 1984) 
(Cox, 1999) 
(Kent and Mentzer, 2003) 
(MacNeil, 1980b) 
(Fisher, 1997) 
(Gaski, 1984) 
(Stern and El-Ansary, 1992) 
Power – Legitimate  (Batt and Purchase, 2004) (Achrol, 1997)  
Power – Coercive (Achrol, 1997) (Pilling and Zhang, 1992)  
Power – Countervailing (Heribert and Silke, 2002)   
Power – Bilateral and Unilateral  (MacNeil, 1980b)   
Reintroducing Competition (Donaldson, 1996)   
Reciprocal or Pre-emptive 
Opportunism (retaliation) 
(Williamson, 1993) (Diskerson, 1998)  
Selfishness – Self Interest (Palmer, 2002) (Elangovan and Shapiro, 1998) (Bakkeland and Berthon, 1997) 
Termination Costs  
(potential for) 
(Morgan and Hunt, 1994)  (Walker and Weber, 1987)  
Threats and Promises (false) (Williamson, 1975) (Predue, 1992)  
Treat or Propensity to 
Leave/Exit/Defection 
(Morgan and Hunt, 1994) 
(Palmer, 2002) 
 
(Bansal, Irving and Taylor, 2004) 
(Gundlach et al., 1995) 
(Axlerod, 1990) 
(Williamson, 1996) (contrived 
cancellation) 
Undetected Opportunism   (Hill, 1990)   
Uncertainty (cultivated) (Morgan and Hunt, 1994) (Bakkeland and Berthon, 1997)  
Value Appropriation  (Cox, 1999, 2001) (Dyer, 1997) (Porter, 1979) 
Withholding of Effort / 
Underperformance 
(Bunduchi and Gerst, 2004) (Williamson, 1975, 1979)  
Note that this table is not exhaustive.  It is presented to provide the reader with some comprehension of the multifaceted nature of supply chain 
opportunism.   
 
This table demonstrates that opportunism can be defined as the lack of honesty or integrity 
in the exchange relationship, and can be manifested in subtle actions like breaching 
relational norms and promises, to withholding and distorting information with the intent to 
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mislead, to entirely illegal actions such as contrived contract cancellation (Williamson, 
1996), and finally to theft, misappropriation and fraud (Moore and Cunningham, 1999).  
The risk of opportunism is inherent in all exchange relationships, and chillingly John 
(1984) notes that the greatest potential for opportunistic behaviour is in long-term 
relationships where the discipline of market based competition is reduced or eliminated by 
a lack of large numbers competition.  Such a state usually arises as a result of close inter-
organisational alignment through collaborative arrangements.  Hence, the very method of 
relationally controlling for opportunism may actually create an environment where it in 
fact flourishes.  Further, given the wide range of opportunistic behaviours scattered 
piecemeal throughout literature, it now becomes somewhat difficult to defend the standard 
definition of opportunism as commonly used.          
3.2.4 Opportunism – Perceptions and Motivations 
Opportunistic behaviours are generally held as being perpetrated by one party of a 
relationship (i.e. in a dyad) against the other party.  Hence, a villain and victim are created.  
The analysis in literature tends to focus on the villain and the actions or threats that can be 
made, yet little attention has been paid to the victim and their perceptions of the event.   
Firstly, concerning the perpetrator (the villain), Elangovan and Shapiro (1998) have 
conceptualised three types of betrayal actions or reasons why an actor would behave 
opportunistically.  In particular, they focus on the psychological processes underlying the 
‘motivation’ to betray or act opportunistically.  Specifically, Elangovan and Shapiro (1998) 
suggest that betrayal actions can take the form of either, “…accidental, premeditated or 
opportunistic betrayals” (p. 563).  The difference between the three is the presence of 
intent and the timing of the action.  Accidental betrayal involves no intent to behave 
opportunistically but is where a mistake or error has been made, for example accidentally 
overcharging on an invoice.  Conversely, premeditated betrayal involves deliberate intent 
to behave opportunistically prior to the opportunity to do so.  For example, the actions of 
con-artists exemplify this form of opportunism.  Similarly, in opportunistic betrayal the 
intent to betray arises in response to specific situations, and the results of betrayal are 
weighted against the implications of betraying versus maintaining trust.  In other words, 
for opportunistic betrayal a “…reasoned analysis precede a conscious decision to betray” 
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(Elangovan and Shapiro, 1998, p. 552), thus distinguishing it from accidental betrayal.  
They note that the bulk of betrayal incidents take the form of opportunistic betrayal.    
Secondly, while the villain’s motivations to behave opportunistically are important, from 
the victim’s side of the dyad the motivations of the villain are less important than the 
consequences of the behaviours.  For example, in a buyer-supplier dyad if the buyer is the 
aggrieved party, then it matters little from the buyer’s perspective what motivated the 
supplier to behave opportunistically (i.e. if it was accidental or intentional behaviour).  
Rather, what matters the most is the buyer’s perceptions of the opportunistic event or 
potential event, even if they cannot discern or erroneously attribute a certain motivation.  
Thus, it can be argued that even if the supplier’s (the villain) actual motivation is not 
opportunistic or self-seeking (i.e. accidental), the behaviour will still result in negative 
perceptions being formed by the buyer (the victim).  Similar attributions of motivation 
leading to perception formation on one side of the dyad are found in other areas of supply 
chain research.  For example, Webb and Hogan (2002) have observed in hybrid channels, 
that conflict involves the formation of a perception that is based on the behaviour of the 
other channel coalition or partner.  Indeed, “…even if one coalition does not intend to 
work at cross-purposes with another, conflict will occur if it is perceived to be doing so” 
(p. 340).  Hence, measuring the perceptions formed of another’s behaviour could be argued 
as being as reliable as measuring the actual underlying motives.  Perceptions are perhaps 
more amenable to research efforts because regardless of true motives, reactive or 
retaliatory behaviours are enacted in response to the perceptions held.  Other channel 
studies have also observed this phenomenon (see for example Brown and Day, 1981; 
Gaski, 1984).  Further, it is argued that perceptual measurers are more appropriate, as 
perceptions of conflict have been highly correlated with the number of conflictioral 
episodes (Webb and Hogan, 2002).  The perceptions formed by one side of a dyad of the 
behaviour of the other can be taken, certainly as Webb and Hogan (2002) found, as the 
main indicator or measure of channel conflict.  Thus, a buyer’s (the victim) perceptions of 
self-seeking motivations attributed to a supplier’s (the villain) observed behaviour are 
sufficient to establish the presence of opportunistic behaviour, even though the true 
motivation of the supplier could have been entirely genuine.  It is the perceptions of the 
aggrieved that counts, and will guide an actor’s subsequent supply chain behaviours and 
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tolerance unless the matter is quickly cleared up between the dyadic partners.  
Nevertheless, it is not the contention of this research to differentiate the various 
motivations for channel member opportunism.  Thus, whether an opportunistic act is 
accidental, premeditated or arises due to circumstances, it is the victim’s perceptions of the 
villain’s behaviour that counts.  
3.2.5 Opportunistic Behaviour and Loss 
For behaviour to be defined as opportunistic, a loss of some kind must be inflicted on the 
victim at some point.  Behaviour that takes advantage of a bona-fide business opportunity 
with the tacit approval, or at least knowledge of the other party is clearly not opportunistic.  
However, depending on the degree of looseness of the relationship, unilateral behaviour 
that results in one party advancing their own cause to the detriment of other should be 
counted as opportunistic.  Necessarily, the ex post consequence of such behaviour is some 
form of loss, uncertainty or negative situation suffered by the aggrieved party.  The losses 
endured by victims of opportunistic behaviour could take a number of forms.  It is 
theorised that opportunistic losses would include; economic loss, opportunity and utility 
loss, and non-economic losses. 
3.2.5.1 Economic Loss   
These losses are expressed in monetary and economic terms.  They include; lost revenue 
and termination costs (Morgan and Hunt, 1994), investigation and monitoring costs, 
litigation and negotiation costs (Arrighetti et al., 1997), switching costs, and the loss of 
relational specific investments.  
3.2.5.2 Opportunity and Utility Loss.   
These losses represent lost future revenue or potential opportunities and enjoyment due to 
the opportunistic behaviour.  They include; the loss of access or use of other resources 
previously available through the other partner, the ability to enjoy (Simatupang and 
Sridharan, 2002), the loss of access to the partner’s personal networks and contacts, not 
being able to pursue other courses of action as a result of the losses suffered by the 
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opportunistic actions, and loss of access to distribution channels, markets and lost sales 
(Morgan and Hunt, 1994). 
3.2.5.3 Non-economic Loss.   
These losses are expressed in non-monetary terms and represent the social and relational 
costs of the behaviour.  They include; the loss of prestige, the loss of social satisfaction 
derived from the association (Dwyer et al., 1987), the socio-psychological costs such as 
worry, stress, aggravation, and perceived loss of reputation (Morgan and Hunt, 1994), 
feelings of betrayal and conflict (Kwon and Suh, 2004), soured relational sentiments and 
climate (Gundlach et al., 1995), and hardship (Arrighetti et al., 1997). 
Therefore, for specific behaviours to be classified as opportunistic a form of loss must have 
been suffered by the aggrieved party.  This, however, is not to be confused with 
opportunity taking.  
3.2.6 Opportunities versus Opportunism  
In addition to the above section outlining the differences between actual motivation and 
perceived (attributed) motivation, we can also discern some perceptual differences between 
legitimate opportunity taking versus acts of opportunism.  One of the major dilemmas 
faced by supply chain actors is determining the point where taking a business opportunity 
that presents itself changes into an act of opportunism?  At what point does doing business 
cross the line from taking an opportunity to taking advantage?  Again the answer lies in the 
perceptions held by the dyadic partner or affected actors and any potential for loss that may 
occur.      
The Rational school would suggest that utility maximising would involve the minimisation 
of transaction cost and the maximisation of revenues, and as a result opportunism would be 
minimised because it is efficient to do so (Williamson, 1975).  Conversely, the opportunity 
maximisation approach is consistent with the Relational School as managers 
collaboratively seek various combinations of resources from the dyad that will generate 
additional relational rents (Barney, 1991).  This time the emphasis is on revenue 
generation.  Regardless of the managerial approach taken (opportunism minimisation or 
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opportunity maximisation), both seek to generate revenues that would not have been 
available without some form of partnership.  A subtle difference is that the objectives of 
the two approaches are different.  The opportunism minimisation approach seeks rents 
through efficiencies, while opportunity maximisation approach seeks additional rents 
through collaboration.  Interestingly, both objectives cannot be achieved in isolation, and 
one partner cannot unilaterally achieve either of these objectives without the tacit 
knowledge of the other dyad partner.   
Nevertheless, the fundamental difference is whether an action is taken unilaterally, or in 
unison with the exchange partner.  One can argue that rent seeking acts taken unilaterally 
advances one’s own position to the exclusion of the other, and therefore can be classified 
as an opportunistic act.  Particularly so if a loss is incurred by the innocent partner.  
However, opportunity taking cannot be defined as opportunistic if both partners are acting 
in unison or at least with some common knowledge.  It is this second reason that sees inter-
firm collaboration and inter-supply chain competition and market efficiencies.  In 
Williamson’s (1979; 1985; 1996) view, advantages or actions derived from pre-existing, 
known factors or conditions cannot be described as opportunistic.  Rather, they are unique 
skills, abilities or resources that provide an advantage over other competitors and rightly 
attract higher rents.  Therefore, there is a clear distinction between opportunistic acts and 
opportunity taking.  It is in the former that this research will develop further in the next 
section  
3.2.7 Extending the Definition of Opportunism  
Having established the perceptual differences between opportunistic motivations versus 
perceptions of opportunism, and also opportunism versus opportunity taking, it is now 
clear that the construct has not been fully developed in the literature.   This research 
attempts to contribute to the overall body of knowledge by outlining a working definition 
of opportunism in the supply chain context.  Therefore, it is suggested that a wider and 
fuller definition of opportunism, such as one that follows, should be adopted: 
Opportunistic behaviours are any acts of commission or omission that 
are self-seeking in nature that knowingly and deliberately advances ones 
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own position or organisation in some manner to the detriment of others, 
or perceived by others as being self-seeking even if the original 
motivations or intentions of the actions are pure.  These behaviours 
include acts that deviate from any explicit or implicit formal or non-
formalised governance agreements, contracts, promises, personal 
understandings or norms of behaviour.        
Given this new working definition, it is now necessary to categorise the forms of 
opportunistic behaviours into a new multidimensional construct that extends the current 
unidimensional and often single item scale that is prevalent in current supply chain 
management research. 
3.2.8 New Forms of Opportunism 
The various opportunistic behaviours, as catalogued in Table 3-1, show a large range of 
disparate behaviours.  It can be determined that some of these behaviours are more severe 
or opprobrious than others.  Therefore, categorising opportunistic behaviours according to 
degree of severity seems a logical next step.  It can also be observed that some behaviours 
are so severe that they will breach not only implicit understandings, but also explicit 
contracts and agreements thereby transgressing various statute laws, and thus becoming 
open to either criminal or tort litigations (Deakin and Michie, 1997; MacNeil, 1978).  
Thus, opportunistic behaviours can also be further defined along the lines of ‘the degree of 
legal recourse’ available to the aggrieved party.  This ranges from no recourse at all 
through to full protection under statute (Lyons and Mehta, 1997).  Derived from the 
proposed definition, it is theorised that the opportunistic behaviours that influence supply 
chain relationship levels can consist of the following dimensions; social opportunism, 
commercial opportunism, unconscionable opportunism, and finally illegal opportunism.  
Each category will explained in the following sections.          
3.2.8.1 Social and Relational Opportunism 
The first form of opportunistic behaviour could be thought of as the most innocuous of the 
four, and centres around the social and psychological contracts and bonds formed in supply 
chain relationships (Chaserant, 2003; Kingshott, 2003; MacNeil, 1980a).     
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For social or relational norms to be breached by opportunistic behaviours, they must be 
present in the relationship in the first instance.  Heide and John (1992) discuss how 
supportive social and relational norms have the ability to govern inter-organisational 
relationships between independent firms.  As a working definition they state that “…norms 
are expectations about behaviour that are at least partially shared by a group of decision 
makers” (p. 34).  Relational exchange norms are developed over time within a trading 
relationship and reflect to a degree, stewardship behaviour in that they are designed to 
enhance the wellbeing of the relationship as a whole (Kwon and Suh, 2005; Moore and 
Cunningham, 1999; Shapiro, 2005).  Ouchi’s (1980) theorised ‘clan’ structures reflect a 
community governed almost exclusively on common behavioural norms.  Where 
normative trusting behaviour has been established, its deliberate betrayal is an example of 
this form of opportunism (Elangovan and Shapiro, 1998).  However, inter-organisational 
social and relational norms are complex and heterogeneous in nature (Arrighetti et al., 
1997; Bakkeland and Berthon, 1997; Berthon et al., 2003; Heide and John, 1992).  They 
include aspects such as trust and commitment (Morgan and Hunt, 1994), mutuality 
(Simatupang et al., 2002), sharing information (MacNeil, 1980a) and goal congruence 
(Achrol, 1997) that all contribute toward forming accepted social and relational normative 
behaviours.  Heide and John (1992) further note that norms exist at different levels (such as 
societal, organisational and group norms), they also differ in content (such as they differ in 
their prescription of the same behaviours), and that inter-firm norms are multidimensional 
as they relate to specific supply chain behaviours.   
3.2.8.1.1 Normative Vertical Control Strategies  
The management of boundary space between organisations in a supply chain is an area that 
has garnered much management and research attention.  However, there is one area in 
particular does not seem to be as well addressed as others.  This concerns the establishment 
of normative vertical control strategies as a governance substitute for ownership control on 
one extreme, or pure market relationships on the other (Berthon et al., 2003; Brown et al., 
2000).  Clearly, social and relationship norms develop over time (Burchell and Wilkinson, 
1997; Gundlach et al., 1995), and do so initially between boundary spanning individuals 
prior to the organisation taking on these relational traits (Bendapudi and Leone, 2002; 
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Frazier and Sheth, 1985).  Yet, organisations do form accepted social and relational norms 
vicariously as more and more boundary spanning individuals buy into the prevailing 
normative behaviour.  The longer the exchange process continues between firms, the 
greater the chance that discernable patterns of boundary space behaviour will begin to 
form.  Each channel member or organisation behaving in unique but rhythmic ways 
according to the exchange and inter-firm context.  Once recognised as a pattern, these 
typical behaviours are internalised as normative by the boundary spanning employees and 
firms, thus forming the framework for anticipating future behaviours of the exchange 
partner.  Hence, social and relational norms do develop over time between exchange 
partners, and can also be considered as effective alternative means of governing the 
boundary space and interactions (Heide and John, 1992).  The pattern in establishing these 
norms are consistent with relational exchange theory.     
Where exchange relationships are established from the outset without formal contracts or 
agreements, then over time the norms of the exchange will be adopted as the default 
governance mechanism.  Chaserant (2003) observes that ‘contract incompleteness’ requires 
the formation of control through relationships.  Often, these norms are reinforced with 
implicit or explicit pledges (Anderson and Weitz, 1992).  Therefore, it is theorised that 
breaching any of these normative understandings or pledges in a self-seeking manner could 
constitute a new form of opportunism not previously considered in literature.  
Opportunism under social and relational norms refers to any act or omission that is a 
violation of the prevailing boundary space norm or pattern of norms.  Thus, for a behaviour 
or act to be classified as opportunistic in this context; it must be self-seeking to the 
detriment of the others, it must breach or be atypical to an expected normative behaviour, 
and a norm must have been established in the first instance.  Therefore, such actions can 
constitute valid opportunistic behaviour, only here social and relational norms are the 
yardstick for measuring breaches.  However, it is noted that generally there will be little or 
no legal recourse when expectations and promises (excluding promises used in contract 
formation) are contravened, ignored or flouted.  The aggrieved exchange partner is left 
with little choice but to either modify their normative expectations, modify the exchange 
relationship or to terminate the relationship.         
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Therefore, a working definition of social opportunism is offered as follows: 
The breaching of formal or informal social or relations norms of 
behaviour between the exchange partners that have been established 
through either agreement or expectations built on previous actions of the 
partner.  No legal recourse available. 
3.2.8.2 Commercial Opportunism  
The second form of opportunism under the new paradigm is that of commercial 
opportunism.  In essence, this form of opportunism is manifested by the exercise of 
commercial power or leverage by one supply chain actor over another to extract some form 
of advantage or concession (Berthon et al., 2003; Cox, 2001; Gaski, 1984).  El-Ansary and 
Stern’s (1972) seminal article on power within a distribution channel empirically shows 
that power is a function of dependence and sources of power in inter-firm relationships.  
Their reasoning indicates that the application of power by the dominant party would force 
unwanted modifications on the dependent party for self-interested reasons.  Hence, Provan 
and Skinner (1989) subsequently link opportunistic behaviour with forms of power.  
Opportunistic behaviour can influence the other exchange partner into making decisions 
that favour the perpetrator in ways that that extend well beyond the traditional sources of 
power (Hunt and Nevin, 1974).  It should be noted that even if a firm possesses various 
sources of power and dependent intermediaries, it does not necessarily mean that they will 
exercise that power, or be successful if they did (Frazier, 1983).  Indeed, dependence can 
also be used to increase cooperation and decrease conflict (Skinner, Gassenheimer and 
Kelley, 1992).  Nevertheless, Joshi and Arnold (1997) argue that in a bargaining context 
those “…buyers who engage in aggressive bargaining by demanding concessions from 
suppliers exemplify self-interest behaviour” (p. 826).  Helpfully, the various sources of 
power have been defined by French and Raven (1959) into five major forms, namely, 
reward, coercive, legitimate, referent and expert.  Of these five forms of power, Hunt and 
Nevin (1974) suggest that only coercive power has the ability to demonstrate sanctions and 
force the desired concessions from the subject, while the other forms of power are 
essentially non-coercive in nature.  Non-coercive sources of power are perceptually 
different to coercive sources.  Essentially, the difference is the willingness to concede or 
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yield to the influence or power source (Hunt and Nevin, 1974).  For non-coercive sources 
one party willingly concedes or defers to the other party with the power.  These sources of 
power are; reward power (being compensated for a concession), legitimate (deference to a 
superior or a higher rank), referent (being awed by the status of the other party), and expert 
(conceding to the party with superior knowledge or expertise) (French and Raven, 1959).  
In contrast, when coercive commercial power is exercised the party with less power will be 
forced against their will to accept the new circumstances, often in contravention to the 
prevailing expectations.  For example, a recent Competition Commission (U.K.) report into 
the relative buyer power of U.K. supermarket chains show a dramatic increase in buyer 
power and ability to leverage price reductions from suppliers through retail consolidation 
in the food industry (Clarke, 2000a; Hollingsworth, 2004).  This exercise of seemingly 
legitimate power has been brought into question recently by regulatory bodies as the larger 
retailers start to gain almost monopoly control over their supply chains, and begin to act in 
an ever increasing unilateral opportunistic manner.   
Hence, the exercise of commercial opportunism (coercive power) occurs when one party to 
the relationship uses its position or commercial leverage to extract some form of 
concession or advantage to the determent of the other partner.  Some authors would 
suggest that this practice is actually a legitimate form of business and is so common that it 
could not possibly warrant the description as opportunistic behaviour (Cox, 1999, 2001).  
John (1984) states that the use of power through such behaviours as “…hard bargaining, 
intense and frequent disagreements and similar conflictual behaviours do not constitute 
opportunism” (p. 278).  It is logical under economic considerations that actors will attempt 
to improve either their own position or that of their employers and thus, opportunities to 
improve their position will be taken when presented.  Under these assumptions, it would 
not be correct to classify these actions as opportunistic behaviours.  However, it is posited 
that under socio-political and relational conditions that some relational norms or 
relationship expectations would have been violated by an actor pursuing the opportunity.  
Achrol (1997) notes that traditional forms of dyadic power can be exercised inter alia in an 
opportunistic manner.  Thus, it can be argued that pursuing legitimate business 
opportunities to improve one’s own position that uses a form of coercive power and 
violates a relational norm or expectation can indeed be classified as an opportunistic act.  
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Invariably, one of the parties will be disadvantaged in an economic or even a relational 
sense.  It is further argued that since one party was forced to concede, then they have 
suffered some form of loss as defined in section 3.2.5, and especially so if some form of 
expectation of relationship continuance or norm has also been breached in the process. 
Such situations of power imbalance are reflected in monopsonic markets where a single 
dominant buyer controls demand from multiple suppliers.  Examples of monopsonic 
players are General Motors, Ford, Chrysler (Hunt and Morgan, 1994),  Boeing, and Wal-
Mart in the U.S., and Foodstuffs and Progressive Enterprises in the New Zealand 
supermarket industry.  Virtually all of these buyers dictate a set of non-negotiable terms 
and conditions for the exchange that a potential suppler can either accept or reject.  One 
can question if these powerful partners are actually partners at all?  However, an agreement 
to conduct an exchange relationship, even under these dictatorial conditions, implies a 
willingness, if not an eagerness to enter into an exchange partnership (Ayres, 2004).  
However, for the construct of commercial opportunism there is an essential difference 
between willingly entering a new relationship under adverse or non-negotiable terms, and 
other situations where commercial opportunism is exercised during an existing 
relationship.  Accepting adverse terms and conditions from the outset is not commercial 
opportunism, however, coercive manoeuvres during the relationship can be defined as such 
if it involves losses or breaches of mutual expectations.          
3.2.8.2.1 Criteria for Commercial Opportunism 
Therefore, supply chain behaviour can be classified as commercial opportunism if it 
satisfies all of the following three major criteria;   
1. A form of commercial leverage or coercive power is exercised during the 
relationship.  
2. The behaviour must result in a form of loss to the non-initiator.  
3. The behaviour breaches some mutual or unilateral expectation as to continuance of 
current exchange conditions and circumstances. 
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If appropriating economic rents and advancing one’s own position relative to others forms 
the basis of opportunistic behaviour, then surely the exercise of power and commercial 
leverage to appropriate economic rents and advance one’s own position relative to others 
should also be considered opportunistic in nature.  Essentially, it can be seen that 
commercial opportunism violates principles of exchange fairness. 
Thus, a working definition of commercial opportunism is: 
The unilateral use of bargaining or other forms of coercive power during 
the relationship to appropriate some concession from the exchange 
partner, including forced renegotiations and holdouts, that breach forms 
of normative expectations and result in a form of loss to one party.  
Generally, there is no legal recourse available.   
3.2.8.3 Unconscionable Opportunism - The Classical Definition 
In the continuum of opportunistic behaviours there is obviously a place for the classic 
definition of opportunism as originally proposed by Williamson (1975; 1985).  Hence, the 
third form of opportunism reflects the common definition as used in literature, and is 
labelled here as ‘unconscionable opportunism’. 
There is little need here to elaborate further, as unconscionable opportunism very closely 
reflects the standard measures of opportunism that have already been widely published and 
previously discussed in this research20 (Dwyer and Oh, 1987; John, 1984; Provan and 
Skinner, 1989).  However to briefly reiterate, this form of opportunism constitutes 
“…calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate or otherwise confuse” 
(Williamson, 1985, p. 47).  This also includes behaviour such as refusing to act, 
unwillingness to adapt, or withholding of effort by one party.  What differentiates 
unconscionable opportunism from other forms is that it takes a ‘blatant’ form (Williamson, 
1975), or as Wathne and Heide (2000) term it “…the strong form assumption” (p. 38).  
This form of opportunism clearly breaches agreements and understandings in a very 
questionable manner.   
                                                 
20
 See sections 3.2.3 to 3.2.7. 
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Primarily, unconscionable opportunism is represented by purposeful misrepresentations 
and also various forms of blatant violation during the course of the exchange relationship.  
The calculated deliberateness of this form of opportunism thus resembles Elangovan and 
Shapiro’s (1998) ‘premeditated betrayal action’, and certainly brings into question the 
morals and ethics of the perpetrator.  In other words, these acts are so blatant and deliberate 
that they would appear unconscionable to the morally and ethically principled exchange 
actor.  For example, a study conducted by Predue (1992) shows that purchasing agents use 
aggressive tactics when bargaining in a re-purchase situation with a supplier.  While 
aggression and hard-headed business is not opportunism, of note in this study is that 
industrial buyers tend to favour tactics that deliberately manipulate the supplier’s 
perceptions.  Hence, deceiving and misleading them concerning the actual degree of 
competition for the business.  This is indeed unconscionable behaviour.  Another example 
is the much publicised Fischer-GM relationship (Klein, 1996).  In this relationship, Fisher 
and GM jointly crafted a risk and cost sharing agreement based on a ‘cost-plus’ pricing 
principle.  However, during the course of the relationship Fisher developed and deployed a 
much more efficient production methodology that resulted in considerable cost savings to 
themselves, and thus gains in profit due to the original cost-plus pricing system.  This vital 
information was deliberately withheld from GM to preserve these extra normal rents.  
Clearly, this act went against the spirit of the agreement, and as such can be classified as 
unconscionable opportunism.  These two cases display acts of obfuscation, obstruction and 
miss-information.  Each act would have resulted in a loss of some manner to the victim, 
and are blatant, deliberate examples of unconscionable opportunistic behaviour.  If 
discovered, the victim might possibly have some legal recourse to recover costs and 
liquidated damages.  However, the major dilemma is in discovering the acts in the first 
place as they can often go undetected for some considerable time (Deakin and Michie, 
1997; Wathne and Heide, 2000).  Indeed, even if discovered, bringing a case to court 
would be fraught with difficulties and complexities.  Finally, to assist in the 
conceptualisation of unconscionable opportunism, the following working definition is 
offered: 
Actions by one exchange partner that either misleads, distorts, disguise, 
obfuscate, sabotage, or confuse the other partner concerning some 
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aspect that materially affects the exchange relationship.  This includes 
acts of commission and as well as acts of omission such as shirking or 
withholding of effort.  There is potential for legal recourse through the 
courts if discovered, although there would be difficulty in proving in 
many cases. 
3.2.8.4 Illegal Opportunism  
One further form of opportunism deserves mention as it captures the most severe and 
extreme forms of opportunistic behaviour.  While there may be some doubt as to the 
potential legal recourses in the previous three forms of opportunism, for ‘illegal 
opportunism’ the options are very clear.  This new conceptualisation is important as illegal 
acts represent the most adverse forms and could potentially be the most damaging.  Thus, 
illegal opportunism deserves a category of its own as distinct to the traditional definition of 
opportunism that usually subsumes within the one concept all forms of opportunism 
including illegal behaviour.    
For opportunism to be illegal, a rule, a law or a statute has to have been contravened or 
breached by one of the exchange parties without provision to aggrieved party.  Given that 
each state, province, country, or trading block have their own unique set of statues, laws 
and regulations including international laws and forums21, this form of opportunism needs 
to be contextually and culturally positioned (Chen, Peng and Saparito, 2002; Skarmeas, 
Katsikeas and Schlegelmilch, 2002).  What constitutes a breach of a law in one country 
may not in another.  Nevertheless, where an act or omission does breach a law or 
regulation (civil or criminal) then it can be considered illegal opportunism provided 
recourse or remedy is available under the relevant law.  Again, the sense of calculated 
deliberateness or premeditation permeates this form of opportunism.  Examples of such 
behaviour include, stealing, misappropriation, expropriation, fraud, theft, deliberate breach 
of some contract condition or warranty, and abandoning the contract to seek other 
opportunities.  For example, one firm interviewed for this research experienced a critical 
incident when an embezzling employee left the firm virtually bankrupt22, yet through 
                                                 
21
 For example the World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
22
 Interview with Firm 36. 
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strong established supply chain relationships with their key partners, they were able to 
trade their way out of trouble.  
Generally, if discovered the victim would have some recourse to the statutes, and national 
or international laws to protect themselves from such acts and to recover liquidated 
damages.  As opposed to the uncertain perceptions of possible opportunistic acts found in 
the previous three types, illegal opportunism takes a strong form and it should be clear 
whether an act has crossed the line of legality or not.  Therefore, a working definition of 
illegal opportunism is: 
Any act or omission that is deemed illegal under the law.  This includes 
breaching contract conditions and warranties, theft, fraud, violation and 
evasion, and other illegal acts or omissions by the exchange partner.  
Generally, there is a range of legal remedies available.    
 
Now that the four new forms of opportunism have been explored individually in detail, it is 
now time to present a new continuum of opportunistic behaviour in exchange relationships. 
3.2.9 Conceptual Continuum of Opportunism  
Williamson (1996) postulates that opportunistic behaviours can take blatant, subtle and 
natural forms.  The blatant form draws its inspiration from Niccolò Machiavelli who 
advised his Prince to engage in pre-emptive opportunism whenever the reasons which 
bound the original agreement no longer existed.  The subtle form is described as ‘strategic’ 
and is defined by the more well known description of ‘self-interest seeking with guile’.  
Finally, Williamson’s (1996) last natural form of opportunism refers to actions of 
“…tilting the system at the margin” (p. 225) referring to the more delicate or difficult to 
detect actions.  Williamson’s (1996) continuum ranging from delicate to quite overt forms 
of opportunism provides the basis for the typological classification for the various forms 
and actions of exchange opportunism.  It would seem that a good starting point would be a 
continuum anchored by more benign forms of opportunism such as social opportunism, 
with the other extreme being anchored the more blatant forms of illegal opportunism.  The 
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following Figure (3-2) represents the continuum of exchange opportunism for marketing 
channel relationships as conceptualised for this research. 
 
Figure 3-2 Continuum of Opportunism in Exchange Relationships 
  
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
As one of the dimensions of this continuum is the issue of legality of actions, it can be 
argued that the more subtle forms of opportunism, while not actually breaching any 
specific law, may actually pose several moral, ethical, religious or philosophical dilemmas 
on the part of the potential opportunistic actor.  Conversely, the more opprobrious 
behaviours become legal dilemmas where the opportunistic actor wonders what they can 
actually get away with, and what the consequences of being caught might be.  Hence, the 
area in the middle of the continuum, called the ‘Moral Morass’, is a very ill defined area 
where moral dilemmas somewhere cross the line and become issues of legality.  
Nevertheless, the main dimension of this continuum is the severity of the opportunistic act, 
and this is often measured by the degree or the extent of the loss suffered by the victim of 
the opportunistic act or acts (John, 1984; Provan, 1993; Wathne and Heide, 2000).  
3.2.10 The Impact of Opportunism on Supply Chain Relationships 
The success and failure of supply chain exchange relationships such as strategic alliances 
are predicated on many factors.  Literature gives several empirical reasons for the failure or 
breakdown of collaborative alliances and supply chain relationships.  It would be 
beneficial to briefly review some of the major reasons for relationship failure and note the 
presence of opportunism as a cause.  Firstly, Tirole (1988) offered three major reasons why 
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customer-supplier relationships fail to develop collaborative processes, and one of these 
was the differences or the perceived bad behaviour or opportunism between partners on 
legal and ethical grounds.  A later piece by Forrest and Martin (1990, cited in Hoyt and 
Huq, 2000) found that a notable lack of ongoing mutual trust due to past critical incidences 
was a major reasons for supply chain partnership failure.  In addition, Ellram (1995) found 
very similar sentiments in her study of buyer-seller relationship failure.  And finally, an 
empirical study into the failure of international alliances by Serapio and Cascio (1996) 
found that two of the four major reasons were essentially opportunistic in nature.  These 
were; breaches in the terms of the agreement and unilateral exiting to take advantage of 
opportunities elsewhere. 
It is interesting to note that all four studies report at least one reason or action that took the 
form of either; a lack of trust, bad behaviour or breaching agreements that could be 
described as forms of opportunistic behaviour under the proposed continuum.  Firstly, 
Forrest and Martin (1990, cited in Hoyt and Huq, 2000) describe a lack of sustainable 
mutual trust development, in that a partner may be suspected of not living up to their 
obligations or behaving opportunistically.  They further describe situations where a partner 
may be engaged in competitive behaviour, or even be part of a competing supply chain.  
Competitive behaviour by a supply chain partner cannot directly be defined as 
opportunistic behaviour in itself.  However, if it can be described as opportunistic if the 
partners have a priori agreed not to directly compete either formally or informally through 
mutual expectations and the establishment of behavioural norms.  It would not be 
unreasonable to assume that opportunistic behaviours form part of Tirole’s (1988) finding 
that legal and ethical differences cause customer-supplier relationships to fail.  This same 
argument can applied to Ellram’s (1995) finding that lack of trust causes supply chain 
partnership failure.  In addition, it seems obvious that some form of serious opportunistic 
actions are the cause of the breaches of alliance agreements as defined by Serapio and 
Cascio (1996).  Moreover, the propensity to unilaterally seek opportunities external to the 
alliance could also be described as a form of opportunism.  Finally, Das and Teng (1998) 
cite the lack of cooperation and opportunistic behaviours by the partner as the reason for 
the relatively high failure rates for alliances (over 50 percent).  Drawing from these causes, 
we can detect the presence of different types of opportunistic behaviours in each of these 
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studies.  It is clear that one of the results of opportunistic behaviour is the deterioration or 
even ultimate termination of the exchange relationship.  However, the extent, severity, and 
types of opportunism were not specifically addressed in these studies.  
Opportunistic actions while proving one-sidedly beneficial to the initiator in the short term, 
will ultimately be bilaterally detrimental over the longer term23 (Joshi and Arnold, 1997).  
Previous studies have shown that opportunism has a detrimental impact on relationships, in 
particular the manner in which wealth is created and then distributed between the exchange 
partners (Wathne and Heide, 2000).  However, todate there are no empirical studies that 
examine the impact of opportunism on relationship levels.  While it is assumed that 
opportunism has a deleterious effect, the presence of specific behaviours and how they 
change a relationship level is a new theoretical thrust.  While opportunistic behaviours tend 
to adversely affect relational development, the construct of collaboration is postulated to 
positively influence exchange relationships.  Collaborative behaviours are reviewed next.  
                                                 
23
 Often called a ‘zero-sum’ or a ‘win-lose’ game.  The opposite to a ‘win-win’ game that is advocated by proponents of 
collaboration.  
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3.3 Supply Chain Collaborative Behaviours  
3.3.1 The Socialisation of Supply Chains 
Supply chain relationships are not purely economic in nature.  The Relational school 
positions them within a socio-political and relational context incorporating social and 
collaborative behaviours (Kwon and Suh, 2005; Moore and Cunningham, 1999; Webster, 
1992).  Sociologists and anthropologists have classically approached collaborative 
behaviour through an analysis of the ways in which individuals are bound together in 
community (Babbie, 1999; Ouchi, 1980), or in marketing parlance; ‘domesticated markets’ 
(Arndt, 1979).  This approach focuses on the social dimensions which engender 
collaboration, and the results of collaboration on the societal group of interest.  
Recognition that exchange behaviours are located within a social context leads to the 
notion that collaboration can be norm-based, and that social exchange relationships can be 
experienced in certain normative or mutually understood ways (Grannovetter, 1985; Lyons 
and Mehta, 1997).  An actor in an exchange relationship may choose to act in a 
collaborative way to satisfy their notions of commitment or obligation to the exchange 
partner that is distinct from any notions of economising.  Indeed, Herbert Simon, (1993) 
based a theory of cooperative organisational behaviour on the concept of ‘bounded 
rationality’.  He posited that due to incomplete information and a lack of other stimuli, 
individuals would tend to follow cooperative group norms as an alternative form of 
guidance.  Extending the bounded rationality premise, Phelps (1999) argues that altruistic 
behaviour, or at least mutuality and equity, are features of group normative behaviour, with 
the expectation of promoting cooperation for the welfare of the group.  Thus, loyalty to a 
group or particular relationship provides the basis for cooperation.  Collaboration can have 
a powerful influence on supply chain behaviour, and trying to understand the behaviour 
from only an economic point of view without the insights of the social context can be 
extremely restrictive.   
Given the limitations of the Rational school theories to explain how to control opportunism 
(Dyer, 1997; Moschandreas, 1997), a new theory is needed to help attenuate the risk and 
consequences of opportunistic behaviours.  Hence, supply chain collaboration has recently 
been viewed as a promising paradigm, and considerable research effort has been devoted in 
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establishing the benefits of inter-organisational collaboration24 (Armistead and Maples, 
1993; Daugherty, Stank and Ellinger, 1998; Ellinger, Daugherty and Keller, 2000; Lynch, 
Keller and Ozment, 2000).  Before the 1990’s the ‘arms-length’ relationships were often 
the most common form of buyer-supplier governance mechanisms (Achrol, 1997).  
However, there was a growing awareness of the role of collaboration and trust.  
Importantly, Anderson and Narus (1990) empirically found that cooperation is an 
antecedent rather than a consequence of trust (contrary to their hypothesised model), and 
that trust need not exist initially for firms to cooperate.  Subsequently, Morgan and Hunt’s 
(1994) Commitment-Trust theory postulates that “…commitment and trust lead directly to 
cooperative behaviours that are conducive to relationship marketing success” (p. 22).  
Hence, trust and commitment remain among the key variables in the success of a 
partnership.  Taken together, these new theories (i.e. the Relational school theories) help 
extend the economic view with more collaborative aspects.     
3.3.2 Collaboration as the Antithesis of Opportunism 
Collaboration can be seen as the antithesis of opportunism.  They are behavioural 
opposites, and the presence of one should normally exclude or at least mitigate the 
presence of the other.  Similarly, Williamson (1993) states that “trust is sometimes the 
antonym for opportunism…” (p. 98). As opposed to opportunism, Dwyer et al., (1987) 
emphasises that “…commitment represents the highest stage of relational bonding” (p. 23), 
while Wilson (1995) observes that “the interaction of cooperation and commitment results 
in cooperative behaviour allowing the partnership to work ensuring that both parties 
receive the benefits of the relationship” (p. 338).  Empirically, relational commitment has 
been positively correlated to collaboration (through trust and commitment), and negatively 
correlated to opportunism.  Gundlach et al., (1995) found in their study of 130 matched 
dyadic relationships that opportunistic behaviour by one party erodes the development of 
relational norms and commitment intentions for current and future time periods.  Joshi and 
Stump (1999) found an inverse relationship between long-term orientation (commitment) 
and manufacturer opportunism.  Similarly, Skarmeas et al., (2002) in a longitudinal study 
of 216 relationships found that opportunism is negatively related to commitment, and also 
                                                 
24
 For this research, the terms cooperation and collaboration will be used interchangeable for clarification, although, 
collaboration generally implies a much higher level of integration than does functional cooperation in literature. 
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that commitment is highly (positively) related to firm performance.  In a study of 388 
Third Party Logistics relationships, Knemeyer and Murphy (2004) found support for their 
hypothesis that trust (and commitment) is a key mediating variable that builds channel 
performance, and reduces opportunism.  Finally, Kwon and Suh (2005) found in a study of 
171 exchange relationships that trust and commitment are positively correlated, while 
potential opportunism was negatively correlated to trust.  Clearly, these studies and others 
in literature show that trust and commitment and by extension collaboration are inversely 
related to channel or partner opportunism, and hence are mutually exclusive.  Both have a 
clear impact on channel performance (Wisner, 2003), and by extension channel 
relationship levels (Kalwani and Narayandas, 1995; Robicheaux and El-Ansary, 1975).  
But, the dualistic situation poses a dilemma; how do these positive and negative behaviours 
influence or produce changes in exchange relationship levels?       
Cognisant of the evidence of the detrimental impact of short-term opportunistic 
behaviours, and the growing support for long-term cooperative behaviours, there has been 
a noticeable shift in supply chain relationship thinking from adversarial to collaborative 
forms (Hoyt and Huq, 2000).  Previously, most business transactions involved arm’s-
length buyer/seller type transactions (Achrol, 1997).  Often, for these basic transactions 
there is a considerable amount of information asymmetry, doubt over the other’s intentions 
and conflict as the two parties attempt to negotiate a deal or maintain a relationship.  For 
good reason the parties lack trust in each other as previous historical precedents have 
shown that either could behave opportunistically, either during the negotiations and even 
ex post the agreement.  Further, both parties attempt to pursue their own agendas and 
secure the best financial deal for themselves.  In such situations, the potential for achieving 
overall operating efficiency is extremely limited as each party manoeuvres to achieve their 
short-term benefits at the expense of the other.  Surprisingly, many firms still hold tightly 
to this unenlightened view in situations where collaborative behaviours could benefit firms 
immensely (Fawcett and Magnan, 2002).  Of course, there are situations where arm’s-
lengths transactional relationships are entirely appropriate, for example, where very low 
value and infrequent purchases are made (Stock and Lambert, 2001).  In these cases a 
durable association is not necessarily always desirable.  Nevertheless, there is a powerful 
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body of literature that attribute superior performance to longer-term collaborative 
relationships.     
3.3.3 The Benefits of Collaboration 
There are three major paradigmatic shifts that need to occur to promote collaborative 
behaviours in the supply chain.  Firstly, the removal of self-serving agendas and replacing 
these with collaboration and mutual trust.  Secondly, the implementation of organisational 
structures, policies, frameworks and measurement tools that promote the desired inter-
organisational behaviour.  Finally, identifying potential conflict areas in advance, and 
agreeing on conflict resolution procedures prior to any adverse events, also agreeing on 
appropriate relationship exit strategies in advance (Bowersox, Closs and Stank, 2000).   
The reason for undertaking these shifts is that the potential for increased operational 
efficiency and relational rents as a result of reducing duplication and redundancy are legion 
(Bowersox et al., 2000; Quinones et al., 2000; Rishel, Scott and Stenger, 2003).  For these 
reasons, Ayres (2004) notes that the greatest gains from supply chain management are 
likely to involve effective collaboration amongst multiple entities.   
The performance benefits and additional relational rents achieved through collaboration 
become the rationale for the implementation of inter-firm collaborative initiatives, and 
taking a long-term relationship commitment perspective.  One study by Stank, Crum and 
Arango (1999) found that inter-firm collaboration through the behaviours of effective 
communication, information exchange, partnering and performance monitoring produced 
performance benefits in the areas of; on-time delivery, flexibility, availability, reducing 
transaction costs, assessing customer needs and improving overall customer service.  Even 
intra-firm collaborative efforts have produced results (Mollenkopf, Gibson and Ozanne, 
2000).  Indeed, the integrating behaviours of collaboration, consultation, and information 
exchange between the marketing and logistics departments of the same firm have produced 
benefits in the areas of distribution and firm performance (Ellinger et al., 2000).  Clearly, 
these benefits are available to those firms who collaborate, both inter-departmentally and 
externally with other supply chain entities.  Thus, collaboration can be broadly defined into 
two types; collaboration that is internal to an organisation and exists between departments 
and functions, and collaboration that is external between business units or independent 
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firms operating in a supply chain.  Specifically, the focus of this research is on the role of 
collaboration in the dynamic environment of the ‘external’ supply chain.      
3.3.4 Collaboration as a Governance Mechanism 
Researchers are now proposing new organisational control paradigms and alternative 
governance mechanisms based on collaborative protocols.  Ellram (1991) in developing a 
normative model of partnership development suggests that purchasing partnerships 
develop over time rather than being constructed, and that key personnel, interaction and 
partner contributions were critical success factors.  She reemphasised that mutual 
commitment is often more meaningful than formal agreements.  Henceforth, trust and 
mutual commitment to the relationship emerged as significant control variables in 
empirical studies.  These were formulated into the Commitment-Trust theory as espoused 
by Morgan and Hunt in (1994).  This theory suggests that relationship commitment and 
trust are central to success rather than the exercise of power and its ability to condition and 
control the actions of others.  Heide and John (1990) proposed three scales for measuring 
the performance of partnerships; the level of joint activity, the expectation of continuing 
the relationship, and the level of monitoring by the buyer over the activities of the supplier.  
They concluded by showing that supplier cooperation was positively correlated with three 
conditions; expectations of a long-term relationship, increased verification efforts by the 
supplier, and relationship specific investments.  Dyer and Singh (1998) suggest that when 
firms collaborate, they generate relational rents when they share knowledge and resources.  
Likewise, Liedtka (1996) argues that learning is important through trust and commitment, 
yet found that collaboration poses its own unique set of difficulties.  Mohr, Fisher, and 
Nevin (1996) demonstrate that when integration and manufacturer’s control are low, that 
effective collaborative communication promotes inter-firm relationship success, and 
collaboration could possibly serve as a flexible, cheap and viable governance mode in its 
own right.  Heribert and Silke (2002) discuss the role of information exchange in supplier 
networks for reducing the opportunistic behaviours of dominant buyers in industrial 
markets.  It is noted that exchange of information and its associated technologies (such as 
the Internet and web-based applications) has been one of the principle drivers for the recent 
surge in supply chain collaboration (Ellinger et al., 2000; Kumar and van Dissel, 1996; 
Muckstadt, Murray, Rappold and Collins, 2001; Swaminathan and Tayur, 2003).  Achrol 
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(1997) discusses how the types of coordination and control mechanisms driving network 
organisations are distinct from the traditional dyadic exchange perspective.  Finally, van 
der Vorst and Beulens (2002) demonstrate the power of collaboration to reduce supply 
chain uncertainty through the redesign of the control strategies.  Therefore, relational 
marketing and the underlying variables of collaboration have demonstrated their ability to 
moderate or control exchange partner behaviour.  Indeed, collaboration has been proposed 
as the new governance mechanism based on normative trust and commitment issues, rather 
than market, hierarchical, bureaucratic or incentivised contractual instruments.      
3.3.4.1 Definitions of Collaboration                    
The benefits of collaboration have been clearly demonstrated, yet collaboration is a 
multifaceted, ethereal concept, and needs to address such concrete issues as performance 
metrics, integrated policies and business practices, information sharing and incentive 
alignment (Simatupang and Sridharan, 2002).  Thus, it is important to review some current 
definitions of collaboration to draw out the central emphasis of the construct (see Table 3-2 
for a sample of definitions). 
Table 3-2 Definitions of Supply Chain Collaboration  
 
Definition  Related Authors 
“…the willingness of a partner firm to pursue mutually 
compatible interests in the alliance rather than act 
opportunistically” 
(Das and Teng, 1998, p. 492) 
 
“…refers to similar or complementary, coordinated, activities 
performed by firms in a business relationship to produce 
superior mutual outcomes or singular outcomes that are 
mutually excepted over time” 
(Mentzer et al., 2001, p. 9). 
 
“A constellation of agreements typified by a commitment 
between two or more partner firms to reach a common goal 
that involves a pooling of resources and activities”  
(Teece, 1992, cited in Hoyt and Huq, 2000, p. 754) 
 
“a collaborative supply chain simply means that two or more 
independent companies work jointly to plan execute supply 
operations with greater success than when acting alone” 
(Simatupang and Sridharan, 2002, p. 19) 
 
“…as a process of decision making among interdependent 
parties; it involves joint ownership of decisions and collective 
responsibility for outcomes” 
(Liedtka, 1996, p. 21) 
“…is a tailored business relationship based on mutual trust, 
openness, shared risks, and shared rewards that yield a 
competitive advantage, resulting in business performance 
greater than would be achieved by firms individually” 
(Lambert et al., 1996, p. 2) 
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3.3.5 Rationale for Collaboration 
From these definitions it can be seen that at the heart of supply chain collaboration are the 
efficiencies gained through leveraging collaborative efforts for competitive advantage.  
Supply chain collaboration is unlike Social Dilemma theory where a person who 
contributes to the good of the community receives fewer personal benefits than one who 
does not (Wiener and Doescher, 1991), rather, supply chain collaboration is built on an 
expectation of mutuality (Gundlach et al., 1995) where the risks and rewards are shared 
between the partners (Pilling and Zhang, 1992).  Indeed, financial incentives such as 
improving cash-to-cash conversion rates, dwell time minimisation and the benefits of cash 
spin (Bowersox et al., 2002) all add weighty dollar arguments25 for attempting 
collaboration.    
The acquisition or investment in relationship specific assets also provides a rationale for 
collaboration.  TCE proposes that the rent generated by joint assets is dissipated due to; 
opportunistic actions by the other party, the monitoring regime instigated to attenuate 
opportunism, and the formalisation of the exchange relationship into a hierarchy such as 
through vertical integration (Hill, 1990).  Thus, these additional transaction costs diminish 
the value generated by the asset.  Yet the rent returns can be maximised when the dyadic 
actors are prepared to cooperate and remove some of the structural inefficiencies inherent 
in such a controlled relationship.  Indeed, Hill (1990) contends that in the long run, the 
invisible hand of market forces will delete actors who bear the additional transactional 
costs such as vertical integration as this strategy produces less rents than cooperation and 
trust.  Further, he argues in partner selection decisions that selection criteria and reputation 
will also tend to eliminate actors with a history of behaving opportunistically.  
These reasons provide a powerful rationale for supply chain collaboration, not solely on 
organisational, social or relational grounds, but also in conjunction with fundamentally 
economic reasons.  Together, these forces are changing the nature of supply chain 
relationships in inter-organisational exchange (Batt and Purchase, 2004; Dyer, 1997; 
Helper et al., 2000; Skjoett-Larsen et al., 2003).  
                                                 
25
 Additional ‘relational rents’ available only through collaboration between organisations. 
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3.3.6 The Risks of Collaborative Initiatives 
However, supply chain collaboration is not without its risks.  Collaboration¸ while 
enhancing overall supply chain performance, introduces some real risks that are worthy of 
contemplation if change is considered.  Bowersox, et al., (2002) notes that as collaboration 
deepens, partner firms face four specific risks; the over dependence on real time 
connectivity, a change in the channel balance of power, the vulnerability of moving to 
global operations, and vulnerability stemming from information sharing and systems 
integration.  All these risk areas are open to opportunistic behaviours by partner firms and 
others external to the partnership.  Further, Handfield, Krause, Scannell, and Monczka 
(2000) warn of the risks of expensive and misguided supplier development programs to 
enhance collaborative efforts with suppliers who may possess different agendas.  Of note, 
Turner (1993) and Fawcett and Magnan (2002) state that very few companies claim to 
have fully implemented the collaborative concept, and even fewer can claim to have 
sustained the ongoing flow of benefits that successful supply chain collaboration claims to 
be able to create.     
These points highlight some of the practical limitations regarding the reality of supply 
chain collaboration.  The concept of collaborating for success is full of virtue, and the 
notions of leveraging core competencies is a compelling vision.  Yet, it is noted that the 
practical mechanics of how to make such complex relationships work on a day-to-day 
basis are not well understood (Bowersox et al., 2002; Fawcett and Magnan, 2002).  As 
such, successful supply chain collaboration needs to be driven by a set of well defined and 
jointly negotiated set of operational rules, rather than the more esoteric trust and 
commitment principles.  Collaborative philosophies have many adherents, yet the 
definitions are fluid and practices have yet to be routinised.  Observing this, Tuominen 
(2004) states that “…the fundamental question of what constitutes relational exchange is 
yet unsolved” (p. 179).  While researchers agree on the core components of collaboration 
(such as trust-commitment, information sharing, conflict resolution, goal congruence, 
mutuality, and risk/reward sharing as examples), a definitive overall supply chain 
management framework has yet to emerge, resulting in ad hoc implementations and 
disjointed practices.  Subsequently, generating a degree of cynicism concerning the claims 
of collaborative benefits as seen in literature (Fawcett and Magnan, 2002).   
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3.3.7 The Construct of Collaboration in Literature 
In an attempt to address the points raised above, and drawing from the extant literature, 
this research conceptualises collaboration into two related yet distinct areas.  The first 
describes the ‘core components’ of collaborative exchange relationships, and represent the 
major variables or constructs that have been empirically tested over many studies (see for 
example, Butterfield, Reed and Lemak, 2004; Moore, 1998; Morgan and Hunt, 1994; 
Wilson, 1995).  These higher order core components address the philosophical 
underpinnings of the collaborative relationship and are shown in Table 3-3 following.    
Table 3-3 Higher Order Core Components of Collaboration 
Core Component Related Authors   
Communication (Anderson and Narus, 1990) 
(Monczka, Petersen, Handfield 
and Ragatz, 1998) 
(Morgan and Hunt, 1994) 
(Cannon and Perreault, 1999) 
(Mohr et al., 1996) 
Conflict Resolution (Heide and John, 1992) 
(Simatupang and Sridharan, 
2002) 
(Cooper et al., 1997) (Mohr et al., 1996) 
(Anderson and Narus, 1990) 
Goal Congruence (Simatupang et al., 2002) (Heide and John, 1992) (Fawcett and Magnan, 2002) 
Information Sharing (Kent and Mentzer, 2003) 
(Cooper et al., 1997) 
(Bowersox, Closs and Stank, 
2003) 
(Golicic et al., 2002) 
(Simatupang and Sridharan, 
2002) 
(Mentzer et al., 2001) 
(Closs and Mollenkopf, 2004) 
Mutuality (Gundlach et al., 1995) (Simatupang et al., 2002)] 
(Dyer and Singh, 1998) 
(Achrol, 1997) 
Power and Dependence (Gundlach et al., 1995) (Achrol, 1997) (Batt and Purchase, 2004) 
Relationship Specific 
Investments 
(Heide and John, 1990) (Bensaou and Anderson, 1999) (Dyer and Singh, 1998) 
Shared Risks and Rewards (Cooper et al., 1997) (Fawcett and Magnan, 2002) (Closs and Mollenkopf, 2004) 
Social Norms (Gundlach et al., 1995) 
(Berthon et al., 2003) 
(Cannon and Perreault, 1999) 
(Morgan and Hunt, 1994) 
(Heide and John, 1992) 
(Dyer and Singh, 1998) 
(Achrol, 1997) Breaks ‘norms’ 
down into 5 variables: Solidarity, 
Mutuality, Flexibility, Role 
Integrity, Harmonisation of 
conflict. 
Trust and Commitment (Kent and Mentzer, 2003) 
(Ellram, 1995) 
(Anderson and Weitz, 1992) 
(Gundlach et al., 1995) 
(Mentzer et al., 2001) 
(Achrol, 1997) 
(Morgan and Hunt, 1994) 
(Liedtka, 1996) 
(Moore, 1998) 
(Williamson, 1985, 1993) 
(Anderson and Narus, 1990) 
This table provides an illustrative list of the fundamental higher order core components of collaboration in supply chain exchange 
relationships. 
 
The second set of components relate to the operationalisation of collaboration in actual 
practice.  These ‘operating elements’ describe the necessary policies, procedures and 
operating principles that are required to make a collaborative arrangement work in actual 
practice.  Although this sample table has been drawn from literature, not every element has 
to be present for the collaborative arrangement to work.  One of the objectives of this 
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research will be to determine which core components and elements are necessary for the 
promotion of extant exchange relationship level from its current form.  The following 
Table (3-4) provides a list of selected lower order operational elements of collaboration in 
supply chain exchange relationships:    
Table 3-4 Lower Order Operational Elements of Collaboration 
Operational Elements  Related Authors   
Acquiescence (Compliance) (Morgan and Hunt, 1994) (Cox, 1999, 2001)  
Business Process 
Integration 
(Mentzer et al., 2001) 
(Lambert, Cooper and Pagh, 
1998) 
(Cooper et al., 1997) 
(Stank, Keller and Daugherty, 2001) 
(Muckstadt et al., 2001) 
(Croxton, Garcia-Dastugune, 
Lambert and Rogers, 2001) 
Business Process Internal 
Functional Integration  
(Stank et al., 2001) (Mollenkopf et al., 2000) (Liedtka, 1996) 
Benevolence  (Ganesan, 1994) (Batt and Purchase, 2004)  
Boundary Spanning roles (Batt and Purchase, 2004)   
Coordination (Simatupang et al., 2002) (Golicic et al., 2003) (Monczka et al., 1998) 
Cooperation (Morgan and Hunt, 1994) (Bowersox et al., 2003)  
Connectedness (Batt and Purchase, 2004)   
Customer Relationship 
Management (CRM) 
(Croxton et al., 2001) (Closs and Mollenkopf, 2004) (Cannon and Perreault, 1999) 
Embeddedness (Williamson, 1993)   
External Integration (Stank et al., 2001) (Noordewier et al., 1990)  
Forsaking of Alternatives  (Gundlach et al., 1995)   
Information System Internal 
Integration  
(Stank et al., 2001) (Fawcett and Magnan, 2002)  
Information System External 
Integration  
(Stank et al., 2001) (Bowersox et al., 2003) (Fawcett and Magnan, 2002) 
Interaction (Batt and Purchase, 2004) (Mohr et al., 1996)  
IT Applications, E-
commerce, and the Internet 
(Simchi-Levi, Kaminsky and 
Simchi-Levi, 2003) 
(Bunduchi and Gerst, 2004) 
(Koutsakas, Hatzaras, Vontas and 
Koumpis, 2002) 
(Golicic et al., 2002) 
(Skjoett-Larsen et al., 2003) 
Investments – Relational 
Specific Assets 
(Gundlach et al., 1995) (Bensaou and Anderson, 1999)  
Loyalty (Gundlach et al., 1995)   
Material and Product Flows (Cooper et al., 1997) 
(Bowersox et al., 2002) 
(Bowersox et al., 2003) 
(Simchi-Levi et al., 2003) 
(Coyle et al., 2003) 
(Stock and Lambert, 2001) 
Performance Measurers and 
Metrics 
(Closs and Mollenkopf, 2004) 
(Simatupang and Sridharan, 
2002) 
(Fawcett and Magnan, 2002) (Cooper et al., 1997) 
Relational Sentiments and 
climate 
(Gundlach et al., 1995)   
Reciprocity (Batt and Purchase, 2004) (Achrol, 1997)  
Reliance (Batt and Purchase, 2004)   
Solidarity (Gundlach et al., 1995)   
Shared values system (Morgan and Hunt, 1994) (Wilson, 1995)  
Value:  
Customer / Supplier 
(Flint and Mentzer, 2000) 
(Wilson and Jantrania, 1994) 
(Cavinato, 1992) 
(Cannon and Perreault, 1999) 
(Cox, 1999) 
Note that this table is not exhaustive.  It is presented to provide the reader with some comprehension of the multifaceted nature of supply chain 
cooperation.   
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The fundamental relationship between the higher order core components and the lower 
order operational elements is that the latter cannot exist without the former.  In other 
words, it is vital for successful collaborative relationships that these core components be 
maintained at least to the satisfaction of both exchange partners.  If any of the actors are 
not prepared to address these core components, they are not maintained, or opportunistic 
behaviours produce destructive conflict within the exchange, then it would be near 
impossible to implement the practical integrative aspects of the operational elements.  This 
conceptualisation attempts to address the current theoretical criticisms that tend to separate 
the collaborative concepts from the actual practice (see Croxton et al., 2001, for an 
example of linking strategic and operational processes).  It also endeavours to provide a 
new theoretical basis on which to examine the dynamic evolution of collaborative supply 
chain exchange relationships.     
Finally, collaboration shows the potential to provide a viable alternative governance 
mechanism as an attempt to control for the risks of opportunistic behaviour, such as those 
often associated with asset specificity and small numbers negotiations.  Nevertheless, the 
risk of opportunism is ever present and buyers must consider the trade-offs between 
inflexible formal agreements (such as contracts), and the more flexible, informal 
agreements based on trust and commitment (Hoyt and Huq, 2000; Hunt and Morgan, 
1994).  Fortunately, research shows that the ultimate success of a supply chain partnership 
is not determined by the exercise of power or coercion, but by the level of trust, 
commitment and collaboration that exists between the partners (Monczka et al., 1998).  
Yet, while collaboration takes centre stage in many studies, it has yet to be fully developed 
into a construct that harmonises the previous definitions and measurement scales.  Thus, it 
is proposed to describe the types and forms of collaborative behaviours, develop a scaled 
typology of collaborative actions in conjunction with relationships levels, and finally to 
measure the key collaborative forces that facilitate the movement of supply chain 
relationships to different levels.   
3.3.8 Typology of Collaborative Behaviours 
This section attempts to integrate into one typology the higher order elements of 
collaboration that have been tested in a piecemeal fashion in previous studies.  The 
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typology of collaborative behaviours is presented first at Table 3-5, and then each of the 
main dimensions and their associated sub-dimensions will be described in detail. 
Table 3-5 Typology of Collaborative Behaviours 
Variable  Definition Sub-Dimensions 
Communication 
 
Active  
Disclosure 
A free exchange of information and data between 
exchange partners through various forms of 
communication and protocols (both formal and 
informal) with the purpose of improving the 
performance of the supply chain. 
 
Information Sharing 
Conflict Resolution 
 
Common 
Objectives 
 
 
The establishment and progress toward mutually 
common objectives, goals and conflict resolution 
processes that align the efforts of both parties so that 
both can achieve their common aims. 
 
Goal Congruence 
Relationship Specific Investments 
and Activities 
 
Joint Risk  
Taking 
The willingness to share the burdens and benefits 
between the parties and the allocation of resources and 
materials to exchange relationship specific investments 
so that both parties share in the risks and rewards of 
the partnership. 
  
Shared Risks and Rewards 
Trust and Commitment 
 
Relational 
Commitment 
The commitment of both parties to a long-term 
exchange relationship through the establishment of 
trust and commitment, relational and social norms that 
are established over time between the parties. 
 
Social and Relational Norms  
 
Each of these major research variables will be discussed in the next sections.  
3.3.8.1 Active Disclosure 
This dimension of collaborative behaviour deals with the flow of information and 
communication that is vital for the implementation of integrated supply chains.  It is made 
up of two related variables, that of ‘communication’ and ‘information sharing’.  While 
these two variables are conceptually different, it is noted that at a higher level of 
abstraction that the flow of information and communication can be used as a proxy 
measure for the level of collaboration or disclosure between partner firms.  Sharing 
proprietary information increases the risk that the recipient of the information will use it to 
their own advantage in an opportunistic way (Heribert and Silke, 2002; Kent and Mentzer, 
2003).  Given these risks, those firms that proceed to sharing information and 
communicating sensitive data are said to have achieved a level of active disclosure.  
Therefore, active disclosure represents the willingness of a firm to become vulnerable by 
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allowing the sharing of sensitive information, data and communicating frequently to 
achieve a coordinated supply chain.      
3.3.8.1.1 Communication 
The literature often uses the terms information and communication synonymously as both 
involve process and content, yet they are essentially different (Holden and O'Toole, 2004).  
Communication involves the creation and the exchange of messages, and is also concerned 
with how the messages are received and processed.  Hence, this construct centres on 
communication in interpersonal relationships, or more specifically between boundary 
spanning individuals in a supply chain.  Meanwhile, information sharing relates primarily 
to the method and means of exchanging of data and information for coordinative purposes. 
Communication in this context relates not only to the message but also to; the messenger, 
the receiver, the confounding noise, and the encoding and decoding processes (Isaacs, 
1999).  To achieve effective communication a common meaning base is required (Holden 
and O'Toole, 2004).  This is achieved as supply chain relationships become closer and 
move to higher, deeper levels where the meaning base is confirmed and extended, hence 
facilitating more complex and detailed communications.  Similar cultural and ethnic 
backgrounds also assist in forming this common meaning base.  Thus, individuals derive 
understanding from the recognition of patterns in information and data, and this 
understanding is defined as communication.        
3.3.8.1.2 Information Sharing 
Information sharing is different to communication in that it is primarily concerned with the 
exchange of data, protocols and transmission issues.  As these tend to be more technical in 
nature than communication, it is logical that the focus of this construct be centred on 
Electronic Data Exchange (EDI) and Information and Communication Technologies (ICT).     
Information sharing also encompasses the development of the technology that facilitates 
the exchange of information.  Key issues for information sharing are speed, connectivity, 
visibility, and the sensitivity of the data.  Exchange relationships that achieve high levels of 
collaboration necessarily also achieve integrated information sharing practices.  For close 
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coordination cannot be achieved without the frequent and detailed sharing of operational 
data (van Hoek, 2002).  Major drivers of EDI have been the relentless rise of the internet 
and associated web platforms and software, and also the massive increase in speed, 
functionality and lower costs of new ICT hardware and software applications 
(Swaminathan and Tayur, 2003).  A key benefit of exchanging data for coordinative 
purposes is to reduce uncertainty in the extended supply chain (van der Vorst and Beulens, 
2002).  Nevertheless, while technology and e-commerce has been a major driver of supply 
chain integration, interestingly, Golicic et al., (2002) found that ‘relationship management’ 
still retains a central role in reducing uncertainty.    
3.3.8.2 Common Objectives 
The second construct of collaboration is an amalgam of two sub-dimensions, conflict 
resolution and goal congruence.  These two variables have been grouped together as the 
achievement of one facilitates the other.  For example, a high level of goal congruence or 
agreement between two exchange partners should also reduce the need for conflict 
resolution as the actions of both are more likely to be approved by the other in the pursuit 
of the common goal.  The setting and pursuance of common objectives is a necessary 
antecedent for supply chain collaboration (Heide and John, 1990). 
3.3.8.2.1 Conflict Resolution 
In literature, conflict has been closely associated with the use of various forms of power 
and levels of dependence (Brown and Day, 1981; Gaski, 1984; Stern, 1967; Stern and 
Reve, 1980; Webb and Hogan, 2002).  Conversely, conflict resolution processes attempt to 
mitigate dependence and the use of power by circumventing or solving conflictioral 
episodes.  Conflict resolution processes involve either; smoothing over/ignoring the issues, 
coercion/confrontational methods, or joint problem solving methods (Claycomb and 
Frankwick, 2004).  Of the three methods, only joint problem solving has proven to produce 
partnership success (Mohr and Spekman, 1994).  Effective conflict resolution signals a 
partner’s intention to maintain the relationships and should result in feelings of justice, and 
increased trust and commitment.             
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Gaski (1984), in his theory of power and conflict in channels of distribution, states that one 
of outcomes of manifested conflict is that it blocks the goal attainment of the other party.  
Again, Skinner et al., (1992) argues that conflict hinders the accomplishment of individual 
or mutual goals, whilst cooperation is the joint striving toward these goals.  Therefore, if 
channel conflict reduces goal attainment, it stands to reason that conflict resolution will 
assist in the achievement of mutual goals.  This positive form is called ‘functional conflict’ 
and refers to positive sentiments ex post a resolution process, and is quite distinct from the 
negative form of unresolved conflict that can lead to pathological consequences such as 
termination (Morgan and Hunt, 1994).             
3.3.8.2.2 Goal Congruence 
Goal congruence between exchange partners will diminish the need for conflict resolution 
procedures.  Goal congruence can be thought of as the extent to which firms perceive the 
possibility of attaining some future mutually beneficial and mutually achieved set of 
objectives or goals.  The rationale for setting collective goals in a supply chain stems from 
the desire of members to achieve goals, such as customer satisfaction (Reve and Stern, 
1979), and demand forecast accuracy (Haughton and Stenger, 1998), that are unobtainable 
by organisations acting independently.  It also measures the ‘meeting of minds’ between 
exchange partners concerning their future plans and intentions.  Goal congruence is 
important during the formation and early stages of an exchange relationship, particularly 
when the strategic objectives of the relationship are being set.  High goal congruence at 
this stage is a sign that the relationship should succeed.  Jap and Anderson (2003) suggest 
that by developing goal congruence between parties, the incentive for opportunistic 
behaviours can be curbed, but not eliminated altogether.  However, frequent referral to the 
stated goals can be an important method of producing the desired behaviour in both partner 
organisations.  Further, goal congruence is important for the long term survival of any 
partnership.  If both partners observe that the joint objectives are being attained by joint 
action, then they will be further motivated to maintain the relationship (Wilson and 
Jantrania, 1994).  This also enhances partnership trust and commitment as a history of 
reliable and consistent partner behaviour is established.    
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3.3.8.3 Joint Risk Taking 
The third construct is joint risk taking, and is the measure of the willingness and actual 
commitment of the parties to share in the risks and rewards of the relationship, and also to 
invest in relationship specific assets and infrastructure.  The creation of relationship 
specific assets and the willingness to share in the risks and rewards of these investments is 
a major strategic decision (Bensaou and Anderson, 1999).  It can be both a source of 
competitive advantage as well as a barrier to entry or exit, as many firms can no longer go 
it alone in the competitive marketplace.  This construct is a bellwether for indicating the 
climate and the level of the relationship.  While relational sentiments can flow easily and 
rewards quickly distributed, it is the commitment of physical resources26 and the sharing of 
the risks, including the acceptance of short-term financial loss that really determines the 
level of collaboration in the relationship.  If firms are unwilling to commit to relationship 
specific assets or accept short-term loss for the sake of the long-term relationship, then it is 
clear that their level of commitment is low and the probability of opportunism also 
increases (Dyer, 1997; Skarmeas et al., 2002; Stump and Heide, 1996).                 
3.3.8.3.1 Relationship Specific Investments and Activities 
Relationship specific assets or idiosyncratic investments (Bensaou and Anderson, 1999) 
refer to the nonretrievable commitment of a firm’s resources to joint investments that will 
have joint worth, but only while the relationship continues.  The investment/s must be 
made specifically as a result of the mutual requirements of the partnership, and the assets 
will have little or no recoverable value outside of the relationship.  Investments in 
relationship specific assets can take many forms, including investments in people, fixed 
assets, property, and business procedures and ICT systems (Knemeyer and Murphy, 2004).    
However, a particular problem concerning asset specificity noted by TCE is the holding of 
the investment or asset as a hostage, or ‘hold outs’ during renegotiations (Barney and 
Ouchi, 1986; Bensaou and Anderson, 1999).  Here one party to the relationship (usually 
the party that has the least invested) threatens the termination of the relationships in order 
to extract some concessions or value from the other party.  The level of threat depends on 
                                                 
26
 Known colloquially as ‘bodies, budgets and buildings’ 
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the value of the investment and viability of redeploying the asset to other uses.  This type 
of opportunistic behaviour is of real concern to relationships.  Brown et al., (2000) found 
that as the level of investment increases, the possibility of opportunistic hostage taking also 
increases.  However, Stump and Heide (1996) note that this problem can be avoided by 
designing incentives into the relationship that make the long-term gains of the relationship 
exceed the short-term opportunistic payoffs of taking hostages.  
These joint investments provide tangible evidence of the commitment of the actors to the 
long-term viability of the relationship.  It shows that the investing party believes in and is 
concerned for the relationship, as well as its willingness to make the necessary sacrifices to 
ensure ongoing viability (Bensaou and Anderson, 1999).   
3.3.8.3.2 Shared Risks and Rewards 
As cooperative exchange relationships improve supply chain performance and increase 
relational rents an issue of important arises.  That is, who receives the rewards of the 
relationship, and who shoulders the risks? (Pilling and Zhang, 1992).  The concept of 
relationship mutuality strongly implies that the risks and rewards of the relationship should 
be distributed according to some pre-agreed formula or agreement.  Yet, one of the most 
elusive problems in modern supply chain management is implementing a suitable formula 
that satisfies everyone.  At some point however, the actors in a relationship have to behave 
cooperatively to achieve this.  Hence, the mutual sharing of risks and rewards within a 
relationship is another indicator of the level of exchange relationship and collaboration 
actually achieved (Ellram, 1995).       
The competitive position of each of the exchange partners and also their level of reciprocal 
power or dependence will determine their behaviour towards the splitting of the rewards of 
the partnership (El-Ansary and Stern, 1972; Gaski, 1986; Hunt and Nevin, 1974).  Cox 
(1999; 2001) argues that firms should exert their leverage to appropriate value for 
themselves, whilst Relational Exchange theory (Robicheaux and Coleman, 1994) suggests 
that the exercise of power reduces collaboration and hence the total available relational 
rents.  Contract clauses such as a 50/50 percentage split of any identifiable cost savings in 
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the relationship are often used to achieve the equitable distribution of rewards.  However, 
the returns need to reflect the amount of effort and the risks adopted by each partner.       
Whilst sharing the rewards of a relationship seems a more pleasant task, the sharing of 
risks is more onerous.  In exchange relationships, there is no guarantee that the relationship 
will produce the expected savings and benefits.  Often the very dimensions of collaborative 
relationships that characterise close partnerships provide an increased incentive for 
opportunistic behaviour (Pilling and Zhang, 1992).  The example of asset specificity hold-
outs noted above is a case in point.  
3.3.8.4 Relational Commitment 
Relational commitment is the final yet very important dimension for exchange 
relationships.  Relational commitment consists of trust and commitment issues, as well as 
social and relational normative behaviour.  Social Exchange theory is built on the principle 
of generalised reciprocity of both trust and the building and maintaining of social and 
relational norms derived from the expectation of a long-term relationship (Gundlach et al., 
1995), as well as implicit understandings (Shung, 1985).  This theory states that mistrust 
breeds mistrust, and would hence decrease the level of overall mutual commitment, thus 
contravening the norms of the relationship (Morgan and Hunt, 1994).  Conversely, 
adherence to the norms of the relationship and meeting mutual expectations greatly assists 
in the building of trust and commitment between exchange partners (Heide and John, 
1992).  Given the centrality of trust and commitment, and the establishment and adherence 
of social and relational norms to supply chains, this construct is also a good measure of the 
level of collaboration achieved.         
3.3.8.4.1 Trust and Commitment 
Acknowledging that there are many dimensions and definitions of trust (Dibben and Lean, 
2003; Doney and Cannon, 1997), this research will conceptualise trust as: 
The expectation and reliance on one’s exchange partner in a relationship 
to behave in a mutually beneficial manner at all times with honesty and 
integrity.  
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The Commitment-Trust theory espoused by Morgan and Hunt (1994) clearly establishes 
trust as a key mediating variable in marketing relationships.  Building on this, Wilson 
(1995) notes that trust is the central building block for the formation of all relational 
exchanges, and that with trust also comes commitment to the relationship.  For strategic 
alliances, Sherman (1992) found that one third of alliances fail and that mistrust and lack 
of commitment is one of the central reasons.  Hunt and Morgan (1994) states that 
“effective cooperation entails both mutual trust and mutual commitment – not just one or 
the other” (p. 23).  Trust leads to higher levels of loyalty and hence relational commitment.  
It is postulated that relationships characterised by trust are so highly valued that the actors 
will desire to commit themselves to such relationships where possible (Hunt and Morgan, 
1994; Morgan and Hunt, 1994).  In problem solving situations trust is a central component 
in finding joint solutions and goal congruence (Schurr and Ozanne, 1985).  Essentially, 
relational exchange will not occur if some level of trust is not present.  Inter-organisational 
trust (like inter-personal trust) is hard to build, but easy to destroy.  Seemingly innocuous 
opportunistic behaviours in a relationship can destroy years of hard won trust between the 
parties, and once destroyed, will take much effort to restore, if ever.  Yet, the existence of 
trust and commitment in a relationship does much to reduce the perceived risks of 
opportunistic behaviours (Moore, 1998).                    
3.3.8.4.2 Social and Relational Norms 
Governing a relationship purely through hierarchies and detailed contracts has proven 
extremely problematic (Hunt and Morgan, 1994).  Hence, Relational Exchange theory 
proposes that exchange transactions be governed, not by detailed contracts, but rather by 
the establishment of social and relational norms of behaviour (MacNeil, 1980a).  These 
norms have been predicted as being a more efficient method of controlling supply chain 
behaviour, particularly in areas not controlled by specific contract clauses, or where the 
dynamic environment prevents the documenting of all potential contingencies (Arrighetti 
et al., 1997).  It is clear that social and relational norms take time to develop, and transition 
through various stages (Anderson and Weitz, 1992; Dwyer and Welsh, 1985).  One study 
suggests that norms can take from three to five years to develop to a point of mutual 
understanding (Spekman, Isabella, MacAvoy and Forbes, 1996).  Social and relational 
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norms have been found to apply to several different levels.  Normative behaviours and 
normative expectations can develop for entire societies, particular industries, individual 
firms and also between groups and individuals (Heide and John, 1992).  Further, social and 
relational norms also differ in content.  Macneil’s (1980a) comparison between ‘discrete’ 
and ‘relational’ exchange show that competitive and economic norms belong to the 
discrete end of the scale, while cooperative and collective behavioural norms belongs to 
the relational end.  Norms in turn discourage opportunism, and encourage actors to commit 
further to the relationship (Anderson and Weitz, 1992; Berthon et al., 2003; Brown et al., 
2000; Burchell and Wilkinson, 1997).  Thus, social and relational norms provide another 
scale with which to measure the level of the current relationship between exchange 
partners.          
In summary, the previous sections have discussed in detail the operation of opportunistic 
and collaborative behaviours in supply chain relationships.  However, collaborative and 
opportunistic behaviours do not exist in isolation.  Rather, they are framed within the 
contextual situation of the buyer-supplier dyad, and various delimiting forces or situations 
constraining the manifestation of these behaviours.  These forces will be discussed next 
under the construct of Strategic Behaviour. 
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3.4 Supply Chain Strategic Behaviours  
3.4.1 Introduction 
There is no single environment or force facing members of a distribution channel.  Rather, 
each separate exogenous influence that impinges on exchange relationships combine to 
create a unique and complex environment for every relational context (Achrol et al., 1983).  
Frazier (1999) advises that the “…channel context must be taken into account when 
developing conceptual frameworks, deciding on settings for empirical studies, and 
interpreting empirical results” (p. 238).  It is important that any channel relationship be 
positioned in terms of its environmental structural context or setting.  Yet, up to this point 
the channel context has not featured prominently in research.  Therefore, this research will 
integrate these environmental influences into the hypothesised model to represent the 
moderating or promotional effects they may have in the manifestation of both collaborative 
and opportunistic behaviours.  However, first we must examine the nature and structure of 
the environment of the exchange relationship.   
3.4.2 Structural and Environmental Factors that Influence Relationship 
Dynamics 
When examining marketing channel dyads, Achrol et al., (1983) postulate that the 
environment is made up of three major areas.  Firstly the primary task environment 
consists of a focal firm’s immediate suppliers, customers and competitors.  Secondly, the 
secondary task environment consists of the second, third and beyond tier of suppliers and 
customers, or in other words the ‘supplier’s supplier’ and the ‘customer’s customer’.  
Thirdly, the macro-environment consists of the general social, economic, political and 
technological forces that influence the activities of the primary and secondary 
environments.  Further, Achrol et al., (1983) theoretically pluralises the environmental 
forces impacting a dyad into direct (the primary task environment) and indirect forces (the 
secondary task environment and macro environment).  Following this lead, this research 
will similarly divide these strategic forces into ‘internal firm level influences’, and 
‘external market influences’ recognising that both internal and external can have either 
direct or indirect influences.  This division of the strategic environment into internal and 
external forces is consistent with the Political and Economic Paradigm (PEP) as proposed 
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by Stern and Reve (1980), Achrol et al., (1983) and Dwyer and Welsh (1985).  Therefore, 
drawing from the PEP conceptualisations and also adding the work of Webster (1972) and 
Sheth (1973), the various forces that have been identified as influencing exchange 
relationships are shown in the following Figure 3-3.        
Figure 3-3 Model of the environment showing both External Market forces and Internal Firm forces 
that all influence the context of supply chain exchange relationships. 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Clearly, Figure 3-3 shows a complex and dynamic environment.  While not all of these 
forces are influential all of the time, nor are they of equal strength, yet when added 
together they indeed give a sense of dynamism, complexity and individuality when each 
specific relationship is considered.  Thus, managers attempting to coordinate supply chains 
face many competing demands on their resources and cognitive capacity from ‘task’ and 
‘non-task’ issues.  The emphasis here is to stress the paradoxical and changeable nature of 
industries, their unpredictability and the firm’s limited ability to control the change.  
Nevertheless despite this dynamic environment, exchange relationships do achieve high 
levels of collaboration and these can be thought of as “…islands of planned coordination 
within a sea of complexity” (Rigby et al., 2000, p. 182).   
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Further, when considering internal firm level influences, developing supply chain 
partnerships inherently changes the nature of the boundary spanning aspects of an 
organisation.  Here the relationship is not just managed by sales and purchasing managers, 
instead potentially all levels of an organisation can interact, including stakeholders 
(Knoppen and Christiaanse, 2004), thus adding deeper considerations to the management 
of the critical boundary space.  As a consequence, interorganisational architecture or the 
structural elements of the relationship increases in importance as many obligations and 
expectations must be satisfied.  One example is that higher levels of interdependence 
between separate organisations are accompanied by more contingency in the relationship.  
Kumar and van Dissel (1996) note that as a consequence, the possibility for specifying the 
desired manner of coordination is reduced, leading to ambiguity, misinterpretations and 
misunderstandings possibly ending in conflict. 
It is also expected that the internal firm forces will have a greater impact on behaviour than 
do external market forces.  This is because of the immediacy of any reaction, sanction or 
punishment from both within the firm and from the exchange partner acting as a deterrent.  
If no immediate feedback is forthcoming from the internal forces, for example 
undiscovered short-term opportunism, then the external market forces will eventually self-
regulate or self-organise.  For example, Hill (1990) notes that opportunistic actors will 
eventually be eliminated, not as the result of any one specific behaviour, but by external 
market forces over time as their poor reputation is disseminated.          
While every attempt has been made to capture the major environmental forces in the 
model, it is acknowledged that this conceptualisation has its limitations.  This is primarily 
due to the impossible task of listing and defining every force or influence that could be 
included in the model.  For example, the decision processes can be further divided into 
latent decision authority, and active decision making.  Another issue that is not clear in the 
model is the fact that the environmental forces can work either individually, in tandem or 
in groups.  Nevertheless, for expediency and theoretical parsimony, it is reasonable to 
assume that there are in fact clusters of environment forces that will affect channel dyads 
in different ways, thus creating a complex contextual situation that must be considered 
when enacting supply chain behaviours.   
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3.4.3 Moderating Elements of the Environment 
Since this research intends to examine the effects of opportunistic and collaborative 
behaviour on buyer-supplier relationship levels, it must do so whilst considering the wider 
environmental and strategic constructs that is theorised to impact or moderate the buyer-
seller relationship.  Hence, for this research we argue that various forces grouped under the 
construct of ‘strategic behaviours’ will moderate the dynamic relationship development 
process, and to some degree encourage or constrain certain exchange behaviours.  For 
example, Heribert and Silke (2002) suggest that such variables as supplier dependence, 
duration of the relationship and number of competitors moderate the relationship between 
buyer-supplier embeddedness and economic success.  Sheth (1996) showed that there are 
at least three organisational specific factors that influence organisational purchasing 
situations.  These are; the orientation or culture of the company, the size and leverage of 
the company, and the degree of centralisation or joint decision making.  The culture of the 
company, as a firm level factor, has a large influence on the type of supply chain 
relationships formed (Batt and Purchase, 2004; Hewett, Money and Sharma, 2002; Lee and 
Yu, 2004).  If the focus of a firm’s senior management is short-termed and profit 
maximising, then they will have difficulty in perceiving any real benefits of a long-term 
relational orientation, and would hence be more inclined to take opportunistic risks.  Such 
behaviours could include for example unilateral decision making, exploiting any 
commercial leverage to extract cost savings from the partner, and threatening to switch to 
competing companies.  There is strong evidence for the fact that senior management 
support is needed to sustain higher level partnering type relationships (Ellram, 1991).  
Hence, the culture of a company needs to be supportive of a partnering orientation before 
higher levels of relational exchange can be achieved.   
The nature of the product to be purchased also impacts on the resulting exchange 
behaviour.  Economic exchanges between firms generally involve the swapping of services 
or products (but more likely a combination of both) for some form of equity.  The 
purchasing decision is affected, and in turn affects many aspects of a firm’s operations and 
environment.  In industrial purchasing situations, Noordewier et al., (1990) notes two 
major classes of purchases; firstly, items routinely needed for production and maintenance 
(e.g. components, bearings, sub-assemblies, coffee etc), and secondly, capital expenditure 
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items (e.g. productive plant, buildings, computer systems etc).  A fundamental difference 
between these types of purchases is frequency and complexity.  Thus, the nature of the 
product affects the sourcing decision, and component complexity affects the potential for 
opportunistic behaviour by both the buyer and the supplier (Baiman, Fisher and Rajan, 
2001). 
Previous research into buying elements and decision making units in industrial markets 
show that purchasing exchanges can also differ according to many environmental elements 
that are transcendent to the decision maker (Hewett et al., 2002).  These include aspects 
such as; the type of purchase being made, the importance of the purchase, the marketing 
strategy, the organisational culture, and the relative cost of the purchase (Mitchell, 1998).  
As noted, these factors can have a large influence on the type of exchange relationship 
formed (Noordewier et al., 1990).  For example, an ongoing, risk reducing relationship to 
guarantee the supply of an expensive and critical component would best be delivered 
through a form of relational based ‘partnership’ with the key supplier (Coyle et al., 2003).  
This arrangement would have the advantage of reducing searching costs, supplier 
development and embedding costs, promoting information exchange for closer 
coordination, and adding value to both organisations.  Therefore, if the type of relationship 
to be implemented in an exchange can be dictated by the structural and environmental 
context, then as a consequence, the type of supply chain behaviour can also be 
circumscribed.  Thus, supply chain behaviour can be constrained for strategic and 
environmental reasons.             
Further, the evolving role of the procurement function within organisations has highlighted 
the key role that procurement now plays in facilitating manufacturing and wider 
organisational strategy.  It has been noted that there has been a fundamental shift from 
adversarial transaction focused negotiations with suppliers, to one of ensuring that the 
organisation has sufficient resources to implement its manufacturing and marketing 
strategies with the support from its supply base (Bowersox et al., 2000; Dwyer et al., 
1987).  In particular, much attention has been placed on ensuring the Total Cost of 
Ownership (TCO) is used as a system wide metric for ensuring inventory minimisation, 
quality improvement, and supplier development (Bowersox et al., 2002).  To achieve these 
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goals, it is necessary for the procurement function to promote collaboration and reduce 
opportunism. 
Finally, the focus of this section was on the external market level environment and the 
internal firm level forces that combine to set the scene for exchange relationships.  
Attributes of the environment will guide the supply chain actors into making decisions and 
behaving according to the freedoms or constrains imposed.  This view is similar to 
Barney’s (2002) RBV theory where a firm’s competitive attributes or resources are always 
prescribed by the nature of its existing resources and access to new resources.  The RBV 
sees path dependence as considerably limiting the freedom of future actions.  Similarly for 
exchange relationships, the environment also acts as a constraining factor for supply chain 
behaviours.  However, to remain at the industry level of analysis as strategic behaviours 
does, is to lose the detail of human interactions.  Next, we review the nature of these 
human interactions within supply chains under heading of dynamic behaviours.    
Chapter Three – Supply Chain Behaviours 
 
129 
3.5 Supply Chain Dynamic Behaviours 
3.5.1 Dynamic Behaviour 
An early theorist, McGarry (1951), described channels of distribution as “… one of infinite 
complexity and of profound significance…” (p. 97).  He did not limit this observation to 
just distribution channels, but used the same analogy for the organisation as well.  Even the 
most rudimentary analysis will observe very complex and dynamic behaviours within 
organisations and in supply chains.  Recently, the idea of Chaos /Complexity theory being 
applied to organisations has found support from writers such as Black and Boal (1994), 
Levy (1994), Macbeth (2002), and Wilding (1998).  However, Murray (2003) is less 
convinced of the usefulness of the theory and warns that Chaos/Complexity theory has not 
been demonstrated in many physical systems, and hence its applicability to a social system 
cannot be assumed.  Nevertheless, he is convinced of the explanatory power of the 
metaphors and concepts that can be drawn from the theory.  Up until this point in this 
research, human organisations have been understood as an objective phenomena where a 
system is bounded conceptually and as such, model formation becomes viable (Stacey, 
Griffin and Shaw, 2000).  However, this approach assumes away much of the freedoms 
inherent in human behaviour as the rules for interaction become quite specific.  Yet, the 
addition of Chaos/Complexity theory allows one to view human interactions as being; non-
specific, sensitive to initial conditions, evolving toward a ‘strange attractor’, flip at the 
‘edge of chaos’ and then self-organise toward a new ‘strange attractor’.  Whilst initially 
confusing, these concepts will be used to explain the processes examined in this research 
(Levy, 1994).            
One consequence of the multifaceted nature of the external and internal environments is 
the dynamic impact that it has on the context surrounding each exchange relationship.  In 
Chaos parlance, a small change (or sensitivity to initial conditions) may later create large 
perturbations in the system.  Such as, a seemingly innocuous negative behaviour (as 
perceived by the perpetrator) may result ultimately in the termination of the relationship by 
the other partner.  Das and Rahman (2001) attribute the premature terminations of a large 
number of exchange partnerships to relational problems rather than business difficulties.  
These relational problems can be directly credited to the various enacted behaviours within 
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the partnership, thus linking behaviour to relationship outcome.  Logically, exchange 
relationships are not static or fixed, rather they are dynamic, living phenomena that change 
and evolve over time.  Yet the process of relationship development or evolution does not 
always go according to plan.  Invariably due to complexity, firms and individuals are not 
able to fully control the relationship changes, yet neither are they totally subject to random 
events.  Thus, Chaos/Complexity theory is a most promising approach to the understanding 
of the continuous state of flux seen in supply chain relationships (Maani and Maharaj, 
2004; Stacey et al., 2000).   
3.5.2 Insights from Chaos/Complexity Theory 
Where complexity has value, it is in the broad conceptualisation of behavioural systems.  
Indeed, it might even provide an overarching explanation to a wide variety of 
organisational and managerial issues.  It may be especially useful for dealing with the 
complexity produced by a large number of only partially understood and dynamically 
interacting variables such seen in the strategic behaviours of this research (Murray, 2003).  
The current interest in deterministic systems is a product of the nineteenth century classical 
determinism, particularly as expressed through the Newtonian laws (Levy, 1994).  Namely, 
if a set of values with specified initial conditions prescribe the evolution of a system 
uniquely with no external disturbances, then its behaviour is deterministic and it evolves 
indefinitely (Shone, 2002).  In other words, if the evolution of a system is fully predictable, 
then causality is also certain.  It is this view that has strongly influenced large sections of 
scientific effort, and has been fully embodied in neoclassical economics.  However, this 
view experiences some difficulty with the advent of randomness, and even more so when 
chaotic patterns were observed in random data.  In the physical sciences, randomness can 
be controlled in a large part by experiments and method, conversely in economics, and 
social sciences this is far from true.  Thus, it was thought that economic systems 
experienced random shocks which ultimately lead to indeterminism (Mirowski, 1990; 
Shone, 2002).  Chaos/Complexity theory is concerned with how deterministic systems can 
exhibit chaos and degrees of randomness.  It notes that randomness does not occur from 
random shocks to the system, but rather such behaviours occur when the parameters of a 
system take on certain values (Shone, 2002).  Yet defining these parameters is an elusive 
task.  It is noted that these values or behaviours are important to this research, for at a 
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particular value when such behaviours occur, the overall system’s behaviour changes.  
These points of departure or points of fundamental change are known in Chaos/Complexity 
theory as bifurcation points.  Bifurcation events examine a system’s equilibrium in relation 
to changes in important parameters.  It should be clear that for some systems, such as 
supply chain relationships, their nature or state could change dramatically at certain 
parameter values.      
3.5.3 Bifurcation Theory Revisited 
Bifurcation theory was introduced and discussed in detail in section 2.7.2.1 of this 
research.  However, to summarise here, bifurcation theory is the study of points in a system 
at which the qualitative behaviour of the system changes to a significant degree.  Systems 
whose ‘strange attractors’ lead them to the ‘edge of chaos’ are not just subject to random 
change.  Rather, strange attractors have a family-like similarity, and therefore some degree 
of future outcome predictability can be seen (Stacey et al., 2000).  Moreover, the 
qualitative behaviour of the system either side of the bifurcation point has quite different 
values.  In economics, the type of bifurcation point encountered is often named after the 
type of graph they exhibit, such as cusp bifurcation and pitchfork bifurcation (Shone, 
2002).  Bifurcation points are most useful in showing when a system’s behaviour becomes 
irregular or chaotic in nature.  
Bifurcation triggering events can be random exogenous shocks or deliberate interventions 
in the system.  The sensitivity to a bifurcation will be different in each system depending 
on the strength of its historical, cultural, normative and economic links.  In other words, 
the strength of a strange attractor in maintaining a relationship’s current trajectory is 
relative to the strength of other viable strange attractors.  Hence, some systems are 
vulnerable to small perturbations, while others can be ever-tolerant depending on the 
strength of the current strange attractor.  Concerning exchange relationships, the literature 
demonstrates that the two dominant supply chain behaviours of opportunism and 
collaboration can be bifurcation triggering events. 
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3.5.4 Adaptations without Significant Change - Zones of Tolerance 
Consistent with, but not directly addressed in Chaos/Complexity theory, is the concept of 
tolerance or the adaptive coping of perturbations of a system without any significant 
change.  While Chaos/Complexity theory deals with those systems at the edge of chaos and 
bifurcation events, it does not say much at all on those systems that remain ordered on their 
original equilibrium.  There is no explanation for the current trajectory of a system (in this 
case an exchange relationship) beyond the pulling power of the prevailing strange attractor 
(Gleick, 1988).  Thietart and Forgues (1995) argue that an organisation can only be in one 
of three states; a stable of equilibrium, a state of periodic equilibrium, or a state of chaos.  
Stable and periodic equilibriums indicate forms of linear dynamics, whilst chaotic patterns 
indicate non-linear dynamics (Dooley and Van de Ven, 1999).  As previously shown, 
linear dynamics are unable to fully explain the complexities of relational exchange.  
Hence, we argue that a system will change in a non-linear fashion, and this change is 
caused by the strength of alternative strange attractors.  Yet, prior to this change, and 
certainly under the periodic equilibrium paradigm, small adaptations are continuously 
taking place, but without precipitating a bifurcation.  Therefore, in addition we hypothesise 
that an area or a zone of tolerance (ZOT) exists around the relationship equilibrium that is 
resistant, or at least adaptive to, positive and negative disruptions without altering its 
current strange attractor.  Further, the strength of the zone of tolerance is determined by the 
strength of the current strange attractor, vis-à-vis the strength of a similar or novel strange 
attractor.  Thus, some events may cause a bifurcation in one system, whilst identical events 
enacted in another system may not.    
3.5.4.1 Threshold Effects 
In social and physical sciences there is clearly a point or a moment when a substance, 
action or perception changes from one state to another due to some stimuli or input.  For 
example, water changes into steam at a certain temperature, steel will bend after applying a 
certain force, and decisions will made and action taken after the evaluation of input.  This 
is commonly known as Threshold Theory, and concerns behaviour that demonstrates 
‘threshold effects’.  A threshold can be considered as a limit below which a stimulus 
causes no reaction.  Logically it follows then, that the stimuli may be present but not in 
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sufficient quantities to cause a change of state.  This concept observes that an individual 
will not make a response unless the value of the underlying variable exceeds a certain 
threshold or critical level as determined by the frame of reference of that individual.  
Threshold effects can be seen in quite diverse areas such as; international relations 
(Studeman, 1998), ecological conservation (Perrings and Pearce, 1994), family 
relationships (Oppenheimer, 2003), macroeconomics (Khan and Senhadj, 2001), and 
medical relationships (Dibben and Lean, 2003).  In marketing literature, threshold effects 
can be seen in consumer behaviour (Vakratsas, Feinberg, Bass and Kalyanaram, 2004).  
For example, Malhotra (1996) argues that a consumer when considering two competing 
stores, will use their preferences to evaluate one store against the other.  If the degree of 
preference for one store is above a certain threshold level, then they will shop in that store, 
if below, then they will shop in the other store.  The evaluation and threshold levels are 
determined by the individual with decision authority.        
What is important for threshold effects is not the stimulus itself, but the reaction to the 
stimulus in terms of the change in physical state or action taken.  Further, it seems quite 
obvious that the threshold values will vary from individual to individual, thus different 
reactions could be expected from different individuals in response to the same stimuli.  The 
change moment, or point of breaching the threshold value can be metaphorically related to 
the bifurcation point in Chaos/Complexity theory.  Therefore, this research proposes that a 
tolerance level or critical threshold value exists, below which no change of state is 
expected, even though a stimulus may be present in various quantities.  The stimulus may 
or may not be observable by the individual, but it is the level of tolerance that is the 
essential value.  Logically, there must also be present a variation phenomenon in the 
individual tolerance levels over a range of situations. 
As an example, in exchange relationships an individual may be tolerant to a small amount 
of opportunistic behaviour, but may terminate the relationships with the transgressor if the 
behaviour persists over the longer term, or gets worse in the shorter term.  At some point, 
the opportunistic behaviour becomes a concern, exceeds the threshold critical value and a 
change occurs.  It is unclear what these threshold values are, or how they are formulated in 
the consciousness of the individual.  Yet, the fact that relationships change in response to 
various supply chain behaviours, points to the existence of threshold hold values held by 
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decision making individuals in a supply chain.  Interestingly, there does not appear to be 
any previous studies done on detecting threshold values or effects in supply chain 
relationships, thus the current study will contribute significantly to this new area.  
3.5.4.2 Adaptation in Exchange Relationships 
Concerning exchange relationships, we can see some evidence of adaptations and threshold 
effects or tolerance levels.  For example, controlling for opportunism can be expensive and 
entail other monitoring and opportunity costs that can at times far out weigh the benefits.  
Alternatively, the behaviour can be tolerated.  This dichotic situation either leaves 
opportunism unchecked, or requiring the expenditure of significant resources to monitor 
and control.  From a managerial perspective both of these choices are unpalatable.  A 
solution can be found in Dutta, Bergen and John’s (1994) seemingly counterintuitive 
suggestion that a manager should control for the more serious forms of opportunism, while 
tolerating the smaller, less consequent violations.  Their research, using the Nash 
equilibrium in self-enforcing agreements demonstrate that dealers covering a particular 
territory can generally tolerate some degree of bootlegging (i.e. the selling in ones own 
territory by another dealer).  They assert that the dealers have a degree of tolerance to the 
opportunistic behaviours of other dealers, up to the point where it becomes worth their 
while to pursue corrective action.  Therefore, demonstrating some evidence of a threshold 
effect and in addition, a zone of tolerance.  This conclusion is based on the idea that 
administering a governance mechanism that is sufficiently robust to fully detect and 
eliminate opportunism may be so costly and cumbersome as to completely outweigh the 
benefits derived from eliminating opportunistic behaviours in the first place.  They 
conclude by stressing that if the margin required to discourage opportunism is sufficiently 
high, it may be more profitable for a firm to tolerate a degree of opportunistic behaviour.  
Hence, a zone of tolerance is established around the trade-off point between managing 
opportunism, and economising on monitoring and governance cost.  This view is supported 
by Hill (1990) who suggests that “…behaviours that stress cooperation, trust, and 
forgiveness of isolated opportunism by others have economic value” (p. 509).  Further, 
Gundlach et al. (1995) found evidence, in industrial situations of small numbers and 
oligopolistic markets, that parties to a relationship who have limited choice or alternatives 
will be more tolerant of opportunistic infractions.  By necessity, their tolerance levels have 
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increased.  These examples have empirically illustrated the presence of threshold effects 
and by logically extension, zones of tolerance in exchange relationships.  The following 
figure (Figure 3-4) provides an illustration of the dynamic relational movement process 
over time.  Initially, an exchange relationship that existed within a ZOT at one relationship 
level encounters a bifurcation event and enters a period of chaos or change.  The causes of 
the bifurcation or any subsequent bifurcations are hypothesised to be opportunistic and 
collaborative behaviours.  The emerging relationship has evolved and is fundamentally 
different due to the behavioural legacy that precipitated the bifurcation event.  The new 
relationship settles into a new relational equilibrium (unless disrupted by further 
bifurcations), and new ZOTs with different parameter values evolve around the new 
relationship. 
Figure 3-4 Zones of Tolerance, Bifurcation Events and Relationship Inertia 
 
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
3.5.4.3 Zones of Tolerance - Conclusions 
So far this review has established the theoretical and empirical evidence for the existence 
of bifurcation points and zones of tolerance.  The existence of bifurcation points, where the 
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The exchange relationship initially starts as a collaborative partnership.  However, some action (possibly an 
opportunistic one by either of the parties) has initiated a period of relationship instability and conflict 
(bifurcation).  A change occurs when the threshold barriers (Zones of Tolerance) in the existing relationship 
have been exceeded.  Where a ZOT has been breached, the old routines, structures and social norms of 
the exchange relationship (Relationship Inertia) have been insufficient to hold the relationship in its current 
state.  Over time (T
-1 to Tn ) a new relationship is formed or it is terminated. 
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values of a system dynamically changes to a new value or direction, implicitly suggests 
that there must be some form of barrier or point of resistance that; keeps the current system 
in a form of equilibrium, and also must be breached in order for a bifurcation to occur.  
Therefore, if these assumptions are correct, then it leads to five important conclusions. 
1. The existence of relationship equilibria in supply chains can be theorised. 
2. That bifurcation points in a relationship can be determined. 
3. That there exists threshold levels that create upper and lower points of change.  
These threshold points must be breached in order for a bifurcation event to occur.  
4. That a bifurcation event will result in a fundamental change in the underlying 
relationship (i.e. relationship level). 
5. That there is an area between the upper and lower change points constituting a ZOT 
where supply chain behaviours or forces are not strong enough to create a bifurcation 
event and therefore adaptation occurs. 
 
Further, as supply chain relationships are patterns of joint human interaction, they may 
change for the better or the worse.  The outcome of a bifurcation event may either promote 
the relationship to a higher level, or reduce if not destroy the relationship depending on the 
positive or negative forces that initiated the bifurcation.  Consistent with Stacey et al’s., 
(2000) transformative teleology, this research argues that new and novel patterns of 
behaviour may emerge ex post a bifurcation as old behavioural patterns rearrange 
themselves.  The resulting new behavioural patterns would lead to different relationship 
levels suitable to the new context.  The behaviours are novel only in the sense that they 
could be new to that particular relationship between firms, yet we may find other very 
similar (but due to context, never identical) behaviours in other supply chain relationships.            
A bifurcation does not necessarily mean that a relationship changes to a completely new 
level or trajectory.  The theory allows for the possibility that a supply chain relationship 
that has exceeded its ZOT, thus precipitating a bifurcation, may actually seek equilibrium 
or self-organise back to state similar to its original trajectory after a period of chaos.  For 
example, this could be seen when a supplier behaves opportunistically and is terminated by 
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the buyer.  However, after a period of instability (chaos) where the system of supply is 
reorganised, the buyer may eventually be forced or constrained by the commercial context 
(strategic behaviours) to approach the original supplier and reluctantly re-establish the 
relationship.  Nevertheless, the relationship will have fundamentally changed in many 
dimensions, certainly the level of trust and commitment will have been reduced.  Indeed, 
the alteration or adjustment of the original ZOTs to new levels established by the buyer 
would surely be narrower and less tolerant of repeated offences in the future.  Here, the 
probability of further bifurcations is enhanced immediately, and is only mitigated as the 
relationship remains stable and proves its worth over time.  Thus, it can be seen that supply 
chain relationships operate in a complex environment and exhibit characteristics of 
dynamic behaviour that can be aptly described by the metaphors of Chaos/Complexity 
theory.       
3.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has thoroughly reviewed the literature and has introduced different types of 
supply chain behaviours.  Initially, the chapter explored the rich research body concerning 
opportunistic behaviours and concludes that while much effort has been directed to the 
construct, it is fundamentally incomplete.  Thus, this research proposes a new continuum 
based of severity and legality incorporating four different types of opportunistic 
behaviours.  These being; 
1. Social Opportunism. 
2. Commercial Opportunism. 
3. Unconscionable Opportunism. 
4. Illegal Opportunism.      
 
Next, this chapter reviewed the construct of collaboration.  Whilst this construct has been 
well documented in literature, it is noted that the sub-dimensions have been researched in 
isolation, or in smaller groupings, and seemingly divorced from the actual operational 
dimensions that make collaboration work.  Hence, this research has reconceptualised the 
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construct by linking together the core and operational dimensions.  Thus, this research 
proposes that collaboration in supply chains consist of four different types of behaviours; 
1. Active Disclosure (sub-dimensions: Communication and Information sharing). 
2. Common Objectives (sub-dimensions: Conflict Resolution and Goal Congruence).  
3. Joint Risk Taking (sub-dimensions: Relationship Specific Investments and Activities, 
and Shared Risks and Rewards). 
4. Relational Commitment (sub-dimensions: Trust and Commitment, and Social and 
Relational Norms).        
 
Overall, the two major supply chain behaviours of opportunism and collaboration were 
investigated from a micro-behavioural perspective, in that human-to-human interaction is 
explored and then behavioural dimensions are conceptualised and operationalised.  Next, it 
was necessary to take a step back and adopt a macro-behavioural perspective to investigate 
the organisational and industry wide forces captured by the construct of Strategic 
behaviours.  This construct allows insights into how industry and firm level structures 
impact on the enacted supply chain behaviours.  Finally, we again adopt a micro-level 
perspective to explore dynamic supply chain behaviours, and how exchange relationships 
handle perturbations and adaptations precipitated by individual exchange behaviours. 
Finally, this chapter has demonstrated that supply chain relationships are dominated by the 
major exchange behaviours of opportunism on the one hand, and collaboration on the 
other.  It also reviewed the major construct of Strategic behaviour; and concluded with a 
description of dynamic supply chain behaviours.  In the next chapter, these elements will 
be now incorporated into a conceptual research model and from this, hypotheses will be 
developed. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4 Theoretical Research Model and Hypotheses 
Development 
4.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapters have discussed in depth the dichotomy of conflicting supply chain 
behaviours that are ostensibly present simultaneously in exchange relationships.  The 
Rational school theories make major assumptions as to the complete rationality of an actor 
with full information maximising their own utility in a self-seeking manner.  Under these 
conditions, behaviours that are opportunistic and self-seeking in character would tend to 
dominate this paradigm.  Conversely, the Relational school makes some major 
assumptions as to the importance of sociological and normative behaviours as alternative 
means of gaining control or influence in exchange relationships.  Under this paradigm 
cooperative and collaborative behaviours are believed to be the dominant modus operandi.  
Further, there are certain environmental and market based forces that delimit the strategic 
choices of the exchange actors, and can either moderate or encourage the enacted 
behaviour.     
Given complete freedom, the exchange actor’s propensity to behave as they chose without 
constraints cannot be questioned (Barnes, 1984).  Each actor has the potential to behave in 
a cooperative manner or an opportunistic manner given the circumstances.  The fact that 
exchange actors have this ability to elect to behave the way they wish produces a ‘response 
dilemma’.  Yet, in industrial supply chain situations these decisions are necessarily 
constrained by situational factors, bounded rationality and individual cognitive abilities 
(Slovic, Fischhoff and Lichtenstein, 1982).  Given these heuristics, we can see that 
opportunism and collaboration are, or should be, mutually exclusive in the sense that while 
one is behaving cooperatively, then one cannot by default be behaving opportunistically 
with the same partner.  However, we know that the same actor can function in both 
domains if the pay-off is desirable over the longer term (Axlerod, 1997).  Further, there are 
multiple empirical examples of both behaviours being present in the same system (Hill, 
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1990; Parkhe, 1993; Wong, Tjosvold, Wong and Liu, 1999).  All these interacting forces 
and behaviours produce very complex behavioural systems, hence the following research 
propositions seek to identify and question some of the more fundamental assumptions 
concerning the complexities of exchange relationships. 
4.2 General Research Questions 
How do supply chain relationships adapt to enacted behaviours of their partners?  How do 
they cope with behavioural complexity?  Do supply chain relationships dynamically 
develop and change over time?  These are important, yet todate, overlooked questions 
concerning a fundamentally vital activity in a national economy.  The fact that there are 
clear contradictions between collaborative and opportunistic ideologies in inter-firm 
relationships suggest that existing theories are not adequate for explaining current inter-
organisational exchange relationships, yet alone dynamic relational movements.  Broadly, 
this research will attempt to investigate the nature and the composition of supply chain 
exchange relationships as they evolve over time, and how they react to observed 
behaviours or perceptions of the functioning of the relationship.  The focus of this research 
is to examine the dynamic forces, or variables acting on supply chain relationships that 
either initiate a movement from one form of exchange relationship to another, or hold the 
relationship in a steady state over time.     
To achieve these aims, this research has merged several major theories and research 
streams into two broad and fundamentally diametrically opposing forces that are theorised 
to impact on supply chain exchange relationships.  This multi-paradigmatic approach 
yielded two schools of thought; the Rational school (characterised by opportunistic 
behaviours), and the Relational school (characterised by collaborative behaviours).  The 
reconceptualisation of these two variables produced two new typologies.  In addition, the 
literature acknowledges that external market forces and internal firm level considerations 
have an impact on the behaviour of the buyer, thus a third behavioural option is explored 
under the heading of Strategic behaviours.    
Previous empirical research has been used to identify the various types and categorisations 
of supply chain relationships (Dwyer et al., 1987; Lambert et al., 1996; MacNeil, 1980b; 
Chapter Four – Research Model and Hypotheses  
 
141 
Stern and Reve, 1980; Webster, 1992).  One of the intermediate forms of exchange 
relationship identified is known as the partnership relationship (Knemeyer et al., 2003).  
This level of relationship contains market based exchanges at one end, and more 
collaborative type partnerships at the other.  Hence, this research makes two 
generalisations for supply chain partnerships, namely that a transactional type relationship, 
and a partnership type relationship exist.  Once the equilibrium level of the current 
relationship is established, any changes to these two types of exchange relationship will be 
measured by describing the impact of various positive and negative behaviours on the 
relationship level and levels of tolerance.  Further, the market and firm level structural 
contexts that influence the behaviour of the buyer in the exchange relationship will also be 
incorporated into the model (see Section 4.3 following).     
It is anticipated that dynamic changes in supply chain relationships will be initiated by 
applying the two major behavioural typologies to an existing relationship.  It follows then 
that the nature of the changes in supply chain exchange relationships can be observed as 
the variables are manipulated in a dynamic manner.   
4.2.1 Specific Research Questions 
Specifically, this research will attempt to answer the following research questions: 
1. Do supply chain exchange relationship levels change due to dynamic behaviours? 
2. Do collaborative behaviours positively influence exchange relationship levels? 
3. Do opportunistic behaviours negatively influence exchange relationship levels? 
4. How tolerant are existing relationships to the presence of opportunistic or 
collaborative behaviours? 
5. What behaviours are more likely to causes exchange relationship bifurcations? 
6. Can strategic behaviours hold the current exchange relationship in a steady state? 
 
These questions will be addressed in turn by the hypotheses development section next.  
However, first it is necessary to integrate the theoretical constructs into a model of 
dynamic relational development theory.  
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4.3 The Research Model 
The following Figure (4.1) represents the conceptualisation of the research constructs into 
a model of dynamic supply chain relationship development.  
Figure 4-1 Main Research Model.  The Dynamic Relationship Development Concept for Supply 
Chain Exchange Relationships 
 
 
 
While this research will examine the movement of exchange relationships in general, 
specifically it is theorised that relationships do not simply bifurcate from one level to 
another in response to any or all opportunistic or collaborative behaviours.  Rather, inter-
organisation relationships are polymorphic and variable over time (Geser, 1992) and are 
highly complex.  Hence, they can be respecified according to changing needs and 
situational conditions, and as they change, they are capable of modifying old or generating 
new social and relational norms that hold the relationship in a steady state (Cheung and 
Turnball, 1998).  Therefore, there should be a degree of tolerance to various behaviours of 
the partners, and the reaction to these behaviours should be defined by the level of 
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tolerance that generates a form of relationship inertia.  According to these arguments, 
specific research hypotheses are developed in the next section.    
4.4 Hypotheses Development 
4.4.1 Main Research Hypotheses 
In general, supply chain relationships do not remain static over time.  Rather, they change 
and evolve in response to various inter and intra-environmental influences and partner 
behaviours.  A major factor in determining the course of a relationship is the degree of 
collaborative or opportunistic behaviours demonstrated.  Hence, the enactment of either 
opportunistic or collaborative behaviours has the ability to change the nature of that 
relationship (Batt and Purchase, 2004; Dwyer et al., 1987; Robicheaux and El-Ansary, 
1975; Stump and Heide, 1996; Wathne and Heide, 2000).  Therefore,     
H1a: Supply chain relationships may change in response to both collaborative and 
opportunistic behaviours. 
 
As there are many different types of supply chain relationships involving different levels of 
interaction and cooperation, supply chain relationships can be categorised into distinctly 
different types (MacNeil, 1980a; O'Toole and Donaldson, 2000; Webster, 1992).  Because 
there are differing levels of involvement for different types of relationships, it is reasonable 
to expect that different supply chain relationship levels will display varying degrees of 
behaviour, thus, 
H1b: Transactional relationships can be differentiated from partnership relationships by 
the different levels of behaviour found in each. 
 
Given that different relationships display different behaviours and degrees of closeness, it 
is likely that important relationships between firms that are seen as more involved and 
committed and will display higher degrees of collaborative behaviour (Morgan and Hunt, 
1994; Skinner et al., 1992).  Conversely, higher level relationships will also display 
correspondingly lower levels of opportunistic or negative behaviours.  Further, if it is 
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assumed that higher level relationships display higher levels of collaborative behaviour and 
lower levels of opportunistic behaviour, then it can also be expected that lower level 
relationships will display lower levels of collaborative behaviours and higher levels of 
opportunistic behaviours, hence,   
H2: Partnership relationships may display more collaborative behaviours and less 
opportunistic behaviours than transactional relationships.  
4.4.2 Zone of Tolerance (ZOT) Hypotheses 
Generally, the deterministic relationship level that is established or is currently present will 
remain unless some unseen or deliberate act or force upsets the relationship equilibrium, 
thus producing a bifurcation that will subsequently set the relationship onto a new path.  
Within this relationship, small system perturbations will not cause the current path to 
deviate to any large degree, and the relationship should stay in a steady state.  However, if 
either of the positive or negative forces become unbalanced the restraining forces will be 
overcome, and a bifurcation event will occur resulting in a relationship change.  
Nevertheless, supply chain relationships all demonstrate that while in a steady state they 
are tolerant to small perturbations and changes in behavioural levels (Dyer and Singh, 
1998; Kale et al., 2000).  Around the relationship equilibrium, there exists a zone that is 
said to be tolerant to behavioural changes, and within which the relationship will remain in 
a relative steady state (within the basin of attraction).  For example, assuming that 
transactional27 supply chain relationships all operate a ZOT, then this zone will be capable 
of adapting to small fluctuations in both collaborative and opportunistic supplier 
behaviours without a bifurcation occurring.  Thus, we would expect to find that the upper 
ZOT for increases of collaborative and opportunistic behaviours are different (not equal) to 
the current relationship equilibrium, hence28;   
                                                 
27
 The Transactional relationship (n = 89) is used for hypotheses testing as it is the only one of the two that theoretically 
allowed the capture of both the upper and lower ZOTs for relationship movement.  See Chapter 5 for a fuller 
explanation.  
28
 Where possible, the hypotheses are expressed firstly in word form and then again mathematically to provide an 
alternative view of the same relationship for clarity. 
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H3a: For transactional relationships, the upper ZOT for increases in collaborative 
behaviours is different to the current relationship equilibrium for the same 
behaviour, or 
( 1 2) ( 1 2) 0A D A DTCc TCi− −− ≠        Equation 4-1 
 
H3b: For transactional relationships, the upper ZOT for increases in opportunistic 
behaviours is different to the current relationship equilibrium for the same 
behaviour, or  
( ) ( ) 0E H E HTOc TOi− −− ≠        Equation 4-2 
 
Similarly, we would expect to find that the lower ZOT for decreases of collaborative and 
opportunistic behaviours are different (not equal) to the current relationship equilibrium, 
hence, 
H3c: For transactional relationships, the lower ZOT for decreases in collaborative 
behaviours is different to the current relationship equilibrium for the same 
behaviour, or 
( 1 2) ( 1 2) 0A D A DTCc TCd− −− ≠        Equation 4-3 
 
H3d: For transactional relationships, the lower ZOT for decreases in opportunistic 
behaviours is different to the current relationship equilibrium for the same 
behaviour, or 
( ) ( ) 0E H E HTOc TOd− −− ≠        Equation 4-4 
 
Where: 
 
TC   = transactional partnerships, collaborative behaviours 
TO   = transactional partnerships, opportunistic behaviours 
c   = current relationship equilibrium 
i  = increased (upper ZOT) behavioural performance 
d  = decreased (lower ZOT) behavioural performance 
( 1 2)A D−  = research collaborative variables (x 8) 
( )E H−  = research opportunistic variables (x 4) 
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The level of tolerance within a supply chain relationship will differ according to the 
displayed behaviour.  It follows then that supply chain relationships will be more accepting 
of increases, and less accepting of any decreases of the same collaborative behaviour.  This 
is due to a buyer requiring much more evidence of an increase in the frequency of a 
particular behaviour before an upward relationship change occurs.  Whereas, they will be 
more sensitive to decreases of the same behaviour as negative perceptions are more keenly 
felt (Ellram, 1995).  In other words, for collaborative behaviours, we would expect to find 
that a buyer would be quite tolerant of any increases of a specific behaviour, and less 
tolerant of any decreases of that same behaviour.  Thus, for transactional relationships, a 
buyer’s ZOT for any increases in a collaborative behaviour will be larger (less sensitive) 
than the corresponding ZOT for any decreases of the same behaviour (more sensitive), 
hence,    
H4: For transactional relationships, the ZOT for any increase in a collaborative 
behaviour will be equal to or larger (less sensitive) than the ZOT for any decrease of 
the same collaborative behaviour, or  
( 1 2) ( 1 2)A D A DTZCi TZCd− −≥        Equation 4-5 
Where: 
TZC   = transactional relationships / zone of tolerance (current –  increase) / collaborative behaviours 
Conversely, for opportunistic behaviours, we would expect to find that a buyer would be 
quite tolerant of any decreases of this behaviour, and less tolerance of any increases.  Thus, 
from the current level, a buyer’s ZOT for any increases in opportunistic behaviours will be 
smaller (more sensitive) than the ZOT for decreases of the same behaviour (less sensitive), 
therefore,  
H5: For transactional relationships, the ZOT for any increases in an opportunistic 
behaviour will be equal to or smaller (more sensitive) than the ZOT for an decrease 
of the same opportunistic behaviour, or 
( ) ( )E H E HTZOd TZOi− −≥        Equation 4-6 
Where: 
TZO   = transactional relationships / zone of tolerance, (current – decrease) / opportunistic behaviours 
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4.4.3 Bifurcation Hypotheses 
Not all supply chain relationship stay within their ZOTs in a steady state.  Changes in 
relationship levels will occur when the buyer perceives that the operation of either 
opportunistic or collaborative behaviour exceeds a certain personal or corporate threshold 
level (whether real or perceived).  Once a particular behaviour becomes dominant or is 
severe enough, it overcomes the restraint of the countervailing force (strange attractor), and 
at some point will breach the ZOT of the buyer, thus precipitating a relationship 
bifurcation.  However, not all relationships are equal, in fact, each is unique in its own 
context (Knemeyer et al., 2003).  Different buyers and relationships will react differently to 
the presence of collaborative and opportunistic behaviours before a bifurcation occurs, as 
the perceptions of a buyer’s ZOTs for each relationship will be quite different.  Further, 
they are dynamically updated in response to the observed events over time (O'Neill and 
Palmer, 2004).  
The direction of the expected change can be predicted in part by the base behaviour being 
displayed prior to the bifurcation.  This is consistent with Chaos/Complexity theory that 
suggests the post bifurcation relationship trajectory can be determined in part by the pre-
existing conditions (Potts, 2000).  Therefore, it seems logical to predict that collaborative 
behaviours will promote relationships, while the threat or act of opportunistic behaviour 
will diminish or terminate the current relationship.  However, as these behaviours operate 
within a ZOT, the increases or decreases will cause no effect until a threshold limit is 
breached (Malhotra, 1996; Vakratsas et al., 2004).  What cannot be determined is if the 
enactment of various behaviours results in an arithmetic or a geometric assessment of the 
relationship perceptions by one party over time.  It is true that various supply chain 
behaviours are assessed in view of the cumulative historical effect on the relationship 
overall, and thus are dynamically updated (Frazier and Sheth, 1985; O'Neill and Palmer, 
2004).  For example, as more collaborative behaviours are enacted, the greater the chance 
of a relationship bifurcation leading to a higher level (Barratt and Oliveira, 2001).   
The question remains as to how these upper and lower ZOTs interact with the relationship 
equilibrium and also with each other?  The dynamic nature of inter-organisational and 
human relations suggest that order can be seen within complexity (De Vree, 1997).  Yet 
the difficulty has always been to suggest ways in which to determine the strength and 
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direction of these periods of self-organisation to get a truly dynamic view of supply chain 
relationships.   
One view would suggest that the dynamic forces are constant or at least stochastically 
balanced, and that there are no real changes over time between the relationship equilibrium 
and the upper and lower ZOTs.  In other words, the upper and lower ZOT levels maintain 
the same distance relative to the relationship equilibrium and with each other.  We can see 
that any change of behaviour is not related in any way to the reaction of the other.  This 
can be demonstrated by Figure 4-2 that shows three parallel lines moving in unison.  
Hence, area A remains at the same in relation to the equilibrium and also area B.    
Alternatively, A or B could change direction yet the areas of A and B remain stable and are 
completely unconnected to each other.  Another way of stating this is that area A has no 
correlation to area B, or the correlation coefficient equals zero or is near zero. 
Figure 4-2 Stable ZOTs Relative to the Relationship Equilibrium (i.e. no correlation) 
 
 
Relational
Equilibrium
ZOT Upper
ZOT Lower
 T0                            Tn
R
e
la
tio
n
sh
ip
 
Le
ve
l
A
B
 
A second view would hold that changes between the upper and lower ZOTs and the 
relational equilibrium are in fact related.  This would seem more logical than the first 
proposition, as collaborative and opportunistic behaviours are seen as the antithesis of each 
other in literature.  This second view would contend that both behaviours are positively 
related to each other in a converging or diverging manner over time.  Thus, if the operation 
of collaborative behaviour (A) increases, then the tolerance for opportunistic behaviour (B) 
also increases in proportion and vice-versa.  These changes would either bring both ZOTs 
closer to the relational equilibrium (the convergent view), or further apart (the divergent 
Chapter Four – Research Model and Hypotheses  
 
149 
view).  Here, the relationship equilibrium is stable, and it could be said that the ZOTs are 
positively correlated to each other, and this is illustrated in Figure 4-3 the divergent view, 
and Figure 4-4 the convergent view, 
Figure 4-3 Divergent View of the ZOT – Stable Relationship Equilibrium 
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Figure 4-4 Convergent View of the ZOT - Stable Relationship Equilibrium 
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However, the increase or decrease of both collaborative and opportunistic behaviours 
simultaneously within a single relationship by one party also seems counter intuitive.  
Rather, it seems logical that any increase in the upper ZOT for a behaviour would see a 
decrease in the lower ZOT for the same behaviour relative to the relationship equilibrium.  
This being true for both collaborative and opportunistic behaviours, and also vice-versa.  
Thus, the third view holds that as the operation of a behaviour increase, the other reduces 
within the total ZOT.  Indeed, a precondition for this relationship to hold is that, as 
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opposed to the first two views, here the both the ZOTs (upper and lower) and the 
relationship equilibrium all move dynamically.  This idea suggests that the outer edge or 
boundary of the ZOT (furthest point away from the equilibrium) is the bifurcation trigger 
point, or the edge of chaos.  This is consistent with O'Neill and Palmer’s (2004) 
proposition that the perceptions of another’s behaviour held by an exchange actor are 
updated episodically according what is observed.  By extension, the perceptions of 
tolerance or an individual’s ZOT should also be updated dynamically (Burke and Edell, 
1989).  If this is the case, then it can be argued that the upper and lower ZOTs should be 
positively correlated with each other.  However, what cannot be determined at this stage, is 
the direction or interrelationships between the upper and lower ZOTs and the relationship 
equilibrium.  But it should be safe to assume that these relationships also display dynamic 
tendencies.   
As each supply chain relationship involves the complexities of dynamic systems, it follows 
that each individual relationship could be treated uniquely, and with appropriate due 
diligence, achieve optimal results.  Given full information, unlimited time, and full 
comprehension of the complexities, this is theoretically possible.  However, due to the 
information asymmetry inherent in supply chains, and the cognitive inability or 
unwillingness of human decision makers to comprehend total complexity, most managers 
attempt to deal with complexity through bounded rationality, selective searches and 
‘satisficing’ decisions (Simon, 1979).  As managers attempt to make rational decisions in 
complex environments, they would economise and tend to apply the same decision rules to 
different situations.  Hence, we would find that managers making complex decisions about 
their level of tolerance for particular behaviours would attempt to be consistent in their 
decision making and perceptions across different situations and relationships.  Thus, the 
whole system adapts to complexity and this interaction is shown in a series of Figures 
below (Figures 4-5a–d).   
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Figure 4-5(a-d) Dynamic ZOTs and Complex Relationship Equilibrium 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The figures show that even if the ZOTs or the relationship equilibrium move, the 
relationship between the upper and lower ZOTs should remain negatively correlated.  
Thus, if the upper ZOT (A) for a behaviour increases, it follows then that the 
corresponding lower ZOT (B) for the same behaviour should decrease, Thus updating the 
ZOTs and relationship equilibrium dynamically, leading to the following hypotheses, 
H6a: As the upper ZOT for a collaborative behaviour changes, the lower ZOT for the same 
behaviour moves in the opposite direction, leading to a negative correlation between 
the upper and lower ZOTs for each collaborative behaviour. 
H6b: As the upper ZOT for an opportunistic behaviour changes, the lower ZOT for the 
same behaviour moves in the opposite direction, leading to a negative correlation 
between the upper and lower ZOTs for each opportunistic behaviour. 
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In supply chain relationships some collaborative behaviours will be viewed more 
favourably than others.  In this respect, a long-term oriented relationship between exchange 
partners will be founded on the overall commitment of the parties to the relationship that in 
turn, is built on trust (Arino et al., 2001; Burchell and Wilkinson, 1997; Moore, 1998; 
Morgan and Hunt, 1994).  Once trust and commitment has at least been demonstrated, then 
the ongoing relationship can be built through the sharing of communication and 
information.  Here it is argued, that the collaborative behaviours of ‘relational 
commitment’ is the most valued behaviour, meaning that the buyer will be more sensitive 
to this behaviour than other forms of collaboration (i.e. active disclosure, common 
objectives and joint risk taking).  Hence, it would take smaller amounts of relational 
commitment behaviour before a bifurcation toward a higher level relationship occurs.  It 
follows then that supply chain relationships are more sensitive (smaller ZOT) to increases 
in ‘relational commitment’ behaviours (H8a) than the other three behaviours.  
Subsequently, for the remaining three behaviours (H8b) ‘active disclosure’ behaviours will 
be more important than ‘common objectives’, and also ‘joint risk taking’ behaviours, thus; 
H7a: For transactional relationships, the ZOT for Relational Commitment (D1-D2) is 
smaller or equal to (more sensitive) than that of the other three collaborative 
behaviours, or 
( 1 2) ( 1 2),( 1 2),( 1 2)D D A A B B C CTZCi TZCi− − − −≤      Equation 4-7 
 
H7b: For transactional relationships, the ZOT for Active Disclosure (A1-A2) is smaller or 
equal to (more sensitive) than both Common Objectives (B1-B2) and Joint Risk 
Taking behaviours (C1-C2), or 
( 1 2) ( 1 2),( 1 2)A A B B C CTZCi TZCi− − −≤       Equation 4-8 
 
Where: 
 
TZC   = transactional relationships / zone of tolerance, (current – decrease) / collaborative behaviours 
i  = increased (upper ZOT) behavioural performance 
( 1 2)A A−  = collaborative variable: Active Disclosure 
( 1 2)B B−  = collaborative variable: Common Objectives 
( 1 2)C C−  = collaborative variable: Joint Risk Taking 
( 1 2)D D−  = collaborative variable: Relational Commitment 
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4.4.4 Strategic Behaviour Hypotheses 
Supply chain relationships by definition operate within a wider commercial and 
environmental context.  This context consists of a myriad of environmental, political and 
socio-economic influences and interventions that constrain the choice and operation of 
supply chain relationships.  These influences come from both within a firm, and from 
external sources, that all combine to generate a unique context for each relationship 
(Achrol et al., 1983).  Strategic behaviours are the manifestations of supply chain 
behaviours that are appropriate and allowable under each specific context dictated by the 
wider environment.  Within this context, buyers could find that they are either constrained, 
or conversely, have much freedom of action when making decisions about supply chain 
relationships (Chen, Paulraj and Lado, 2004; Hewett et al., 2002).  This degree of decision 
freedom could be reconceptualised as an indication of the degree of influence or power 
over the nature and form of the relationship.  If the buyer has little choice or options, then 
it could be said that the supplier holds the balance of power (Hunt and Nevin, 1974).  
Conversely, if the buyer has much greater decision latitude, then it could be said that the 
buyer holds the power.    
The different levels of power impact on the types of relationships formed and the 
behaviour enacted within the relationship.  Buyers that have high degrees of power will 
tend to use this position to extract concessions from their suppliers (Cox, 2001).  Usually, 
this means that the buyer would play one or more suppliers off against each other for 
concessions.  In doing so, they must be prepared to switch from one supplier to the next.  
Therefore, selecting lower levels of supply chain relationships becomes important as 
partnership relationships require much more investment in time and resources to develop 
than transactional relationships (Ellram, 1995; McHugh et al., 2003; Mohr and Spekman, 
1994).  Since the buyer, in exercising this power, would prefer the freedom of action, they 
would tend to form only superficial transactional relationships that are more easily formed 
and exchanged at will.   
However, more likely, we should find that the exercise of strategic power for short-term 
material gain is subordinated by the needs of the buyer and seller to coordinate the 
exchange process over the longer term (Axlerod, 1997).  It is hypothesised that the more 
important the purchase or product to the buying firm, the more interested the buyer is in 
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forming collaborative links with the selling firm to optimise the supply chain.  The reason 
for this approach is that in seeking more collaborative arrangements the buyer attempts to 
reduce supply risks, control event management, and minimise price and quality 
fluctuations, thus enhancing the competitiveness of the buying firm (Coyle et al., 2003).  It 
is maintained that this is one of the primary motivations for the evolution of supply chain 
relationships from mere basic or transactional exchanges to the more advanced forms of 
exchange such as partnerships.  Therefore, strategic behaviour or power is an important 
consideration in the formation and maintenance of supply chain relationships.  It follows 
then that,  
H8: Buyers with high levels of strategic power would tend to form partnership 
relationships. 
 
A buyer that is constrained by these strategic forces would generally be channelled into 
choosing the type of supply chain relationship that is most suitable to their specific 
strategic background.  If the supplier feels that the buyer is dependant or constrained, then 
they have greater decision latitude and their propensity to behave opportunistically should 
increase proportionately as they know that the buyer has little choice but to maintain the 
relationship (Jap and Anderson, 2003).  All things being equal, this hypothesis assumes 
that moral and ethical constraints are held as a constant and are not factored in to this 
decision context.  Therefore, a buyer with low strategic power or options would be more 
tolerant of negative supplier behaviour before a bifurcation occurs due to these constraints, 
thus their ZOTs would be greater than those with high strategic power.   
Conversely, if the buyer has formed higher level partnership relationships with a view to 
reducing supply risk and seeking optimisation through more collaborative interactions, 
then it could be expected that they would also be more tolerant of negative supplier 
behaviours as they have much more invested in the relationship (Helper et al., 2000).  
Enacting the various collaborative behaviours within a supply chain takes considerable 
effort in the form of managerial time, and resources to achieve integration, and if these 
efforts are not to be wasted, then maintaining the relationship is an important goal for the 
buyer.  Therefore, if the supplier is important to the buyer, the buyer would be dependent 
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to a degree and hence more tolerant of reduced collaborative or increased opportunistic 
behaviour because of the constraints of strategic behaviour (Provan and Skinner, 1989).  It 
stands to reason that buyers with low strategic power will be more tolerant of reduced 
collaborative (H9a) and increased opportunistic (H9b) supplier behaviours than buyers with 
high strategic power.  Therefore, the ZOT for buyers in a low strategic power situation will 
be smaller or equal to the ZOT for behaviours in a high strategic power situation, thus, 
H9a: For collaborative behaviours, the ZOT for buyers with low strategic power will be 
smaller (more sensitive) or equal to the ZOT of those buyers with higher strategic 
power, or 
( 1 2 ) ( 1 2 )ZA d ZD d ZA d ZD dSBIlow SBIhigh− −≤      Equation 4-9 
 
H9b: For opportunistic behaviours, the ZOT for buyers with low strategic power will be 
smaller (more sensitive) or equal to the ZOT of those buyers with higher strategic 
power, or 
( ) ( )ZEi ZHi ZEi ZHiSBIlow SBIhigh− −≤       Equation 4-10 
 
Where: 
 
SBIlow   = strategic behaviour index / low power 
SBIhigh  = strategic behaviour index / high power 
( 1 2 )ZA d ZD d−  = zone of tolerance / collaborative variables (x 8) / decrease 
( )ZEi ZHi−  = zone of tolerance / opportunistic variables (x4) / increase 
 
 
 
Chapter Four – Research Model and Hypotheses  
 
156 
4.5 Summary of Hypotheses and Logic 
The following table summarises the research hypotheses as developed in this chapter. 
Table 4-1 Summary table of research hypotheses 
Main Research Hypotheses  
H1a:  Supply chain relationships may change in response to both collaborative and 
opportunistic behaviours. 
H1b: Transactional relationships can be differentiated from partnership relationships by the 
different levels of behaviour found in each. 
H2: Partnership relationships may display more collaborative behaviours and less 
opportunistic behaviours than transactional relationships. 
Zone of Tolerance (ZOT) Hypotheses 
H3a: For transactional relationships, the upper ZOT for increases in collaborative behaviours 
is different to the current relationship equilibrium for the same behaviour, or 
( 1 2) ( 1 2) 0A D A DTCc TCi− −− ≠  
H3b: For transactional relationships, the upper ZOT for increases in opportunistic behaviours 
is different to the current relationship equilibrium for the same behaviour, or 
( ) ( ) 0E H E HTOc TOi− −− ≠  
H3c: For transactional relationships, the lower ZOT for decreases in collaborative behaviours 
is different to the current relationship equilibrium for the same behaviour, or 
( 1 2) ( 1 2) 0A D A DTCc TCd− −− ≠  
H3d: For transactional relationships, the lower ZOT for decreases in opportunistic behaviours 
is different to the current relationship equilibrium for the same behaviour, or 
( ) ( ) 0E H E HTOc TOd− −− ≠  
H4: For transactional relationships, the ZOT for any increase in a collaborative behaviour 
will be equal to or larger (less sensitive) than the ZOT for any decrease of the same 
collaborative behaviour, or 
( 1 2) ( 1 2)A D A DTZCi TZCd− −≥  
H5: For transactional relationships, the ZOT for any increases in an opportunistic behaviour 
will be equal to or smaller (more sensitive) than the ZOT for an decrease of the same 
opportunistic behaviour, or 
( ) ( )E H E HTZOd TZOi− −≥  
Bifurcation Hypotheses 
H6a: As the upper ZOT for a collaborative behaviour changes, the lower ZOT for the same 
behaviour moves in the opposite direction, leading to a negative correlation between the 
upper and lower ZOTs for each collaborative behaviour. 
H6b: As the upper ZOT for an opportunistic behaviour changes, the lower ZOT for the same 
behaviour moves in the opposite direction, leading to a negative correlation between the 
upper and lower ZOTs for each opportunistic behaviour. 
H7a: For transactional relationships, the ZOT for Relational Commitment (D1-D2) is smaller 
or equal to (more sensitive) than that of the other three collaborative behaviours, or 
( 1 2) ( 1 2),( 1 2),( 1 2)D D A A B B C CTZCi TZCi− − − −≤  
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H7b: For transactional relationships, the ZOT for Active Disclosure (A1-A2) is smaller or 
equal to (more sensitive) than both Common Objectives (B1-B2) and Joint Risk Taking 
behaviours (C1-C2), or 
( 1 2) ( 1 2),( 1 2)A A B B C CTZCi TZCi− − −≤  
Strategic Behaviour Hypotheses 
H8: Buyers with high levels of strategic power would tend to form partnership relationships. 
H9a: For collaborative behaviours, the ZOT for buyers with low strategic power will be 
smaller (more sensitive) or equal to the ZOT of those buyers with higher strategic 
power, or 
( 1 2 ) ( 1 2 )ZA d ZD d ZA d ZD dSBIlow SBIhigh− −≤  
H9b: For opportunistic behaviours, the ZOT for buyers with low strategic power will be 
smaller (more sensitive) or equal to the ZOT of those buyers with higher strategic 
power, or 
( ) ( )ZEi ZHi ZEi ZHiSBIlow SBIhigh− −≤  
4.5.1 Linking the Hypotheses with the Research Questions 
It this stage it is important to reiterate the conceptual link between the specific research 
questions (as stated in section 4.2.1) and the hypotheses developed to test the theory.  
Table 4-2 below connects the specific questions with the related testable hypotheses that 
seek to answer the research questions. 
Table 4-2 Linking the specific research question with the testable hypotheses 
# Research Question Related 
Hypotheses  
1 Do supply chain exchange relationship levels change due to dynamic 
behaviours? H1a-b and H2 
2 Do collaborative behaviours positively influence exchange relationship 
levels? H3a and H3c  
3 Do opportunistic behaviours negatively influence exchange 
relationship levels? H3b and H3d 
4 How tolerant are existing relationships to the presence of opportunistic 
or collaborative behaviours? H4 and H5 
5 What behaviours are more likely to causes exchange relationship 
bifurcations? H6 and H7a-b 
6 Can strategic behaviours hold the current exchange relationship in a 
steady state? H8 and H9a-b 
 
Prior to testing these hypotheses with the empirical data it is now necessary to discuss in 
detail the critical task of developing the research methodology.  This will be the focus of 
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the next chapter.  Following this, the results of the hypotheses testing phase is reported in 
the chapter six. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
5 Research Methodology 
5.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapters outlined the case for the various theories that are relevant to supply 
chain behaviour and how this behaviour can be understood in terms of a dynamically 
complex reaction to various actions of a partner.  The previous chapter discussed the 
research model and developed various hypotheses to be tested.  This chapter will discuss in 
some detail the rationale for the methodology chosen, the research processes and the tests 
used.  The details regarding the choice of research method will be provided, as well 
discussion on issues such as; dynamic research problems, sampling frame, survey design, 
scale development and stages of purification, interview method and biases, data coding, 
and finally choice of statistical methods for hypothesis testing.  However, firstly it is 
important to set out the researcher’s interpretative philosophical framework.     
5.2 Philosophical Position and Research Design 
In social science it is important to engage in some form of epistemological discussion to 
establish the interpretative framework that constitutes the researcher’s philosophical 
position, and this discussion is contained in a statement of the researcher’s philosophical 
position attached as Appendix 1.  While it is not the intent of this Appendix to delve into 
deep philosophical discussion per se, it is meant rather as a statement of the researcher’s 
own philosophical understanding and how this has influenced the research design.   
5.2.1 Epistemology and Methodology - The Research Approach  
When it comes to the selection of a research method, there seems to be a choice ranging 
from one extreme the positivist quantitative methods, and on the other extreme the 
phenomenological qualitative approaches.  In helping to defining the research approach 
taken, it will be enlightening to review the following table (Table 5-1).  This table sets out 
quite succinctly what would be considered the principles as espoused by the two major 
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epistemological positions described in the Appendix 1.  The three levels are divided into 
what Morgan (1979) would call a philosophical level, a social level and a technical level.  
These three levels quite readily correspond to the ontological viewpoint, the 
epistemological viewpoint, and the methodological viewpoint as outlined below. 
Table 5-1 Positioning the Positivist and Phenomenological Paradigms  
 
Positivist  
Paradigm 
Phenomenological 
Paradigm Perspective Morgan (1979) 
Basic 
Beliefs: 
The world is external and 
objective. 
 
Observer is independent. 
 
Science is value-free. 
The world is socially 
constructed. 
 
Observer is part of what is 
observed. 
Science is driven by human 
interest. 
Ontological 
viewpoint 
Philosophical Level 
Researcher 
Should: 
Focus on facts. 
 
Look for causality and 
fundamental laws. 
 
Reduce phenomena to 
simplest elements. 
 
Formulate hypotheses 
and then test them. 
Focus on meanings. 
 
Try to understand what is 
happening. 
 
Look at the totality of each 
situation. 
 
Develop ideas through 
induction from data. 
Epistemological 
viewpoint 
Social Level 
Preferred 
methods 
include: 
Operationalising concepts 
so that they can be 
measured. 
 
Taking large samples. 
 
 
Randomisation. 
 
Quantitative approach. 
 
Using multiple methods to 
establish different views of 
phenomena. 
 
Small samples investigated in 
depth over time. 
 
Contextualisation. 
 
Qualitative approach. 
Methodological 
viewpoint 
Technical Level 
Source: Adapted from (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe, 1991, p. 27)  
 
This table illustrates how any one particular approach influences the choice of research 
design and method, each has its own advantages and disadvantages.  The advantages of the 
quantitative methods (positivistic) are that they can provide wide coverage of a range of 
subjects, and can be fast and economical.  They use large samples that enable 
generalisability to the population of concern that is helpful for policy formulation (Leedy 
and Ormrod, 2005; Sekaran, 2003).  Conversely, these methods tend to be inflexible and 
cross-sectional in nature thus, limiting the understanding of behaviour and causation.  They 
also tend to be used as a confirmatory tool and are thus, not fully amenable to new theory 
formulation (Cavana, Delahaye and Sekaran, 2001).   
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The strength of the phenomenological approach lies in its ability to look at change over 
time and to understand the meaning behind the phenomena as the gathered data more 
closely reflects the natural process.  They are more flexible and can adjust to the 
unexpected, hence they are more agreeable to producing new theories in areas not 
previously widely explored (Babbie, 1999; Voss, Tsikriktsis and Frohlich, 2002; Yin, 
2003).  However, these methods can be very time consuming and costly, but more 
significantly, the analysis of the data and category allocation is wide open to alternative 
interpretations.  Further, the results can be distrusted by decision makers as there tends to 
be few hard and fast facts to rely on (Easterby-Smith et al., 1991; Malhotra, Peterson and 
Kleiser, 1999).       
As a starting point, Sarantakos (1998) suggests that positivist quantitative techniques 
should be used where the contemporary body of knowledge on a particular phenomena is 
accepted as robust and comprehensive, and there is little scope for producing new 
theoretical insights with qualitative methods.  Given that the theory of marketing channels 
and behaviour in supply chains has generally been well covered in the last 30 years 
(Barney, 1991; Bowersox et al., 2002; Croom et al., 2000; Eisenhardt, 1989; Hunt and 
Nevin, 1974; Robicheaux and El-Ansary, 1975; Ross et al., 1997; Stern and El-Ansary, 
1992) the requirement for new theory development has diminished to a degree.  Hence, it 
seems more appropriate to adopt a more quantitative method to examine the levels of 
behaviour and behavioural change in supply chain dyads.  Yet there seems to be some 
value in combining the two approaches in some manner. 
This mixed-method research approach has been recommended as it provides alternative 
perspectives on the phenomena under study (Easterby-Smith et al., 1991; Gable, 1994; 
Mangan, Lalwani and Gardner, 2004).  Combining qualitative and quantitative approaches 
provides the benefits of synergising the strengths of both.  However, the limitations of this 
study in terms of time and resources prevent a full mixed-model approach.  Nevertheless, 
while this research approach is primarily positivist in nature, framing hypotheses from 
previous literature and drawing conclusions from survey data, where possible and where it 
adds value qualitative data has been incorporated to provide additional insights in the 
relevant places.  
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Finally, we can intuitively sense that ontologically speaking that the world around us is 
much more complex than we could ever imagine, wheels within wheels, with complexity 
confounding at some level the most sophisticated investigations.  Yet, epistemologically 
speaking we are only capable to capturing limited snap-shots or windows of enlightenment 
into this complex world as the researcher is constrained to a degree by the extant range of 
methodologies and techniques that currently exist.  The challenge to science is to advance 
the range of tools and methodologies that allow the researcher to more fully explain 
complexity.  Indeed, if complexity can ever be explained.  Hence, this research also suffers 
from this universal limitation, in that reductionist instrumentation has been applied to 
investigate complexity in supply chain relationships.  Yet, while recognising that 
knowledge derived from such techniques can prove to be imperfect (Dupré, 2000), this 
instrumentation represents well grounded and tested methods.  Similar to the artisan’s 
dilemma of being forced to use a wrench as a hammer – not that effective, yet the job will 
be done.  Hence, multivariate linear techniques have been employed in this research while 
attempting to give the reader a wider non-linear view of complexity through interpretative 
explanations of the results.   
5.3 Time and Temporality Issues in Dynamic Research 
Time is one of the fundamental issues on which an infinite variety of constructs can be 
measured, and through which human beings interpret the reality around them.  Temporality 
has a profound effect on behaviours and conceptions of business practices (Ofori-Dankwa 
and Julian, 2001).  The perceptions of problems and the interpretation of the behaviours of 
others are all significantly affected by the perceptions of time and space.  For example, the 
efforts to reduce ‘leadtimes’ in supply chains is simply an effort to reduce the time taken 
for the physical materials to flow from the point of requisition to the point of delivery at 
the desired location (Christopher, 2004; Stank and Crum, 1997).  Hence, temporal 
dimensions in business and research are vital in understanding the scope, scale and 
movement of the phenomena under study.   
This research claims to investigate relational movement under certain paradigms, and thus 
asserts that dynamic movement over time and temporal issues can be inferred.  However, 
the cross-sectional methodology employed would tend to suggest that temporal issues 
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cannot be captured to their fullest and necessary extent (Naude and Turnball, 1998).  It is 
also acknowledged that a properly constituted longitudinal study would perhaps be a better 
method, as actual relational movements could then be observed and measured from one 
time period to the next (Halinen, 1998).  However, this research is also constrained by 
temporal as well as cost issues that exclude the implementation of such a longitudinal 
methodology.   
To address these issues, this research has incorporated the temporal dimensions in the 
study of relational movement by various means.  It has been included in the theoretical 
development of the new research concepts by utilising existing theory and combining these 
in a unique way to produce dynamic theoretical explanations for the research model.  
Particularly, this research has employed the conceptualisations, nomenclature and 
explanatory power of Chaos/Complexity theory (Davis, 1999) and its dynamic non-linear 
ideas (Tsonis, 1992) to formulate the theory and interpret the results.  Next, the conceptual 
definitions and tools used to describe and define the various dynamic behaviours have 
purposely been used to encapsulate the idea of dynamic influence.  In other words, the 
variables used are described not in static, but dynamic terms that introduce the potential for 
relational responses and movement.  This approach has been taken in an attempt to provide 
literature with an alternative model to the static and axiomatic relationship models that 
overwhelmingly dominate extant supply chain literature.  Finally, it should be noted that 
the respondent’s actions and perceptions lie at the heart of this empirical enquiry, not the 
variables themselves.  Nevertheless, to measure these perceptions it is necessary under this 
positivist paradigm to develop meaningful constructs, and the method of achieving this is 
described next.   
5.4 Construct Operationalisation 
5.4.1 Triangulation 
The manner of approaching this research involves mixed-methodologies where first some 
qualitative methods are used to develop the dimensions and scales, and then quantitative 
methods used to test the theory.  Hence, triangulation is an important method for obtaining 
generalisability, validity and reliability in this type of research, particularly for the initial 
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qualitative efforts (Oppermann, 2000; Yin, 2003).  Triangulation relies on information that 
has been viewed from at least three different perspectives, thus providing a more in-depth 
and robust view of the dimensions of the phenomena under study.  For this research 
evidence has been drawn from three types of triangulation; theoretical, evidential and 
methodological.  This method has been well documented in literature (Hall and Rist, 1999; 
Oppermann, 2000; Yauch and Steudel, 2003), and its use in this research is graphically 
represented below.  
Figure 5-1 Triangulation Methodology 
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Interviews
Q-Sort
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Qualitative
Vignettes
Theoretical Source Evidential SourceMethodological Source
 
 
As can be seen from the above figure (Figure 5-1), the phenomena for this research has 
been isolated by at least six different points of reference, hence confidence can be had in 
the validity of the constructs.  Further, this method not only provides a more complete 
description of the topic under investigation, but it also allows better comprehension, and 
provides greater accuracy for the conclusions.  In addition, it provides an explanation of 
the convergence of the results.  Hence, this method is not only suitable for investigating a 
research topic that is in an early stage of theoretical development (such as this research), it 
also allows the establishment of empirical standards that facilitate subsequent research in 
the area. 
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5.4.2 Scale Development 
For marketing and management research, the development of constructs should proceed 
based on the guidelines suggested by psychological measurement theory.  Generally, this 
theory takes the view that the hypothetical constructs tend to be unobservable, thus any 
measurers that attempt to capture the construct can only at best achieve partial 
representativeness (Peter and Churchill, 1986).  Therefore, Peter and Churchill (1986) 
believe that construct validity is an inferred judgement made by researchers.  They suggest 
three major evidential stages that could be used in the evaluation of construct validity.  
Firstly, construct validity can be assessed by reviewing the procedures used in the creation 
and development of the measure.  In particular, models of measure development such as 
that proposed by Churchill (1979) are suggested as an example of an appropriate and 
widely accepted model.  The second check is examining the theoretical relationships as 
estimated through reliability, convergent and discriminant validity checks.  It is assumed 
here that the variance not accounted for by error or method variance is tentatively accepted 
as variance represented by the construct.  The final check is the testing of the results of the 
theoretical model with the estimates of nomological validity.  It is generally accepted that 
empirical evidence of the relationships between the measures of conceptually related 
constructs is evidence of the validity of both the measurers and the theoretical setting 
(Peter and Churchill, 1986).  This stage is commonly known as the theory testing stage.                 
This research will broadly follow these three stages of assessing the research validity.  It 
will initially start by utilising Churchill’s (1979) suggested model for developing valid 
measurers.  This well known methodology has been widely accepted as providing rigor 
when assessing construct validity in marketing channel research (Mentzer and Flint, 1997; 
Min and Mentzer, 2004; Stratman and Rot, 2002; Tuominen, 2004; Woo and Ennew, 
2004).  The following figure (Figure 5-2 ) provides the general overview of Churchill’s 
(1979) paradigm.  
Chapter Five – Methodology 
 
166 
Figure 5-2 Churchill’s (1979) suggested paradigm for developing better measurers 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The stages employed in developing the constructs used in this research are; firstly the 
current literature was reviewed, secondly, a comprehensive list of current and new items 
was generated.  Thirdly, data was collected from three experts that refined the initial list, in 
addition five in-depth qualitative interviews were conducted with a mixture of academics 
and practitioners to test the conceptual soundness of the constructs.  Fourthly, a Q-Sorting 
ranking exercise was conducted to purify even further the list of items that were used in the 
final survey interview instrument for the data collection phase.  Fifthly, data was collected 
from two different pre-test stages and analysed, and finally, the main data collection phase 
was conducted and final reliabilities and nomological validities were assessed.       
The following sections will discuss in detail each of the stages used in developing and 
testing the scales used to operationalise this research. 
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Source: Churchill (1979), p. 66. 
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5.4.2.1 Literature Review - Stage One 
An extensive literature review was conducted to identify the research gap, determine the 
construct domain, develop the research model, and to determine the number and quality the 
existing scales used to measure the constructs of interest. 
Initially, the researcher reviewed the literature in a general manner scoping the nature, the 
various schools of supply chain thought, and the methodology used in the area of interest, 
namely dynamic supply chain relationship development.  The literature was categorised 
into various schools depending its on subject area, foundational assumptions, philosophical 
research approach (ranging from phenomological to positivist), and methodology 
employed as it related to the current research topic.  The literature was further categorised 
along the lines of the current research model as the construct domains became clearer and 
more defined.  Finally, detailed lists of research constructs and their measurement scales 
and items were generated.  This then formed the basis of the operationalising of the 
variables of the research model.  The literature was captured in summary tables that 
outlined the main topic area, findings, contributions, variables used, methodology, country 
of study, sample details, and data analysis techniques.  Further, all references, abstracts, 
key words and details were recorded in Endnote (version 9.0) to ensure systematic capture 
and management of the literature.               
The literature review resulted in the identification of two major construct domains, those of 
opportunistic behaviours and collaborative behaviours (see chapter three).  These two 
domains were then further discriminated into 12 dimensions or variables (eight 
collaborative and four opportunistic).  Of the 12 dimensions discerned from literature, the 
eight collaborative variables were then re-conceptualised into four pairwise higher-order 
dimensions that aggregated the collaborative behaviours into four variables that are new to 
the literature.  The opportunistic dimension and its associated items were considered 
sufficient in number and conceptual breadth to measure the construct of opportunistic 
behaviours in supply chains.  However, opportunism has previously only been measured 
by a single variable in previous studies (for examples see Brown et al., 2000; Dwyer and 
Oh, 1987; Joshi and Arnold, 1997; Knemeyer and Murphy, 2004; Skarmeas et al., 2002).  
This research considers that the construct is too complex to be captured by only a single 
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dimension, thus it was reconceptualised into four new sub-dimensions.  The following 
table (Table 5-2) outlines the flow of the conceptual development of the variables.   
Table 5-2 Conceptual development of the major constructs        
Major Construct Domains Sub-dimensions Identified in Literature 
Re-conceptualisation of the 
Dimensions 
Communication Supply Chain Behaviours: 
Collaboration Information Sharing 
Active Disclosure 
 Conflict Resolution 
 Goal Congruence 
Common Objectives 
 
Relationship Specific Investments and 
Activities 
 Shared Risks and Rewards 
Joint Risk Taking 
 Trust and Commitment 
 Social and Relational Norms 
Relational Commitment 
Supply Chain Behaviours: 
Opportunism 
“…behaviour contrary to a party’s 
implicit understanding of an exchange 
but not necessarily contrary to any 
explicit agreement” (Gundlach et al., 
1995, p. 84) 
Social Opportunism 
 
The exercise of coercive power for self 
or organisational gain Commercial Opportunism 
 
“…incomplete or distorted disclosure of 
information and calculated efforts to 
mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate, or 
otherwise confuse” (Williamson, 1985, 
p. 47) 
Unconscionable Opportunism 
 
Illegality of actions for self or 
organisational gain Illegal Opportunism 
 
Once the construct domains and underlying dimensions were identified and 
reconceptualised, the literature was searched for suitable items and scales.  These were 
formulated into an initial list, and were then subject to various stages of refinement and a 
Q-Sort exercise, supported by qualitative interviews.  This process is consistent with 
Churchill’s (1979) recommendations, and is described in the following sections.   
5.4.2.2 Scale Selection Procedure 
Multi-item scales were selected as the most appropriate measurement vehicle for this 
research as they provide a multi-question approach to measuring the same construct 
(Sekaran, 2003).  Also, Peter (1979) recommends the multi-item approach as it allows the 
measurement errors to self-cancel thus increasing their reliability, and that multi-item 
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scales are a necessary approach for the “…valid measurement of factorially complex 
constructs” (p. 7) such as seen in the behavioural dynamics of supply chains.   
When reviewing the literature for appropriate scales and items, the selection guidelines as 
proffered by Bruner (2003) were used.  Bruner (2003, p 367) suggests that the researcher 
compare any potential scales or items using several criteria.  These being; 
• Face Validity – does the scale appear to capture the meaning of the construct?  
• Psychometric Quality – review the published support for the scale that attests to its 
unidimensionality, reliability and validity.  
• Typicality and Acceptability – review the research context and sample in which the 
scale was used.  Also, review any alternative views of the construct held by different 
schools of thought and their alternative scales. 
Ultimately, the choice of scales or items should be influenced by the needs of the current 
research context and also how previous researchers used and reported the scales.  Hence, a 
list of the items relating to the variables of concern was subsequently generated utilising 
the above criteria, and resulted in 232 collaborative items, and 94 opportunistic items being 
selected.  The review process ended when the number of items being rejected due to 
repetition (i.e. already selected or rejected) became almost constant, and the number of 
new items being added was minimal.  The following table (Table 5-3) shows the number of 
items selected for each variable (see Appendix 2 for the full list and their associated 
sources).    
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Table 5-3 Number of scale items generated for each construct from the literature review 
 
Major Construct Domains Construct 
No. of 
Selected 
Items 
Supply Chain Behaviours: 
Collaboration Active Disclosure 46 
Total items – 232 Common Objectives 45 
 Joint Risk Taking 51 
 Relational Commitment 90 
Supply Chain Behaviours: 
Opportunism Social Opportunism 24 
Total items –94 Commercial Opportunism 26 
 Unconscionable Opportunism 28 
 Illegal Opportunism 16 
 
Total Number of Items 326 
 
It should be noted that no complete scale was incorporated in its entirety into this research.  
Rather, the researcher was forced by either the face validity criteria, or the typicality and 
acceptability criteria, to either reject the scale as a whole, or one or more items within the 
scale, even though the reported psychometric properties were acceptable.  This stringent 
vetting was necessary due to the original way in which the variables were conceptualised, 
and also due to informed face validity vetting as the researcher is also an experienced 
practitioner in the supply chain field.       
Included in the above totals were 19 new items for opportunistic behaviours, and 24 new 
items for collaborative behaviours generated by the researcher.  It was considered 
necessary to generate new items where the combined face validity of the proposed list was 
not considered sufficient to adequately cover the conceptual breath of the construct29.  
Once the lists were generated, the next stage was to conduct a refining process to finally 
derive a usable set of items for each scale that could be incorporated into the survey 
instrument.  
                                                 
29
 Five of these new items graced the final list of 37 questions. 
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5.4.2.3 Scale Purification – Stage Two 
The initial list of 326 items was considered too unwieldy to be useful.  Therefore, the items 
needed purification and the numbers reduced to a more manageable level by keeping the 
most relevant items and discarding the rest.  The next stage in the operationalisation of the 
variables was to derive a consensus rating for each item compared to those other items 
within the same construct category using a forced choice method.  This method (Barnard 
and Ehrenberg, 1990) had the advantage of reducing the complexity of any inter-construct 
correlation as it focused on only one construct category at a time.  For practical reasons, 
and also due to the number of items involved, it was decided that a small number of 
experts be asked to rate each item to determine an item’s face validity in relation to its 
construct category on a scale of 1 to 10 (1 = very low validity, 10 = very high validity).  
This method advances inter-judge reliability (Babbie, 1999), produces a consensus rating 
of each item, and was considered an appropriate method to conduct the initial purging30.     
The exercise was conducted by three judges; the researcher, one academic who is both an 
expert in supply chain management and also an experienced practitioner, and a third 
practitioner who was familiar with supply chain management theory and concepts as well 
as practice.  The three judges examined each item in relation to its construct and eliminated 
duplications, similar sounding items, items with culturally/contextual specific language, 
and ambiguous terms and expressions, finally grading the remaining items on a 1 to 10 
scale.  If an item was not considered applicable to its initial category, the judge was asked 
to nominate another more suitable construct category, if none were obvious it was then 
eliminated.  If an item changed categories, it was then subjected to the same evaluation 
against all other items within its new category.  The process continued until all the items 
were; graded, moved and regraded, or eliminated.  The grading exercise was conducted 
simultaneously and in isolation to ensure the independence of the results (Babbie, 1999).      
The results of the grading exercise were collated and those items rating above 20 points 
(maximum possible score; 3 x 10 pts = 30 pts) were chosen to go forward to the next stage 
of the purification, the remainder were eliminated.  However, to balance the number of 
items in each construct category, some items that had more marginal scores (scores of 18 
                                                 
30
 Normally consensus scales are produced post-examination of the items’ validity and reliabilities (Cavana et al., 2001). 
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and 19) were also included.  The following table (Table 5-4) shows the results of this 
exercise.  
Table 5-4 Scale Item Purification – Results of Stage Two 
 
Major Construct Domains Construct 
Lit 
Review 
Items 
(Stage 1) 
Items 
Retained 
Post 
(Stage 2) 
Supply Chain Behaviours: 
Collaboration Active Disclosure 46 14 
Remaining items – 58  Common Objectives 45 13 
 Joint Risk Taking 51 14 
 Relational Commitment 90 17 
Supply Chain Behaviours: 
Opportunism Social Opportunism 24 7 
Remaining items - 30 Commercial Opportunism 26 7 
 Unconscionable Opportunism 28 8 
 Illegal Opportunism 16 8 
 
Total Number of Items 326 88 
 
At the conclusion of this stage of the refinement process, 58 collaborative behavioural 
items, and 30 opportunistic behavioural items remained.  As the number of items was still 
too large, these items were then subjected to a final Q-Sort methodology to produce the 
final purified scales.  However, first some qualitative interviews were conducted.  
5.4.2.4 Qualitative Interviews – Stage Three 
Prior to the Q-Sort exercise, face-to-face in-depth qualitative interviews were conducted to 
test the conceptual universe of potential supply chain relationships and behaviours.  While 
the literature had provided the basis of the constructs, there was a concern that the 
reconceptualising of some variables would invalidate the original context, thus affecting 
their underlying psychometric properties.  The advantage of qualitative techniques (in this 
case in-depth interviews) is their ability to generate insights that help clarify these sorts of 
problems (Miles and Huberman, 1994).  Further, their flexibility and open structure allow 
researchers to probe and gather information that cannot normally be achieved through 
structured survey based approaches (Aaker, Kumer, Day and Lawley, 2005).  They also 
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can be conducted quickly and tend to be less expensive if few in number, although gaining 
access to busy executives can be problematic.  While the analysis can be examined for 
more depth in themes, rich descriptions and possibly deeper connections, qualitative 
procedures have been criticised for their ambiguities and disagreements in the coding 
processes.  Moreover, Gould (1999) suggests that determining the number and description 
of the categories of data can be difficult, suppressing some types of thoughts in favour of 
others.  Since the aim of the pretest was confirmatory in nature, it was considered prudent 
to conduct some in-depth qualitative interviews to assess the properties and relevancy of 
the current constructs, and also to assess if there were any other underlying dimensions of 
supply chain behaviours that had been inadvertently over looked.     
Subsequently, five face-to-face in-depth interviews were conducted with experienced 
industry practitioners who were knowledgeable in supply chain relationships and 
interactions.  All participants held senior appointments within their organisations (3 
Managers at National level, 1 GM, and 1 Director/Owner) and were thus considered as 
suitable key informants for the purpose of the interviews (John and Reve, 1982; Schwenk, 
1985).  The following table (Table 5-5) shows the demographic profiles of the five 
interviews. 
Table 5-5 Demographics of pre-test Qualitative Interviews 
 
Interview 1 Interview 2 Interview 3 Interview 4 Interview 5 
Industry Food IT Electronics Manufacturing Logistics 
Experience in the Industry 6 years 12 years 3.5 years 13 years 24 years 
Firm Annual Turnover (NZD) $60M $3.5M $120M $2.5M $68M 
Number of FTE’s 50 28 110 11 400 
Reported Authority to Change 
or Modify their Supply Chain 
Relationships 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
As the researcher also has extensive industry experience and was known to all 
interviewees, rapport was quickly established and there were no obvious impasses to the 
free flow of information.  The interviews lasted from between 55 to 105 minutes in 
duration.  While the pretest interviews followed the broad outlines of the interview 
protocol sheet (see Appendix 3), generally the interviews were open-ended and essentially 
unstructured in nature.     
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The interviews were analysed in an interpretive and inductive way.  The results of the 
interviews supported the original conceptualisations, and that the current variables 
adequately covered the conceptual breadth of the relevant construct domains.  One 
important theme that did emerge concerned the dynamics of superior/subordinate, 
large/small, important/not-important or unequally weighted dyadic relationships, where 
one party (usually the more powerful) was able to exercise various forms of compulsion, 
influence or holdouts over the other party.  In many ways this influence or sway closely 
reflecting some of the five forms of power as postulated by French and Raven (1959), in 
particular the ‘reward’ and ‘coercive’ forms31.  This theme lends qualitative support to the 
conceptualisation that opportunistic acts can indeed be manifested through the exercise of 
coercive channel power as captured in the ‘commercial opportunism’ construct. 
The list of variables and their descriptions where shown to the respondents at the end of the 
interview and were asked if they could think of any other important factor not already 
mentioned.  There was only one additional suggestion from the fifth interview who was a 
manager in a State Owned Enterprise (SOE) (this is a form of quasi-business structure 
owned by the Government but operated as a profit centre).  Namely, that as public and 
political accountability is a major consideration for an SOE, then they are not fully at 
liberty to act in accordance with the pure profit motive, and that some inefficient supply 
chain relationships existed purely for the purpose of delivering a public good.  While these 
political and public good obligations are an important mediating variable on the ability of 
an SOE to change its supply chain relationships, it is however, a situation peculiar to 
SOE’s and not generalisable to the overall population.  Nevertheless, this could have 
introduced bias if any SOE’s were included in the final sample.  However, a check made 
after random sampling did not reveal any SOE’s in the final sample, and was thus not a 
concern for this research.  The final stage in operationalising was to conduct a formal Q-
Sort exercise.            
5.4.2.5 Q-Sort Confirmatory Methodology – Stage Four 
The first two stages of the exercise had reduced the potential list of items from 326 to 88, 
however, this number was still considered too large to meet the restrictions imposed by a 
                                                 
31
 French and Raven’s (1959) five forms of social power are; reward, coercive, legitimate, referent and expert. 
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face-to-face survey interview methodology.  It was considered prudent to conduct a further 
purifying and confirmatory exercise with more than the original three expert judges (Stage 
two) with the aim of confirming the initial reliabilities, unidimensionality, and also to 
produce a much smaller list of items for the final survey interview instrument.  The aim of 
this exercise was to extract the three most valid items (questions) for each of the twelve 
constructs as the researcher was limited as to the number of items that could practicably be 
tested within a survey interview.  Hence, while there is a positive correlation between the 
number of items in a scale and its alpha scores (Churchill and Paul, 1984; Hair, Anderson, 
Tatham and Black, 1998), and the fact that single item scales should be avoided (Kerlinger 
and Lee, 2000; Verhees and Meulenberg, 2004), it was considered that three items per 
construct would be the optimum balance in the compromise between parsimony and 
adequate reliabilities.  Including only three items is acknowledged as a very conservative 
approach.         
To achieve this there are a variety of methods that could be used to determine the 
preference of one item over another such as the Q-Sort methodology, magnitude 
estimation, and Guttman Scaling or scalogram analysis (Malhotra, Hall, Shaw and 
Oppenheim, 2002).  However, Voss, Stem, Johnson, and Arce (1996) have criticised the 
magnitude estimation and the Guttman scaling techniques as being difficult to apply as 
control groups are recommended, and that the best results come from closely supervised 
administrations.  Further, it is recommended that the stimuli be presented many times and 
in different orders (Sturges, 1990).  Finally, both these methods require the ranking of 
individual items, whereas the current exercise only required the sorting of items into 
predefined groups without individual ranking.  Due to these criticisms and complications 
and for practical reasons, the researcher was lead to use a simplified Q-Sort methodology.  
A Q-Sort consists of a large number of items (such as photos or cards) being sorted into 
piles based on similarity with respect to some criterion, with the number of items in each 
pile being prespecified to fit roughly the normal distribution.  Essentially, the Q-method is 
used to discover the underlying value of items and can be described as a positivist 
technique used to explore a postpositivist dilemma (Weimer, 1999).  This methodology has 
been successfully employed in recent research to investigate preferences and value in 
diverse disciplines such as organisational psychology (Lee and Yu, 2004), public policy 
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(Martin and Steelman, 2004), information systems (Pimchangthong, Plaisent and Bernard, 
2003), quality in health care (Dijkstra and van der Bij, 2002), and marketing and tourism 
(Fairweather and Swaffield, 2002).    
For this research, while the number of items (88) were within the recommendations 
(between 60 – 140 Malhotra et al., 2002, and 50 - 150 Huges, 1974), the judges were given 
prespecified criterion (the construct name, description and code) which is usually the result 
of a Q-Sort exercise.  The judges where asked to fit each item into what they considered as 
its most relevant criterion.  This Q-Sort rating task is essentially an efficient categorising 
procedure whereby subjects were given a large number of attributes (items), and were 
instructed to allot the items into homogeneous groups.  In this modified form of Q-Sort 
each judge was asked to allocate the 88 items (58 collaborative and 30 opportunistic) into 
one of the 12 variable categories, hence utilising a forced-choice model in that each judge 
was forced to assign a variable category to each item.  This forced-choice procedure was 
not seen as problematic as Barnard and Ehrenberg (1990) have empirically demonstrated 
that there is no significant difference between the results that used forced-choice scaling 
and ranking methods (such as the normal Q-Sort design), and the free-choice technique.  
Although as a modification, in this exercise the expert judges did have the option of not 
choosing any categories at all.   
The Q-Sort method started with two processes, one assigning a numbered label to each 
item for the Q-Sort (1-50 for collaborative, and 1-38 for opportunistic), and then assigning 
a random number for each label32.  The random numbers were then sorted (ascending) and 
formulated into the Q-Sort questionnaire.  See Appendix 4 for the Q-Sort questionnaire 
sheets and instruction protocols for participants.   
Integral to the questionnaire was the development of the construct categories and their 
descriptive labels.  Churchill (1979, p. 67) emphasised the importance of this stage of 
development by stating “…the researcher must be exacting in the conceptual specification 
of the construct and what is, and what is not included in the domain”.  He goes on to 
specify that the researcher must primarily draw their definitions from the literature, and 
                                                 
32
 Items were randomised by using a table of random numbers (Moore and McCabe, 1993) entering the table at line 122 
for collaborative numbers, and line 144 for opportunistic numbers. 
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that the multiplicity of definitions for the same construct that proliferate in literature is the 
result of previous researchers addressing this step too lightly.    
For this research, the construct categories were primarily drawn from the existing literature 
as suggested, and were then reconceptualised to provide the basis for measurement.  In a 
similar manner the descriptive labels were also synthesised from the extant literature.  It 
was found that the collaborative variables descriptions were sufficient to adequately cover 
the conceptual domain of each of the eight sub-dimensions.  These were subsequently 
synthesised into the four main collaborative constructs and the four final definitions 
developed.  However, it was found that the descriptions for the single opportunistic scale 
found in literature was inadequate for this current research (see for example, Joshi and 
Arnold, 1997; Lyons and Mehta, 1997; Monczka et al., 1998; Moore and Cunningham, 
1999; Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Wathne and Heide, 2000).  Hence, there was justification 
for developing new descriptive labels for each of the four new opportunism constructs.  
Again, they were principally based on the literature of each of the four areas.   
While there were only four descriptive labels for the collaborative variables, the judges 
were asked to be more specific and fit each item into one of the eight sub-dimensions.  
Consequently, the judges first fitted the item into one of the four main constructs, and then 
made a judgement on the relevant sub-dimension.  A smaller number of descriptive labels 
(a total of eight as opposed to 12) was seen as preferable due to cognitive dissonance (see 
Auster, 1965; Evangelista, Albaum and Poon, 1999), the potential to confuse or overwhelm 
the decision making processes of the judges with too many choices33.  Nevertheless, this 
limitation is not seen as a major draw back as essentially the definitions of the constructs 
are the means to an end rather than the ends in themselves (Churchill, 1979).  The 
construct domains and their descriptive labels are shown in Tables 5-6 and 5-7 below.   
                                                 
33
 The actual form of cognitive dissonance experienced by the judges was not examined.  However, anecdotal evidence 
(post exercise comments) suggested that this Q-Sort questionnaire was challenging at some level for some of the 
judges.  See (Camerer, 2003) for fuller explanations and examples of the forms of cognitive dissonance in perceptions 
and survey responses.  
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Table 5-6 Construct domains and descriptive labels – Collaborative (Positive) supplier behaviours 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5-7 Construct domains and descriptive labels – Opportunistic (Negative) supplier behaviours 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The final form of the Q-Sort questionnaire was sent to a blind panel of thirteen 
independent judges.  In addition to the five practitioners that were interviewed for the 
pretest stage (see 5.4.2.4 Stage Three above), two more senior practitioners (1 x Operations 
Manager, and 1 x GM), three academics (2 x Senior Lecturers and 1 x Professor all in 
Behaviour  Sub-Dimension Sort Code Definition 
 
Communication 
 
A1 Active  
Disclosure 
Information Sharing A2 
A free exchange of information and data 
between exchange partners through various 
forms of communication and protocols (both 
formal and informal) with the purpose of 
improving the performance of the supply chain. 
 
 
Conflict Resolution 
 
B1 Common 
Objectives  
Goal Congruence 
 
B2 
The establishment and progress toward mutually 
common objectives, goals and conflict resolution 
processes that align the efforts of both parties so 
both parties achieve common aims. 
 
 
Relationship Specific 
Investments and Activities 
 
C1 Joint Risk  
Taking 
 
Shared Risks and Rewards 
 
C2 
The willingness to share the burdens and 
benefits between the parties and the allocation 
of resources and materials to exchange 
relationship specific investments so that both 
parties share in the risks of the partnership. 
  
 
Trust and Commitment 
 
D1 Relational 
Commitment 
Social and Relational Norms D2 
The commitment of both parties to the exchange 
relationship through the establishment of trust 
and commitment, relational and social norms 
that are established over time between the 
parties. 
 
 
 
 
Behaviour Sort Code Definition 
Social 
Opportunism E 
The breeching of informal social or relational norms of 
behaviour between the exchange partners that have been 
established through either agreement or expectations built on 
previous actions of the partner.   
No legal recourse. 
 
Commercial 
Opportunism F 
The unilateral use of bargaining tactics and coercive forms of 
power in the relationship to appropriate some concession from 
the unwilling exchange partner, including forced renegotiations 
and holdouts.    
No legal recourse. 
 
Unconscionable 
Opportunism G 
Actions by one exchange partner that either misleads, distorts, 
disguise, obfuscate, sabotage or confuse the other partner 
concerning some aspect that materially affects the exchange 
relationship.  This includes acts of commission as well as acts 
of omission such as shirking or the withholding of effort.  
Questionable legal recourse. 
  
Illegal 
Opportunism H 
Any act or omission under the law deemed as illegal.  This 
includes breeching contract conditions and warranties, theft, 
fraud, violation and evasion and other illegal acts or omissions 
by one of the exchange partners. 
Full legal recourse.  
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Marketing and Management disciplines), and three Ph.D students (Marketing, Economics 
and Tourism Management) were also included on the expert panel.  All judges have either 
practical or academic experience (or both) with supply chain relationships and channel 
theories.  The questionnaires were personally delivered and the instructions explained.  The 
judges were allowed time to review the questionnaire and ask any questions if necessary.  
Of the 13 Q-Sort questionnaires delivered, 11 usable responses were received (an 84% 
response rate) after an average of 3 ½ weeks response time.  Telephone calls to the two 
non-responding judges elicited the causes of non-response as being simply too busy at 
present to complete. 
Each judge was asked to allocate a Q-Sort code to each item and then give a strength-of-fit 
rating on a five point scale (1 = very weak fit, 5 = very strong fit).  In addition, a space was 
left for any comments and suggestions.  One of the strengths of the Q-Sort methodology is 
that it provides strong face validity and inter-judge reliability (Babbie, 1999; Huges, 1974).  
The results of the exercise are discussed in the next section. 
5.4.2.6 Q-Sort Exercise - Results 
The data were entered into an Excel spread sheet as the responses were received.  The 
construct code and the fit rating allocated by the judges were recorded, and any items not 
allocated a code were recorded as missing data (a total of 12 data points out of 880 
possible points - 1.3%).  The number of times an item was correctly coded was counted, 
and its corresponding strength-of-fit average was calculated.  The results showed that on 
average 81.1% of the items were coded correctly by the panel into either their sub-
dimension or alternatively their primary dimensions.  The final list of items selected 
consisted of the three items per construct that represented the highest inter-judge 
reliabilities.  Where two items had the same inter-judge reliabilities, the items with the 
highest mean fit rating were selected.  The following table (Table 5-8) shows the number 
of items selected for the final survey interview questionnaire.  Further, the complete list of 
finalised items, their alphas, strength-of-fit means and sources are included in Appendix 5.   
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Table 5-8 Finalised number of items per construct domain 
Major Construct Domains Construct 
Lit 
Review 
Items 
(Stage 1) 
Items 
Retained 
Post 
(Stage 2) 
Finalised 
List    
Post 
(Stage 4) 
Supply Chain Behaviours: 
Collaboration Active Disclosure 46 14 6 
Final Number of items – 24  Common Objectives 45 13 6 
 Joint Risk Taking 51 14 6 
 Relational Commitment 90 17 6 
Supply Chain Behaviours: 
Opportunism Social Opportunism 24 7 3 
Final Number of items – 13 Commercial Opportunism 26 7 3 
 Unconscionable Opportunism 28 8 3 
 Illegal Opportunism 16 8 4 
 
Total Number of Items 326 88 37 
 
The next step in assessing validity is to investigate the scales’ initial and final 
psychometric properties.  
5.4.3 Construct Reliabilities 
The Q-Sort process provides strong inter-coder reliability (Miles and Huberman, 1994).  
This is due to the sharpening of definitions when more than one researcher allocates the 
codes, and is a good check for initial reliability of the scales.  The initial Q-Sort reliabilities 
of each scale were calculated using the following formula (Figure 5-3): 
Figure 5-3 Item Reliability Assessment 
 
 
 
 
reliability   =
number of agreements
total number of agreement + total
number of disagreements
 
 
This formula was used to calculate the item-to-item correlations and 
also the item-to-total correlation for each construct domain. 
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5.4.3.1 Internal Consistency  
With any summated scale, it is important to establish the internal consistency of the 
measure when several items are summed to form a total score.  As each item measurers 
some aspect of the construct measured by the entire scale, the items should be consistent in 
what they indicate about that characteristic (Malhotra et al., 2002).  Thus, to be useful 
these measures should possess internal consistency and reliability.  Henceforth, reliability 
refers to the extent to which a scale produces consistent results (cohesion) if repeated 
measurements are made, and the most common statistic used to measure this is Cronbach’s 
alpha coefficient (α ).   
When developing scale items, Churchill (1979) suggests that the “…coefficient alpha 
absolutely [emphasis in the original] should be the first measure one calculates to assess 
the quality of the instrument” (p. 68).  He also suggests that the coefficient alpha or the 
Cronbach’s alpha is “pregnant with meaning” (p. 68) as the square root of the coefficient 
alpha is the “estimated correlation of the k-item test with errorless true scores” (Nunnally, 
1967, p. 192).  Thus, a low alpha score will result for a set of item means that fails to, or 
poorly captures the construct under measure, and is thus considered unreliable.  
Conversely, a large alpha means that the k-item test correlates well with the true test 
scores, and that the set of items has higher reliability in capturing the construct under 
measure.  Nunnally (1967, p. 226) suggests that reliabilities of between 0.50 to 0.60 are 
satisfactory for early basic or exploratory research, while Churchill (1979) suggests that for 
important decisions to be made confidently, that a reliability of 0.90 is the minimum but 
that researchers should aim for 0.95 as the desirable standard.  What constitutes a reliable 
alpha score has been debated in literature, however general guidelines have emerged.  
Nunnally (1978) later revised the minimum acceptable limit to 0.70, while Hair et al., 
(1998) also suggest that 0.70 is the lower limit although 0.60 would be suitable for 
exploratory research.  Malhotra et al., (2002) state that any value less than 0.60 generally 
indicates unsatisfactory internal reliability.  Overall, it is generally accepted that the lowest 
acceptable alpha is 0.60 and this figure will be used for this research.    
One other issue exists with assessing the reliability through the Cronbach’s alpha.  
Generally, there exists a positive correlation between the number of items in a scale and 
the Cronbach’s alpha value (Churchill and Paul, 1984).  This means that an increasing 
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number of items will increase the reliability value, even when they have the same degree of 
intercorrelation (Hair et al., 1998).  However, any overestimation of the statistic has been 
avoided in this research by limiting the number of items in each scale to a much more 
conservative number (initially three as a minimum for all except one scale illegal 
opportunism (H) that contains four).  This design decision will latter have an effect on the 
normality of the distributions for some of the variables (see Section 5.9.2 below)  
5.4.3.2 Cronbach’s Alpha Coefficient – Initial and Final 
Peter and Churchill (1986) hold the view that “construct validity is a subjective belief and 
that measurers are accepted as valid for only a limited time and only for a limited number 
of situations” (p. 10).  They emphasise the importance of investigating the quality of the 
measurers in all research where practical.  Firstly, this highlights the limitations of the new 
measurers developed in this research when applied to alternative research settings in the 
future, but it also provides the rationale for the method of developing the measurers in the 
first instance.  Thus, for this exploratory research these new scales are offered with a 
caution for future users that they be re-examined for construct validity when used in 
different contexts and in future settings.   
The reliabilities for the initial Q-Sort alphas were calculated using the formula as stated in 
Figure 5-3 above, the Cronbach’s alphas were calculated using SPSS (Version 12).  For 
this research, the following table (Table 5-9) displays the psychometric properties for each 
of the scale items developed. 
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Table 5-9 Psychometric properties of the research scales 
Q-Sort Initial 
Reliabilities 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha Major Construct 
Domains Sub-Dimensions N of 
items α  
N of 
items α  
A1 – Communication 3 0.82 3 0.614 Supply Chain 
Behaviours: 
Collaboration A2 – Information Sharing 3 0.88 3 0.642 
 B1 - Conflict Resolution 3 0.64 3 0.750 
 B2 - Goal Congruence 3 0.73 3 0.691 
 
C1 - Relationship Specific 
Investments and Activities 3 0.82 3 0.799 
 C2 - Shared Risks and Rewards 3 0.94 3 0.684 
 D1 - Trust and Commitment 3 0.91 3 0.698 
 D2 - Social and Relational Norms 3 0.76 2* 0.612 
E - Social Opportunism 3 0.79 3 0.818 Supply Chain 
Behaviours: 
Opportunism F - Commercial Opportunism 3 0.97 3 0.779 
 G - Unconscionable Opportunism 3 0.82 3 0.710 
 H - Illegal Opportunism 4 0.76 4 0.746 
* The item, “…thinks that social exchanges are an important addition to any formal agreement” (v30 and v77) was 
dropped from further analysis due to negative inter-item correlations. 
 
The inter-item correlation matrices were examined for any unusually low or negatively 
correlated items.  Only one scale was found to have experienced problems, and this was for 
the construct of social and relational norms (D2).  The item of concern was “My supplier: 
thinks that social exchanges are an important addition to any formal agreement”.  This item 
was initially conceptualised as containing positive properties in that social exchanges were 
seen as positively related to the enhancement of social and relational norms.  However, 
anecdotal comments made during the interviews by some respondents raised some doubt, 
as they regarded that social exchanges as being superfluous, if not impedimental to their 
exchange relationships (particularly if predicated on a formal agreement), and hence 
interpreted this item in a negative sense.  The inter-item correlation matrix supported this 
contention, thus the item was dropped from the scale.  The new alpha based on two items 
is marginal at 0.612, yet within the guidelines (Nunnally, 1978).  A measure of assurance 
was gained in the research process as an a-priori assumption of statistical divergence was 
confirmed by the final analysis.  In addition, the corrected item-total correlations for all 
items were also examined for any unusually low correlations.  This statistic showed no, or 
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only marginal improvements in the alpha if any additional item/s were to be removed, thus 
no additional items were excluded.   
While very low alphas (below 0.60) show poor internal consistency, conversely very high 
alphas indicate that the items could be almost identical (and possibly redundant) also 
meaning that scale is too narrow (Ntoumanis, 2001).  Further, the alphas usually improve 
when the number of items increases.  Therefore, given that the final scales were reduced to 
a minimal number of items (three in each with the exception of illegal opportunism – four, 
and social and relational norms - two), and that they were attempting to capture the 
conceptual breadth present within each construct, it is not surprising that the range of final 
alphas is from 0.612 to 0.818 with the average being 0.712.  Given the above explanations, 
these alphas demonstrate sufficient internal consistency for the purposes of this research.        
5.5 Questionnaire Development 
Determining what information is required from the research starts with its objectives.  The 
requirements of this research necessitated the development of a quantitative questionnaire 
based on a-priori secondary data and also qualitative techniques (Aaker et al., 2005).  The 
secondary data was drawn from literature, and the five qualitative in-depth face-to-face 
interviews supported the development of a more quantitative method of gathering the data.  
This triangulation places this research as a whole within the context of previously 
established theory and other research evidence.       
When developing the questionnaire, the format and the wording will be influenced by the 
profile of the potential respondents.  Hence, any format and derived meaning must be as 
generalisable as possible.  In addition, before a question can be phrased, a decision must be 
made as to the degree of freedom allowed to the respondents when answering.  A more 
phenomenological research design would allow much greater freedom for 
participant/observer interaction with open-ended questions and unstructured interviews that 
are more amenable for exploring subjective and unobservable phenomena (Cavana et al., 
2001; Easterby-Smith et al., 1991; Mangan et al., 2004).  However, as the objective of this 
research is to test a-priori hypotheses, a much more structured approach is required.  This 
common structure is necessary to gather a sufficiently large body of comparable data 
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across different respondents in order to surmise statistical inference.  The questionnaire 
would need to be rigorously applied to all respondents in an identical manner whilst at the 
same time not requiring inordinate amounts of time and being as comprehensible as 
possible.  Therefore, much consideration was given to the type and style of questions 
asked, and the form and manner of recording the respondent’s answers.  The design of the 
questionnaire used in this research underwent several iterations before its final 
administration.  The final design allowed for fast administration, with sufficient structure 
for detailed comparative analysis, but with scope at the conclusion to permit qualitative 
open-ended discourse.      
Although this thesis has separate sections for questionnaire and scale development, it 
should be noted that the development of the survey questions and the appropriate response 
scales did not proceed in isolation, rather it was an iterative process where both the 
questions and the scales were conjointly developed.  The challenge was to capture a sense 
of complicated dynamic movement in a cross-sectional survey.  Hence, respondents were 
asked to identify supply chain relationships with current key suppliers that fitted the 
description of both a transactional and a partnership relationship.  Once they had 
cognitively pictured or visualised this particular supplier and relationship (and 
subsequently confirmed by questioning), they were then presented with a list of 
collaborative and opportunistic behaviours (items) and asked if they were present or not as 
the case may be in the current relationship, and in what amounts (frequency).  The 
respondents were then asked to consider what changes in the current relationship would be 
required in order for it to move to higher, or lower levels.  Here the design of the survey 
instrument provided some challenges.  Initially it was thought that the tests would need to 
cover five relational movements or bifurcation points, these were; 
1. From transactional upward to partnership 
2. From transactional downward to termination 
3. From partnership upward to another higher order partnership (such as a Joint 
Venture). 
4. From partnership downward to transactional 
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5. From partnership downward to termination. 
 
The rationale for this design is that it would cover all possible (five) relational movements, 
and provide two data sets for collaborative movements and three data sets for opportunism 
to enable a thorough comparison.  However, it was doubtful that there would be sufficient 
time in the interview to test all five movements.  Hence, it was felt that the higher order 
partnership should be removed as this relationship was conceptually too similar to the 
partnership relationships (Knemeyer et al., 2003), and would be difficult for the 
respondents to distinguish.  For similar reasons, the movement from partnership down to 
transactional was also removed from consideration.  The final survey questionnaire design 
investigated three primary relational movements, these are;    
1. From transactional upward to partnership 
2. From transactional downward to termination 
3. From partnership downward to termination. 
 
Next, scales were developed to collect data for the demographics, strategic behaviour and 
the two major variables of collaborative and opportunistic behaviour.  The properties of 
these scales will be explained in the next section.   
5.5.1 Scale Properties  
Each of the four basic scales possesses different properties34.  As the scale increases in 
calibration and sophistication, the power of the scale also increase.  Hence, as it was the 
aim of this research to answer a reasonably multifarious question concerning dynamic 
relational movement, then the more powerful scales would be preferable.  As such, higher 
level scales such as interval and ratio scales were chosen to collect data.  Interval scales 
overcome the disadvantage of the other two scales, and in this research it also possesses an 
absolute zero point as the zero point on the scale actually means zero in the natural.  This is 
a meaningful measuring point as it taps the magnitude as well as the proportions of the 
differences.  It also subsumes all the properties of the other two lesser scales (Sekaran, 
                                                 
34
 The basic scales are; Nominal, Ordinal, Interval and Ratio. 
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2003).  Accordingly, interval scales were used to measure the major opportunistic and 
collaborative variables, thus allowing the more powerful parametric statistical tools to be 
used in the analysis (Coaks and Steed, 1999; Hair et al., 1998).   
The strategic behaviour variable was also an important variable in the model and was thus 
captured on semantic difference scales.  Semantic difference scales are considered as 
possessing interval level properties similar to Likert scales, as empirically supported by 
Westbrook and Oliver (1991, cited in Kivela, Reece and Inbakaran, 1999).  Likert scales 
have been found to intrinsically communicate interval properties to respondents (see for 
example: Avkiran, 1994; Cavana et al., 2001; Luna-Reyes and Andersen, 2003; Madsen, 
1989; McCarty and Shrum, 2000; Sekaran, 2003), although some still argue that Likert 
scales only capture ordinal level data (Simomoff, 2003; Strube, 2000), or at best 
somewhere between ordinal and interval known as quasi-interval scales (Kachigan, 1986) .  
Nevertheless, interval level data still allows parametric testing, several such tests being 
applied in this research.  Conversely, it was sufficient for the analysis to collect the 
demographic data by using essentially categorical scaled questions.    
5.5.1.1 Reverse Coded Items  
In addition, traditional scale development methodology suggests that the researcher 
employ some negatively (reverse) worded items to reduce acquiescence bias or “yea or 
nay-saying tendencies” (Churchill, 1979, p. 68).  However, other researchers suggest that 
negatively worded items can be difficult for the respondent to comprehend, and could also 
produce negative perceptions that lead to method factors, thus bringing the validity of the 
instrument into doubt (Avkiran, 1994).  Even Parasuraman, Zeithaml, and Berry’s (1991) 
refinement of their SERVQUAL instrument to measure service quality suggested the 
transposition of the original negatively worded items back to the positive.  Further, 
previous studies have also revealed some contextual and method bias being introduced 
through negatively coded items, namely that negatively worded items were not the exact 
reverse their original counterparts (Dwyer and Oh, 1988; Gerbing and Anderson, 1984).  
For these reasons, and also considering that the major variables were exploring socially 
positive and negative constructs anyway, it was considered by the researcher that the 
inclusion of negatively words items in the scales would only lead to respondent confusion 
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possibly invalidating the data.  For example, an opportunistic behavioural item (negative) 
would have to be stated in the positive and potentially be confused with a collaborative 
behaviour.  Therefore, all items scales for this research are positively worded, and reflect 
the natural direction of the construct being measured.  
5.5.2 Scale Points - Affective and Cognitive Responses 
The number of scale points on a scale is an important consideration for scale design.  
Helgeson and Ursic (1994) notes the survey respondents use either affective or cognitive 
decision making processes when answering survey questions.  Affective responses enable 
the respondent to conserve time and effort by relying on more subjective and basic emotive 
responses, whereas cognitive response require more time and effort in intellectually 
processing and understanding the questions (Burke and Edell, 1989).  Internally, the 
respondent is making trade-off decisions between conserving effort and applying 
themselves to answering the question.  In essence, affective decisions are ‘good enough’ or 
‘rule of thumb’ decisions that stem from limited time and information, and therefore 
closely reflect the theory of ad-hocracy known as bounded rationality (Cohen and Dickens, 
2002).  In this respect, the number of scale points is of concern to the scale design, as well 
as question and survey length.  This because there is some contention that more points on a 
scale leads to more affective decision processing, and thus less valid responses (Peter and 
Churchill, 1986).  Empirical evidence has not found universal support for this hypothesis 
(Churchill and Paul, 1984; Helgeson and Ursic, 1994), concluding that the number of scale 
points did not significantly impact on the type of responses employed.  Since this research 
has employed 11 and 15 point scales (11 for collaborative and 15 for opportunistic) there is 
some confidence that the response data will be as valid as data gathered from scales with 
fewer scale points (such as a five or seven point scales).  
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5.5.3 Scale and Scaling Issues in Dynamic Research 
In addition to the final decision on the number of scale points, the underpinning unit of 
measurement and the scale labels posed some interesting issues for this research.  As one 
of the aims of this research was to measure the frequency of occurrence of actual 
behaviours enacted within a supply chain dyad, the natural unit of measurement suggested 
would be to capture the number of times a behaviour occurred (Levin, 1992).  Counting the 
number of episodes seemed logical, but a frequency would not provide any insight as a 
discrete number in isolation, particularly when compared to other behavioural frequencies.  
Rather, a point of reference, a scale, or a natural or a maximum figure would be more 
preferable to provide some indication of scale or magnitude for interpretive purposes.  If a 
particular supply chain behaviour is reported as being enacted twice a year, what does that 
actually mean?  What is the basis for forming an indication of importance?  Is twice a year 
good or bad?  Thus, in addition to the scalar problem was added the issues of time and 
space.  Would a particular behaviour occur within a time period specified by the 
researcher?  Indeed, what is a suitable period of time and space that would allow sufficient 
frequencies to be observed?  If the period was too narrow there was the risk of not 
collecting enough observations, while too long a time period risked being swamped with 
too many observations.  Also, some behaviour is enacted multiple times a day, while other 
important behaviours may only potentially be enacted once a year.  While scale data can be 
mathematically transformed (Gravetter and Wallnau, 1995; Kachigan, 1986; Simomoff, 
2003), setting an optimal historical time and space period still presents some 
methodological issues.  Furthermore, there is no guarantee that respondents would be able 
to recall responses in terms of frequency within a given period with any degree of accuracy 
(Cambell, 1955; Malhotra et al., 2002; Schwenk, 1985).  The fundamental question was 
trying to understand patterns in terms of the processes that produce them, and this is the 
essence of science, and the key to developing sound principles of supply chain 
management.                  
Similar scale and scaling problems are present in dynamic ecological and economic 
systems.  Chave and Levin (2003) emphasise that one of the fundamental truths in the 
study of natural systems is that there is no single correct scale on which to study system 
dynamics.  They suggest that organisations and economies exhibit elements of collective 
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dynamics that emerge from the behaviours of individuals, mediated through levels of 
interaction and aggregation and display many different orders of magnitude (Chave and 
Levin, 2003).  It is of fundamental importance how we perceive scaling, and how observed 
or perceived phenomena influences each another within a dynamic system (Levin, 1992).  
This leads to an obvious problem for this research in that different supply chain dyadic 
systematic interactions occur with different dominant scales of activity, and that any 
subsequent cross comparisons between different scales would be meaningless.            
One suggested solution to this scaling problem, and used in this research, was to capture 
the concept of an idealised or most preferred situation and compare the actual observed 
frequency with this most preferred situation.  In other words, to abstract the scale based on 
a frequency that is common to a scale based on potentialities or maximum possibilities.  
This is a common approach to generic model building whereby the enough detail is 
included to formulate realistic extrapolations, yet the model does not attempt to capture 
every detail (Babbie, 1999; Chave and Levin, 2003; Hair et al., 1998; Halinen, 1998; 
Levin, 1992; Luna-Reyes and Andersen, 2003)  Therefore, the questions were framed 
along the lines ‘of all possible times’ a behaviour could occur within a system, how often 
did it actually occur?35  Here the problem of counting frequencies within specified time 
periods has been replaced by abstracting time and space and setting no prespecified limits.  
Thus, the respondent would then report not on specific frequencies but more on the 
magnitude of the behaviour in relation to its perceived maximum possible occurrences.  
The aim here was to facilitate understanding by abstracting and incorporating just enough 
detail to produce observed patterns within the system.        
Moreover, the concept of ‘of all possible times’ can be distilled to a percentage figure that 
reflects the proportion of observations or occurrences.  This approach has been used in 
pervious research such as the study done by Dyer (1997).  In this research, Dyer (1997) 
asks questions prefixed by statements such as “in your experience, what percentage of time 
do you…” (pp. 554-555).  This allows the respondent to frame their responses to a 
consistent scale that is transferable to multiple situations.  It also avoids the confusion 
inherent in presenting different scales for different questions.  In this sense, a natural scale 
                                                 
35
 Each item in the survey protocols where prefixed with the generic question ‘Of all possible times, how often does your 
supplier … (do behaviour X1 - Xn)?’ 
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that emerges (Levin, 1992) is a scale that represents the magnitude of behaviour as a 
percentage figure against the maximum possible occurrence of that behaviour.  Similarly, 
probability judgements are naturally bounded by the range of [0 – 1].  This provides the 
rationale for the adoption an 11 point scale (0 = ‘never’, 10 = ‘always’) as it allows the 
respondent to frame their answers in percentage terms as this interval scale intuitively 
resembles the continuous [0 – 10] scale, or a [0 – 100] percentage scale, or a [0 – 1] 
probability scale.  Empirical work and conceptual logic has previously supported this 
contention in that respondents can use continuous scales reliably in making attitudinal and 
performance judgements in surveys (Givon and Shapira, 1984).  Subsequently, the scales 
were anchored with both percentage and ‘0 to 10’ labels (i.e. 0 = ‘never’, 1 = 10%, 2 = 
20% … 9 = 90%, 10 = ‘always’) so as to communicate the conceptual link between the 
scale points and percentages to the respondents.  This scale is shown in Figure (5-4). 
Figure 5-4 Collaborative scale used to capture magnitude of supplier behaviour 
 
Never 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% Always
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
CODING:
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 
These scales were designed to capture the current level of supply chain behaviour, and the 
potential future actions by the supplier as perceived by the respondents.  Measuring 
collaborative and opportunistic behaviours does not rely on the object ability of the 
supplier to enact those behaviours, rather the measurement relies on the potentiality of the 
behaviour as perceived by the buyer.  Hunt and Nevin (1974) discuss similar issues in 
trying to measure the ethereal issues of channel power.  They operationalised channel 
power by measuring the perceived amount of influence one member had over the other.  
The goal here was to select a scale that captured the relevant level of detail to describe the 
dynamics of the whole system in terms of statistical properties, yet without the paralysis 
caused by excessive detail and cross scalar comparisons that would confound any analysis.  
As the research progressed, the 11 point opportunistic scale was modified to a 15 point 
scale for reasons that will be explained in the section dealing with the results of the first 
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pretest (see Section 5.5.5.2 following).  The next step in the methodological development 
was to conduct a dress rehearsal prior to the commencement of the pre-testing stage.   
5.5.4 Survey Instrument Validation 
To validate the survey interview instrument, a full interview dress rehearsal was conducted 
on the 12 July 2005 with an experienced industry buyer with eight years purchasing and 
supply chain experience.  The interview was timed and lasted 47 minutes easily meeting 
the anticipated maximum limit of one hour.  No major methodological problems were 
encountered with the trial of the instrument.  Post interview feedback was given 
concerning the ease of use of the scales, and also the perceptual understanding of the 
properties communicated by the scales and the items.  The feedback showed no major 
divergences between the respondent’s and the researcher’s viewpoints.  The respondent 
noted that the [0 – 10] scale was easily understood and did not perceive any end loading 
problems due to the scale bounds (Givon and Shapira, 1984).  Further, they found that the 
questions were easy to understand, and the prompt cards were a valuable reference point.  
The respondent got faster as they became more familiar with the format of the questions, 
and what was being asked.  Minor corrections were noted (see Table 5-10 for the 
corrections) during and after the interview and were actioned prior to the first pretest. 
Table 5-10 Corrections to the interview protocols post review 
 
No. Items / Questions Description of the Changes 
1 Collaborative items No. 7 and 14 Changed syntax from the plural to the singular. 
2 Opportunistic item No. 9 Changed syntax from the plural to the singular. 
3 Collaborative item No. 17 Changed “demonstrate trust” to “demonstrate trustworthiness” to reflect the buyer’s orientation. 
4 Collaborative item No. 23 Changed “do the right thing” to “do the right thing by us” to reflect the buyer’s orientation. 
5 Opportunistic item No. 2 Removed the word “does” to improve sentence flow 
 
The most significant change was the requirement for an explanation as to the motivation 
for supplier opportunism in the verbal instructions to ensure that the respondent did not 
become confused between observed behaviours, and the underlying true motivations of the 
supplier that are of course unobservable.  It was sufficient that the respondent simply 
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reported any opportunism they have observed (current level), and the amount of the 
behaviour (more or less) they would tolerate before a bifurcation occurred.  It was 
explained that they did not need to understand or second guess the supplier’s motivations 
for these behaviours.         
5.5.5 Initial Pretest 
In accordance with Churchill’s (1979) model of scale development, an initial pretest was 
conducted with the first 12 firms included in the sample frame.  The initial target was to 
achieve a pretest sample of ten or 10% of the expected complete sample frame of 100 
interviews.  However, two firms that were originally contacted and delayed their replies 
eventually agreed to an interview and were subsequently included in the pretest.    
The 12 interviews where conducted during the period 18th to 25th July 2005.  The pretest 
resulted in 11 complete and usable responses.  Problems were encountered with the 
interview of Firm 6.  During the interview the respondent appeared to be agitated and did 
not fully complete the answers relating to the transactional relationship.  It was clear that 
the interview was not what the respondent was expecting, and the researcher drew the 
interview to a close at the next most suitable point.  This happened unfortunately even 
despite the researcher gaining prior consent for the interview (via telephone) with a clear 
understanding as to length and purpose.  Given the similarities of the answers the 
respondent did provide and the quantity of missing data, this interview was excluded from 
the pretest and the final analysis.   
5.5.5.1 Initial Pretest Results 
From the pretest interviews, the remaining 11 sets of data were examined using frequencies 
and distribution analysis.  The data displayed sufficient variability and discrimination 
among the constructs.  No end scale loading was noticed for the collaborative scale, and 
the strategic behaviour scales.  However, the pretest did highlight a major problem with the 
conceptualisation of the opportunistic scale.    
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5.5.5.2 The Threat of Opportunism – A Multi-dimension Measurement 
Problem 
The opportunistic behaviour variables showed in the pretest little variation from the 
“never” or zero response category, thus seemingly to indicate that the instances of 
opportunistic behaviour actually occurring in current relationships were negligible.  
Further, the respondents were highly sensitive to the occurrence of these behaviours that 
would lead to a termination bifurcation with little or no tolerance.  While these results are 
interesting in themselves and were in the expected direction, because of the minimal 
variation, the influence of each of the four opportunistic variables could not be determined 
in the pretest data set.  It appeared that the respondents, given the original scale presented, 
could not distinguish between the various degrees of opportunism.  Yet anecdotal 
comments alerted to researcher to potential problems with this scale as the respondent’s 
comments suggested another dimension of opportunism that was not reflected in the scale.  
Essentially, it appeared that the current scale [0 – 10] was not fine enough to discriminate 
between the current operation of the behaviours and any increases or decreases.  Indeed, 
from the comments it was apparent that even the threat of opportunism was sufficient for 
respondents to change their exchange relationships, yet the current scale could not capture 
this threat.  This was true for both transactional and collaborative relationships.  Without 
forming any premature conclusions, the researcher first investigated for any potential bias 
in the current scale items.        
Due to the reporting of lower levels of opportunistic behaviours than was expected in the 
pretest, the question was asked if there were any inherent bias in the scale items?  It was 
acknowledged that the opportunistic behaviours were written in a negative sense, and this 
raised the possibility that the wording of the questions ostensibly leaded the respondents to 
the extreme left (0 = never) end of the scale.  This explanation could account for the lack 
of variation in the opportunistic scale items as each respondent would agree that these 
behaviours were undesirable, and most perceived that their suppliers would be unlikely 
ever to enact this behaviour.  Also, due to the negative question bias, the respondents could 
possibly display greater sensitivity to these behaviours and report smaller zones of 
tolerance before any change occurs.  To mitigate these effects, the opportunistic items were 
reworded to reflect more neutral statements.  However, it was quickly realised that the new 
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statements lost their original meaning and would be unable to capture what is essentially a 
negative behaviour anyway (see the discussion on reverse worded items in section 5.5.1.1 
above).  Hence, it was decided that the original items should be retained and that any 
negative wording bias be acknowledged.      
Subsequently, questions were asked if the original conceptualisation of the opportunistic 
scale was adequate, and further literature was sought.  The answer was found in 
operational risk management and also organisational purchasing literatures.  In particular 
Bauer’s (1960) two-component model of risk behaviour, where the probability component 
and the consequence component were combined to produce a much fuller understanding of 
what constitutes total risk.  Further, Lazo (1960) was one of the first researchers to address 
risk reducing behaviour in organisational purchasing situations, and similarly denoted 
‘purchasing risk’ as the sum of the potential for failure times the consequences.  In the 
literature on operational risk in organisations we can see a similar treatment of the risk 
concept, such as Waring and Glendon’s (1998) ‘risk cognition’ and ‘risk perception’ model 
(see also, Montgomery, Lipshitz and Brehmer, 2005; Slovic et al., 1982).  Similarly, this 
two-component model can be stated as a simple equation: 
( ) ( ) ( )p OB i OB r OB× =         (Equation 5-1) 
Where: 
p  = probability function 
i  = impact or consequence function 
r  = total risk function 
OB  = organisational behaviour 
 
 
Therefore, idea of capturing the ‘total perception’ of opportunistic behaviour must not only 
include the actual behaviour (i.e. the consequences of the behaviour or risk), but it must 
also capture the first part of the equation, that is the threat potential (i.e. the probability 
component).  Clearly, the perceived threat of exchange relationship opportunistic actions 
(without any actual evidence) has had a profound effect on organisational behaviour and 
structural theory and practice, both past and present.  The efforts of TCE were directed at 
mitigating the threat of opportunistic behaviour by determining the most appropriate 
organisational structure (Dwyer and Oh, 1988; Heide and John, 1992; Williamson, 1975, 
1979, 1985), while Agency theory is concerned with mitigating any potential threats of 
Chapter Five – Methodology 
 
196 
opportunistic behaviour by providing a mediating contract typology and appropriate 
incentive structure (Carlos, 1992; Eisenhardt, 1989; Ross et al., 1997).  All this effort and 
expense being expended a-priori any actual experience of opportunistic behaviour.  Thus, 
it is clear that the perceived threat of opportunistic behaviour, plus the evidential behaviour 
as experienced in a current supply chain relationship both multiply together to provide a 
fuller, more conceptually complete and rigorous operationalisation of the opportunism 
construct.  Therefore, the original scale as used in the first pretest was not able to clearly 
capture both the ‘threat’ and the ‘actual’ behaviour under investigation, hence it was 
considered unsuitable for further use unless amended.  This lesson being accepted, the 
researcher then set about formulating a more comprehensive scale that captured both 
dimensions of opportunistic behaviour. 
The new opportunistic scale that was developed kept the original 0 – 10 scale as this was 
directly comparable to the collaborative behaviours.  However, a further four scale points 
were added and were anchored by descriptions of varying levels of threat, increasing in 
severity from the left of the scale to the right.  The zero point or ‘never’ in the original 
scale was dropped and replaced with a ‘very high threat’ anchor.  The following figures 
show the original scale (Figure 5-5) and the new amended scale (Figure 5-6) along with the 
related coding. 
Figure 5-5 Original Opportunistic Scale 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-6 Reconceptualised Opportunistic Scale Incorporating Threat Scale 
 
 
 
Never 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% Always
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
CODING:
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Actual Negative Behaviour
 
No 
Threat
Low 
Threat
Medium 
Threat
High 
Threat
Very 
High 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% Always
0 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
CODING:
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Not yet,                                                   
But a Potential Threat Exists Actual Negative Behaviour
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As a result of the amendment of the opportunistic scale, it was therefore necessary to 
conduct a further pretest to validate the new scale.  Hence, a second pretest was conducted. 
5.5.6 Second Pretest 
Over the period of 11th to 16th August 2005, a second pretest was conducted to validate the 
new opportunistic scale.  A further five firms were drawn from the main sample frame and 
interviews were conducted.  As the interview protocols and other scales had been 
previously validated, attention was concentrated on the new scales.  The following tables 
compare the descriptive statistics for the initial pretest (Table 5-11) and for the new scales 
(Table 5-12) for the four opportunistic variables.    
Table 5-11 Descriptive Statistics – Initial Pretest (n = 11)36 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5-12 Descriptive Statistics – Second Pretest (n = 5) 37 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36
 While n = 11 reflects the number of interviews, each interview tested two different relationships (transactional and 
partnership) thus there are actually 22 data points respectively for the initial pretest. 
37
 Similarly, for the second pretest; interviews n = 5, relationships n = 10. 
Descriptive Statistics
22 3.00 .00 3.00 1.0464 .19660 .92214
22 5.33 .00 5.33 1.6059 .34220 1.60507
22 2.67 .00 2.67 .8032 .18034 .84588
22 3.50 .00 3.50 .2614 .15988 .74991
22
OEc Social Opportunism
OFc Commercial Opportunism
OGc Unconscionable Opportunism
OHc Illegal Opportunism
Valid N (listwise)
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic
N Range Minimum Maximum Mean Std.
Deviation
 
Descriptive Statistics
10 3.67 -4.00 -.33 -2.7010 .38367 1.21327
10 5.00 -4.00 1.00 -2.5660 .46633 1.47468
10 3.67 -4.00 -.33 -2.4330 .41590 1.31519
10 1.50 -4.00 -2.50 -3.2750 .17658 .55840
10
OEc Social Opportunism
OFc Commercial Opportunism
OGc Unconscionable Opportunism
OHc Illegal Opportunism
Valid N (listwise)
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic
N Range Minimum Maximum Mean Std.
Deviation
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The descriptives show that two standard deviations (OEc and OGc) show wider variations 
in the second pretest while two (OFc and OHc) show smaller variations, yet the level of 
overall deviation is slightly higher for the second pretest.  However, the range (minimum 
and maximum) shows a decided shift to the left and includes both negative (threat) and 
positive figures (actual behaviour).  The pronounced shift to the left clearly shows that the 
threat of opportunism is a major component, and that the new scales are more effective in 
capturing the wider definition of opportunism and were subsequently used in all the 
remaining interviews.  The main data gathering process could now proceed through survey 
interviews.  
5.5.7 Main Data Gathering Phase 
The main data gathering phase was conducted over the period of 22nd August to the 7th 
October 2005.  Most interviews were completed on the first attempt, however 
approximately 5% of the sample necessitated a call-back at a more appropriate time due to 
business and scheduling exigencies.  
While generally well received, another incident occurred similar to the problem 
encountered with Firm 6 in the initial pre-test.  On this occasion the respondent for Firm 24 
appeared to be very brusque and agitated from the beginning of the interview.  
Recognising this, the researcher terminated the interview after the opening remarks and 
prior to any data gathering for similar reasons as Firm 6.  The next firm on the list was 
contacted to replace this refusal.  The remaining 99 interviews were completed 
successfully, and no similar problems were encountered with any other respondents.  The 
final number of interviews conducted was 101 with 100 usable responses.   
5.6 The Data Gathering Instrument 
The nature and form of data gathering in research always presents the researcher with 
several dilemmas and requires making difficult trade-offs between the research objectives 
and the methods employed.  The form of the data gathering process is predicated to a large 
degree on the philosophical position and the nature of the research being undertaken.  
Some forms suit the more positivist positions such as mail surveys and electronic 
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questionnaires, while more phenomenological qualitative data can be obtained from 
observational studies and in-depth unstructured interviews. 
There are advantages and disadvantages for each approach and subsequent research 
methods (Aaker et al., 2005; Cavana et al., 2001).  For example, face-to-face interviews, 
personally administered questionnaires and observational studies have the advantage of 
being able to establish rapport, explore complex issues, provide clarifications, collect data 
immediately, and observe non-verbal clues and environmental evidence.  Against this, they 
also have the disadvantage of possibly introducing interviewer bias, and are generally 
expensive and time consuming to administer.  Whereas positivistic approaches such as 
mail surveys, telephone interviews and electronic questionnaires have the advantage of 
being much more structured, reach a wider geographic spread, are less expensive and 
greater quantities of data can be gathered.  Their major disadvantage is that generally they 
have low response rates, and response bias is a major threat to representativeness.  Given 
these issues, the rationale for selecting the survey interview as the primary data gathering 
vehicle is that it retains the best of both approaches.  It allows for rapport to be established 
quickly, and for immediate clarifications and responses that encourage higher response 
rates and completeness of data (Babbie, 1999; Evangelista et al., 1999; Fowler and 
Mangione, 1990).  Further, for the survey, each participant was asked to respond to the 
same variables over two different relationship types (transactional and partnership).  This 
type of design is known as a within subjects design, as is has repeated measures which 
facilitates paired comparisons (Kinnear and Gray, 2004).       
5.6.1 The Survey Interview 
The survey interview as used in this research incorporated a multi-method approach in that 
it gathered quantitative data through a survey instrument whilst being administered in a 
qualitative face-to-face interview setting.  In addition, while a survey instrument was the 
primary source of data, supporting qualitative data was also gathered in the same interview 
by the use of open-ended questions asked at the end of the interview.  Moreover, firms in 
the randomised sample were initially contacted by telephone to obtain consent for an 
interview, thus gaining a higher response rate and encouraging respondent enthusiasm for 
the topic.      
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5.6.1.1 Interview Protocols 
In conjunction with the development of the scales and survey instrument, the survey 
protocols were formulated.  Survey research is necessarily based on the stimulus-response 
theory of cognition and behaviour (Babbie, 1999), where essentially it is assume that a 
question will mean the same for each respondent, and the response must mean the same 
over the sample.  However such consistency is an impossible goal, hence the survey must 
therefore approximate as closely as possible the ideal.  Yin (2003), when commenting on 
qualitative case study research, suggests that the reliability and validity of the research data 
can be strengthened by developing well designed survey protocols.  A survey interview 
protocol consists of more than just the survey instrument.  It will also contain the general 
rules, procedures and the format to be used in the research interaction with the respondent 
or respondents.  A good protocol should detail from whom or where different types of 
information should be gathered to achieve the aim of the research.  Essentially, the core of 
the protocol is a set of specific questions that serve as a prompt and a checklist to the 
researcher to ensure that all questions and topics of interest have been covered (Voss et al., 
2002).  It is the consistent application of the protocol that ensures the reliability of the data 
and the minimisation of common method variance, particularly in multi-case, and multi-
interview designs.  The full survey protocols (minus the cue cards and actual survey 
instrument) as used in the main data gathering phase are attached at Appendix 6.  For 
examples of the survey instrument (sheets) used during the interviews see Appendix 7. 
Given that this research proposed to interview at least 100 subjects, the development of a 
well structured interview protocol was extremely important.  To this end, the guidelines as 
suggested by Babbie (1999, pp. 242-245) were used to develop the survey interview 
protocols: 
• The preamble, whilst written down verbatim, was administered in a flexible manner 
according to the researcher’s feel for the way the introductions had proceeded.  The 
researcher attempted to maintain eye contact to establish trust and an image of 
competence38.     
                                                 
38
 It is acknowledged that maintaining eye contact with certain cultures, even cultures within New Zealand can be 
interpreted as offensive or aggressive.  Hence, where the respondent was from a different cultural background from the 
researcher a more neutral stance was adopted.   
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• The protocols started with demographics questions to break the ice and establish 
rapport. 
• The researcher was very familiar with the questionnaire and protocols from the 
outset. 
• For the survey instrument, the wording was followed exactly and became very 
familiar so the questions sounded like normal conversation. 
• Cue cards were developed to assist with the respondent’s recall of some key 
concepts. 
• For the survey instrument, each sheet was formatted in exactly the same way so the 
same information (for example the different marks used to record each response) was 
always in the same place, with only the actual question differing.   
• The respondents recorded their own responses immediately on the actual 
questionnaire, and the researcher ensured by neutral observation and comment that 
the questions were answered in the correct order and with the correct marks to ensure 
data accuracy and completeness. 
• Standardised explanations and clarifications developed for each behaviour and were 
only used to answer any respondent queries as they arose.   
• The open-ended questions were recorded verbatim by the means of a digital voice 
recorder once permission was gained.  In addition, field notes were taken to record 
clarifications, environment, non-verbal clues and emotions of the respondent.   
• Probing questions used completely neutral words such as; “how is that?”, “in what 
ways?”, “anything else?” 
• At the end of each interview, the respondents’ efforts and contributions were 
formally acknowledged and thanked.  Further, light conversation was initiated as 
time and context permitted so as to end the interview on good terms.   
 
Each of the above principles and steps were incorporated into a survey protocol that was 
developed between the 13th and 24th of June 2005.  As with the survey instrument, it is 
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important that the entire interview protocols be piloted and tested prior to full 
administration (Ellram, 1996; Groves, 1989; Hall and Rist, 1999; Voss et al., 2002) 
An initial trial run of the protocols was conducted on the 21st June 2005 with an 
experienced industry practitioner and academic.  The interview lasted for 40 minutes and 
while the full protocols were tested only the transactional relationship of the survey 
instrument was used to save time.  The results produced a few minor wording changes.  In 
addition, the order of the questioning about Strategic behaviours and also the other 
relationship details were also changed.  These questions were previously at the end of the 
interview, but were now introduced just after the respondent was asked to think of a 
current relationship and just before they were questioned about the behaviours.  This 
change was important as the researcher could now confirm that the respondent held a 
correct perception or definition of a transactional or a partnership relationship by the 
answers given to these questions.  Also, the researcher was able to quickly cross check that 
the key relationship indicators (Strategic behaviours) did in fact reflect the relationship 
type being investigated.     
In addition to the interview protocols, visual aids in the form of cue cards were developed 
to assist with the respondent’s recall of some of the key definitions.  The cue cards, 
although only text was shown, were printed on bright green card so as to provide sensory 
stimuli and to keep a reference handy for the respondent.  Three cue cards were developed, 
firstly, a definition of a transactional relationship, secondly, a definition of a partnership 
relationship, and finally, a definition of a relationship termination.  These clear definitions 
helped the respondent to ensure that their conceptual comprehension remained aligned 
with the research definitions.  Although it could be argued that they introduce common 
method variance.  However, if they did, then at least the variance is standardised across all 
the cases.  These cue cards are presented at Appendix 8.         
5.6.1.2 Perceived Anonymity 
As a respondent’s perceived anonymity is low in an in-depth survey interview where the 
location and identity of the respondent is obvious to the researcher, clear assurances were 
given to all respondents prior to the administration of the survey that their personal and 
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organisational identities would remain confidential to the researcher exclusively.  This was 
achieved by allocating each respondent with a consecutive number that was subsequently 
used on all documentation and recorded in the SPSS and other databases.  The researcher 
maintained full control over the master list and this was held in a secure place.  In one case, 
a respondent asked for and received a letter from the University prior to the interview 
stating the authenticity of the research, the researcher and repeating the assurances of 
anonymity.  All another respondents accepted the verbal assurances given prior to 
proceeding with the interview.   
The only other issue of any sensitivity was the demographic question quantifying the 
firms’ turnover for the previous calendar year or full financial year as appropriate.  For this 
question (D1 SPSS file variable label) there were 94 valid responses from the 101 
interviews conducted.  Of the seven missing data points, two respondents (Firms 100 and 
125) did not know and did not have immediate access to the information, and five firms 
(Firms 10, 47, 48, 97 and 153) exercised their right to withhold the information for privacy 
reasons.  The question was not pressed, and the respondents were reassured of their 
confidentiality and right to decline answering any of the questions.  No other questions 
were refused by the respondents in any of the interviews.    
5.6.2 Qualitative Data Gathering 
When recording observations made in the field, the researcher has three major choices for 
managing and recording the data; via an audio tape or recorder, field notes, and the 
researcher’s memory (Singleton, Straits and Straits, 1993).  Given that the memory is a 
very poor data repository (Bernard, 1988), the best way to record the qualitative data was 
via a digital voice recorder (DVR)39, complimented with fields notes taken during the 
interview.  The DVR allowed the verbatim recording of everything that was said, and the 
non-verbal clues, environmental context and other impressions were recorded on the field 
notes.  However, the DVR had a distinct disadvantage of being highly intrusive and it is 
acknowledged that respondents modify their behaviour somewhat when they know they 
are being recorded (Lofland and Lofland, 2006).  However, to mitigate these effects, the 
                                                 
39
 The DVR used was an Olympus DVR model DS2200, and the software for used for the downloads and management of 
the files was the DSS Player Pro Dictation Module version 4 that came with the DVR when purchased.  
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respondent was asked for permission prior to the recording being started, and the DVR was 
a slim and compact unit that was placed on the table equidistance between the researcher 
and the respondent.  Further, the DVR was sensitive enough to pick up the ambient 
conversation clearly without having to be handed between the participants or requiring 
anyone to speak directly into a microphone, and in this way it quickly became unobtrusive 
allowing the conversation to flow.  The advantage of the DVR was that it allowed the 
researcher to concentrate on what was being said and also the field notes without 
distracting the respondent.  The open-ended questions of interest were included on the field 
note sheet (see the last section of Appendix 6 Survey Protocols) similar to a semi-
structured interview to allow for prompts and the recording of other detail or answers.  
Other questions supplemented this sheet according to the direction of the conversation and 
also to elicit more explicit or explanatory responses.      
A total of 62 interviews files were recorded that ranged in length from 1 minute, 50 
seconds to 11 minutes, 50 seconds with an average length of 5 minutes, 5 seconds.  One 
recording was unintelligible due to back ground noise and was subsequently deleted, while 
another interview was recorded in two parts (i.e. two separate files) as some additional 
relevant detail was offered post the conclusion of the interview and the respondent agreed 
to the continuation of the interview.  This resulted in the recording and transcription of 60 
completed interviews.   
5.6.2.1 Restrictions in the Analysis of the Qualitative Data 
Since the objectives of gathering the qualitative data were always secondary to the 
gathering of the primary empirical data, the results of the qualitative data gathering process 
were not analysed or codified further according to the generally accepted methods (Lofland 
and Lofland, 2006; Mangan et al., 2004; Mayer, 1974; Miles and Huberman, 1994).  One 
of the initial research objectives and intent was to supplement the quantitative data of the 
survey instrument with qualitative insights from the in-depth interviews.  However, as the 
research progressed it was clear that time and space limitations imposed some serious 
restrictions on a detailed examination of the data (this task awaits a future date).  Yet, the 
rich descriptive nature of the transcripts were too valuable to discard in their entirety.  An 
alternative use of this data was to use illustrative vignettes to enhance the narrative and 
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results (Miles and Huberman, 1994).  Hence, where appropriate this research is illustrated 
with informative vignettes in the form of direct quotes or comments of the respondents 
relevant to the narrative.  However, the reader is cautioned not to draw any causation, 
correlation or inference from the use of these vignettes, they are simply illustrative and 
only add descriptive depth and insight to real supply chain behaviours.  The nature of these 
vignettes is explained further in the next section.   
5.6.2.2 Illustrative Vignettes 
A vignette is a focused description of an event or a series of events taken to be 
representative, typical or emblematic of the topic (Singleton et al., 1993).  Essentially, 
vignettes represent rich pockets of information that appear to be especially representative 
of the subject at hand that can be used to focus the reader on partial or interim 
understanding.  Vignettes are snap-shots or examples of every-day-life or a phenomena of 
interest and are especially useful for enriching any statistical study and can be embedded 
gainfully into longer reports or research findings (Miles and Huberman, 1994).  It is under 
these conditions that vignettes are used in this thesis.      
When using vignettes, it is important to discriminate what type of vignette is being used 
and how it was formulated.  Seidman (1991) describes an extended version or ‘profile 
vignette’ which is a summary of a narrative over time using the informants own words.  
Conversely, Merryfield (1990) uses what can be considered as constructed forms of 
vignettes known as ‘narrative scenes’ that have been written by the researcher and verified 
by the respondent near the end of the research process.  Rather, what has been used here 
are what could be termed ‘representative vignettes’ or ‘illustrative vignettes’ in that they 
provide a much more vivid, compelling and persuasive illustration of the phenomena using 
the respondents own words to describe a situation, event, observation, feeling or emotion.  
These vignettes are distributed through the thesis at points where they are relevant to the 
text and add value to the discussion.  Again, no causative inference should be drawn from 
the use of these vignettes.        
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5.6.3 Interviewer Bias and Method Variance 
One of the key issues of any analysis based on survey interview data is the role that 
variance and interviewer bias play in the resulting conclusions (Babbie, 1999; Bernard, 
1988; Groves, 1989; Strube, 2000).  The standard research model assumes that variance 
results from the differences between the data gathered concerning a concept, and the true 
representation of the concept as a theoretical absolute, and this variance can generally be 
accommodated using standard statistical techniques.  Another form of deviation stems 
from the interviewers themselves by introducing bias simply by their expectation that 
respondents will have consistent attitudes, or that respondents with specific social 
characteristics will hold certain beliefs (Schaeffer and Maynard, 2002).  Hence, the 
variance caused by the interviewer represents the error about the expected value, and the 
net interviewer bias represents the deviation from the true population mean.  Some studies 
(see Groves, 1989 for a summary) show that the behaviour of the interviewer affects the 
amount of ‘error’ in survey estimates being introduced through the reactions or 
expectations of the interviewer.  The interviewer potentially introduces bias in several 
ways, for example the interviewer may not follow or deviate from the prescribed protocols 
in some manner, or they may suggest the most appropriate response by some verbal or 
non-verbal clues.  Further, they could also introduce bias by their reaction to the 
respondents race, manner of dress, personality or ability to answer the questions (Singleton 
et al., 1993).      
The issue of concern is to minimise the bias introduced by the presence of the researcher in 
the interview.  One method of dealing with this, as suggested by Schaeffer and Maynard 
(2002), is to conduct all interviews using a methodology of ‘standardisation’.  They argue 
that standardisation addresses both components of interviewer error (variance and bias) as 
the rules of standardisation attempt to hold the behaviour of the interviewer constant.  
Success in reducing interviewer error have been reported (Bailar, Bailer and Stevens, 
1977) yet true or perfect standardisation is impossible to achieve.  While it appears that 
there are no hard and fast rules concerning standardisation (Schaeffer and Maynard, 2002), 
a set of guidelines developed by Fowler and Mangione (1990, p. 35) describe the principles 
to which the interviewer should adhere.  These being: 
1. Read the questions as written. 
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2. Probe inadequate answers nondirectively. 
3. Record the answers without discretion. 
4. Be interpersonally non-judgemental regarding the substance of the answers  
 
In addition to implementing the above guidelines, bias was further reduced by the 
suitability of the researcher’s industrial background and experience.  The researcher has 24 
years industry experience within the logistics and supply chain management fields across a 
variety of industry groups.  This experience and the fact that all interviews were conducted 
by the same researcher reduced significantly the training burden and problems associated 
with inexperienced interviewers.  It also enabled consistency in approach and conduct of 
the interviews with standardised explanations thus enhancing reliability and reducing 
method variance.  Finally, the researcher was able to quickly comprehend the context of 
each supply chain relationship examined and establish empathetic rapport by asking 
knowledgeable questions and comments where appropriate.  Given the above application 
of accepted methodology and the benefits of a knowledgeable researcher, the possibility of 
bias being introduced by the interviewer has been minimised to the fullest extent possible 
for this research context.   
5.7 Population and Sample Derivation 
5.7.1 Unit of Analysis 
Prior to selecting an appropriate population and thence sample frame, the unit of analysis 
must be defined.  The entities or objects under study are referred to as the units of analysis, 
and in most cases the unit of analysis is easily identifiable being simply who or what is to 
be described or analysed.  However, on closer inspection the unit of analysis can 
sometimes be difficult to isolate.  For example, if a social scientist was interested in 
investigating the changing cultural trends over a generation, what would the unit of 
analysis be?  Does the researcher investigate the trends themselves, the people, or the 
social artefacts of the past that reflect the behaviour of interest?  It is vital that the unit of 
analysis be adequately described as any confusion may result in the incorrect interpretation 
of the data.  One such problem that stems from mixing units of analysis is the ecological 
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fallacy as described by Robinson (1950).  This problem occurs for example, where 
incorrect inference is attributed to individuals from data collected, not on the individuals 
themselves but on the relationships and properties between groups or organisations.  In a 
similar manner the selection and description of the unit of analysis for this research was 
not as straightforward as it first seemed. 
The problem faced in this research was choosing the unit of analysis that was the most 
appropriate for analysing supply chain relationships?  Some authors argue that supply 
chain relationships are essentially formed on a relational basis, and as such these relational 
aspects can only be formed between individuals (Marsden and Cambell, 1984; Wilson, 
1995).  They contend that organisations do not possess the properties to form relationships 
per see, rather organisations are seen as mechanistic not relational entities.  However, 
Wathne, et al., (2001) state that interpersonal relationships evolve through boundary 
spanning personnel in the transacting organisations, and that an “emotional bonding that 
transcends economic exchange” (p. 55) develops between these individuals.  Thus, these 
authors would argue that any measurement of relational and behavioural aspects of 
exchange would necessitate the selection of the individual as the unit of analysis.   
Nonetheless, another school of though would argue that supply chain relationships can 
really only be understood from the perspective of the organisation (Ulrich and Barney, 
1984).  For example, switching costs (Williamson, 1985), relationship specific investments 
(Bensaou and Anderson, 1999; Dyer and Singh, 1998) and shared risks and rewards (Closs 
and Mollenkopf, 2004; Fawcett and Magnan, 2002) are phenomena that affect the 
organisation not the individual.  Indeed, contract law specifically states that a commercial 
contract can be formed and is enforceable between organisations (Gebric and Lawrence, 
1996).  It is also noted that the signatories are usually individuals signing as nominees on 
behalf of the organisation.  Often many supply chain relationships are underpinned by legal 
contracts and the ensuing relationship adopts many characteristics of the contractual 
clauses.  Therefore, while some aspects of an exchange ‘relationship’ can develop between 
individuals (such as trust and commitment), other aspects can only be understood in terms 
of the organisation.  Henceforth, to gain a much fuller understanding of supply chain 
relationships, the organisation has been selected as the unit of analysis for this research.          
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5.7.2 Key Informant Method 
Once the decision was made to focus the analysis on the organisation, a decision was 
required as to from whom would the data be gathered?  It seemed logical to approach a key 
member of the organisation in the sample to elicit the required information, hence, the key 
informant method was chosen.  The key informant must satisfy the selection requirements 
as stated by Cambell (1955), in that they must; occupy roles that make them 
knowledgeable about the phenomenon under study, and be able and willing to 
communicate with the researcher.  Given these criteria, initial telephone contacts were 
made with the sample firms, and the manager with the greatest responsibility for supplier 
relationships (generally the procurement function) was identified.  Where, this 
responsibility was split between several managers, the one with the largest or most 
important spend or budget was requested.  The titles of the key informants actually 
interviewed reflect a range of job titles, however, the vast majority reflect ownership or 
senior positions, thus meeting Cambell’s (1955) criteria.  See Appendix 9 for a table that 
displays the frequencies of the key informants’ job titles.  
While key informants can possibly have issues with recollection (Schwenk, 1985), and the 
monomethod single informant method has been criticised as not being adequate or reliable 
when complex social judgements are being described (Phillips, 1981), generally key 
informants are considered as being most reliable when dealing with smaller organisations 
(John and Reve, 1982; Rhea and Shrock, 1987).  In this research, 47% of the sample was 
from Small to Medium sized Enterprises (SME’s) with 20 and under FTE’s (Full Time 
Equivalent employees), and overall 79% of the sample employed 50 people or less.  Given 
that the owner, managing director or general manager in these smaller firms virtually make 
all the important decisions, it is not unreasonable to expect that they could talk 
authoritatively on their supply chain relationships, and any potential behaviours that would 
cause them to react (John and Reve, 1982).         
5.7.3 Population and Sample Frame 
Choosing the population to be sampled raised some issues.  These concern the choice of 
country, the choice of industry, the choice of subjects, the problems of access to the 
subjects, and other practical considerations.  The first issue was the choice of country.  
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Originally, a comparative study between at least two countries was considered, and then 
quickly discarded due to practical and cost limitations, hence this study was conducted in 
New Zealand.  The next decision concerned the choice of industry to study.  As the 
research question was centred on dynamic supply chain relationships it was necessary to 
select a population that contain established supply chain relationships.  For this reason, the 
manufacturing sector was chosen as it was hypothesised that since a manufacturer 
performs a transformation role, it would need both inputs in the form of matériel and 
supplies, and distribution channels to move the end product.  In addition, the relationship 
between a manufacturer and its suppliers was selected as the dyad to investigate, as it was 
hypothesised that the buyer in a dyadic relationship has greater flexibility and latitude to 
purposefully change their supply chain relationships as opposed to the supplier (Berthon et 
al., 2003).  Thus, this research centred on the buyer side of the manufacturer – supplier 
dyad.   
As the chosen vehicle to collect the primary data was the survey interview, the sample had 
to be geographically close and clustered so as not to involve excessive travelling, time 
commitment and costs.  Therefore, manufacturers that were geographically centred on the 
city of Christchurch and the surrounding Canterbury region seemed the most convenient 
and appropriate way to meet the aims of this research.  It was also important to limit the 
population to those firms that employed greater than five employees so as to eliminate sole 
traders and other insignificant firms.  No upper limits were placed on the number of FTE’s, 
or turnover when selecting the sample frame.     
A suitable database was found in the form of the Kompass (NZ) Ltd (January 2005 edition) 
company database.  Negotiations with Kompass (NZ) Ltd allowed for the limited use of 
the CD Rom, and later the full access through their online Kompass Global website (see 
http://www.kompass.com).  The above described criteria were entered into the database 
search engine and subsequently a list of 490 Canterbury40 manufacturers matching the 
criteria was extracted.  This list then formed the basis of the sample frame and was entered 
into an Excel spread sheet for easier management.  The information supplied by the 
database was very comprehensive and even detailed the names and contact details of the 
                                                 
40
 While described as ‘Canterbury’ manufacturers, the database selected firms from as far as the Chatham Islands, 
Reefton and Chevoit.  Interviews were actually conducted in towns of Timaru, Ashburton, Taitapu, Rangiora, and 
Kaiapoi, with the majority being located in the city centre and suburbs.    
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key executives.  This information greatly enhanced the researcher’s ability to find and 
contact the most appropriate key informant, and improve the response rates. 
5.7.4 Sample Size and Design 
The sample size has an effect on the degree of statistical inference that can be drawn from 
the results.  Interpreting statistical inference requires the researcher to specify the level of 
Type I error that is acceptable, and in most cases this alpha (α ) is generally established at 
α  = .05 or 95% confidence interval.  Increased sample sizes always produce greater power 
of the statistical test, however, very large sample sizes produce too much power and 
smaller and smaller effect sizes become statistically significant (Hair et al., 1998).  Hence, 
there is a trade off between sample size, effect size and the power of a statistical test.  
Cohen (1988) provides some useful guidelines and suggests that power becomes 
acceptable at sample sizes of 100 or more in situations with predicted moderate effect sizes 
at both alpha levels (α  = .05 and α  = .01).  As larger effect sizes (i.e. the difference 
between the means of two groups or the correlation between variables) are more likely to 
be encountered than smaller effects (Hair et al., 1998) in the current study,  the sample size 
of 100 was considered adequate for the purposes of drawing correct inferences from the 
results of the multivariate statistical tests used in this research.  Further, Singleton et al., 
(1993) suggests that at one extreme 30 cases is generally regarded as the minimum needed 
for statistical data analysis, “…although most social researchers would probably 
recommend at least 100” (p. 169).           
As the aim of this research is a generalisation of theory, some form of probability sampling 
is necessary.  Hence, each firm in the sample frame of 490 Canterbury manufacturers was 
allocated a random number and then sorted from lowest to highest, thus providing a 
random sample of subjects.  The sample could hence be considered a simple random 
sample (Sekaran, 2003).    
5.7.5 Response Rates 
The highest potential response rates can be obtained through the personal interview method 
(Mayer, 1974).  This is true because of two interacting phenomena.  Firstly, personal 
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motivation of the respondent is higher as the interviewers presence is useful in motivating 
the respondent to cooperate, and secondly, the researcher has full control over the number 
of times difficult to reach respondents are contacted.      
The responses rates were enhanced by a priori contact (Malhotra et al., 2002; Singleton et 
al., 1993).  The initial contact with a prospective respondent was made by telephone.  The 
project was then described in board outline, and the respondent was then qualified as a 
potential key informant through their job title and direct questioning as to their 
responsibilities, and number and types of supply chain relationships they were responsible 
for.  If suitable, an interview with the respondent was requested, and if consent was gained, 
an honest estimation of the time was given (approximately one hour), and finally an 
appointment time, place and date were confirmed.  Just prior to finishing the conversation, 
each respondent was then asked to reconfirm their consent.  Some respondents requested a 
reminder closer to the interview and this was noted in the appointment calendar.     
In total 181 firms were contacted from the randomised sample frame of 490, and 101 
interviews were conducted giving an effective conservative response rate of 55.8%.  The 
following table outlines the breakdown of the responses.     
Table 5-13 Effective response rates 
Total Firms in Sample: 181 100% 
1. Less:   
Double entry in sample frame (Firm 28 and 98 the same): 1 0.6% 
Beyond region (cost of travel was beyond the budget): 5 2.8% 
Not contactable: 1 0.6% 
Contacted but not interviewed (not needed): 15 8.3% 
 22 12.2% 
   
Effective Sample Size 159 
 
2. Less:   
Unsuitable (e.g. service firms or no variety in supplier base, or no key 
informant):   20 11.0% 
Refused to participate: 38 21.0% 
 58 32.0% 
   
Interviews Completed* 101 55.8% 
Total Response Rate (101/181) 55.8% 
* One interview was eliminated in the pretest stage leaving a total sample of 100 completed interviews. 
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However, if the first category of firms (see point 1 in Table 5-13) were excluded from the 
calculations as they do not really constitute an outright refusal or suitability issues, then the 
true response rate increases to 63.5%41.  This compares very favourably with similar 
studies such as Lassar and Kerr, (1996) who gained a response rate of 38.8% for their 
questionnaire after their initial approach through interviews, and another personal contact 
study of only 28% (Stank and Lackey, 1997). 
5.8 Data Coding and Data Cleaning  
Except for the main scales that were answered by the respondent, all other answers to 
questions were recorded by the researcher on a sheet that contained the relevant coding 
instructions.  Once the interview was complete, all answers (both those recorded by the 
respondent and the researcher) were transferred to a blank data sheet at the first convenient 
moment.  This was usually done between interviews.  The coding sheet also included the 
variable label, variable number and coding range to help ensure accurate transference.  All 
responses were recorded on the data sheet in their coded form thus facilitating the transfer 
to electronic format.        
All data was initially entered into an Excel spread sheet in the same format that was 
eventually transferred to SPSS for Windows (Version 12 for Windows).  The reason for 
this was that Excel allowed for dynamic updating of the summated scales whereas in SPSS 
whole columns would have to be recalculated even if only one data point changed. 
Accuracy was the most important aspect of this phase of the research, hence a check was 
conducted to establish if the responses were consistent with the expected direction of the 
survey instructions.  In other words, if the values recorded for any relational increase did in 
fact equal or increase from the current level, or similarly, that the values recorded for any 
relational decrease did in fact equal or decrease from the current level. This check 
highlighted 14 data coding deviations, representing a 0.0007% error rate out of 18,500 
possible data entry points.  
In addition to the above check for parameter contravention, a further ‘wild-coding’ 
checking exercise (Sonquist and Dunkelberg, 1977) was undertaken to determine the 
                                                 
41
 Effective sample size: 159 divided by completed interviews: 101 = 63.5% 
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overall accuracy of the data entry process.  A 10% random check was conducted by re-
entering the data from 10 randomly selected check cases (out of 100 cases).  This check 
noted three errors, of which two occurred during the wild-coding data entry process itself, 
and only one true error was found in the original file.  Thus, (extrapolating the 1 mistake in 
the 10 case check) the overall integrity of the database is estimated as 10 mistakes out of a 
possible 21,200 data entry points, or a 0.0004% error rate.  Finally, SPSS (Version 12 for 
Windows) output frequencies for all of the variables were examined for any out of range 
entries (minimum and maximum descriptions) and none were found (Coaks and Steed, 
1999).  These steps have ensured the accuracy and integrity of the data coding and entry 
processes.  
5.9 Statistical Approaches to Data Analysis 
To address the research questions, quantitative approaches have been employed.  However, 
data analysis is not an end in itself, rather its purpose is to produce information that will 
help clarify the research questions at hand.  It is also important to take into account the 
properties of the statistical techniques focusing particularly on their purpose and 
underlying assumptions, as some techniques can withstand violations of their assumptions 
better than others.   
As the main variables of interest possess at least interval level properties42 and the sample 
size (100) provides sufficient but not excessive power, then parametric statistical methods 
are considered the most appropriate tests for making inference statements (Coaks and 
Steed, 1999; Field, 2000; Hair et al., 1998).  However, firstly all variables were examined 
using frequencies and descriptive statistical outputs to gain a feel for the nature and 
distribution of the data.  The results of the statistical analysis will be presented in chapter 
six.  The remainder of this chapter will discuss the rationale for the tests used in the 
analysis. 
                                                 
42
 It could even be argued that the 0-10 scale represents a ratio scale as it has an absolute zero point, however, to take a 
conservative approach, all scales are considered as possessing interval properties for the purposes of this research.  
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5.9.1 Computer Based Statistical Analysis 
All data analysis conducted in this research used SPSS (Version 12 for Windows) 
statistical package.    
5.9.2 Analytical Assumptions – Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of Normality 
As the parametric tests used in this research rely on the fundamental assumption of the 
normality of the data, an essential preliminary step was to examine the distributions of the 
major variables.  This was done by using the one-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) 
statistic along with examining the histograms, stem and leaf diagrams, normal and 
detrended Q-Q plots.  If the K-S statistic significance level is greater than .05 (p > .05), 
then normality is assumed.  The results of the K-S tests are presented in Table 5-14 that 
follows.  
Table 5-14 One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tests of Normality 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Testa 
Variable Statistic N Sig        (2-tailed) 
CA1c Communication .735 100 .652 
CA2c Information Sharing 1.260 100 .084 
CB1c Conflict Resolution 1.273 100 .078 
CB2c Goal Congruence .910 100 .380 
CC1c Relationship Specific Investments and Activities .1.528 100 .019b 
CC2c Shared Risks and Rewards 1.028 100 .241 
CD1c Trust and Commitment 1.254 100 .086 
CD2c Social and Relational Norms 1.969 100 .001b 
OEc Social Opportunism 1.303 89 .067 
OFc Commercial Opportunism 1.377 89 .045 b 
OGc Unconscionable Opportunism 2.196 89 .000b 
OHc Illegal Opportunism 1.735 89 .005b 
a. Test distribution is Normal. 
b. Significant result.    
 
The K-S tests show that seven of the twelve variables are normal while five deviate to 
some extent.  However, as this is an exploratory study, these results are not surprising.  
Realistically, it is unlikely that the distribution of some of these behaviours (particularly 
opportunistic behaviours) would reflect a normal distribution in the first instance.  For 
example, the stem and leaf plot for the variable CC1c Relationship Specific Investments 
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and Activities shows that over 26% of respondents noted none or very minimal joint 
investment.  Given that this activity requires high levels of trust and a long term orientation 
in the relationship, it is not surprising that this study found very low levels of this activity, 
and hence by its nature it would be non-normal.  Further, given that the data was gathered 
on interval scales divided into categories, the resulting discrete variables (as opposed to 
continuous variables) are also unlikely to fit the normal profile due to the coarseness of the 
categories.   
While there are transformational options available if the data varies from the classic 
normal distribution (such as the logarithmic transformation), the decision to transform 
depends on the severity of the departure (Coaks and Steed, 1999).  If the departure is not 
severe then parametric testing can still proceed as the methods used in this research are 
noted as being robust to departures from normality (Hair et al., 1998).  Bryman and Cramer 
(1997) comment that the need to fulfil this condition is meeting with increased resistance.  
They cite previous studies (for example, Boneau, 1960; Games and Lucas, 1966, cited in 
Bryman and Cramer, 1997), where deliberate changes were made to the value of the 
statistical information to demonstrate that non-fulfilment does not necessarily produce 
different results.   
The variables that were highlighted by the K-S statistic as being non-normal were further 
examined using the detrended Q-Q plots.  The following table (Table 5-15) illustrates the 
maximum values, both positive and negative, of the deviation from normal as shown in the 
plots. 
Table 5-15 Maximum deviation from normal – Detrended Q-Q Plots             
 
Detrended Q-Q Plot Values 
Variable Maximum Minimum Outliers 
CC1c Relationship Specific Investments and Activities 0.4 -0.4 0 
CD2c Social and Relational Norms 0.4 -0.8 3 
OFc Commercial Opportunism 1.8 -0.3 3 
OGc Unconscionable Opportunism 1.5 -0.5 5 
OHc Illegal Opportunism 1.5 -0.4 5 
 
This table shows that the majority of the Q-Q plot deviations were fractions of one scale 
category (i.e. less than 10%) and would therefore not essentially change the result of tests.  
Chapter Five – Methodology 
 
217 
While it is acknowledged that three items exceeds the value of 1.0, the number of 
occurrences in the data highlights only a few outliers and extreme values for each non-
normal variable.  Nevertheless, sufficient confidence was garnered to proceed with 
parametric testing as the usefulness of the tests far outweighed the deviations from 
normality noted above.     
5.9.3 Multivariate Tests 
Multivariate analysis uses multiple measurements on each individual or object under 
investigation simultaneously, and as such offer greater power than their univariate 
predecessors.  The following multivariate tests were used to examine the hypotheses. 
5.9.3.1 Univariate and Multivariate GLM Model 
Generally, all parametric statistical analyses are special cases within a single general linear 
model (GLM) family (Thompson, 2000).  Cohen (1968) states emphatically that multiple 
regression subsumes all the univariate parametric methods such as t test, analysis of 
variance (ANOVA), and analysis of co-variance (ANCOVA).  As such, the GLM is a 
powerful heuristic technique that helps researchers view three important facets.  Firstly, all 
these methods use weights43 to optimise explained variance and minimise model error 
variance.  Secondly, all methods focus on the use of latent or dummy variables as 
measurers of the constructs under investigation, and thirdly all methods produce 
correlation figures and indication of the size of the variance accounted for similar to the r2 
(Thompson, 2000). 
5.9.3.1.1 GLM Model Fit Statistics  
The GLM multivariate test shows four multivariate tests of goodness-of-fit for each effect 
within the model.  These are the Pillai’s trace, Wilk’s Lambda, Hotelling’s Trace, Roy’s 
Largest Root.  These statistics pool the variance from all the dimensions to create the test 
statistic.  Pillai’s trace considers all the characteristic roots and can be approximated by the 
F statistic.  Wilk’s lambda is sometimes called the U statistic and is averagely 
conservative.  Wilk’s Lambda ranges between 0 and 1, with values close to 0 indicating the 
                                                 
43
 i.e. regression beta weights and standardized canonical function coefficients. 
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group means are different and values close to 1 indicating the group means are not 
different (equal to 1 indicates all means are the same).  Hotelling's trace is based on the 
sum of eigenvalues, while Roy's Largest Root is the largest eigenvalue. The Roy’s Largest 
Root only uses the variance from the dimension that separates the groups most (the largest 
‘root’ or difference).  There is general agreement that Pillai’s trace and Wilk’s Lambda 
provide the greatest power and are most immune from violations of the base assumptions 
(Hair et al., 1998).  Where there are only two levels all the test statistics should be the 
same, and this is the case for this research as transactional relationships were tested against 
partnership relationships.  
5.9.3.2 One-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
Deciding whether two or more groups of observations differ in location is a common task 
in data analysis.  Generally, in the One-way ANOVA parametric approach the task is 
reduced to testing whether two or more group means are equal and the technique 
generalises the Students t test to three or more groups (Muller and Fetterman, 2002).  
Essentially the ANOVA tests for the equivalency of all the means between two groups, 
hence the overall test looks above and beyond the grand mean (intercept and location) and 
compares the grand mean model (intercept only model) to the full model.  The test seeks to 
test the null hypothesis that the category means are equal in the population, or: 
1 2 3: ... cHo µ µ µ µ= = = =         (Equation 5-2) 
 
This test is especially useful for reducing familywise error (Malhotra et al., 2002) or in 
other words the cumulative effect of a Type I error (rejecting the null hypothesis in error) 
across all paired comparisons.  When conducting an ANOVA test the assumptions to be 
satisfied are identical to the GLM.  Namely that, the categories of the independent 
variables are assumed to be fixed, the error term is normally distributed and also 
uncorrelated.  In many data analysis situations these assumptions are reasonable meet 
(Malhotra et al., 2002).          
It has been noted that the t test and the ANOVA tests applied to samples with data points 
greater than 30 in size will still give accurate p-values even if the data is not entirely 
normally distributed (Gravetter and Wallnau, 1995; Green, Salkind and Akey, 1997).  As 
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the variables of this research have a minimum number of data points for each test of 89, 
then it is considered that parametric testing will not cause any misinterpretation of results 
by the violation of the normalcy assumption.       
5.9.3.3 Paired Sample t tests 
For the survey, each participant was asked to respond to the same variables over two 
different relationship types (Transactional and Partnership) and at different levels (current, 
increase and decrease).  These specific pairwise comparisons have been planned as part of 
the research design known as a within subjects design, and has repeated measures which 
facilitates paired comparisons (Kinnear and Gray, 2004).  Hence, the data is highly 
amenable to paired sample t testing, and also one tailed t tests as the t distribution is more 
conservative than the normal distribution.   
The t tests (t statistic or Student’s t) were selected for making inference statements as 
although normality is assumed, the t test is quite robust to departures from normality.  This 
is particularly true for large samples (over 120) where the t distribution and the normal 
distribution become virtually indistinguishable (Malhotra et al., 2002).  Further, a paired 
samples or repeated measures t test has one additional assumption that needs to be 
satisfied.  Here the population difference scores need to be normal as well, however (Coaks 
and Steed, 1999) note that sample sizes over 30 usually cover this requirement and this has 
been satisfied in this research.  The paired sample t tests were used to examine any 
differences in the means for the same behaviour rated across the three different levels (i.e. 
the current level, an increase and a decrease).      
5.9.3.4 Bivariate Correlations  
Significance testing does not help illuminate the degree of association between variables.  
Often powerful statistical tests (i.e. large sample sizes) will produce significant results yet 
small or trivial associations.  The correlation coefficient is the measure of the size and 
direction of relationship between two variables, and the squared correlation (r2) is the 
measure of strength of association.  The Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient is 
the most frequently used measure of association.  The Pearson r is independent of the scale 
of measurement (as both X and Y scores are standardised), and independent of sample size 
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(Tabachnick and Fidell, 1989).  The value of r ranges between -1.0 and +1.0 where 0.0 
represented no relationship, hence the higher the value in either direction, the stronger the 
association.  Bivariate correlations are used in this research to assess how the upper and 
lower ZOTs interact with each other and also the relationship equilibrium?  Further, inter-
correlation matrices were a critical part of the results interpretation.              
5.10 Design Problems and Limitations 
There are various problems and limitations that the reader must be cognisant of when 
interpreting the results of this research.   
Firstly, the opportunistic questions were in essence negatively weighted as they were 
seeking responses to actual negative behaviour.  An attempt was made when developing 
the items to remove this bias and create neutral statements, however it was found that the 
meaning of the question was lost or became too vague to capture the effect.  Hence, since 
one of the research objectives was to investigate the dynamic reactions to actual and 
perceived negative behaviours by suppliers, the researcher felt justified to directly ask the 
respondents about specific negative behaviours instead.     
This research was only able to test the movement of supply chain relationships within what 
is termed ‘transactional’ and ‘partnership’ type relationships.  It is acknowledged that this 
quite narrow focus on two forms ignores many of the other types of relationship that exist 
on the full continuum.  As such, this research did not examine any relationships where a 
degree of mutual dependence through degrees of ownership was present.  Clearly different 
relationship types respond to different behaviours, and this should be the subject of further 
research effort. 
Further, the testing as to dynamic relational movement was only conducted on the 
transactional type of relationship due to time limitations during the interview process.  
Hence, the concepts drawn from the results are said to be true only for the movement and 
ZOTs for the transactional relationship.  It is acknowledged that results could differ when 
examining other types of supply chain relationship with the same instruments.  
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A common criticism for this type of research is that data gathered from one side of the 
dyad does not provide valid tests of the complete dyadic relationship (Lindgreen, 2001).  
There is some weight to this argument, however this research was interested only in the 
perceptions of one side of the dyad (the buyer) to the actions perpetrated by the other (the 
supplier).  It was further restricted in terms of time, resources and access to a matched 
dyadic partner.  Hence, the results should be interpreted with this limitation in mind.   
Further issues might be raised about the use of single key informants to speak on behalf of 
the firm and the relationship especially where complex social judgements are made.  
However, the careful vetting and selection of the key informants during the initial contact 
phase, as well as the use of internally consistent multi-item scales allows for the gathering 
of reliable and valid data even in a variety of channel settings (John and Reve, 1982).  
Further, the weight of this research was placed on the key informant’s perceptions, not the 
other side’s perceptions.  As there is no quantifiable reference groups with which to 
compare the respondent’s perceptions, then their own assessments must be taken as valid 
and meaningful as it is against these perceptions that they initiate action, not others.     
5.11 Conclusion 
The next chapter will utilise the methodology as discussed to conduct the hypotheses 
testing phase of the research.  It will also examine in detail the outcomes of the tests, and 
provide an interpretation of the results.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
6 Analysis of Data and Hypotheses Testing 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the results of the current research.  One hundred interviews were 
conducted with supply chain professionals from various industries.  Each respondent was 
asked to describe the current state of their relationships with two different suppliers, one 
reflecting a transactional relationships and the other reflecting a partnership relationship.  
Each was then asked to indicate their preferences in terms of what behaviours would 
trigger both positive and negative relationship movements (bifurcations).  Eventually, 189 
different supply chain relationships44 were surveyed for the data collection phase, and this 
data matrix forms the basis of the analysis.  The first section of this chapter reports the 
analysis conducted on the demographic background to the cases and the key informants.  
Secondly, descriptive statistics of the main behavioural variables were examined using 
frequencies, distributions, graphics, measures of central tendency, and most importantly, 
the measures of variance in the data.  Thirdly, this chapter then reports on the hypotheses 
testing and the results are described for each.  Finally, this chapter concludes with a table 
summarising the results of the hypotheses testing phase.  
6.2 Analysis of Data 
6.2.1 Sample Demographics 
This first section describes the demographic data of the cases in the data matrix in terms of 
frequencies and proportions. 
 
                                                 
44
 The first eleven opportunistic relationships were not used due to a scale change after the pretest – see Section 5.5.5.2. 
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6.2.1.1 Industry Breakdown 
While the respondents were not required to self-report their industry segment, the sample 
frame drew cases from the category of ‘manufacturers’ primarily based in the province of 
Canterbury in New Zealand.  The range of industries represented in the randomised sample 
was quite diverse.  Examples include; engineering, printing, industrial goods, electronics 
manufacturing, agri-business, textile, mining support industries, primary food products, 
packaging, communications infrastructure, heavy transport engineering, and fast moving 
consumer goods (FMCG) manufacturers.  The heterogeneous nature of the sample adds 
some confidence as to the generalisability of the results (Sekaran, 2003).      
6.2.1.2 Firm Turnover 
Table 6-1 shows the turnover of the firms in $NZ45 by categories.  Six firms refused to 
supply or could not supply the details.  The table shows a wide range of revenue with 13% 
of the sample having significant revenues (over $NZ20m).  However, 57% of firms had 
revenues under $NZ5M showing turnover relative to the size of the firms as most where 
considered Small to Medium sized Enterprises (SME’s) according to the Ministry of 
Economic Development’s (2004) classification scheme (i.e. under 20 FTE’s, see next 
section).        
Table 6-1 Annual Turnover in $NZ (2004) 
Turnover
1 1.0 1.1 1.1
3 3.0 3.2 4.3
11 11.0 11.7 16.0
17 17.0 18.1 34.0
22 22.0 23.4 57.4
18 18.0 19.1 76.6
10 10.0 10.6 87.2
5 5.0 5.3 92.6
5 5.0 5.3 97.9
2 2.0 2.1 100.0
94 94.0 100.0
6 6.0
100 100.0
< $200k
$200 - 500k
$500 - 1M
$1.0M - 2M
$2.0M - 5M
$5.0M - 10M
$10.0M - 20M
$20.0M - 50M
$50.0M - 100M
> $100M
Total
NZD
SystemMissing
Total
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
                                                 
45
 To convert to a $US equivalent, multiply the $NZ sum by the exchange rate of .671 (current at 29 Nov 2006) 
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6.2.1.3 Number of Employees - Full Time Equivalent (FTEs) 
Table 6-2 shows the number of FTEs employees of the sampled firms for each category.  
The table show that 47% of firms employed 20 or fewer FTEs thus meeting the definition 
of a SME, while nearly 80% employed 50 FTEs or less.  Only about 9% could be 
considered large firms (in the New Zealand context) employing over 100 FTEs. 
Table 6-2 Number of FTEs  
No FTEs
3 3.0 3.0 3.0
27 27.0 27.0 30.0
17 17.0 17.0 47.0
13 13.0 13.0 60.0
13 13.0 13.0 73.0
6 6.0 6.0 79.0
6 6.0 6.0 85.0
4 4.0 4.0 89.0
2 2.0 2.0 91.0
9 9.0 9.0 100.0
100 100.0 100.0
< 5
6 - 10
11 - 20
21 - 30
31 - 40
41 - 50
51 - 60
61 - 70
71 - 80
> 101
Total
Valid
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
6.2.1.4 Key Informant Details 
The job titles of the key informants are summarised here in Table 6-3.  For a fuller 
explanation of the self-reported titles see Appendix A9.   
Table 6-3 Summary of Key Informant job titles 
 
  
Frequency Percent
Valid          
Percent
Cumulative 
Percent
Valid Operations Manager 31 31.0 31.0 31.0
MD / Owner 24 24.0 24.0 55.0
Procurement Manager 20 20.0 20.0 75.0
GM 16 16.0 16.0 91.0
Sales/Marketing 5 5.0 5.0 96.0
Logistics Manager 4 4.0 4.0 100.0
Total 100 100.0 100.0
 
 
MD = Managing Director 
GM = General Manager 
Chapter Six – Data Analysis and Hypotheses Testing 
 
225 
6.2.1.5 Experience of Key Informants and Buyer-Supplier Interactions 
Table 6-4 shows the experience levels of the key informants when dealing with suppliers 
for sourcing and procurement purposes.  Over 90% had 3 years plus experience, whilst 
63% had over 10 years experience, and 44% had over 15 years experience.  Clearly, the 
experience levels of the respondents is considerable and this provides additional support 
for the validity of the data. 
Table 6-4 Experience levels of Key Informants in dealing with suppliers 
Experience with Suppliers
1 1.0 1.0 1.0
2 2.0 2.0 3.0
5 5.0 5.0 8.0
2 2.0 2.0 10.0
14 14.0 14.0 24.0
13 13.0 13.0 37.0
19 19.0 19.0 56.0
44 44.0 44.0 100.0
100 100.0 100.0
< 6 mths
6 mths - 1 yr
1.0 - 2 yrs
2.0 - 3 yrs
3.0 - 5 yrs
5.0 - 10 yrs
10.0 - 15 yrs
> 15.0 yrs
Total
Valid
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
 
 
Table 6-5 as follows shows the total number of supplier firms that each key informant 
deals with on a regular basis (at least once per month).  Over 70% reported 20 or more 
suppliers with whom they have regular contact.  Thus, the scope and range of buyer-seller 
relationships is high, giving further evidence of validity.  
Table 6-5 Number of active buyer-supplier relationships for each firm  
 
  
Frequency Percent
Valid         
Percent
Cumulative 
Percent
Valid < 20 suppliers 30 30.0 30.0 30.0
20 - 40 suppliers 27 27.0 27.0 57.0
40 - 60 suppliers 21 21.0 21.0 78.0
60 - 80 suppliers 5 5.0 5.0 83.0
80 - 100 suppliers 8 8.0 8.0 91.0
>100 suppliers 9 9.0 9.0 100.0
Total 100 100.0 100.0
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6.2.2 Descriptive Data - Transactional and Partnership Relationships  
The respondents were asked some confirmatory questions concerning their chosen 
suppliers to ensure that the relationship being examined actually reflected the descriptions 
prescribed by this research.  They were asked to provide an estimation of how long the 
relationship had been in existence, the frequency of contact, and if there were any 
ownership interests between the two firms.  The last question was important to remove any 
confounding ownership or obligation dependency relationships, and ensure that the 
relationships being investigated were truly independent.   
6.2.2.1 Duration of Buyer-Supplier Relationships 
Of the length of the relationship, the following Figure (6-1) shows that the majority of the 
transactional relationships are of a shorter-term orientation (57% between 0-6 years), 
whilst the partnership relationships reflect a longer-term orientation (60% being 10 years 
old and over).  Thirteen partnership relationships were over 20 years in duration with one 
being 40 years old.  This finding is consistent with previous research where transactional 
relationships are correlated with a short-term orientation, and partnership relationships 
with a long-term orientation (Hoyt and Huq, 2000; Kwon and Suh, 2005; Narayandas and 
Rangan, 2004).  
Figure 6-1 Duration of buyer-supplier relationships (transactional and partnership types) surveyed 
in this research   
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6.2.2.2 Frequency of Contact 
To determine the number of opportunities for relational interaction the respondents were 
asked how frequently they had contact (of any sort) with the supplier under evaluation.  
The results are shown in Table 6-6, and clearly show that the frequency of contact for 
partnership relationships (94% weekly or more frequent) appears to be much higher than 
transactional relationships (74% weekly or less frequently).  Thus, there is a much higher 
probability of inter-organisational behavioural transactions occurring in partnership 
relationships.   
Table 6-6 Crosstabulation - Frequency of contact for transactional and partnership relationships 
 
Count
3 23 45 29 100
26 32 36 6 100
29 55 81 35 200
Transactional
Partnership
Trans or Partnership
Total
Many times
a day Once a day Weekly Monthly
Freq of contact
Total
 
6.2.2.3 Tests of Firm Independence - Degrees of Ownership 
All dyadic buyer-suppler relationships used in this research were tested for degrees of joint 
ownership.  This step was important, as the research model has been built on the 
assumption that the two firms are truly independent, and can thus make independent 
decisions concerning their supply chain relationships and behaviour.  All 200 relationships 
tested were self-reported as being completely independent with no reported degrees of 
ownership between the two firms. 
6.2.2.4 Supplier Geographical Location 
During data gathering it became apparent that the geographical location of the supplier, 
particularly if they were based overseas, might have an impact on the formation of the 
supply chain relationship.  Stock and Lambert (2001) note that purchasing relationships are 
much more problematic with overseas suppliers as physical, socio-cultural, and 
communicative barriers are hard to surmount.  Thus, partnership formation is much more 
likely with locally or nationally based suppliers.  As a result, a further question was 
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appended to the survey protocol from interview number 54 onwards (out of 100 usable 
interviews).  This question asked the respondents if their suppliers were based nationally or 
internationally, and if the latter, in what country?  Thus, the remaining 47 cases46 were 
asked these questions and the following Table (6-7) lists the results (two relationships per 
case, n = 94).  All transactional relationships (47) reported the use of local suppliers only 
(i.e. at least based nationally).  Of the partnership relationships, all used only national 
suppliers with the exception of three cases.  Of the three overseas-based partnership 
relationships, two were based in mainland China, and one on the Eastern seaboard of 
Australia.      
Table 6-7 Crosstabulation - Location of suppliers for transactional and partnership relationships 
Trans or Partnership * Local vs O/Seas Crosstabulation
Count
47 0 47
44 3 47
91 3 94
Transactional
Partnership
Relationship
Type
Total
Local O/Seas
Local vs O/Seas
Total
 
 
While only the last 47 cases were recorded (47% of the sample), there is no evidence to 
suggest that the geographical location of the supplier materially influenced the relationship 
or behavioural variables of this research.  However, the table clearly shows that the vast 
majority of suppliers surveyed were either locally or nationally based, thus the results 
should only be generalisable to this range of relationships.    
 
                                                 
46
 There were 101 interviews completed with one entire interview being rejected, thus 54 + 47 = 101. 
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6.2.3 Major Behavioural Variables – Descriptives 
The major behavioural variables hypothesised to impact on supply chain relationships were 
operationalised in accordance with the methodology as outlined in chapter five. 
6.2.3.1 Descriptive Statistics – Collaborative Behavioural Variables        
The collaborative variables were operationalised into four main dimensions, with each of 
these incorporating two sub-dimensions.  The descriptive statistics provide a starting point 
for the interpretation of these variables.  As the data was interval scaled, the measures of 
central tendency (mean and standard deviation) are reported for both transactional and 
partnership relationships and these are shown in Table 6-8.  Further, the distribution 
statistics of skewness and kurtosis were also examined showing that generally the 
collaborative behaviours were mildly negatively skewed, whist the opportunistic 
behaviours were positively skewed.  The distribution of each variable is also illustrated in 
the accompanying box-blot graphics (also known as a box and whisper plots).  These box-
plots summarise the distribution of each variable based on the mean and interquartile 
ranges.  The box area represents the interquartile range containing the mean (thick 
intersecting line) and the central two quartiles (i.e. 25% to 75%).  The whiskers represent 
the upper and lower quartiles of the remaining observations, with circles representing 
outlying values, and the asterisks representing extreme values (more than three box lengths 
from the box).  The Y axis shows the response values ranging between 0 – 10 (11 point 
measurement scale).  An example box-plot with explanations is included in Figure 6-2 for 
clarity.   
Table 6-8 Descriptive statistics – The four major collaborative behavioural variables   
Descriptive Statistics
200 .00 10.00 6.0562 2.28392
200 .00 10.00 6.8940 2.37725
200 .00 9.83 5.3008 2.68052
200 2.58 10.00 8.0277 1.55865
200
Active Disclosure
Common Objectives
Joint Risk Taking
Relational Commitment
Valid N (listwise)
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
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Figure 6-2 Box-Plot Graph – The four major collaborative behavioural variables 
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For this research, each of the four major collaborative behaviours was further divided into 
eight collaborative sub-dimensions (see Section 3.3.8 for the associations).  To provide 
further insight these sub-dimensions were examined with descriptive statistics and box-plot 
graphics, and the results are shown in Table 6-9 and Figure 6-3. 
Table 6-9 Descriptive statistics – Sub-dimensions of major collaborative behavioural variables   
Descriptive Statistics
200 .00 10.00 6.4236 2.48128
200 .00 10.00 5.6899 2.46249
200 .00 10.00 7.0285 2.58428
200 .00 10.00 6.7602 2.56517
200 .00 10.00 4.4566 3.17056
200 .00 10.00 6.1452 2.73629
200 1.33 10.00 7.7536 1.89772
200 2.50 10.00 8.3025 1.53264
200 1.73 9.79 6.5702 1.97474
200
Communication
Information Sharing
Conflict Resolution
Goal Congruence
Relationship Specific Investments
Shared Risks and Rewards
Trust and Commitment
Social and Relational Norms
Collaboration (Current All)
Valid N (listwise)
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
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Figure 6-3 Box-Plot Graphic – Subdimensions of major collaborative behavioural variables 
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6.2.3.2 Descriptive Statistics – Opportunistic Behavioural Variables 
The opportunistic behaviour data for the first 11 cases from the initial pretest were 
excluded from the final analysis due to an amendment in the original (11 point) scale.  
Thus, while collaborative behaviours are measured across all 100 cases (200 relationships), 
the opportunistic behaviours were measured across the remaining 89 cases (178 
relationships). The opportunistic behaviours were measured on the new 15 point scale 
ranging from -4 = ‘No threat’, through to 10 = ‘Always’.  The opportunistic behaviours 
were conceptualised along four major dimensions, and the distribution of each variable is 
described in Table 6-10 and Figure 6-4.   
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Table 6-10 Descriptive statistics – Major opportunistic behavioural variables 
Descriptive Statistics
178 -4.00 6.67 -1.4740 2.17449
178 -4.00 8.33 -1.3932 2.36831
178 -4.00 5.00 -2.2997 1.76650
178 -4.00 2.25 -3.0506 1.07828
178 -4.00 5.19 -2.0543 1.58394
178
Social Opportunism
Commercial Opportunism
Unconscionable Opportunism
Illegal Opportunism
Opportunism (Current All)
Valid N (listwise)
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
 
 
Figure 6-4 Box-Plot Graphic – Major opportunistic behavioural variables  
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6.2.4 Strategic Behaviour Index 
The Strategic Behaviour variables of external market forces and internal firm forces were 
operationalised with five questions that were asked directly in relation to the buyer-
supplier dyad under consideration.  The responses were captured on a five point semantic 
difference scale (1 = ‘strongly agree’ with ‘A’, 3 = ‘neutral’, and 5 = ‘strongly agree’ with 
‘B’).  The descriptive results of these questions are shown in Table 6-11. 
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Table 6-11 Descriptive statistics – Strategic behaviour variables   
Descriptive Statistics
200 1.00 5.00 2.6400 1.21977
200 1.00 5.00 3.2550 1.31477
200 1.00 5.00 2.7200 1.43594
200 1.00 5.00 2.9950 1.28969
200 1.00 5.00 3.4800 1.39619
200
Firm Buying Culture (1 = cost savings, 5 = relational)
Purching Requirements (1 = small , 5 = large)
Product Type (1 = commodity, 5 = complex)
Number of Potential Suppliers (1 = many, 5 = few)
Current Relationship (1 = contract, 5 = open understanding)
Valid N (listwise)
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
 
These five questions were combined to produce an index of relative strategic behaviour 
‘power’ in the relationship.  Literature clearly shows that those firms with greater relative 
power or influence in the relationship are more likely to act unilaterally and change the 
relationship behaviour according to their will (Cox, 2001; Hollingsworth, 2004; Hunt and 
Nevin, 1974; Provan and Skinner, 1989).  The statistics of the Strategic Behaviour Index 
(SBI) are shown in Table 6-12.  As the mean was just over the mid point ( SBIX  = 3.018), it 
was decided to allocate cases with and index of 3.0 and below as having low power, and 
those above 3.0 as having high power.  This was then recoded into a new SBI categorical 
variable.  This categorisation showed that 57% of the relationships demonstrated low 
power, whilst 43% of the relationships were characterised by high power.        
Table 6-12 Strategic Behaviour Index: Relative power in the relationships  
( ≤  3 = Low Power, > 3.1 = High Power ) 
Descriptive Statistics
200 1.40 5.00 3.0180 .76354
200
Strategic Behaviour Index / Power
Valid N (listwise)
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
 
This section of the chapter has provided the sample demographics, described the 
differences between transactional and partnership relationships, and also the descriptive 
statistics of the major behavioural variables of collaboration, opportunism and the strategic 
behaviour index.  Next, this research embarks on the hypotheses testing section of the 
analysis phase.  
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6.3 Hypotheses Testing 
6.3.1 Main Research Hypotheses  
6.3.1.1 Hypothesis H1a 
The research model suggests that supply chain relationships change in response to the 
operation of opportunistic and collaborative behaviours.  A major factor in determining the 
course of a relationship is the degree of collaborative or opportunistic behaviours 
demonstrated.  Hence, the enactment of either opportunistic or collaborative behaviours 
has the ability to change the nature of the relationship.  Therefore,     
H1a: Supply chain relationships may change in response to both collaborative and 
opportunistic behaviours. 
The first two hypotheses (H1a-b) were tested within the framework of the General Linear 
Model (GLM) by combining all of the behavioural variables into a large linear model and 
applying a one-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) to see if there is any systematic 
variance in the data.  The fixed factors were the differences between transactional and 
partnership relationships over a range of variables.  The dependent variables were the eight 
sub-dimensions of collaborative behaviour, and also the four dimensions of opportunistic 
behaviour.  Hypothesis H1a was tested by examining the overall model for its goodness-of-
fit.  The GLM provides four multivariate tests of goodness-of-fit for each effect within the 
model, these are the Pillai’s trace, Wilk’s Lambda, Hotelling’s Trace, Roy’s Largest Root.  
These statistics pool the variance from all the dimensions to create the test statistic.  There 
is general agreement that Pillai’s trace and Wilk’s Lambda provide the greatest power and 
are most immune from violations of the base assumptions (Hair et al., 1998).  Where there 
are only two levels in the model all the test statistics should be the same, as is the case for 
this research (i.e. two different types of relationships).  The following Table 6-13 shows 
the goodness-of–fit test statistics for the overall model. 
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Table 6-13 General Linear Model (GLM) – Goodness-of-fit statistics 
Multivariate Testsb
.980 679.424a 12.000 165.000 .000
.020 679.424a 12.000 165.000 .000
49.413 679.424a 12.000 165.000 .000
49.413 679.424a 12.000 165.000 .000
.410 9.574a 12.000 165.000 .000c
.590 9.574a 12.000 165.000 .000c
.696 9.574a 12.000 165.000 .000c
.696 9.574a 12.000 165.000 .000c
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
Effect
Intercept
TorP
Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig.
Exact statistica. 
Design: Intercept+TorPb. 
Significant at the p < .01 level.c. 
 
6.3.1.1.1 Results: H1a  
The results show support for Hypothesis H1a.  The goodness-of-fit statistics are all 
significant at the p < .01 (df 12, 165) level showing good support for the overall model fit, 
and thus confirming the hypothesis that relationships change due to enacted behaviours 
within the dyad.  None of the correlations from the inter-item correlation matrix exceeded 
the threshold level of 0.8, thus indicating that multicollinearity was not an issue in the data 
(Hair et al., 1998).      
6.3.1.2 Hypothesis H1b 
Given the level of support for the overall model, the next step is to determine if there is a 
difference in the behaviours demonstrated in the two major relationship levels 
(transactional and partnership).  It is hypothesised that because exchange relationships take 
various forms, it is reasonable to expect that each relationship will display different levels 
of enacted behaviour, thus, 
H1b: Transactional relationships can be differentiated from partnership relationships by 
the different levels of behaviour found in each. 
Continuing on from the GLM, this hypothesis was tested by examining the between-group 
behavioural dimensions of the ANOVA table, as determining whether two or more groups 
of observations differ in location is a common task in data analysis.  Generally, with the 
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one-way ANOVA approach, the task is reduced to testing whether two or more group 
means are equal, and tests for the equivalency of all the means between two groups.  
Hence, the overall test looks above and beyond the grand mean (intercept and location) and 
compares the grand mean model (intercept only model) to the full model.  The ANOVA 
uses the F distribution as this probability distribution of sample variances changes with the 
sample size.  As there were only two groups tested, a post hoc analysis (such as the 
Scheffe’s and Tukey’s tests) that would normally examine the variation between three or 
more groups was not required in this situation.  The SPSS output for the ANOVA test for 
H1b is shown below at Table 6-14.    
Table 6-14 ANOVA test of the differences in collaborative and opportunistic behaviours across 
transactional and partnership relationships             
ANOVA
346.687 1 346.687 78.137 .000a
878.509 198 4.437
1225.196 199
375.435 1 375.435 89.425 .000a
831.272 198 4.198
1206.707 199
335.405 1 335.405 66.837 .000a
993.614 198 5.018
1329.019 199
310.977 1 310.977 61.668 .000a
998.463 198 5.043
1309.440 199
566.700 1 566.700 78.262 .000a
1433.734 198 7.241
2000.433 199
433.121 1 433.121 81.145 .000a
1056.852 198 5.338
1489.974 199
106.624 1 106.624 34.606 .000a
610.046 198 3.081
716.669 199
40.051 1 40.051 18.555 .000a
427.397 198 2.159
467.449 199
28.296 1 28.296 6.159 .014b
808.630 176 4.594
836.926 177
4.833 1 4.833 .861 .355
987.944 176 5.613
992.777 177
3.071 1 3.071 .984 .323
549.264 176 3.121
552.335 177
1.264 1 1.264 1.088 .298
204.531 176 1.162
205.795 177
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Communication
Information Sharing
Conflict Resolution
Goal Congruence
Relationship Specific
Investments
Shared Risks and
Rewards
Trust and Commitment
Social and Relational
Norms
Social Opportunism
Commercial Opportunism
Unconscionable
Opportunism
Illegal Opportunism
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Significant at the p < .01 level.a. 
Significant at the p < .05 level.b. 
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6.3.1.2.1 Results: H1b  
The tests show only partial support for hypothesis H1b, yet do clearly reveal a difference 
across the two major relationships by behaviour.  They show that all the collaborative 
behaviours are highly significant at the p < .01 level, whilst Social Opportunism (p = .014, 
F = 6.159) is the only opportunistic behaviour that can be distinguished between the types 
of relationships at the p < .05 level.  The remaining three opportunistic behaviours cannot 
be distinguished between transactional and partnership relationships. 
Further, the ANOVA table establishes not only that there are differences in the between-
group relationships, but that there are also differences in the within-group relationships.  
This shows that amongst themselves each behaviour is quite distinct, i.e. that each 
behaviour is significantly different from the other thus supporting the discriminant validity 
of the variables.  However, there were some concerns with the assumption testing, in 
particular the Levene’s test for homogeneity of variance.  As a consequence, further post 
hoc tests were conducted47 and established that any violation to this assumption did not 
have a material effect on the results, thus allowing the continuation of the hypotheses 
testing.      
6.3.1.3 Hypothesis H2 
The second main hypothesis states that the higher level partnership relationship will 
display higher levels of collaborative and lower levels of opportunistic behaviours than the 
lower level transactional relationship.  Conversely, transactional relationships will display 
higher levels of opportunistic and lower levels of collaborative behaviours than partnership 
relationships, therefore, 
H2: Partnership relationships may display more collaborative behaviours and less 
opportunistic behaviours than transactional relationships.  
This hypothesis was tested using pairwise comparisons of the GLM.  Here the model 
compares (in direction; I-J or partnership less transactional) the estimated marginal means 
of transactional versus partnership relationship in pairs for every supply chain behaviour.  
                                                 
47
 For details on the post hoc testing to validate the ANOVA assumptions, see Appendix 10. 
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Table 6-15 Pairwise comparisons from the GLM showing the means for each behaviour relative to 
its relationship type and significance testing  
 
Pairwise Comparisons
2.625 .317 .000b 2.001 3.250
2.693 .314 .000b 2.073 3.313
2.633 .340 .000b 1.962 3.304
2.506 .343 .000b 1.829 3.183
3.472 .403 .000b 2.677 4.266
3.030 .348 .000b 2.343 3.717
1.499 .265 .000b .976 2.021
.921 .222 .000b .483 1.360
-.797 .321 .014c -1.432 -.163
-.330 .355 .355 -1.030 .371
-.263 .265 .323 -.785 .260
-.169 .162 .298 -.487 .150
(J) Transactional
Transactional
Transactional
Transactional
Transactional
Transactional
Transactional
Transactional
Transactional
Transactional
Transactional
Transactional
Transactional
(I) Partnership
Partnership
Partnership
Partnership
Partnership
Partnership
Partnership
Partnership
Partnership
Partnership
Partnership
Partnership
Partnership
Dependent Variable
Communication
Information Sharing
Conflict Resolution
Goal Congruence
Relationship Specific Investments
Shared Risks and Rewards
Trust and Commitment
Social and Relational Norms
Social Opportunism
Commercial Opportunism
Unconscionable Opportunism
Illegal Opportunism
Mean
Difference
(I-J) Std. Error Sig.a Lower Bound Upper Bound
95% Confidence Interval for
Differencea
Based on estimated marginal means
Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Least Significant Difference (equivalent to no adjustments).a. 
Significant at the p < .01 level.b. 
Significant at the p < .05 level.c. 
 
6.3.1.3.1 Results: H2  
The tests for H2 shows support for the hypothesis, although the results for the opportunistic 
behaviours are mixed.  The pairwise comparisons show that the means for collaborative 
behaviours in partnership relationships are all significantly higher (at the p < .001 level) 
than the same behaviours in transactional relationships.  This shows that for collaborative 
behaviours at least, partnerships relationships demonstrate significantly higher levels of all 
the collaborative behaviours than do transactional relationships, thus supporting the 
hypothesis. 
However, for opportunistic behaviours, only one of the pairs (Social Opportunism) shows 
significant support (at the p < .05 level), while the remaining three behaviours are not 
significant.  Yet, the mean differences of all four opportunistic behaviours are in the 
hypothesised direction where partnership relationships show less opportunistic behaviours 
than do transactional relationships, providing further support for the hypothesised 
relationships among the variables.  While 9 out of the 12 pairs show significant support, 
three of the pairs do not, giving a mixed result.  Nevertheless, all of the mean differences 
are in the hypothesised direction, for collaborative behaviours: pX  > tX , and for 
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opportunistic behaviours pX  < tX , providing further support for the hypothesis.  However, 
H2 will be reported as a partially supported result to be conservative.  
6.3.2 Zone of Tolerance Hypotheses  
6.3.2.1 Hypotheses H3 a-d 
Generally, supply chain relationships do not react or change with every perturbation in the 
relationship equilibrium.  In order to maintain effective inter-firm relationships, there must 
exist a level of (either deliberate or passive) tolerance that is forgiving of another’s 
negative behaviours, or accepting of another’s positive behaviours before a change occurs.  
This area or zone of tolerance (ZOT) should be different from the current relationship 
equilibrium.  In effect, increases of collaborative behaviours and decreases of opportunistic 
behaviours should promote the relationships, while the opposite should also be true.  As a 
result, we would expect to find that for each behaviour the upper and lower ZOTs are 
different to the relationship equilibrium.  Hence for the upper ZOT, 
H3a: For transactional relationships, the upper ZOT for increases in collaborative 
behaviours is different to the current relationship equilibrium for the same 
behaviour, or 
( 1 2) ( 1 2) 0A D A DTCc TCi− −− ≠        Equation 6-1 
 
H3b: For transactional relationships, the upper ZOT for increases in opportunistic 
behaviours is different to the current relationship equilibrium for the same 
behaviour, or  
( ) ( ) 0E H E HTOc TOi− −− ≠        Equation 6-2 
 
Conversely, for the lower ZOT, 
H3c: For transactional relationships, the lower ZOT for decreases in collaborative 
behaviours is different to the current relationship equilibrium for the same 
behaviour, or 
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( 1 2) ( 1 2) 0A D A DTCc TCd− −− ≠        Equation 6-3 
 
H3d: For transactional relationships, the lower ZOT for decreases in opportunistic 
behaviours is different to the current relationship equilibrium for the same 
behaviour, or 
( ) ( ) 0E H E HTOc TOd− −− ≠        Equation 6-4 
 
Where: 
 
TC   = transactional partnerships, collaborative behaviours 
TO   = transactional partnerships, opportunistic behaviours 
c   = current relationship equilibrium 
i  = increased (upper ZOT) behavioural performance 
d  = decreased (lower ZOT) behavioural performance 
( 1 2)A D−  = research collaborative variables (x 8) 
( )E H−  = research opportunistic variables (x 4) 
 
 
For these hypotheses, the necessary data as to bidirectional relational movement was 
gathered for the transactional relationship only, thus only the transactional relationship will 
be tested.  Hypotheses H3a-d was tested using paired samples t tests which examined the 
potential behavioural increases or decreases against the current level of behaviour reported 
in the relationship (the equilibrium).  The paired samples represent each behaviour, as well 
as the respondent’s perceptions of any potential increase or decrease from the current 
levels that could initiate a relationship bifurcation.  This explores the upper and lower 
tolerance levels of the supply chain relationship to see if they are statistically different 
from the current relationship equilibrium.  The more conservative two-tailed t test was 
used as the expected directions of the relationships were not hypothesised.  In these tests it 
would be expected that the difference between the behavioural increase and decreases 
should be distinct from the current levels.  The results of the pairwise t tests are shown in 
Tables 6-16 to 6-19 that follow. 
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Table 6-16 Paired samples t tests – Collaborative behaviours, current relationship equilibrium minus 
the upper ZOT (H3a) 
Paired Samples Test
-2.57650 1.92728 .19273 -2.95891 -2.19409 -13.369 99 .000
a
-3.04370 2.07188 .20719 -3.45481 -2.63259 -14.691 99 .000
a
-2.49970 2.10540 .21054 -2.91746 -2.08194 -11.873 99 .000
a
-2.66060 2.14638 .21464 -3.08649 -2.23471 -12.396 99 .000
a
-3.38350 2.34531 .23453 -3.84886 -2.91814 -14.427 99 .000
a
-2.98610 2.18251 .21825 -3.41916 -2.55304 -13.682 99 .000
a
-1.96670 1.66098 .16610 -2.29627 -1.63713 -11.841 99 .000
a
-1.23000 1.16433 .11643 -1.46103 -.99897 -10.564 99 .000
a
Communication - Communication
(upper ZOT)
Pair 1
Information Sharing - Information
Sharing (upper ZOT)
Pair 2
Conflict Resolution - Conflict
Resolution (upper ZOT)
Pair 3
Goal Congruence - Goal Congruence
(upper ZOT)
Pair 4
Relationship Specific Investments -
Relationship Specific Investemnts
(upper ZOT)
Pair 5
Shared Risks and Rewards - Shared
Risks and Rewards (upper ZOT)
Pair 6
Trust and Commitment - Trust and
Commitment (upper ZOT)
Pair 7
Social and Relational Norms - Social
and Relational Norms (upper ZOT)
Pair 8
Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error
Mean Lower Upper
95% Confidence
Interval of the Difference
Paired Differences
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Significant at the p < .01 level.a. 
 
Table 6-17 Paired samples t tests – Opportunistic behaviours, current relationship equilibrium 
minus the upper ZOT (H3b) 
Paired Samples Test
-2.19528 2.06392 .21877 -2.63005 -1.76051 -10.034 88 .000a
-2.62899 1.67337 .17738 -2.98149 -2.27649 -14.821 88 .000
a
-2.51247 1.77630 .18829 -2.88665 -2.13829 -13.344 88 .000
a
-2.30899 1.52257 .16139 -2.62972 -1.98826 -14.307 88 .000a
Social Opportunism - Social Opportunism (upper ZOT)Pair 1
Commercial Opportunism - Commercial Opportunism
(upper ZOT)
Pair 2
Unconscionable Opportunism - Unconscionable
Opportunism (upper ZOT)
Pair 3
Illegal Opportunism - Illegal Opportunism (upper ZOT)Pair 4
Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error
Mean Lower Upper
95% Confidence
Interval of the Difference
Paired Differences
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Significant at the p < .01 level.a. 
 
Table 6-18 Paired samples t tests – Collaborative behaviours, current relationship equilibrium minus 
the lower ZOT (H3c) 
Paired Samples Test
1.70380 1.11228 .11123 1.48310 1.92450 15.318 99 .000a
1.47300 1.07726 .10773 1.25925 1.68675 13.674 99 .000
a
1.71020 1.28257 .12826 1.45571 1.96469 13.334 99 .000
a
1.64680 1.07486 .10749 1.43352 1.86008 15.321 99 .000
a
1.03690 1.08823 .10882 .82097 1.25283 9.528 99 .000
a
1.42710 1.24062 .12406 1.18093 1.67327 11.503 99 .000
a
1.96370 1.29292 .12929 1.70716 2.22024 15.188 99 .000
a
2.46000 1.59810 .15981 2.14290 2.77710 15.393 99 .000
a
Communication - Communication (lower ZOT)Pair 1
Information Sharing - Information Sharing
(lower ZOT)
Pair 2
Conflict Resolution - Conflict Resolution (lower
ZOT)
Pair 3
Goal Congruence - Goal Congruence (lower
ZOT)
Pair 4
Relationship Specific Investments -
Relationship Specific Investemnts (lower ZOT)
Pair 5
Shared Risks and Rewards - Shared Risks
and Rewards (lower ZOT)
Pair 6
Trust and Commitment - Trust and
Commitment (lower ZOT)
Pair 7
Social and Relational Norms - Social and
Relational Norms (lower ZOT)
Pair 8
Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error
Mean Lower Upper
95% Confidence
Interval of the Difference
Paired Differences
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Significant at the p < .01 level.a. 
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Table 6-19 Paired samples t tests – Opportunistic behaviours, current relationship equilibrium 
minus the lower ZOT (H3d) 
Paired Samples Test
2.21000 1.87828 .19910 1.81434 2.60566 11.100 88 .000
a
1.91798 1.48763 .15769 1.60461 2.23135 12.163 88 .000
a
1.41596 1.44425 .15309 1.11172 1.72019 9.249 88 .000
a
.89326 .88780 .09411 .70624 1.08028 9.492 88 .000
a
Social Opportunism - Social Opportunism
(lower ZOT)
Pair 1
Commercial Opportunism - Commercial
Opportunism (lower ZOT)
Pair 2
Unconscionable Opportunism -
Unconscionable Opportunism (lower ZOT)
Pair 3
Illegal Opportunism - Illegal Opportunism
(lower ZOT)
Pair 4
Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error
Mean Lower Upper
95% Confidence
Interval of the Difference
Paired Differences
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Significant at the p < .01 level.a. 
 
6.3.2.1.1 Results: H3a-d  
These tests show strong support for hypotheses H3a, H3b, H3c and H3d.  The results of the 
paired sample t tests show that all pairs are highly significant (at the p < .001 level).  The 
tables show that all of the confidence intervals do not contain a zero, thus providing a 
validation of the significance testing.  Also of note, is that all the correlation coefficients 
are also highly significant (at the p < .001 level), as should be expected from tests over 
time using the same sample (see Appendix A11 for the full tables). 
Thus, there is clearly a difference between the current relationship equilibrium means, and 
the means of the points where relationship levels change for better or worse.  The gap 
between these means, otherwise known as the area between the equilibrium and the point 
of change or bifurcation, is called in this research the zone of tolerance (ZOT).  The data 
clearly supports the existence of this ZOT, both above and below the equilibrium point for 
both collaborative and opportunistic behaviours in the transactional relationship.    
6.3.2.2 Hypotheses H4 and H5 
The next hypotheses tests the sensitivity of the relationship to increases and decreases of 
the enacted behaviour.  Hypothesis H5 postulates that for collaborative behaviours the 
relationship would be more sensitive (smaller ZOT) to decreases of the behaviour than it 
would to increases (larger ZOT) of the same behaviour before reaching the ZOT limit and 
bifurcating, thus,    
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H4: For transactional relationships, the ZOT for any increase in a collaborative 
behaviour will be equal to or larger (less sensitive) than the ZOT for any decrease of 
the same collaborative behaviour, or  
( 1 2) ( 1 2)A D A DTZCi TZCd− −≥        Equation 6-5 
Where: 
TZC   = transactional relationships / zone of tolerance (increase – current) / collaborative behaviours 
Conversely in hypothesis H5, the reverse should also be true of opportunistic behaviours, 
where the relationship should be more sensitive (smaller ZOT) to increases of the 
behaviour than to decrease (larger ZOT) of the same behaviour, therefore, 
H5: For transactional relationships, the ZOT for any increases in an opportunistic 
behaviour will be equal to or smaller (more sensitive) than the ZOT for an decrease 
of the same opportunistic behaviour, or 
( ) ( )E H E HTZOd TZOi− −≥        Equation 6-6 
Where: 
TZO   = transactional relationships / zone of tolerance, (current – decrease) / opportunistic behaviours 
Again, the two hypotheses were tested using the paired sample t tests.  Here the ZOT 
means were calculated in new variables for the upper and the lower zones for each of the 
behaviours.  The upper and lower ZOT variables were then compared to see if they were 
different to determine sensitivity.     
6.3.2.2.1 Results: H4 and H5 
The results of the hypotheses testing shows mixed results for H4, while no support for H5.  
For H4, the means for the upper ZOT should be larger than the means for the lower ZOT, 
thus showing a greater tolerance to increases in collaborative behaviours.  Tables 6-20 and 
6-21 below should be read together and show that for collaborative behaviours (A1 – D2) 
pairs one to seven all reflect this phenomenon, although pair seven is not significantly 
different (p = .991, t statistic = 0.011).  In fact, for this pair (D1 – ‘trust and commitment’) 
both the ZOTs are of almost identical size, yet still in the expected direction.  Further, 
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while pair eight is also significantly different (p = .01, t statistic = -5.693) the negative t 
statistic shows that the relationship is the inverse of what was hypothesised.  For this 
behaviour (D2 – ‘social and relational norms’), the lower ZOT is larger (less sensitive), 
than the upper ZOT, thus showing that increases of this behaviour would be noted before 
any reduction of this behaviour.  Thus, while the H4 results are mixed, the majority of the 
hypothesised relationships are displayed in the data leading to the partial support of this 
hypothesis.                
Table 6-20 Paired sample statistics – Upper and lower ZOT for collaborative behaviours 
Paired Samples Statistics
2.5766 100 1.92742 .19274
1.7033 100 1.11181 .11118
3.0432 100 2.07151 .20715
1.4733 100 1.07703 .10770
2.4999 100 2.10582 .21058
1.7098 100 1.28224 .12822
2.6601 100 2.14647 .21465
1.6464 100 1.07535 .10754
3.3836 100 2.34524 .23452
1.0363 100 1.08871 .10887
2.9869 100 2.18255 .21825
1.4263 100 1.23989 .12399
1.9664 100 1.66089 .16609
1.9638 100 1.29206 .12921
1.2300 100 1.16433 .11643
2.4600 100 1.59810 .15981
Upper ZOT A1
Lower ZOT A1
Pair 1
Upper ZOT A2
Lower ZOT A2
Pair 2
Upper ZOT B1
Lower ZOT B1
Pair 3
Upper ZOT B2
Lower ZOT B2
Pair 4
Upper ZOT C1
Lower ZOT C1
Pair 5
Upper ZOT C2
Lower ZOT C2
Pair 6
Upper ZOT D1
Lower ZOT D1
Pair 7
Upper ZOT D2
Lower ZOT D2
Pair 8
Mean N Std. Deviation
Std. Error
Mean
 
Table 6-21 Paired samples t tests – Upper and lower ZOT for collaborative behaviours 
Paired Samples Test
.87330 2.49993 .24999 .37726 1.36934 3.493 99 .001
a
1.56990 2.65866 .26587 1.04236 2.09744 5.905 99 .000
a
.79010 2.86413 .28641 .22179 1.35841 2.759 99 .001
a
1.01370 2.78480 .27848 .46114 1.56626 3.640 99 .000
a
2.34730 2.88525 .28852 1.77480 2.91980 8.136 99 .000
a
1.56060 2.94762 .29476 .97573 2.14547 5.294 99 .000
a
.00260 2.36623 .23662 -.46691 .47211 .011 99 .991
-1.23000 2.16074 .21607 -1.65874 -.80126 -5.693 99 .000
a
Upper ZOT A1 -
Lower ZOT A1
Pair 1
Upper ZOT A2 -
Lower ZOT A2
Pair 2
Upper ZOT B1 -
Lower ZOT B1
Pair 3
Upper ZOT B2 -
Lower ZOT B2
Pair 4
Upper ZOT C1 -
Lower ZOT C1
Pair 5
Upper ZOT C2 -
Lower ZOT C2
Pair 6
Upper ZOT D1 -
Lower ZOT D1
Pair 7
Upper ZOT D2 -
Lower ZOT D2
Pair 8
Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error
Mean Lower Upper
95% Confidence
Interval of the Difference
Paired Differences
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Significant at the p < .01 level.a. 
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For H5, the results are also mixed, but largely do not support the hypothesised relationships 
(see Tables 6-22 and 6-23 below).  Only the ZOT means of first pair (E – social 
opportunism) reflect the hypothesised direction where the ZOT for increases of 
opportunistic behaviours should be smaller (more sensitive) than any decreases, yet the 
differences are not significant (p = .968, t statistic = -.040) as the ZOTs are of almost equal 
size.  Further, the other three opportunistic behaviours (pairs 2 to 4) unusually show more 
tolerance toward increases of each behaviour rather than decreases.  All three ZOTs are 
statically significant (p < .05 or more), yet in the opposite direction.  The reason for this 
anomalous behaviour is the end loading of the lower ZOT scale and will be discussed in 
detail in the next chapter 
Table 6-22 Paired sample statistics – Upper and lower ZOT for opportunistic behaviours 
Paired Samples Statistics
2.1948 89 2.06431 .21882
2.2099 89 1.87884 .19916
2.6285 89 1.67291 .17733
1.9174 89 1.48838 .15777
2.5130 89 1.77630 .18829
1.4160 89 1.44467 .15313
2.3090 89 1.52257 .16139
.8933 89 .88780 .09411
Upper ZOT Social Opportunism
Lower ZOT Social Opportunism
Pair 1
Upper ZOT Commercial Opportunism
Lower ZOT Commercial Opportunism
Pair 2
Upper ZOT Unconscionable Opportunism
Lower ZOT Unconscionable Opportunism
Pair 3
Upper ZOT Illegal Opportunism
Lower ZOT Illegal Opportunism
Pair 4
Mean N Std. Deviation
Std. Error
Mean
 
Table 6-23 Paired samples t tests – Upper and lower ZOT for opportunistic behaviours 
Paired Samples Test
-.01506 3.51769 .37287 -.75607 .72595 -.040 88 .968
.71112 2.61090 .27675 .16113 1.26111 2.570 88 .012
b
1.09708 2.65666 .28161 .53745 1.65671 3.896 88 .000
a
1.41573 1.88593 .19991 1.01845 1.81301 7.082 88 .000
a
Upper ZOT Social Opportunism - Lower ZOT
Social Opportunism
Pair 1
Upper ZOT Commercial Opportunism -
Lower ZOT Commercial Opportunism
Pair 2
Upper ZOT Unconscionable Opportunism -
Lower ZOT Unconscionable Opportunism
Pair 3
Upper ZOT Illegal Opportunism - Lower ZOT
Illegal Opportunism
Pair 4
Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error
Mean Lower Upper
95% Confidence
Interval of the Difference
Paired Differences
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Significant at the p < .01 level.a. 
Significant at the p < .05 level.b. 
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6.3.3 Bifurcation Hypotheses 
Not all supply chain relationship stay within their ZOT.  Periodically, some relationships 
breach their ZOT and initiate a bifurcation, thus changing their relationship levels.  The 
following hypotheses will examine this theory.         
6.3.3.1 Hypotheses H6a-b 
One of the aspects of complexity in inter-organisational relationships is the unknown 
interaction of the ZOTs in relation to the relationship equilibrium.  When relationships 
self-organise post a bifurcation, the new direction will be predicated to some measure on 
the artefacts remaining from the past relationship.  Simultaneously, the actor’s perceptions 
and their ZOTs will also be dynamically updated according to what has just transpired (see 
the 'perceptions' argument in services quality, Cronin and Taylor, 1994).  Therefore, the 
relationship equilibria and the ZOTs should be theoretically related in some manner.  For 
this theory we can deduce that if the upper ZOT (A) for a specific behaviour increases, it 
follows then that the corresponding lower ZOT (B) for the same behaviour should 
decrease, updating the ZOTs and relationship equilibrium dynamically.  This leads to the 
following hypotheses, 
H6a: As the upper ZOT for a collaborative behaviour changes, the lower ZOT for the same 
behaviour moves in the opposite direction, leading to a negative correlation between 
the upper and lower ZOTs for each collaborative behaviour. 
H6b: As the upper ZOT for an opportunistic behaviour changes, the lower ZOT for the 
same behaviour moves in the opposite direction, leading to a negative correlation 
between the upper and lower ZOTs for each opportunistic behaviour. 
6.3.3.1.1 Results: H6a-b 
Both hypotheses H6a and H6b were supported.  To conduct this test, bivariate correlations 
were used to investigate the strength of the linear relationships between the ZOTs for both 
the upper and lower zones and equilibrium for each behaviour.  Again, only the 
transactional relationship was used as this was the only relationship where the upper and 
lower zones were fully measured.   
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The Pearson’s product moment correlation coefficient was used as this shows the 
significant values and number of cases that were used to test the strength of the association 
and directions of the relationship between the upper and lower ZOTs for both collaborative 
and opportunistic behaviours.  As the direction of the test was hypothesised, a one-tailed 
test was specified for the correlation matrices.  The Pearson’s correlation coefficient matrix 
for hypothesis H6a (the ZOT for each collaborative behaviour) is shown in the grey 
diagonal line of cells at Table 6-24.     
Table 6-24 Pearson’s correlation coefficient matrix – Upper and lower ZOTs for collaborative 
behaviours 
Correlations
-.303 -.118 -.128 -.033 -.018 -.014 -.063 .077
.001a .122 .103 .372 .431 .444 .267 .225
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
-.106 -.362 -.118 -.051 -.153 .008 -.234 .021
.147 .000a .121 .307 .064 .469 .010 .417
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
.056 -.092 -.393 -.087 -.086 -.178 -.167 -.025
.290 .180 .000a .194 .197 .038 .049 .403
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
-.254 -.231 -.229 -.431 -.142 -.225 -.272 .013
.005 .010 .011 .000a .079 .012 .003 .449
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
-.211 -.124 -.288 -.106 -.321 -.331 -.148 .019
.018 .109 .002 .147 .001a .000 .071 .427
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
-.122 -.050 -.179 -.104 -.071 -.441 -.183 -.141
.113 .311 .038 .152 .241 .000a .034 .081
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
.030 -.089 .050 .011 -.015 .029 -.273 -.014
.383 .189 .310 .457 .440 .386 .003a .444
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
.264 .013 .184 .211 .085 .155 .002 -.204
.004 .448 .034 .018 .201 .062 .492 .021b
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (1-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (1-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (1-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (1-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (1-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (1-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (1-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (1-tailed)
N
Lower ZOT A1
Lower ZOT A2
Lower ZOT B1
Lower ZOT B2
Lower ZOT C1
Lower ZOT C2
Lower ZOT D1
Lower ZOT D2
Upper ZOT A1 Upper ZOT A2 Upper ZOT B1 Upper ZOT B2 Upper ZOT C1 Upper ZOT C2 Upper ZOT D1 Upper ZOT D2
Correlation is significant at the p < .01 level (1-tailed).a. 
Correlation is significant at the p < .05 level (1-tailed).b. 
 
As these tests only examine the upper and lower ZOT of each behaviour (collaborative A1 
– D2, and opportunistic behaviours), it is beyond the scope of this current research to 
examine the ZOTs of the non-related behaviours.  The correlations of interest are all 
significant at the p < .01 level with the exception of the ZOT for D2 (social and relational 
norms) that is significant at the p < .05 level.  Further, all the correlations are in the 
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hypothesised direction and range from -.204 to -.441 in strength.  This provides empirical 
support for hypothesis H6a.   
The next table (Table 6-25) will examine the correlations for the ZOTs for opportunistic 
behaviours as hypothesised in H6b. 
Table 6-25 Pearson’s correlation coefficient matrix – Upper and lower ZOTs for opportunistic 
behaviours 
Correlations
-.591 -.241 -.137 -.153
.000a .011 .101 .077
89 89 89 89
-.510 -.362 -.196 -.220
.000 .000a .033 .019
89 89 89 89
-.262 -.254 -.354 -.132
.007 .008 .000a .109
89 89 89 89
-.215 -.239 -.093 -.167
.022 .012 .193 .059b
89 89 89 89
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (1-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (1-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (1-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (1-tailed)
N
Lower ZOT Social
Opportunism
Lower ZOT Commercial
Opportunism
Lower ZOT Unconscionable
Opportunism
Lower ZOT Illegal
Opportunism
Upper ZOT
Social
Opportunism
Upper ZOT
Commercial
Opportunism
Upper ZOT
Unconscionable
Opportunism
Upper ZOT
Illegal
Opportunism
Correlation is significant at the p < .01 level (1-tailed).a. 
Correlation is significant at the p < 0.1 level (1-tailed).b. 
 
Again, for H6b, the correlation coefficient matrix above shows the correlations of interest in 
the shaded cells.  All the correlations are significant, with three being highly significant at 
the p < .001 level, and one being significant at the p < 0.1 level.  The strength of the linear 
associations range from -.167 to -.591, and are all in the hypothesised direction.  This 
provides empirical support for hypothesis H6b.  Of note in both these inter-item correlation 
matrixes was that none of the correlations exceeded the threshold level of 0.8, again further 
attenuating against multicollinearity (Hair et al., 1998).    
6.3.3.2 Hypotheses H7a-b 
These two hypotheses state that supply chain relationships rely heavily on the levels of 
trust and commitment and also social and relational norms that are built during the 
operation of the exchange.  In this research, these two sub-dimensions are captured in the 
construct of Relational Commitment, and the lower level ‘transactional’ relationship was 
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used for the testing.  It follows then that supply chain relationships are more sensitive 
(smaller ZOT) to increases in relational commitment behaviours (H7a) than the other three 
main collaborative behaviours.  In other words, the relational commitment variable would 
be the one that most likely bifurcates upwards to a higher level relationship.  Subsequently, 
for the remaining three behaviours (H7b), active disclosure behaviours will be more 
important than common objectives, and also joint risk taking behaviours, thus; 
H7a: For transactional relationships, the ZOT for Relational Commitment (D1-D2) is 
smaller or equal to (more sensitive) than that of the other three collaborative 
behaviours, or 
( 1 2) ( 1 2),( 1 2),( 1 2)D D A A B B C CTZCi TZCi− − − −≤      Equation 6-7 
 
H7b: For transactional relationships, the ZOT for Active Disclosure is smaller or equal to 
(more sensitive) than both Common Objectives (B1-B2) and Joint Risk Taking 
behaviours (C1-C2), or 
( 1 2) ( 1 2),( 1 2)A A B B C CTZCi TZCi− − −≤       Equation 6-8 
 
Where: 
 
TZC   = transactional relationships / zone of tolerance, (current – decrease) / collaborative behaviours 
i  = increased (upper ZOT) behavioural performance 
( 1 2)A A−  = collaborative variable Active Disclosure 
( 1 2)B B−  = collaborative variable Common Objectives 
( 1 2)C C−  = collaborative variable Joint Risk Taking 
( 1 2)D D−  = collaborative variable Relational Commitment 
6.3.3.2.1 Results: H7a-b 
Hypothesis H7a is supported and was tested using a paired sample t tests.  The following 
two Tables 6-26 and 6-27 show that the mean for the variable Relational Commitment is 
smaller ( ( 1 2)D DX −  = 1.5982), that the other behaviours of Active Disclosure ( ( 1 2)A AX −  = 
2.8099), Common Objectives ( ( 1 2)B BX −  = 2.5800), and Joint Risk Taking ( ( 1 2)C CX −  = 
3.1852).  Also, the paired sample t tests are all highly significantly different (at the p < 
.001 level).  These results indicate that the ZOT for Relational Commitment is smaller than 
the other three major collaborative behaviours, and thus supply chain relationships are 
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more sensitive to this behaviour, meaning that it is more likely to trigger a bifurcation 
towards a higher level partnership relationship.  
Table 6-26 Paired sample statistics – Relational commitment versus Active disclosure, Common 
objectives and Joint risk taking collaborative behaviours 
Paired Samples Statistics
2.8099 100 1.79371 .17937
1.5982 100 1.19789 .11979
2.5800 100 1.91027 .19103
1.5982 100 1.19789 .11979
3.1852 100 1.93705 .19371
1.5982 100 1.19789 .11979
Active Disclosure (upper ZOT)
Relational Commitment (upper ZOT)
Pair 1
Common Objectives (upper ZOT)
Relational Commitment (upper ZOT)
Pair 2
Joint Risk Taking (upper ZOT)
Relational Commitment (upper ZOT)
Pair 3
Mean N Std. Deviation
Std. Error
Mean
 
Table 6-27 Paired samples t tests – Relational commitment versus Active disclosure, Common 
objectives and Joint risk taking collaborative behaviours 
Paired Samples Test
1.21170 1.57581 .15758 .89903 1.52437 7.689 99 .000
a
.98180 1.64762 .16476 .65488 1.30872 5.959 99 .000
a
1.58705 1.82604 .18260 1.22472 1.94938 8.691 99 .000
a
Active Disclosure (upper ZOT) -
Relational Commitment (upper ZOT)
Pair 1
Common Objectives (upper ZOT) -
Relational Commitment (upper ZOT)
Pair 2
Joint Risk Taking (upper ZOT) -
Relational Commitment (upper ZOT)
Pair 3
Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error
Mean Lower Upper
95% Confidence
Interval of the Difference
Paired Differences
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Significant at the p < .01 level.a. 
 
 
Hypothesis H7b shows mixed support and was also tested using simple paired sample t 
tests.  The results are displayed in Tables 6-28 and 6-29 and show that as predicted the 
ZOT for Active Disclosure was smaller and thus more sensitive when compared to the 
ZOT for Joint Risk Taking (it is also significant; p = .010, t statistic = -2.631).  However, 
when the ZOT for Active Disclosure was compared to the ZOT mean for Common 
Objectives, the inverse relationship was true, showing that the ZOT mean for Common 
Objectives is slightly (not significantly different) smaller, and thus more sensitive than the 
ZOT for Active Disclosure.  While not in the expected direction, this also shows that the 
ZOT for these two behaviours are approximately equal, and leads to the conclusion that 
both could be regarded as being similarly sensitive to any increases in those collaborative 
behaviours. 
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Table 6-28 Paired sample statistics – Active disclosure versus Common objectives and Joint risk 
taking collaborative behaviours 
Paired Samples Statistics
2.8099 100 1.79371 .17937
2.5800 100 1.91027 .19103
2.8099 100 1.79371 .17937
3.1852 100 1.93705 .19371
Active Disclosure (upper ZOT)
Common Objectives (upper ZOT)
Pair 1
Active Disclosure (upper ZOT)
Joint Risk Taking (upper ZOT)
Pair 2
Mean N Std. Deviation
Std. Error
Mean
 
Table 6-29 Paired samples t tests –Active disclosure versus Common objectives and Joint risk taking 
collaborative behaviours 
Paired Samples Test
.22990 1.44721 .14472 -.05726 .51706 1.589 99 .115
-.37535 1.42653 .14265 -.65840 -.09230 -2.631 99 .010
a
Active Disclosure (upper ZOT) -
Common Objectives (upper ZOT)
Pair 1
Active Disclosure (upper ZOT) -     
Joint Risk Taking (upper ZOT)
Pair 2
Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error
Mean Lower Upper
95% Confidence
Interval of the Difference
Paired Differences
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Significant at the p < .01 level.a. 
 
 
The results of these two hypotheses show that Relational Commitment is the most sensitive 
and valued collaborative behaviour and the most likely to initiate and upwards bifurcation.  
The other three behaviours adopt the following order of decreasing sensitivity; Common 
Objectives, Active Disclosure and Joint Risk Taking, as displayed in Table 6-30.  
Table 6-30 Descriptive statistics – Decreasing order of ZOT sensitivity for collaborative behaviours 
Descriptive Statistics
100 .00 5.59 1.5982 1.19789
100 .00 8.67 2.5800 1.91027
100 .00 9.00 2.8099 1.79371
100 .00 9.00 3.1853 1.93705
100
Relational Commitment (upper ZOT)
Common Objectives (upper ZOT)
Active Disclosure (upper ZOT)
Joint Risk Taking (upper ZOT)
Valid N (listwise)
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
 
6.3.4 Strategic Behaviour Hypotheses 
Supply chain relationships operate within a much wider strategic environment that includes 
such external forces and factors as the socio-economic, geo-political and technological 
environments.  Further, there are also internal firm-level forces such a firm culture, the 
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purchasing leverage of the firm (dollars spent), the nature of the product and also the type 
of existing relationship already present.  All these forces and factors constrict or restrain 
the freedom of action and decision latitude of the exchange actors.  These forces are known 
in this research as ‘strategic behaviours’ and have been grouped into a new strategic 
behaviour index (SBI) that reflects relative ‘power’ levels for further testing.   
6.3.4.1 Hypothesis H8 
This hypothesis states that the level of ‘power’ possessed by any one member of the dyad 
has an impact on the type and nature of the exchange relationship in operation.  In 
particular,  
H8: Buyers with high levels of strategic power would tend to form partnership 
relationships. 
6.3.4.1.1 Results: H8 
The results show that hypothesis H8 is supported.  To test this hypothesis an index of 
relative strategic power was created by combining several variables48 into a new variable 
that represents the strategic power index of the buyer ( SBIX  = 3.0180, S = .76354).  A 
further dummy variable was created coding those buying firms with low power as = 1 and 
those with high power as = 2.  Those firms reflecting a mean statistic of ≤  3.0 were 
classified as having low power, while those with a mean statistic > 3.0 were classified as 
having high power.         
A revision of the descriptive frequencies show that for transactional relationships (n = 100) 
79% of buying firms demonstrated low power, while only 21% reflected relatively high 
levels of power.  Conversely, for partnership relationships (n = 100) 73% of relationships 
demonstrate high power, and only 27% demonstrated low power.  These frequencies 
provide some support for hypothesis H8, but to examine the nature of the relationships 
further it was decided to conduct a univariate Analysis of Variance (One-way ANOVA) to 
determine the overall effects.  The dependent variable was the strategic behaviour index 
                                                 
48
 The five strategic behaviour variables were: Firm culture, Purchasing spend, Product requirements, Number of 
suppliers available in the market and Type of existing relationship already present. 
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variable, and the fixed factors being the two types of relationships.  The results of the 
univariate Analysis of Variance are shown below.  However, some assumption testing was 
first required.       
The Levene’s test for diagnosing the assumptions of homogeneity of variance was 
conducted.  Any significant p values below .05 show significant tendency against 
normality.  The results (see Table 6-31) show that the assumption of homogeneity of 
variance is satisfied (p = .550, F[1,198] = .359) and testing can continue. 
Table 6-31 Levene’s test of homogeneity of variance 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa
Dependent Variable: SB Index / Power
.359 1 198 .550
F df1 df2 Sig.
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of
the dependent variable is equal across groups.
Design: Intercept+TorPa. 
 
The results of the univariate analysis of variance (see Table 6-32) demonstrate that the 
model is highly significant (p = .001, F[1,198] = 112.158) and that clearly there is a 
significant difference in the strategic power weightings of transactional and partnership 
relationships.        
Table 6-32 Univariate analysis of variance model – Main effects of strategic power index of 
transactional and partnership relationships 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: SB Index / Power
41.953a 1 41.953 112.158 .000b .362
1821.665 1 1821.665 4870.078 .000 .961
41.953 1 41.953 112.158 .000 .362
74.062 198 .374
1937.680 200
116.015 199
Source
Corrected Model
Intercept
TorP
Error
Total
Corrected Total
Type III Sum
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Partial Eta
Squared
R Squared = .362 (Adjusted R Squared = .358)a. 
Significant at the p < .01 level.b. 
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The model’s adjusted R2 value of .358 explains 35.8% of the variation in the model.  While 
this value is considered adequate, further testing with variables not included in the current 
model may produce higher R2 values and a more adequate model fit.  Nevertheless, the 
testing does shows that exchange actors (buyers) with higher levels of strategic power will 
tend to be in partnership type relationships (partnership SBI SBIXp  = 3.4760), while those 
suffering from low levels of strategic power will tend to be in transactional type 
relationships (transactional SBI SBIXt  = 2.500).  Further, this model shows that the external 
market influences and internal firm influences do indeed have a considerable impact on the 
operation and type of supply chain relationship formed.  These results support hypothesis 
H8 and the contention of the main research model.    
6.3.4.2 Hypotheses H9a-b 
Not only does the strategic power level influence the type of relationship formed, it also 
influences the behaviour enacted within the current dyadic relationship.  It can be argued 
that those buyers with low levels of power are more dependent on their supplying firms 
and would thus be more likely to tolerate (larger ZOT) opportunistic behaviour increases 
and/or collaborative behaviour decreases.   
Conversely, it has been shown that those firms with low strategic power tend to be in 
transactional type relationships, and these can be switched relatively easily and cheaply 
with another supplier, thus their ZOT should be smaller (less tolerant).  Similarly, those 
firms with high strategic power tend to form partnership type relationships where time and 
effort have been invested into the relationship.  Hence, those firms with this type of 
relationship should also display greater tolerance (larger ZOTs) to reduced collaborative 
behaviours and increased opportunistic behaviours as the imperative is to maintain the 
current relationship.  Therefore, 
H9a: For collaborative behaviours, the ZOT for buyers with low strategic power will be 
smaller (more sensitive) or equal to the ZOT of those buyers with higher strategic 
power, or 
( 1 2 ) ( 1 2 )ZA d ZD d ZA d ZD dSBIlow SBIhigh− −≤      Equation 6-9 
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H9b: For opportunistic behaviours, the ZOT for buyers with low strategic power will be 
smaller (more sensitive) or equal to the ZOT of those buyers with higher strategic 
power, or 
( ) ( )ZEi ZHi ZEi ZHiSBIlow SBIhigh− −≤       Equation 6-10 
 
Where: 
 
SBIlow   = strategic behaviour index / low power 
SBIhigh  = strategic behaviour index / high power 
( 1 2 )ZA d ZD d−  = zone of tolerance / collaborative variables (x 8) / decrease 
( )ZEi ZHi−  = zone of tolerance / opportunistic variables (x4) / increase 
 
6.3.4.2.1 Results: H9a-b 
The results support hypothesis H9a, while hypothesis H9b shows mixed support.  However, 
the data fully supports the hypothesised direction.  To test these hypotheses, a multivariate 
Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) was employed.  The fixed factors were again the 
strategic behaviour index, and the dependant variables were the ZOT for collaborative 
behaviour decreases, and also the ZOT for opportunistic behaviour increases.  In testing 
the assumptions of the MANOVA we find that the Box’s M test of equality of the 
variance–covariance produces a significant result (p > .01, F[78,95320.275] = 1.874).  This 
means that the assumption has not been met and the equality of variance cannot be 
assumed.   
Table 6-33 Box’s M test of homogeneity of the variance-covariance matrices 
Box's Test of Equality of Covariance Matricesa
157.445
78
95320.275
.000
Box's M
F
df1
df2
Sig.
Tests the null hypothesis that the observed covariance
matrices of the dependent variables are equal across groups.
Design: Intercept+SBIHorLa. 
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However, the goodness-of-fit statistics of the main model are all significant at the p < .01 
level, and the majority of the main effects have also produced significant results (10 out of 
the 12 variables) even despite the presence of outliers in the data set.  Further, the data 
shows support for the theoretical conceptualisation for the hypotheses as only two of 
variables (ZGi – ZOT unconscionable opportunism and ZHi – ZOT illegal opportunism) 
show high levels of correlation and distribution issues.  Given these points, and the fact 
that the Box’s M test is viewed as being extremely sensitive anyway (Coaks and Steed, 
1999), it was considered permissible to continue with the testing and interpret the results 
with this in mind.   
The main model displaying the Pillai’s Trace, Wilks’ Lambda, Hotelling’s Trace and 
Roy’s Largest Root statistics of the MANOVA tests are shown in Table 6-34. 
Table 6-34 Multivariate Analysis of Variance – Goodness-of-fit statistics 
Multivariate Testsb
.859 84.110a 12.000 165.000 .000 .859
.141 84.110a 12.000 165.000 .000 .859
6.117 84.110a 12.000 165.000 .000 .859
6.117 84.110a 12.000 165.000 .000 .859
.169 2.795a 12.000 165.000 .002c .169
.831 2.795a 12.000 165.000 .002c .169
.203 2.795a 12.000 165.000 .002c .169
.203 2.795a 12.000 165.000 .002c .169
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
Effect
Intercept
SBIHorL
Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig.
Partial Eta
Squared
Exact statistica. 
Design: Intercept+SBIHorLb. 
Significant at the p < .01 level.c. 
 
The MANOVA results are displayed in Table 6-35 that follows.  The first part of the table 
lists the eight collaborative variables tested under H9a stating that relationships 
demonstrating low strategic power will have more sensitive lower ZOTs for collaborative 
behavioural decreases than those relationships with higher strategic power.  The variables 
listed from Lower ZOT A1 to Lower ZOT D2 are all highly significant at the p < .01 level 
and clearly show that for collaborative behaviours, the relationships with lower levels of 
strategic power do indeed have smaller ZOTs and are thus more sensitive, providing 
support for hypothesis H9a. 
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Table 6-35 MANOVA results – Strategic power index effects across collaborative behaviour ZOT 
decreases and opportunistic behaviour ZOT increases 
29.383 1 29.383 16.352 .000a .085
316.248 176 1.797
26.680 1 26.680 15.019 .000a .079
312.648 176 1.776
29.481 1 29.481 13.572 .000a .072
382.317 176 2.172
33.831 1 33.831 21.017 .000a .107
283.309 176 1.610
38.338 1 38.338 24.852 .000a .124
271.501 176 1.543
37.050 1 37.050 18.554 .000a .095
351.452 176 1.997
32.774 1 32.774 15.357 .000a .080
375.596 176 2.134
27.731 1 27.731 11.896 .001a .063
410.276 176 2.331
17.516 1 17.516 4.268 .040b .024
722.391 176 4.104
11.456 1 11.456 3.803 .053c .021
530.217 176 3.013
6.008 1 6.008 1.900 .170 .011
556.379 176 3.161
6.601 1 6.601 2.375 .125 .013
489.215 176 2.780
Contrast
Error
Contrast
Error
Contrast
Error
Contrast
Error
Contrast
Error
Contrast
Error
Contrast
Error
Contrast
Error
Contrast
Error
Contrast
Error
Contrast
Error
Contrast
Error
Dependent Variable
Lower ZOT A1
Lower ZOT A2
Lower ZOT B1
Lower ZOT B2
Lower ZOT C1
Lower ZOT C2
Lower ZOT D1
Lower ZOT D2
Upper ZOT Social
Opportunism
Upper ZOT Commercial
Opportunism
Upper ZOT Unconscionable
Opportunism
Upper ZOT Illegal
Opportunism
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Partial Eta
Squared
The F tests the effect of Strategic Index. This test is based on the linearly independent pairwise comparisons among the
estimated marginal means.
Significant at the p < .01 level.a. 
Significant at the p < .05 level.b. 
Significant at the p < 0.1 level.c. 
 
For hypothesis H9b, results for the increases in opportunistic behaviours however display 
mixed results with two out of the four ZOTs being significant at various levels (p < .05 and 
0.1) while two of the variables are not significant.  These weaker results can be attributed 
to the similarity of the distributions for these behaviours, yet there is still a distinguishable 
difference.   
A closer examination of the means for each of the variables under the fixed factors of high 
and low strategic power show that all of the pairs are in the expected direction with the low 
power variable having a smaller ZOT to those cases with high strategic power.  This shows 
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that overall those relationships with high strategic power tend to be more tolerant of 
increases of opportunistic behaviour and decreases of collaborative behaviours.  Hence, we 
can conclude for hypothesis H9b that while the MANOVA results are mixed, they do 
largely support the hypothesised relationships.        
Overall, these tests demonstrate support for the theoretical formalisation of the main 
research model and hypotheses.  Thus, this research has established the foundation for a 
new conceptualisation of dynamic relationship developments in supply chains.  This new 
concept is a unique addition to the field and will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.  
However, prior to this discussion, the summarised results of the hypotheses testing phase is 
tabulated in the next section. 
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6.4 Summary of Results 
The hypotheses testing phase has produced some interesting results.  The following Table 
(6-36) summarises the results of the various tests and shows the level of support for each 
hypothesis plus some explanatory and supportive comments.   
Table 6-36 Summary results table of the hypotheses testing phase 
  
Hypotheses Test Result Comments 
Main Research Hypotheses 
H1a:  Supply chain relationships may change in response 
to both collaborative and opportunistic behaviours. 
GLM 
(ANOVA) 
Supported Model sig at the p < .01 
level. 
H1b: Transactional relationships can be differentiated 
from partnership relationships by the different 
levels of behaviour found in each. 
One-way 
ANOVA 
Partially 
Supported 
All 8 collaborative 
variables sig. 
1 out of 4 opportunistic 
variables sig. 
H2: Partnership relationships may display more 
collaborative behaviours and less opportunistic 
behaviours than transactional relationships. 
ANOVA 
Pairwise 
Comparison 
Partially 
Supported 
9 out of 12 pairs are 
sig. 
3 pairs are not sig. 
All means are in the 
expected direction 
 
Zone of Tolerance (ZOT) Hypotheses 
H3a: For transactional relationships, the upper ZOT for 
increases in collaborative behaviours is different to 
the current relationship equilibrium for the same 
behaviour, or 
( 1 2) ( 1 2) 0A D A DTCc TCi− −− ≠  
Pairwise  
t tests 
Supported All pairs sig at the  
p < .01 level. 
H3b: For transactional relationships, the upper ZOT for 
increases in opportunistic behaviours is different to 
the current relationship equilibrium for the same 
behaviour, or 
( ) ( ) 0E H E HTOc TOi− −− ≠  
Pairwise  
t tests 
Supported All pairs sig at the  
p < .01 level. 
H3c: For transactional relationships, the lower ZOT for 
decreases in collaborative behaviours is different 
to the current relationship equilibrium for the same 
behaviour, or 
( 1 2) ( 1 2) 0A D A DTCc TCd− −− ≠  
Pairwise  
t tests 
Supported All pairs sig at the  
p < .01 level. 
H3d: For transactional relationships, the lower ZOT for 
decreases in opportunistic behaviours is different 
to the current relationship equilibrium for the same 
behaviour, or 
( ) ( ) 0E H E HTOc TOd− −− ≠  
Pairwise  
t tests 
Supported All pairs sig at the  
p < .01 level. 
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H4: For transactional relationships, the ZOT for any 
increase in a collaborative behaviour will be equal 
to or larger (less sensitive) than the ZOT for any 
decrease of the same collaborative behaviour, or 
( 1 2) ( 1 2)A D A DTZCi TZCd− −≥  
Pairwise  
t tests 
Partially 
Supported 
7 out of 8 pairs sig. 
1 pair not sig, and 1 
inverse. 
7 out of 8 in expected 
direction. 
H5: For transactional relationships, the ZOT for any 
increases in an opportunistic behaviour will be 
equal to or smaller (more sensitive) than the ZOT 
for an decrease of the same opportunistic 
behaviour, or 
( ) ( )E H E HTZOd TZOi− −≥  
 
Pairwise  
t tests 
Not 
Supported 
3 out of 4 pairs sig, but 
in the inverse direction. 
Bifurcation Hypotheses 
H6a: As the upper ZOT for a collaborative behaviour 
changes, the lower ZOT for the same behaviour 
moves in the opposite direction, leading to a 
negative correlation between the upper and lower 
ZOTs for each collaborative behaviour. 
Pearson’s 
Product 
Moment 
Correlation 
Supported All correlations sig and 
in the expected 
direction 
H6b: As the upper ZOT for an opportunistic behaviour 
changes, the lower ZOT for the same behaviour 
moves in the opposite direction, leading to a 
negative correlation between the upper and lower 
ZOTs for each opportunistic behaviour. 
Pearson’s 
Product 
Moment 
Correlation 
Supported All correlations sig and 
in the expected 
direction 
H7a: For transactional relationships, the ZOT for 
Relational Commitment (D1-D2) is smaller or 
equal to (more sensitive) than that of the other 
three collaborative behaviours, or 
( 1 2) ( 1 2),( 1 2),( 1 2)D D A A B B C CTZCi TZCi− − − −≤  
Paired 
Sample  
t tests 
Supported All pairs sig at the  
p < .01 level, and in the 
expected direction.  
Variable (D1-D2) has 
smallest mean. 
H7b: For transactional relationships, the ZOT for Active 
Disclosure (A1-A2) is smaller or equal to (more 
sensitive) than both Common Objectives (B1-B2) 
and Joint Risk Taking behaviours (C1-C2), or 
( 1 2) ( 1 2),( 1 2)A A B B C CTZCi TZCi− − −≤  
 
Paired 
Sample  
t tests 
Partially 
Supported 
A1-A2 < B1-B2 - not 
sig and inverse. 
A1-A2 < C1-C2 - sig 
Strategic Behaviour Hypotheses 
H8: Buyers with high levels of strategic power would 
tend to form partnership relationships. 
One-way 
ANOVA 
Supported Model sig at the p < .01 
level 
H9a: For collaborative behaviours, the ZOT for buyers 
with low strategic power will be smaller (more 
sensitive) or equal to the ZOT of those buyers with 
higher strategic power, or 
( 1 2 ) ( 1 2 )ZA d ZD d ZA d ZD dSBIlow SBIhigh− −≤  
MANOVA Supported Model sig at the p < .01 
level 
All variables sig at the 
p < .01 level and in 
expected direction. 
H9b: For opportunistic behaviours, the ZOT for buyers 
with low strategic power will be smaller (more 
sensitive) or equal to the ZOT of those buyers with 
higher strategic power, or 
( ) ( )ZEi ZHi ZEi ZHiSBIlow SBIhigh− −≤  
MANOVA Partially 
Supported 
Model sig at the p < .01 
level 
2 out of 4 sig at the  
p < 0.1 level, yet all in 
expected direction. 
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6.5 Conclusion  
In conclusion, the model testing phase has produced some conclusive results while other 
hypotheses are less well supported.  Of the sixteen individual hypotheses tested, ten were 
supported, five were only partially supported, and one was not supported.  Of those 
hypotheses that were only partially supported, most showed more support than not, but in 
the interests of conservatism it was necessary to report a partial result.  Only one 
hypothesis was not supported, and this result has thrown up some interesting questions 
along both theoretical and methodological lines.  However, the details of these issues will 
be left for the discussion on the theoretical and managerial implications that will occupy 
the content of the next chapter.        
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
7 Discussion of Results, Theoretical and Managerial 
Implications 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter has described the application of various statistical tests to determine 
inferences from the data matrix.  This chapter will expand on these results and will provide 
an in-depth analysis and discussion on the implications of the findings.  As such, the 
discussion will expand the focus from narrow methodological issues to a wider analysis of 
the conclusions, and the theoretical and managerial implications that are grounded in the 
results of this study.  
In addition, this research is summarised into two theoretically unique ideas in the form of 
the Dynamic Relational Development (DRD) concept, and also the Supply Chain Citizen 
theory.  The DRD concept offers an explanation of the hypothesised results by capturing 
the essence of the dualistic behavioural dilemma, and the impact that these conflicts have 
on supply chain relational movements.  Next, the Supply Chain Citizen theory is offered as 
an attempt to decipher these behavioural dilemmas by suggesting a way to conceptually 
resolve the rational versus relational debate that is so embedded in supply chain literature.  
It proposes to do this by positioning exchange relationships within their wider supply chain 
networks, and suggests that moral and ethical fairness becomes the reconciling construct to 
moderate all behaviours.  Nevertheless, first it is necessary to readdress the central 
questions and motivations for this study.    
7.2 Research Loci 
The central tenet of this research was to explore the dynamic evolutionary nature of inter-
organisation relationships, in particular the way in which supply chain relationship levels 
respond to the various behaviours of the actors.  The researcher’s interest in this 
phenomenon has been piqued by experiencing two major dilemmas.  Firstly, as a 
practitioner having personally experienced a large number of the supply chain behaviours, 
Chapter Seven – Discussion 
 
263 
and having often pondered their impact on supply chain relationships.  Of concern was 
how a current relationship could be moved up through the value chain to higher levels in 
order to gain some of the benefits of collaboration, and also to mitigate potential and actual 
opportunistic behaviours.  Secondly, it is clear from an extensive review of the practitioner 
and academic literature that a lucid answer to the dualistic behavioural dilemma has yet to 
be provided.  Previous efforts have seemed only to emphasise the competitor versus 
cooperator or the rational versus relational dichotomy.  Furthermore, those few authors 
who seek to integrate these two disparate branches of thought (for example Axlerod, 1990; 
Clarke-Hill et al., 2003; Nalebuff and Brandenburger, 1996; Vakratsas et al., 2004) do so 
seeking answers to their own particular research agendas, and only add piecemeal to the 
rational versus relational debate.  The two disparate branches of literature identified in this 
research (the rational and relational schools) appear on the surface at least, to be 
irreconcilable.  Thus, the second major motivating factor for this research was the desire to 
provide answers, or at least improve our understanding of this major behavioural 
dichotomy.  At the outset it became clear that there was needed to fill this obvious gap left 
in literature, and to answer some long standing managerial questions about supply chain 
relationships.  The first step was to frame the problem, and this is achieved by restating the 
general research direction, and then detailing specific research questions to be answered.  
7.2.1 Revisiting the Research Questions  
In order provide this chapter with a focused analysis and to direct the discussion, the 
research questions are reiterated here49.  In general, the interest was in determining how 
supply chain relationships adapt to enacted behaviours of the other party, and how they 
dynamically develop or change over time in response.  In particular, the following specific 
research questions were proposed at the beginning of this research. 
1. Do supply chain exchange relationship levels change due to dynamic behaviours? 
2. Do collaborative behaviours positively influence exchange relationship levels? 
3. Do opportunistic behaviours negatively influence exchange relationship levels? 
                                                 
49
 See chapter four; sections 4.2 and 4.2.1. 
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4. How tolerant are existing relationships to the presence of opportunistic or 
collaborative behaviours? 
5. What behaviours are more likely to cause exchange relationship bifurcations? 
6. Can strategic behaviours hold the current exchange relationship in a steady state? 
 
It is hoped that the following discussion will provide enough illumination to, at least, 
provide some preliminary answers to these questions, and also to initiate discussion on the 
relative merits of the tentative DRD concept and the Supply Chain Citizen theory.  
7.3 Conceptual Domain of the Dynamic Relational 
Development Concept 
When attempting to offer a new theoretical explanation for an observed phenomena it is 
important to firstly ensure absolute clarity as to the likely conceptual domain and context 
in which the phenomena takes place.  Hence, this research design consciously attempted to 
be as generalisable as possible by selecting a sample that could be extrapolated to other 
national or environmental contexts in order to draw broader conclusions.  However, the 
research design also places limits on what can be inferred, and this discussion attempts to 
be clear about the inference drawn from the actual empirical results, and when broader 
generalisations are offered as a way of explanation.  
Henceforth, it necessary to state that the DRD concept is first and foremost positioned 
within the context of inter-organisational exchange, or in other words supply chain 
exchange relationships.  How much beyond this domain these ideas would remain 
applicable is uncertain.  Further, while there has been much written on the formation of 
new relationships in terms of new partner selection, evaluation, desirability criteria 
(Ellram, 1995; Kannan and Tan, 2002; Lambert et al., 1996), and strategic alliance 
relationship formation (Arino et al., 2001; Kale et al., 2000; Ohmae, 1989; Varadarajan 
and Cunningham, 1995), this research takes a different approach by focusing exclusively 
on existing exchange relationships.  These relationships tend to be ignored by researchers, 
as it is assumed that selecting new suppliers is a more critical task than maintaining or 
improving the value from existing relationships.  In this respect, the field of supply chain 
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management can learn from the Relationship Marketing paradigm that has clearly 
demonstrated the link between the value in building long-term relationships with existing 
customers, as opposed to the problems and costs inherent in the continuous quest of 
finding new customers (Foster and Cadogan, 2000; Matthew and Carter, 2005; Morgan and 
Hunt, 1994).  Specifically, this research was conducted by gathering empirical data on 
existing buyer-supplier interactions within a dyadic exchange framework.  While there is 
no set definition of how long a relationship needs to be in existence, clearly it needs to be 
of a sufficient duration for such things as social and relational norms to at least begin to 
form.  For the firms used in this sample, the average length of transactional type 
relationships was eight and ½ years ( tX  = 8.52 years), while the average length of 
partnership type relationships was eleven and ¼ years ( pX  = 11.24 years).  Both 
relationships archetypes are clearly of a reasonable duration, and if they are typical of the 
average dyadic exchange, then the current lack of research into this area is somewhat of a 
baffling oversight. 
Further, it is important to note that, as Foster and Cadogan (2000) found when looking at 
effective relationship marketing, exchange relationships are built on two dimensions 
simultaneously.  Firstly, and perhaps most critically, relationships are built on an inter-
personal dimension between the key boundary spanning individuals of dyadic exchange.  
Secondly, and almost as a consequence of the first, the relationship is also built on an inter-
organisational dimension between the two firms.  As it grows the inter-organisational 
relationship appropriates the characteristics of the interpersonal interactions.  Thus, it could 
be said that inter-organisational relationships are acted out vicariously through the deeds of 
the individual employees.  This is perhaps why understanding dyadic exchange behaviour 
is a critical first step in understanding the health and value potential of supply chain 
exchange relationships.  In addition, it also focuses attention on the DRD concept’s unit of 
analysis.                    
As stated in the methodology chapter, the unit of analysis is the dyadic relationship 
between buying and selling organisations.  It is important to note that the dyadic view is 
only one of many different ways of looking at supply chains.  Many other researchers have 
focused on such units of analysis as the channel or chain wide views (Coughlan et al., 
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1996), the value chain (Bititci, Martinez, Albores and Parung, 2004), or a more recently 
the phenomena of the ‘network’ perspective (Holmberg, 2000; Mills, Schmitz and Frizelle, 
2004).  These alternative views attempt to analyse the supply chain as a whole and have 
adopted stylised terms such as; ‘womb to tomb’, ‘raw materials to final consumer’, ‘farm 
gate to plate’, or in military parlance, ‘factory to foxhole’ to cover their conceptual 
domain.  Hence, individual dyadic relationships are subsumed into the chain or channel as 
a whole, and are often overlooked during any analysis.  However, the DRD concept 
contends that a supply chain network actually consists of a series of related dyadic 
exchanges that exist in the boundary space between the actors.  An early channel thinker, 
McGarry (1951) termed this as “…a vast network of contractual relationships” (p. 105).  It 
is argued that in order to understand the nature of the supply chain as a whole, one must 
first analyse the dyads in the series.  It is also argued that proven measures to analyse the 
behaviour of a supply chain as a whole do not presently exist, and that the next best 
alternative is to measure the dyadic behaviour at various stages within a chain.  Further, the 
dyad is also much more amenable to the measurement of inter-personal behaviour than a 
chain as suggested by Achrol (1997) who states that “…relationship theory is essentially a 
dyadic theory” (p. 57).  This point is important as individual behaviours clearly have an 
impact on the likely character of inter-organisational relationships.  Support for this view 
can be found in numerous empirical studies such Morgan and Hunt’s (1994) trust and 
commitment theory, Hunt and Nevin’s (1974) power and dependence theory, and 
Gundlach’s et al., (1995) model of relational exchange that have all used inter-personal 
dimensions in their analysis of inter-organisational exchange. 
In summary, the conceptual domain of the DRD concept is one of existing dyadic 
exchange relationships, with two independently owned firms that have chosen to conduct 
economic exchange for mutual benefit.  The decision latitude of the exchange actors, 
whilst in some ways constrained by firm level and environmental forces, allows the 
freedom to choose between either collaborative or opportunistic acts, or both.  Therefore, 
any generalisation of this concept beyond this domain should be accepted with these 
limitations in mind.  Nevertheless, the domain also appears to cover quite a broad spectrum 
of different exchange relationships, and could possibly be relevant in a general sense as 
well.     
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7.3.1 Supply Chain Views on Dynamic Relational Evolution.   
In order to understand the dynamic view of exchange relationships, it is first necessary to 
examine it in juxtaposition with the strategic firm/product positioning view.  There are 
many mechanisms by which supply chain relationships evolve, but arguably there are two 
main views.  One is a positional or structural view, and the other is a dynamic perspective.  
The first view analyses supply chain evolution through the lens of strategic and product 
positioning decisions similar to Mintzbergs’ (1987) positioning school of strategy 
formation, and also Porters’ (1980) ideas on generic competitive strategy.  Here, supply 
chain relationships change and evolve not as a result of relational dimensions, but as a 
result of deliberate strategic decisions and actions such as mergers, acquisitions, product 
positioning and outsourcing.  Firms are positioned or repositioned within an existing or a 
new supply chain as a result of snapshot or cross-sectional analysis.  This view takes as its 
unit of analysis the firm or the product, not the supply chain.  The evolution of supply 
chain relationships under this paradigm stems from static, firm level, episodic views, thus 
one can talk about new and emerging relationships as a result of deliberate strategic 
positioning in the supply chain. 
Conversely, the dynamic relational perspective centres on the behavioural dimensions that 
evolve in existing exchange transactions.  It focuses on the changes or the evolution of the 
relationship over time, and is less concerned with firm level strategic positioning than with 
understanding behaviour as it adapts to the vicissitudes of the business environment.  As 
such, the unit of analysis is the relationship itself, and one can talk about existing and 
evolving relationships as the current portfolio of exchange relationships develop and 
mature.  This view however, does not by definition exclude the process of embedding new 
positioning derived relationships, nor does it discount the termination a relationship as a 
result of any strategic firm/product positioning reviews.  
Finally, with the essential preliminaries completed, the conceptual domain of the DRD 
concept and the relational perspective of dynamic evolution should now be clear.  The next 
section will discuss the DRD concept in terms of the empirical evidence of this study and 
its relationship to other theoretical viewpoints.  
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7.4 The DRD Concept – Empirical Evidence  
While the following attempts to examine the empirical or ‘positivistic’ evidence for the 
theory, it in no way attempts to imply definite or final ‘proof’ of the phenomena or the 
social construct under examination.  As mentioned in the section (see Appendix 1) 
detailing the researcher’s philosophical approach to research, the position taken here is 
neither wholly positivistic, nor is it wholly antipositivistic (Hunt, 1991).  Rather, this 
researcher much prefers the scientific realist paradigm that allows room for both 
observable and unobservable ‘entities’ (Newton-Smith, 2000).  Thus, the evidence will be 
initially examined positivistically looking for ‘causal’ relationships and eliminating any 
spurious or purely accidental associations.  However, as far as interpreting the results, any 
associations that are found give reason to believe, but not an absolute warrant to believe 
that the relationship or entity actually exists.  Hence, under the scientific realist approach, 
the best that could be hoped for at this early stage is that any evidence for the DRD concept 
would give reason to believe that ‘something like’ the postulated concept exists.  Further 
work would be needed to either validate or refute the theory or elements of it.     
7.4.1 Characteristics of the ‘Average’ Firm 
Much depends on the generalisability of the sample when searching for applicability of the 
concept.  Conservatively, the results can really only said to be representative of the 
members of the sample, or at best extrapolated to the population in the geographic location 
selected for the research.  Nevertheless, the random design of the sampling, the selection of 
a generic industry sector (manufacturing) with only one exception rule (those with a five 
FTE’s or less were excluded), the disparate position of the firms in the supply chain50, and 
the wide diversity of firm size and activities all promote the generalisability of these 
results.  In this respect, one of the first questions concerns the nature of the respondents in 
the sample.  The following table provides the details of what could be termed the ‘average’ 
firm in the sample.  This approach allows managers and researches to then compare or 
benchmark these results with their own situations.        
 
                                                 
50
 The sample included firms from all positions in their respective supply chains.  The firm’s activities reflected their 
positions and included firms that where: raw material suppliers, commodity processors, component manufacturers, final 
product manufacturers, assemblers, distributors, and the retail end of the supply chain.   
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Table 7-1 Descriptives of the ‘Average’ firm in the sample 
 
Characteristic The Average Firm N 
Annual turnover (2004): Between $NZ 2M to $NZ 5M 94 
Number of Full Time Equivalent (FTE’s) employees: 20 to 40 employees 100 
Key informant’s experience with suppliers: 5 to 10 years 100 
Number of active suppliers: 30 to 40 different suppliers 100 
Length of relationship with suppliers: 9.8 years 200 
Frequency of contact with survey suppliers: 2 to 3 times a week 200 
Level of interdependence through ownership:  Independent of their suppliers, autonomous decision makers. 200 
The management culture of the firm: Management was mostly concerned with cost savings as 
opposed to promoting relationships in the supply chain. 
200 
Purchasing spend and quantity requirements:  The firm tends to represent a reasonable percentage of the 
suppliers business, thus the supplier should be moderately 
dependent on the firm. 
200 
Criticality and importance of the product or service 
purchased: 
The firm purchased a range of products and services evenly 
split between simple/generic to more complex/critical products 
and services. 
200 
The number of qualified suppliers and level of 
competition 
There seems to be an adequate number of suppliers for the 
firm.  Enough to generate competition, but not enough to allow 
routine switching.  
200 
The nature of the existing relationship: The majority of existing relationships are built on open-ended 
informal understandings rather than on formal contract 
documents. 
200 
Strategic Behaviour Index – level of power or 
dependence: 
Overall, the power in the relationship is evenly balanced 
between the firm and the supplier.  No one side is dominant or 
overly dependent.  
200 
Note:  The average firm represents both transactional and partnership relationships.  Analysis on the respective relationship 
types will reflect different values across most of these dimensions. 
 
Table (7-1) provides a good overview the average firms’ size, turnover and also its 
strategic position in terms of its current exchange relationships.  While each research 
setting and sample will differ, the generalisability of the results will depend on the 
comparability of one’s own situation to that of this sample.  This should not however, limit 
the applicability of the more overarching generalisations that are important to theory 
building.  The next issue of importance in establishing the DRD concept is to determine if 
there are any differences between the proposed relationship types.   
7.4.2 Establishing Different Levels of Behaviour in Supply Chain 
Relationships 
The conceptual differences between various exchange relationship archetypes have been 
well documented in previous research.  Most authors agree that supply chain relationships 
exist on a unidimensional continuum with discrete relational types anchoring one end, and 
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highly relational types anchoring the other (Donaldson and O'Toole, 2000; Sako, 1992; 
Simatupang et al., 2002; Webster, 1992; Wilson, 1995).  To develop the DRD concept, it is 
necessary that relationship archetypes be found using behavioural dimensions only.  This is 
because the concept argues that dynamic exchange relationship movement occurs across 
and between different levels of relationship via enacted behaviours.   
While previous literature has demonstrated that there are conceptual differences in 
relationship types, it has done so using quite broad constructs that have incorporated only 
explicit behavioural dimensions in a piecemeal fashion (Knemeyer et al., 2003; Peterson 
and Wysocki, 1998).  The descriptors used generally only focus on structural or 
operational dimensions of the relationship51.  For example, the transactional level 
relationship as used in this research is conceptually the same as labels used by other 
authors such as ‘discreet’ (Dwyer et al., 1987), ‘arms-length’ (Hoyt and Huq, 2000), ‘win-
lose’ (Cox, 2004), and ‘Type I’ partnership relationships (Lambert et al., 1996).    
However, while this research used these descriptors to guide the respondents, what is 
unique is that the resulting analysis shows that relationships can indeed be differentiated 
solely by their behavioural dimensions.      
To examine this, a General Linear Model (GLM) was employed (hypotheses H1a-b and H2).  
The overall model was constructed by integrating the behavioural variables into the GLM 
and testing these against the two major types of supply chain relationship (transactional 
and partnership) as the dependent variables.  This was done using a one-way ANOVA test 
with the fixed factors being the differences between the transactional and partnership 
relationships along the eight collaborative variables, and the four opportunistic variables.  
The results show support for the overall GLM model as tested in H1a, but only partial 
support for hypotheses H1b.  This suggests that there is enough variance in the model to 
show a clear difference between the two relationship archetypes, and on a behaviour by 
behaviour level, nine out of the twelve behaviours were distinguishable across the two 
relationships archetypes, but three opportunistic behaviours were not.   
The second part of testing was to examine the hypothesis (H2) that partnership 
relationships display higher levels of collaborative behaviours and less opportunistic 
                                                 
51
 See Chapter Two Literature Review, Tables 2-4 and 2-5.   
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behaviours than do transactional relationships.  The means for each of the 12 behaviours 
were calculated and then compared across the two relationship types by using Pairwise t 
test comparisons in the GLM.  The results show partial support for H2 and are shown 
graphically in the following Figures (Collaborative; 7-1 and Opportunistic; 7-2). 
Figure 7-1 Differences between the two relationship archetypes - Collaborative behaviours** 
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**Note:  Behavioural abbreviations used in the charts of this chapter refer to the following: 
 
S & R Norms  = Social and Relational Norms Comms = Communication 
T & C = Trust and Commitment Shared R&R = Shared Risks and Rewards 
Conflict Res = Conflict Resolution Info Sharing = Information Sharing 
Goal Cong = Goal Congruence  RSI = Relational Specific Investments 
Opp = Opportunism   
 
 
Figure 7-1 has been rank ordered from highest to lowest mean according to the frequency 
of the behaviour experienced in the different relationships52.  It can be seen that the green 
linear trend line (showing the partnership relationship) slowly diverges from the red linear 
trend line (showing the transactional relationship), indicating that as the frequency of the 
behaviours diminish, the difference between the two behaviours becomes more distinct.  
Also of note, the two behaviours with the lowest frequencies across both relationship types 
also happen to be the two behaviours that require more overt managerial action to 
implement.  Sharing information generally requires that some form of investment be made 
into synchronising information and business systems, and also the willingness to share 
                                                 
52
 For a chart showing the order of the collaborative behaviours as proposed in the original typology, and also the 
summarised typology of the proposed four collaborative behaviours and their frequencies, see Appendix A12.  
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confidential information with partners.  Further, relationship specific investments clearly 
means making some form of hard monetary investment into physical assets53 specifically 
for, and shared between the exchange partners.  It is interesting that while the analysis 
shows good levels of relational sentiments (social and relational norms and also trust and 
commitment), when it comes to actually implementing the collaborative initiatives firms 
are much less prepared to commit.  This then could be the difference between talking about 
collaborative supply chains and actually implementing them, and reflects a low level of 
supply chain management maturity in this sample (see for example, Fawcett and Magnan, 
2002).   
For opportunistic behaviours, the differences are shown below in Figure 7-2.    
Figure 7-2 Differences between two the relationship archetypes - Opportunistic behaviours. 
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In Figure 7-2, the Y axis scale represents the mean level of ‘threat’ of the particular 
opportunistic behaviour (0 = very high threat, -4 = no threat).  For transactional 
relationships, the frequency of the variables exactly reflects the hypothesised sequence of 
opportunistic behaviours ranging from high levels of the less severe behaviour (social 
opportunism), to lower levels of more severe behaviour (illegal opportunism).  This same 
sequence is also generally reflected in the partnership behaviours, with the exception that 
partnerships generally experience more commercial opportunism than social opportunism.  
                                                 
53
 Colloquially known as “Bums, Budgets and Buildings” referring to the commitment of resources and assets such as: 
acts of hiring people, allocating money and building/buying buildings, all overt actions specifically aimed at meeting 
the joint goals of the two partner firms.  
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A possible explanation for this is that the relational closeness of partnership type 
relationships provides less opportunities for breaches in convention as social and relational 
norms have become embedded over time.  As a way around this social constraint, 
partnership suppliers revert to the use of coercive forms of commercial power instead.  
This was an unexpected finding considering that only 27% of suppliers in a partnership 
relationship have a high Strategic Power index rating.  Meaning that, generally the buyer is 
dominant and would be well positioned to fend off any attempts by suppliers wishing to 
manipulate their coercive power.  Indeed, this research has only recorded incidents of 
actual opportunistic behaviour, it could not determine if they were successful or not.   
The two linear trend lines in Figure 7-2 represent the same relationships as in the previous 
Figure 7-1, and show a converging trend as the differences become smaller with an 
increase in the severity of the behaviour.  Logically, this would suggest that the more 
opprobrious the behaviour, the less of a distinction the respondents would make between 
the two relationships as they view these behaviours with converging level of distaste.  It 
can be postulated that as the severity of the opportunistic behaviour increases, the less 
influential other relational and strategic considerations become.  This is important for the 
proposed DRD concept, as it supports the contention that relationships exist within a ZOT 
that are dynamically updated.   
7.4.2.1 Evidence of Actual Opportunistic Relationships 
Not only was this research attempting to measure the threat of opportunism, it was also 
attempting to measure the actual incidents of opportunistic behaviours.  As the 
measurement instrument combined the threat and actual incidence scales, the resulting 
means tended to reflect the fact that the majority of respondents rated their exchange 
partners as being threats only.  Thus, the mean values of all four dimensions of 
opportunism where rated exclusively in the threat range.  However, the centralising 
tendency of a mean disguises the fact that some respondents actually reported their 
exchange partners as being inherently opportunistic along one or more dimensions.  To 
investigate further, it was decided to count the frequency of cases that reported their 
exchange partner as being actually opportunistic (i.e. with a value of ≥  1 on the 
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opportunistic scale).  The following Figure 7-3 shows the percentage of cases that reported 
actual opportunistic relationships for each of the four dimensions.      
Figure 7-3 Percentage of cases reporting actual opportunistic relationships 
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This figure is both enlightening and disturbing at the same time.  Across all dimensions, 
the respondents rated their transactional relationship as being more opportunistic than the 
partnership relationship.  This provides further support for both H1a and also H2.  Of 
particular concern are the high levels of reported opportunistic cases for both types of 
relationships for both social opportunism (25.8% and 14.6%), and commercial 
opportunism (21.3% and 18%).  This would suggest that the majority of the ‘bad’ supply 
chain behaviour occurs at the more subtle end of the spectrum where norms are breached 
and coercive power is exercised to the detriment of the partner.  While it is to be expected 
that the less severe forms of opportunism would be more prevalent, it is the sheer 
frequency of these behaviours that is surprising with over one quarter (25.8%) of 
transactional relationships breaching social and relational norms some of the time, and 
nearly one fifth (18%) of partnership relationships experiencing the use of negative 
commercial power.         
The more severe behaviours also feature more frequently than desired.  Just over 10% of 
all exchange relationships seem to have experienced some quite questionable behaviour 
from their exchange partners in terms of unconscionable acts.  Both the transactional and 
partnership relationships experience quite similar levels of the two worst kinds of 
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opportunistic behaviours.  The fact that just over 2% of cases reported suspected or actual 
illegal behaviour from their exchange relationships is a matter of concern.  This frequency 
may actually be higher than reported as this research only examined existing supply chain 
relationships.  It can be argued that other relationships that have previously experienced 
these severe behaviours have already been terminated post a bifurcation, and thus have not 
been captured here.  For example, the experience of one respondent54 is summarised here: 
“These new people didn’t respect the contracts that were put in 
place…being a small business, a signed contract was absolutely 
meaningless in the respect of ‘what are you going to do about it’? Take 
them to court?  We haven’t got that sort of money to throw at them… we 
haven’t got the time” 
One possible mitigating factor is that these reported incidents are based on the 
respondent’s perceptions, who rightly or wrongly attribute opportunistic motivations to an 
observed event.  It has already been established that these perceived motivations could be 
mistaken.  Yet is has also been argued that from the victim’s perspective, the mere fact that 
they perceive an act as being opportunistic means to them that it is.  Thus, these results 
should not be easily dismissed due to attribution errors.   
In general, on every dimension partnership relationships have higher levels of 
collaboration and lower levels of opportunistic behaviour.  Specifically, there is a highly 
significant difference between the two relationships over all eight collaborative 
dimensions.  However, for the last three opportunistic behaviours, there is no statistical 
difference between the two relationship archetypes.  As other research has found 
significant value attributed to collaborative behaviours (Bititci et al., 2004; Tuominen, 
2004; Wilson and Jantrania, 1994), it is plausible, indeed logical for the DRD concept to 
state that as transactional relationships have higher levels of opportunism they are less 
valuable than partnerships relationships that possess higher levels of collaboration.       
This research distinguishes itself from previous studies in that it has been able to 
differentiate between two relationship archetypes solely on behaviours with a holistic 
                                                 
54
 Qualitative interview transcript - Firm 9. 
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administration of 12 different behavioural dimensions in one test.  Indeed, it was critical 
for the continuation of this research that this be the case.  For if there were no discernable 
differences between the relationship levels, then there can be no basis for one of the central 
tenants of this research, namely that exchange behaviours can initiate changes to 
relationship levels.  This being affirmed, the next step is to examine the actual behaviours 
in more detail, specifically this research attempts to measure how tolerant supply chain 
relationships are to behavioural perturbations.       
7.4.3 Examining Supply Chain Relationship Tolerance Levels 
Acknowledging the differences in relationship levels, the next logical step to progress the 
DRD concept is to move beyond recording current amounts of behaviour, to exploring the 
levels of tolerance supply chain relationships have to changes in these behaviours 
(hypotheses H3a-d to H5).  More specifically, the DRD concept predicts that each 
relationship type will have a zone of tolerance (ZOT) around the relational equilibrium, 
and these zones are the expression of the supply chain managers’ level of tolerance to any 
given action, behaviour or perceived behaviour of their exchange partner.  This ZOT gives 
rise to certain ‘threshold effects’ that exist at the boundaries (or upper and lower levels) of 
tolerance, beyond which dramatic changes in the system occur.  In Chaos parlance, these 
threshold effects are known as being on the ‘edge of chaos’ or at the point of bifurcation or 
dramatic change (Stacey et al., 2000).  These threshold effects surrounding the relationship 
equilibrium will now be examined in detail.  It is believed that this research is the first 
attempt to empirically measure these hypothesised ZOTs.    
7.4.3.1 Establishing the Upper and Lower ZOTs 
There are two essential points to consider when establishing upper and lower theoretical 
ZOTs.  Firstly, it must be recognised that a ZOT exists within the cognitive processes of 
individuals.  It is the individual supply chain manager (or boundary spanner) that manages 
the boundary space between exchange partners, and is required to make continuous 
assessments of the performance and behaviour of their supply chain partners.  Thus, they 
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formulate an opinion of a particular supplier based on the available information55 and 
intuitively establish a ZOT if one did not already exist.  Secondly, this assessment process 
is both complex and dynamic.  The boundary spanning manager forms their assessment on 
a continual and cyclic basis utilising systems thinking continuous loops that incorporates 
both positive and negative feedback (Dickson et al., 2001).  This process specifically 
allows for both a correct, and/or incorrect attribution to the partner of opportunistic or 
good-will motivations linked to the observed behaviours.  Both types of assessments are 
equally valid for ZOT formation, as the nature of exchange relationships mean that an 
exchange partner’s actions run the risk of being misinterpreted at any time.  Thus, the 
formulation of a boundary spanner’s ZOT is individualistic, dynamic, continually 
updating, and also constrained by the strategic and contextual situation of the relationship.  
To an extent, these effects moderate the options available to the supply chain manager.  
For example, when asked what would cause a manager to terminate a supply relationship 
one respondent56 stated; 
“[the decision] would have to be tempered with the position of power.  
[With] some of our suppliers we have no discretion, and we [must] use 
them.  So obviously our tolerance is a lot higher”57   
The process of measuring active ZOTs was not easy, and the results presented in this 
research should be considered as an initial contribution to the subject, not a definitive final 
statement.  Theoretically, the assessment or modification of any ZOT needs a reference 
point or benchmark, and the DRD concept posits that the prime exchange relationship 
reference point would logically be the current relationship equilibrium.  Hence, the 
measurement of a ZOT should be fixed from this reference point, and the measurement 
instrument used in this research allowed for this.  The respondents where initially asked to 
rate their transactional and partnership suppliers in terms of the percentage-of-time they 
currently enacted a particular behavioural dimension.  They were then asked how much 
more or less of that behaviour they would need to see to affect a significant change in the 
relationship level.  This process allowed the establishment of individual ZOTs, and when 
                                                 
55
 There is every chance that this assessment will be based on incomplete and asymmetric information, thus 
misconceptions are an inherent part of formulating ZOTs. 
56
 Qualitative interview transcript - Firm 11. 
57
 The words surrounded by [ ] have been inserted by the researcher to aid clarity.  
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aggregated together with the entire sample, a picture of the industry’s ZOT or the generally 
accepted levels of tolerance to variations in exchange behaviour begins to emerge.   
To establish the validity of these ZOTs for the DRD concept, this research hypothesised 
that the upper and lower ZOTs should be distinguishable from their reference point, in this 
case the relationship equilibrium (see hypotheses H3a-d).  For each ZOT (upper and lower) 
a Pairwise t test was conducted, and it was found that every pair (the ZOT and its 
equilibrium reference point) were indeed highly significantly different.  The following 
Figures (7-4 and 7-5) graph the ZOTs for both collaborative and opportunistic behaviours.  
Note that only the transactional relationship was used in this test as it was the only one that 
allowed for the measurement of relational movement, both up and down (including 
termination).     
Figure 7-4 Relationship equilibrium (Reference point) and upper and lower ZOT for collaborative 
behaviours 
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Maintaining consistency, the collaborative behaviours in the above figure have been rank 
ordered from the highest current mean to the lowest to demonstrate the trends.  However, 
the following figure showing the upper and lower ZOTs for opportunistic behaviours is 
ordered according to the conceptual continuum of opportunistic behaviours.   
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Figure 7-5 Relationship equilibrium (Reference point) and upper and lower ZOT for opportunistic 
behaviours 
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7.4.3.2 Adaptations and Responsiveness of ZOTs 
The above charts demonstrate the existence of ZOTs positioned around the relationship 
equilibrium or reference point as hypothesised.  The upper (red) and lower (green) ZOT 
lines represent the threshold point or the bifurcation point where relationship is said to 
fundamental change if exceeded.  Logically, if the upper ZOT is exceeded then the 
relationship would evolve into a higher level relationship archetype, and conversely if the 
lower level is exceeded the relationship could potentially be terminated.  The DRD concept 
would suggest that the state space in between the relationship equilibrium and the upper 
and lower ZOTs represent the area or zone where relational perturbations and minor 
infractions can be tolerated or ignored without major problems or change (Anselmi and 
Marquardt, 2000; Knoppen and Christiaanse, 2004).  One possible reason for this tolerance 
has been offered by Gundlach et al., (1995) who suggests that “…parties may have been 
tolerant of minor opportunistic infractions if they perceived that the relationship was 
heading in the right overall direction” (p. 87).  Indeed, this is not to suggest that these 
issues are forgotten or totally ignored.  Rather, the boundary spanning supply chain 
manager would intuitively update their perceptions and probability estimations of repeat 
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infringements by the partner of concern.  Thus, it is said that ZOTs are dynamic and evolve 
over time.   
Further, the ZOT state space is theoretically the expression or the outworking of many 
dimensions, and as such represents the summation of many underlying constructs.  For 
example, the ZOT could represent the level of commitment shown by the party toward the 
other actor, it could also represent the ability of the actors to switch suppliers, also it may 
be the end result of other strategic and macro-environmental forces that make an actor 
either more or less tolerant.  The ZOT could also represent the amount of resources 
committed to relationship specific investments (Skarmeas et al., 2002).  For example, if the 
resource commitment level is high then it is suggested that the ZOT should be larger (less 
sensitive).  On the other hand, if the resource commitment is low then logically the ZOT 
should be smaller (more sensitive).  While, not specifically tested here, other empirical 
evidence demonstrates that asymmetric relationship specific investments do indeed result 
in negotiation ‘hold-outs’ (Bensaou and Anderson, 1999), thus supporting the contention 
that resource commitment levels modifies an actor’s ZOT.  
As for the sensitivity of the ZOT, this can be represented by the distance from the 
relationship equilibrium to the ZOT line, or the size of the zone.  Theoretically, the smaller 
the distance, the more sensitive the is relationship to increases or decreases of that 
behaviour, while larger ZOTs show less sensitivity, more adaptability and are less likely to 
bifurcate.  For collaborative behaviours, rank ordering the mean equilibrium highlights an 
interesting phenomena.  Diagrammatically, Figure 7-4 (page 278 above) shows that as the 
relationship equilibrium decreases the upper ZOT grows larger (becomes less sensitive), 
and the lower ZOT grows smaller (become more sensitive).  At the extremes, the upper 
ZOT for relationship specific investments (UZOT RSIX  = 3.3825) is 2.3 times larger than 
the other end, being the upper ZOT for social and relationship norms (UZOT &S RnormsX  = 
1.2300) showing quite a large variation, see Figure 7-6 for the example.   
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Figure 7-6 Changes in sensitivity of upper ZOTs for two collaborative behavioural extremes 
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Thus, the DRD concept suggests that as the frequency of a given collaborative behaviour 
decreases (as in relationship specific investments), the boundary spanning manager 
becomes less satisfied with the performance of the partner, and hence dynamically 
modifies their expectations by requiring more of that behaviour in future before it registers.  
As a consequence, the ZOT grows and becomes less sensitive, therefore the exchange 
partner would have to demonstrate considerably more of that behaviour before they could 
improve their relationship.  Conversely, if the frequency of a collaborative behaviour is 
already high (as in social and relational norms), then the ZOT becomes more sensitive to 
positive changes, and is more likely to bifurcate toward a higher level relationship.      
A similar phenomenon can be observed with the lower ZOT for collaborative behaviours, 
except in this case the direction is reversed from that of the upper ZOT.  Here it can be 
seen that the ZOT reduces or becomes more sensitive as the behavioural equilibrium 
reduces.  It is likely that the awareness of the supply chain manager who observes the 
decrease or the absence of a collaborative behaviour would become heightened, as any 
reduction of a desired behaviour would be a cause of concern for management.  The 
relative sizes of the upper and lower ZOTs for all collaborative behaviours are shown in 
Table 7-2 below for comparison. 
 
Relationship Specific Investments 
Less sensitive to adaptations, low probability 
of bifurcating. 
 
 
 
 
 
Social and Relational Norms 
More sensitive to adaptations, high 
probability of bifurcating. 
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Table 7-2 Size of upper and lower ZOTs for collaborative behaviours 
Size of ZOT* Exchange Behaviour 
Lower ZOT Upper ZOT 
Social and Relational Norms 2.460 1.230** 
Trust and Commitment 1.964 1.967 
Conflict Resolution 1.710 2.499 
Goal Congruence 1.647 2.661 
Communication 1.704 2.577 
Shared Risks and Rewards 1.427 2.986 
Information Sharing 1.473 3.044 
Relationship Specific Investments 1.037 3.383** 
* The absolute difference between relationship equilibrium and upper and lower bifurcation points. 
** See Figure 7-6 for a direct comparison. 
 
Nevertheless, the upper ZOT for opportunistic behaviours display slightly different 
properties.  The relative size of the upper and lower ZOTs for all four opportunistic 
behaviours is displayed in Table 7-3 for direct comparison.   
Table 7-3 Size of upper and lower ZOTs for opportunistic behaviours 
Size of ZOT* Exchange Behaviour 
Lower ZOT Upper ZOT 
Social Opportunism 2.210 2.476 
Commercial Opportunism 1.918 2.348 
Unconscionable Opportunism 1.416 2.513 
Illegal Opportunism 0.893 2.309 
* The absolute difference between relationship equilibrium and upper and lower bifurcation points. 
 
Of note in Table 7-3 is that the size of upper ZOTs remain relatively stable across all four 
opportunistic dimensions even though the severity and the odiousness of the behaviours 
increase.  No observable trend emerges, and this may suggest that a supply chain manager 
views all forms of opportunism as equally distasteful, and hence cannot distinguish 
between the different types of behaviour.  While this seems logical, the data does not 
support this contention as the inter-item correlations are all below 0.8 suggesting that 
respondents do actually discriminate between the constructs, and this is further supported 
by a series of pairwise t tests that show significant differences between all pairs (H3a-d). 
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Rather, for the upper ZOT the differentiating factor could be the line drawn between the 
threat of opportunistic behaviour and actual opportunistic behaviour.  For three of the 
variables, the manager was prepared to accept some level of manifested opportunistic 
behaviour, whilst for the last variable (illegal opportunism) an increase in the threat level 
alone is enough to initiate a bifurcation.  This is graphically illustrated in Figure 7-5 above 
where the red upper ZOT line is above zero (manifested behaviour) for the first three 
dimensions, and then dips below zero (threat only of the behaviour) for illegal 
opportunism.  Thus, while the size of the upper ZOT for opportunistic behaviours remains 
relatively consistent, the distinguishing influence is whether the supply chain manager is 
prepared to accept or tolerate manifested opportunistic acts from their partners, or whether 
to terminate the relationship on potential threat alone.    
The ZOT for both behaviours have been graphically summarised in Figures 7-7 and 7-8 
below showing the relative size or sensitivity of both the upper and lower ZOTs relative to 
each supply chain behaviour.   
Figure 7-7 Relative size of the upper and lower ZOTs for each collaborative behaviour. 
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Figure 7-8 Relative size of the upper and lower ZOTs for each opportunistic behaviour. 
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Finally, the lower ZOT for opportunistic behaviours displays a trend similar to the lower 
ZOT for collaborative behaviours.  However, the conceptual meaning of the two ZOTs is 
quite different.  The DRD concept would suggest that if an exchange partner reduces or 
stops behaving collaboratively and breaches the lower ZOT, the relationship would at 
some stage be terminated.  On the surface, this deduction appears to be quite logical.  
Nevertheless, if an exchange partner reduces the threat of opportunism and breaches the 
lower ZOT then this is said to positively influence the relationship, potentially moving it to 
a higher level.  It seems that the logic for the second proposition is much less tenable, as 
reducing or eliminating bad behaviour alone would not be enough to encourage a supply 
chain manager to promote a relationship.  More likely, the supply chain manager would 
want to see increases in collaborative behaviours in addition to the reduction or elimination 
of the bad behaviours before changing relationship levels.  Thus, this deduction is not 
overly useful for explaining the likely effect of reducing opportunistic behaviours, only 
except that it helps the relationship in a general sense.   
There is one other possible explanation for the close grouping of the values for the lower 
ZOT for opportunistic behaviours.  This has to do with the methodology and the 
coarseness of the categories of the two-part opportunistic scale.  The mean values of the 
current relational equilibria for all four variables range from -1 high threat ( X  = -1.0753) 
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to -3 low threat ( X  = -2.9663), while the minimum possible value was - 4 (no threat).  
However, for a scale ranging between - 4 to zero, this does not leave much room or many 
scale categories (five) for respondents to record their lower ZOT perceptions when 
conceptually the responses must be lower than the stated equilibrium.  Hence, the potential 
for some form of end-loading cannot be ruled out (Givon and Shapira, 1984).  Indeed, as a 
result it would be prudent not to speculate further on the likely outcome or influence of the 
lower ZOT for opportunistic behaviours except in a general sense only.   
7.4.4 Examining Relationship Bifurcations 
Under the chaos paradigm, a bifurcation means that a system splits into two possible paths 
and subsequent iterations of the system oscillate between the two paths (Peters, 1991; 
Tsonis, 1992).  Thus, a bifurcation refers to the point of division or critical value where a 
system splits into two.  Under the DRD paradigm, a bifurcation retains its chaotic meaning 
in that it refers to the point of dramatic system change at a critical value.  However, it 
differs only slightly in that, once a system splits or bifurcates, it does not then oscillate 
between the two randomly, but instead follows a new path almost exclusively.  In this 
sense the supply chain manager has a choice of two possible bifurcation outcomes once 
they perceive that their ZOT or critical value has been breached.  They can either choose to 
remain within the system’s ZOT and not bifurcate by maintaining the current relationship 
as it is by adaptation, or they can react and bifurcate the system by changing the nature of 
the exchange relationship.       
The DRD concept states that as exchange relationships evolve, they will be able to adapt to 
changes in the levels of various behaviours.  They will remain within a perceptual 
threshold level or ZOT until such a point as the behaviours or forces become severe 
enough to exceed this threshold, thus initiating a relationship bifurcation (see hypotheses 
H6a to H7b).  Whilst the relationship moves around the equilibrium and within the ZOT, it 
is thought that no bifurcations would occur.  Rather, small dynamic adaptations are made 
to both the relationship equilibrium, and also to the ZOT of the supply chain manager as it 
changes over time.  In other words, the relationship remains in a state of order until a 
bifurcation occurs.  Subsequently, a period of chaos prevails until the relationship is 
reordered (such as self-organisation) into a new level or it is terminated.   
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With regards to exchange behaviours, it is thought that a relationship bifurcation could be 
initiated either by one of four events, thus resulting in one of two possible post bifurcation 
relational outcomes.  These events and their related outcomes are; 
1. Breaching the upper ZOT for collaborative behaviours causes a relationship level 
increase. 
2. Breaching the lower ZOT for collaborative behaviours causes either a relationship 
level decrease or a termination. 
3. Breaching the upper ZOT for opportunistic behaviours causes either a relationship 
level decrease or a termination. 
4. Breaching the lower ZOT for opportunistic behaviours causes a relationship level 
increase.               
As it transpired, there is some contention concerning the fourth path, due to measurement 
validity issues of the lower ZOT for opportunistic behaviours, and also the founding logic 
is much less robust than the other three paths.  Hence, the lower ZOT for opportunistic 
behaviours is excluded from further analysis and discussion.   
Potentially, moving to higher levels of relationship may be a better and more palatable 
proposition for an existing relationship rather than an awkward and messy termination.  It 
would seem then, that upwards movements would be more likely than the degradation or 
termination of the relationship.  Yet the data shows something different for collaborative 
behaviours.  Here, the mean for the collective upper ZOT for collaborative behaviours is 
larger and less sensitive ( X  = 2.5438) than the collective mean for the lower more 
sensitive ZOT ( X  = 1.6782).  It seems then that according to the data, a negative 
bifurcation would be more likely as the supply chain manager would tend to act more in 
response to reductions of a collaborative behaviour than any increase of the same 
behaviour.  This leads to the next question; what causes bifurcations?     
7.4.4.1 What Causes Bifurcations? 
There is one noticeable aspect of the DRD concept that is still open to conjecture.  That is; 
if supply chain behaviours alone can cause relational bifurcations as suggested, then what 
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specific behaviour or combination of behaviours, if any, would initiate the bifurcation?  
Unfortunately, it cannot be clearly determined from this research if relational bifurcations 
are initiated by a single behaviour, a certain combination of behaviours, or all of them 
together?  This issue emerged post analysis as a research design limitation, and would be 
an interesting area for further research.  Nevertheless, one can provide some initial logical 
and experiential deductions, and while certainty is presently beyond this research, a general 
idea of relationship bifurcations can be formulated as follows.    
For collaborative behaviours, it is unlikely that breaching any single upper ZOT by itself 
would cause a positive bifurcation resulting in the relationship attaining a higher level.  It 
is suggested here that no individual collaborative behaviour is of sufficient consequence to 
initiate a positive bifurcation in its own right.  More likely, it would take a combination of 
behavioural increases, demonstrated over a sufficient period of time before any movement 
to a higher level of relationship is initiated.  In other words, improvement in any single 
collaborative behavioural dimension would normally be insufficient to breach the ZOT, 
thus the relationship would simply adapt and not bifurcate.  Hence, for a positive relational 
movement the supply chain manager would need to be convinced, and see improvements 
over a range of behavioural dimensions with at least one dimension breaching the upper 
ZOT.  This is supported in part by the collaborative behaviour data that shows the upper 
ZOTs generally possessing larger and less sensitive zones compared to the corresponding 
lower ZOTs. 
Conversely, while improvements in several collaborative dimensions may be needed for a 
positive bifurcation to a higher relationship, it is suggested that for collaborative 
behaviours a negative bifurcation can be caused by the reduction of any single dimension, 
or with more certainty, multiple dimensions.  As such, the supply chain manager should be 
sensitive to any reductions in the current performance of their suppliers, and this is again 
borne out by the lower ZOT being smaller (more sensitive) than the upper ZOT.  For 
example, if the adherence to joint goals is compromised by the lack of progress by the 
partner (whilst all the other dimensions remain the same) and the lower ZOT is breached, 
then this one dimension should be sufficient to initiate a negative bifurcation.  Previous 
research has noted the quite detrimental impact on exchange relationships of only one type 
of negative behaviour (Hunt and Nevin, 1974; Kwon and Suh, 2005).  Furthermore, a 
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negative bifurcation is much more likely if multiple ZOTs are breached.  Indeed, some 
collaborative behaviours are more valued than others by different boundary managers at 
different times and stages of the relationship development.  This again hints at the 
dynamism and complexities of relationship evolution within supply chain relationships.    
For opportunistic behaviours, it is suggested that an increase in any one dimension through 
the upper ZOT would be a sufficient raison d’être for a negative bifurcation, possibly even 
resulting in a termination.  The data shows that the bifurcation point for social, commercial 
and even unconscionable opportunism is above the threat line indicating that the supply 
chain manager would need to see observable and clear evidence of the act before a 
bifurcation would occur.  Whereas, the upper ZOT for illegal opportunism is below the 
threat line, indicating than even a rise in the threat levels is sufficient to initiate a 
bifurcation.  This gives an idea of where a relationship is likely to bifurcate, yet it is argued 
that it only needs one of the opportunistic behaviours enacted in isolation (not a 
combination) to negatively change or terminate a relationship.  
In summary, predicting which behaviour will initiate a negative bifurcation and when is 
problematic and cluttered with perceptual impedimenta.  Hence, this whole process is 
imbued with complexity and dynamism as befitting the dynamic inter-organisational 
behavioural context of supply chain relationships.  As a result, the above discussion relies 
on both deductive logic and also empirical evidence.  Future research covering these points 
would be a useful addition to the DRD concept. 
7.4.5 Examining Relationship Movement Constraints through Strategic 
Behaviours 
The final phase of the research looks at the impact of exogenous forces on the formulation 
and practice of ZOTs and bifurcations.  The first hypothesis for this section states that 
buyers with high strategic power would tend to form partnership type relationships (H8).  
The analysis supports this contention as those suppliers who are defined as ‘partners’ tend 
to be the source of the more critical or expensive inputs or resources into the firm.  
Therefore, the supply chain manager would be motivated to form closer, more cooperative 
links with these suppliers in order to secure supply through performance monitoring and 
governance links (Tuominen, 2004; Wagner, Macbeth and Boddy, 2002).  This then is the 
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explanation behind the link between high strategic power and higher partnership type 
relationships.    
Next, it was hypothesised (H9a) that those firms with low strategic power would have more 
sensitive collaborative lower ZOTs than those with high strategic power.  Whilst for 
opportunistic behaviours, those firms with low strategic power would have more sensitive 
upper ZOTs than those with high power (H9b).  Meaning that those firms with low power 
and more sensitive ZOTs would be more likely to negatively bifurcate potentially 
terminating the relationship.  Again, support was found for the collaborative variables in 
hypothesis H9a as those firms with higher power who have invested time, effort and 
resources in forming integrated collaborative links with a supplier were found to have 
larger ZOTs, or a higher tolerance toward reduced levels of collaboration.  In addition, 
hypothesis H9b supported this contention by examining increases in opportunistic 
behaviours, but while producing weaker results, it still confirmed the conceptual argument.         
Integration and cooperation are important goals for efficient supply chains (Burt, Dobler 
and Starling, 2003), and this takes considerable effort in the form of managerial time and 
resources to implement.  If these efforts are not to be wasted, then maintaining an ongoing 
relationship is an important goal for the partnership.  Therefore, if a relationship with a 
particular key supplier is important and the buyer becomes somewhat dependent, they 
would hence be more tolerant of reduced collaborative or increased opportunistic 
behaviours.  This example demonstrates the constraining or liberalising effects of the 
strategic behaviour mediating variable used in this research.  Thus from the results, it can 
be seen that strategic power or the strategic behaviour variables do indeed influence the 
size and sensitivities of the supply chain manager’s ZOT for both collaborative and 
opportunistic behaviours.  This finding adds to the central tenant of the Political Economy 
Paradigm that positions supply chains within their wider environmental context (Achrol et 
al., 1983; Dwyer and Welsh, 1985; Stern and Reve, 1980).  Yet, this research has gone one 
step further and has demonstrated how these political and economic forces help shape and 
mould the ability of supply chain exchange relationships to change and adapt over time. 
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7.4.6 The DRD Concept - Summarising the Theoretical Logic 
In summarising the above discussion, it is now important to clearly state the logic of the 
Dynamic Relational Development concept.  The following points attempt to succinctly 
trace the sequential thinking behind this research effort and paradigm development 
process.   
• Firstly, supply chain exchange relationships exist within a complex and dynamic 
environment, both at the firm level and the macro-economic level.    
• Supply chain exchange relationships are initially formed to satisfy the need to secure 
resources, inputs or access to markets or other economic reasons.  In addition, 
relational aspects such as reputation and compatibility are also of importance and 
should form part of the partner evaluation and selection process. 
• Once an exchange relationship has been established, dynamic relational aspects such 
as social and relational norms, trust and commitment follow as the interaction levels 
deepen between the dyadic partners over time. 
• All supply chain behaviours enacted within relationships can be grouped into two 
major categories.  They are either ‘collaborative’ or ‘opportunistic’ behaviours. 
• Collaborative behaviours are said to positively influence the relationship, whilst 
opportunistic behaviours are said to negatively influence the relationship or even 
terminate the relationship.  Thus, movement between relationship archetypes is said 
to be based, at least in part, on the type and amount of supply chain behaviours 
enacted within the dyadic relationship.      
• Exchange relationships in a dyadic sense will remain stable as long as the basin of 
attraction remains the same, i.e. the fundamental rationale for the existence of the 
relationship does not change.  Hence, over time the behaviours enacted in the 
partnership will approximate a form of relationship equilibrium.  This in turn helps 
establish the norms of behaviour that assists in the governance of the exchange. 
• Within this relational equilibrium, exchange relationships will be tolerant of given 
levels of partner behaviour (both collaborative and opportunistic) but not of others.  
Thus, each relationship will possess a zone of tolerance (ZOT).  
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• A ZOT is a cognitively based assessment formed by boundary spanning personnel 
such as a supply chain manager.  These ZOTs can be tactile such as established 
policies or procedures, or they can be intangible perceptions formed in the mind of 
the key boundary spanning individual.  Usually, a ZOT is a mixture of both. 
• The tolerance levels are unique to each individual and context, however general 
aggregate patterns can be observed. 
• The ZOT is dynamically updated as the relationship progresses, but the size of the 
ZOT is predicated on the level of each behavioural dimension currently being 
experienced in the relationship (the reference point), and also exogenous strategic 
behavioural forces.  
• Once the behaviour or lack of behaviour becomes too much or too extreme to ignore, 
the supply chain relationship is said to have reached the edge of chaos, and if pushed 
further will breach a ZOT, thus initiating a significant relationship change or 
bifurcation event. 
• A bifurcation event occurs once the threshold level or critical value has been 
surpassed, in other words a ZOT or multiple ZOTs have been breached.  A 
bifurcation leaves the decision maker with two basic options, either to remain in the 
current relationships and adapt the ZOT, or bifurcate and fundamentally change the 
nature of the relationship.     
• When a relationship bifurcates the new relationship will be predicated at least in part 
by the pattern of pre-bifurcation interactions, if it is not terminated. 
• Severe opportunistic behaviours would increasingly override other relational and 
strategic behaviour considerations when initiating a bifurcation. 
• Thus, the DRD concept posits that supply chain exchange relationships change and 
evolve over time in a dynamic and evolutionally nature.   
The results of the hypotheses testing phase have provided some interesting theoretical and 
managerial implications concerning dynamic supply chain relationship movements.  The 
following section will provide further discussion on these results and their latent meaning 
to theory.      
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7.5 Theoretical and Managerial Contributions 
7.5.1 Contributions to Theory and Method 
This section seeks to succinctly highlight those areas where a noticeable contribution has 
been made to theory and method, or where a different perspective adds new insight.   
7.5.1.1 New Conceptual Continuum of Opportunism  
Firstly, much previous research work and theorising such as in Transaction Cost 
economics (Williamson, 1979, 1985) and Agency theory (Carlos, 1992; Eisenhardt, 1989) 
have focused on the mitigation of opportunistic behaviours.  These works have been 
founded on the concept that opportunism is generally initiated by rational actors motivated 
by self-interested seeking, but using guileful tactics (Williamson, 1985).  Hence, for the 
Rational school theories the mitigation of opportunism plays a central role in their 
theorising, and it has also dictated much of the research agenda in the area (Bensaou and 
Anderson, 1999; Carr and Brower, 2000; Hill, 1990; Wathne and Heide, 2000).  
Opportunism is one of the foundational behavioural assumptions within this school, yet, as 
a construct it seems to be surprisingly underdeveloped.  Most efforts utilise multi-item 
measures to report on opportunism as a single construct (John, 1984; Provan and Skinner, 
1989).  Perhaps the construct was considered conceptually complete at the time, however, 
this research has demonstrated that opportunism is indeed more multifaceted, and complex 
than first thought. 
As a unique offering, this research proposes that all opportunistic behaviours can be 
conceptually categorised into one of four sub-dimensions, each emphasising different 
aspects of opportunistic behaviour.  These dimensions are arranged along a unidimensional 
continuum that are anchored at one end by the slight or more subtle forms (social 
opportunism), and at the other end by the most severe forms (illegal opportunism).  
Further, the continuum is underpinned by the degree of legality of the opportunistic acts.  
These range from the more subtle acts that, whilst not breaking any specific laws, do in 
fact breach social and relational conventions and can thus constitute an opportunistic act, to 
the other end where clear and specific violations of contracts, national or international law 
occur.  It is proposed that the descriptive labels of the four new dimensions be; Social 
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Opportunism, Commercial opportunism, Unconscionable opportunism and Illegal 
opportunism.  The conceptual distinction between these dimensions has been covered in 
detail in chapter three, however, for clarity the new continuum is again presented below in 
Figure 7-9.  
Figure 7-9 Continuum of opportunism in exchange relationships. 
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collaborative dimensions and some dependant variable.  Thus, the literature has developed 
a wide and exhaustive bank of valid instruments for single behavioural dimensions, but has 
done so in a piecemeal fashion, usually at the expense of understanding the construct as a 
whole.       
As such, it is contended that any researcher seeking to holistically measure the concept of 
supply chain collaboration would need some form of composite scale in order to do so.  In 
response, this research offers another unique typology that includes the bulk of the 
individual collaborative behaviours identified in literature.  It has done so by grouping 
similar constructs into higher order constructs.  For example, the quite similar behaviours 
of ‘communication’ and ‘information sharing’ are grouped together under the higher order 
construct of ‘active disclosure’ meaning a willingness to share sensitive information.  In 
this way a new parsimonious typology containing four new collaborative constructs is 
offered to meet the aims of economy in research.  However, it does marginally sacrifice 
conceptual breadth of the individual dimensions, as the aggregation of the variables in this 
manner tends to decrease the granulation or detail of the lower order constructs.  
Nevertheless, the benefits gained by having a parsimonious measure of the complete 
construct of collaboration should outweigh the negatives.  The new typology and its 
underlying constructs are shown in Figure 7-10 as follows. 
Figure 7-10 Consolidated typology of collaborative behaviours 
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This new typology is an important addition as it is a well accepted fact the supply chain 
cooperation, and in its fullest extent collaboration, have been proven to be a superior 
philosophical approach to that of adversarial arm’s-length exchanges (Ayres, 2004; 
Ellinger et al., 2000; Stank et al., 1999).  This new conceptualisation of collaboration 
should allow researchers and managers alike to measure this quite diverse and complex 
construct.  
7.5.1.3 Contributions to Exchange Relationship Methodology   
Offering new conceptual continuums of collaborative and opportunistic behaviours is one 
thing, it is another to develop valid measures and scales for each of the constructs 
measured under these new typologies.  In this respect, this research offers a unique set of 
parsimonious multi-item scales and their corresponding survey instruments to measure the 
new dimensions of both the major behavioural types.   
7.5.1.3.1 Multi-Item Scales for the Major Behaviours 
A set of multi-item scales for each behavioural construct were developed utilising 
Churchill’s (1979) paradigm for developing better measures.  In this respect, these items 
have gone through exhaustive pre-testing and various iterations to validate and improve the 
scales.  Hence, these multi-item scales were developed under a four stage approach58.  The 
first stage harvested from the literature an exhaustive list of scales and items used in 
previous research settings and resulted in an initial list containing 326 items.  The next step 
involved the examination of face validity of the items utilising three expert judges, and this 
purified the overall list to a potential 88 items.  Stage three consisted of a series of five in-
depth qualitative interviews with industry experts to examine not only the items 
themselves, but also the conceptual typologies of the two major behaviours.  The fourth 
stage was conducted utilising a formal confirmatory Q-Sort methodology with a panel of 
thirteen independent judges.  Derived from the inter-judge reliabilities, a final list 
comprising 37 items were used in the final instrument (see scale items at Appendix 5).  
The final reliabilities were examined using Chronbach’s Alpha, and all alphas were within 
the guidelines (Nunnally, 1967) ranging from 0.612 to 0.818, with an average of 0.712. 
                                                 
58
 See Section 5.4.2 and the following sections for a full description of the development approach and results.  
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For reasons of parsimony, these scales were developed utilising on average only three 
items per scale.  Whilst, this is considered quite conservative, the fact that acceptable 
alphas were achieved attests not only to the rigor of the development process, but also the 
strength of the scales themselves.  It is almost certain that relaxing the ‘three items per 
scale’ rule would produce higher alphas, but at the expense of parsimony and would also 
include the need for re-verification.  Thus, these new scales should be considered 
sufficiently robust for use in future research and are offered here for that purpose. 
Further, the grouping of multiple dimensions of collaborative behaviours into a 
consolidated typology allowed, perhaps uniquely, the development of a measurement 
instrument that is capable of capturing the generic construct called ‘supply chain 
collaboration’ in a holistic manner.               
7.5.1.3.2 Measurement Instruments for the Major Behaviours 
In addition to the new multi-item scales, this research was also able to build, test and 
validate two new measurement instruments in the form of an 11 point collaboration scale, 
and a 15 point opportunism scale (see Figures 5.4 and 5.6 respectively in chapter five).  
Both of these scales are able to measure the frequency of a behaviour in a way that solves 
the problem of systematic interactions occurring with different dominate scales of 
activities.  It allows the cross-comparison of behaviours that occur at different frequencies 
and also different magnitudes by reducing the scale to a ‘percentage of the time’ 
measurement, and thus should be quite generalisable for other research contexts.  
The new 15 point opportunism scale is particularly relevant for measuring what is a quite 
socially troubling and complex behaviour.  The difficulty with trying to measure 
‘opportunism’ is that the threat of the behaviour is as important as the actual incidents of 
opportunism themselves.  Hence, as the threat of opportunism is sufficient to modify 
exchange structures and relational perspectives, it had to be included in the same scale.  
The survey data indicates that this scale did indeed capture both these dimensions 
seamlessly, and again is offered as a contribution to the field.  This two dimension 
approach removes some of the conceptual difficulties previously experienced with 
researching this difficult behavioural construct (John, 1984).  
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7.5.1.4 The Dynamic Relational Development Concept and the 
Identification and Measurement of ZOTs  
The DRD concept as espoused provides a different perspective concerning supply chain 
exchange relationships.  In particular, two key concepts emerge as a useful addition to the 
theory of inter-organisational exchange.  Firstly, the idea that supply chain relationships 
evolve and emerge is in no way new or unique, yet little has previously been done to show 
how they evolve.  Thus, the DRD concept offered here shows that enacted supply chain 
behaviours are able to change and modify existing supply chain relationships that then 
reflect changes across their relationship level archetypes.  Hence, supply chain 
relationships can evolve based on enacted behaviours alone.        
Secondly, this research has been able to identify and then measure the phenomena of a 
perceptual ZOT for each supply chain relationship.  Intuitively, all actors possess some 
form of private judgement or assessment of their supply chain partners, yet this is often not 
articulated until assertive action is required.  Being such a personalised and subjective 
assessment that melds many different perspectives and inputs, it has been a difficult 
concept to define and then demonstrate.  Nevertheless, this research has been able to 
operationalise a personal ZOT that exists in conceptual form utilising the language and 
logic of Chaos/Complexity theory.  The breaching of this ZOT would then initiate a 
relationship bifurcation.  This research has also demonstrated that ZOTs differ across 
relationship archetypes, and also that the upper and lower bifurcation points are also 
different to each other.  This knowledge then provides a somewhat unique picture of 
relationship break points and tolerance levels, and also gives an indication of likely 
situations that could possibly initiate a bifurcation.   
Conversely, there are many reasons why a ZOT would remain relatively stable over time.  
Firstly, investments, resources and other sunk costs within a relationship tend not to be 
wholly recoverable, thus a proportion would be at risk or lost if the relationship was 
terminated.  Under the TCE paradigm, this is commonly known as asset specificity and 
other researchers have confirmed that high asset specificity helps to maintain exchange 
relationships (Pilling, Crosby and Jackson, 1994).  Secondly, the Resource Dependence 
theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) would argue that those partners that provide important 
or critical resources cannot be easily changed or replaced, hence the tolerance levels would 
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increase, and this has been observed in this research.  Finally, organisations tend to have a 
degree of natural inertia when it comes to change.  Some firms are more responsive to 
opportunities than others, but generally it takes some effort to initiate and achieve change.  
Geser (1992) describes organisations as being “rigid actors” (p. 433) as any change is seen 
as being undesirable and the status quo is often preferred even if it is less favourable.  
Thus, while this research has identified the ZOT break point, it has also proposed that the 
zone itself is the end product of a supply chain manager’s dynamic and complex 
amorphous assessments and perceptions of the other partner’s behaviour.  Therefore, these 
ideas expressed in the DRD concept should be an addition to the field of exchange 
relationship management.   
7.5.1.5 The Application of the DRD Concept to Chaos/Complexity Theory 
Chaos/Complexity theory deals with those systems that display attributes that are non-
linear and dynamic in their behaviour.  In this respect it focuses on those systems that are 
at the edge of chaos and subsequent bifurcation events, and is replete with rich descriptions 
and explanations.  However, one area where Chaos/Complexity theory is silent concerns 
the adaptations that are made within a system that does not ultimately bifurcate, such as 
those found within a ZOT.  There are no explanations for the current trajectory of a system 
beyond the pulling power of the prevailing strange attractor (Gleick, 1988).  In the case of 
exchange relationships that are complex and dynamic human interactions, the concepts of 
Chaos/Complexity theory could benefit from the examination of system states that 
demonstrate elements of change or evolution yet do not ultimately bifurcate.  Such systems 
could possible show attributes that can be likened to threshold effects or zones of 
tolerance.  Hence, this research advances Chaos/Complexity theory incrementally by 
demonstrating and actually measuring such effects within a dynamic social system, in this 
case exchange relationships.  It clearly shows that evolving social systems have zones that 
are resistant to small or minor perturbations that allow adaptations to the trajectory of the 
system, thus avoiding major bifurcation events.   
This research also adds to the theory by suggesting that system bifurcations can be initiated 
in one of two ways.  Firstly, a bifurcation can be initiated through a singular major event or 
shift in the strange attractor forcing the relationship on to a new trajectory.  Here, either a 
Chapter Seven – Discussion 
 
299 
discrete episode of opportunistic behaviour or a shift such as a strategic change in 
procurement needs, will fundamentally change the nature of the relationship.  Secondly, a 
bifurcation may occur through a series of small one-off events or repetitive behaviours by 
an exchange partner that may be assessed over time cumulatively.  The net effect of the 
ongoing review and dynamic updating of tolerance perceptions is that a further small 
incident, not in itself sufficient to cause a bifurcation, may trigger a much larger reaction or 
bifurcation that is out of all proportion to the triggering event.  This dramatic change and 
seemingly over-reaction, is the result of a process that dynamically updates the zones of 
tolerance of the exchange partner.  Thus, the concepts of zones of tolerance, and 
relationship bifurcations are offered as a contribution to the theoretical domain. 
7.5.2 Supply Chain Citizen Theory – Reconciling Dualistic Behaviour 
Up to this point, no attempt has been made to reconcile to two disparate branches of 
literature, and the seemingly schizophrenic behaviour observed in supply chain 
relationships.  As one of the stated objectives of this research was to attempt to reconcile 
the dualistic collaborative and opportunistic ideologies in supply chain relationships, this 
research cannot conclude without at least an attempt.  Hence, the proposed synthesis of 
ideas flowing from the DRD concept could be descriptively titled here as the Supply Chain 
Citizen theory.  This theory essentially views exchange behaviour through three separate 
lenses; the rational lens, the relational lens and the integrative supply chain citizen lens.  It 
is only when the third lens is used that dualistic exchange behaviour can be reconciled.      
7.5.2.1 The Rational Lens 
This study has noted that previous contributions seemed to have added to the body of 
exchange literature only in a piecemeal fashion.  As a result, a question still remains; why 
do firms and actors behave in a rational economic way, and also a cooperative and 
relational way simultaneously?  This dichotic dyadic dilemma is analogous to virtually all 
exchanges conducted in the boundary space between firms and also within firms.  The 
Rational school summarises those theories that take the first view by arguing quite strongly 
that exchange is conducted for purely economic reasons, and that actors always behave in a 
self-interested utility maximising manner.  Game theory takes this a step further, and 
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Axlerod (1990) clearly demonstrates that cooperative behaviour can emerge even from a 
rational competitive paradigm.  Yet, the motivation that underlies Axlerod’s version of 
cooperation essentially remains the same as the other economic theories, that of self-
interested seeking.  Only under Game theoretic situations, the two parties have jointly 
identified that working together increases the rent returned to both through cooperation.  In 
this sense Game theory adds nothing new to the rational versus relational debate.  
Nevertheless, the economic theories are able to explain much that happens in exchange 
relationships, particularly concerning governance structures, agency incentives and 
contracts and also why opportunistic behaviour emerges in exchange.  Hence, the rational 
school provides the first of the three founding behavioural concepts of the Supply Chain 
Citizen theory that of, rationally based opportunistic behaviour.  Those operating through 
the rational lens are assumed to be motivated by self-interested and this may include 
socially opprobrious acts.     
7.5.2.2 The Relational Lens               
Conversely, the second behavioural concept emerges from the Relational school theories.  
Here the school seems to suggest that exchange partners cooperate and form relationships 
for the sake of the relationship alone, almost as if sentimental reasons were sufficient to 
override all other concerns.  While this school does tend to emphasis the soft systems 
approach (Checkland, 1993) and focuses on behavioural issues such relational 
commitment, joint risk taking, common objectives and active disclosure, it does so at the 
risk of losing sight of the economic rationale for the exchange in the first place.  However, 
what it does add to the debate is a more complete and holistic view of exchange behaviour 
by highlighting not only the existence, but also the importance of some of the more 
relational aspects of exchange, and how these add value to the relationship.  This then is 
the second behavioural concept that underpins the Supply Chain Citizen theory, that of 
relationally based collaborative behaviour.  Thus, those operating through the relational 
lens are assumed to pursue behaviour that is socially and relationally acceptable. 
At this point both schools could be accused of taking rather polarised views when arguing 
their points.  As a result, could this diametric view be the source of the schizophrenic 
behaviour of supply chain actors?  Promoting cooperation on the one hand, whilst quietly 
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taking advantage of the unsuspecting partner firm?  It is suspected that these ideologies are 
indeed the reasons for the observed dualistic behaviour and the source of much conflict and 
angst for supply chain practitioners (Brown and Day, 1981; Gaski and Ray, 2004; Webb 
and Hogan, 2002).  However, under the Supply Chain Citizen theory both schools have 
something to contribute.  One should think of supply chain behaviours as needing both 
paradigms to function effectively.  Economic rationality is needed to ensure that supply 
chain exchanges are efficient and do not waste resources.  Whereas, the relational 
behaviour is needed to ensure that longer term exchanges can be maintained, again 
providing effectiveness.    
Nevertheless, there is a third behavioural ideology that has been oft over looked, mainly 
due to much of the literature and research effort being spent examining the first two 
paradigms.  If collaboration and opportunism produce mutually exclusive and conflictioral 
forces, it then raises the question of what can control or delimit the enactment of these 
behaviours?  Is there a set of principles or paradigm that supersedes rational and relational 
behaviours to produce the most harmonious and productive synergy?  In other words, what 
can possibly reconcile these two opposing behavioural paradigms?  
7.5.2.3 The Ethical and Moral Lens 
It is suggested that there is indeed such a reconciling or controlling ideology.  The Supply 
Chain Citizen theory proposes that the enactment of ethically responsible behaviour based 
on moral obligations and a sense of fair play will moderate and control the extremes of the 
first two approaches.  Moral and ethical behaviour is not based on exclusively rational or 
relational imperatives, but on doing what is right and proper in each and every situation 
(Etzioni, 1988).  For example, it is noted that ethical behaviour and fairness have a positive 
impact on marketing relationships (Kumar, Scheer and Steenkamp, 1995).  However, when 
one actor behaves in an opportunistic manner, then the victim experiences an emotional 
reaction to the behaviour, usually a sense of unfairness or anger.  Conversely, when an 
actor experiences the benefits of collaboration, a sense of obligation or commitment can be 
felt toward the other party.  Thus, the collective experience of an actor will allow them to 
view all partner behaviours through their, admittedly, uniquely individual moral and 
ethical lens.  By extension, these emotive reactions may account for the tit-for-tat Game 
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theory strategy where the next move actor out of a sense of unfairness (partner defected), 
or obligation (partner cooperated) copies the exact move of their partner (Axlerod, 1990; 
Camerer, 2003).  It could be argued that the tit-for-tat strategy is more about emotive 
reasoning than rent accruing.  It seems then that our behaviours are not primarily 
determined by economic reason alone, but rather by a continuous battle between the 
rational and relational, and emotions moderated by our ethical and moral point of view.   
By way of an explanation, the ‘ultimate game’ as played in economics (Thaler, 1992) 
provides some significant insights into the behaviour conceptualised in the Supply Chain 
Citizen theory.  To play the ultimate game59, one player (A) is given a sum of money, say 
$20.  They must share this money with their exchange partner (B) and can divide this sum 
any way they wish.  However there is one condition, if A’s first offer is rejected by their 
partner (B), then no one receives any money at all.  The dilemma for A is how to split the 
money in such as way that B will accept their first offer, with A keeping as much of the 
money as possible.  From B’s perspective a purely rational approach would suggest that 
any offer no matter how small would improve their current position (nothing) and thus 
must be accepted.  However, results of the ultimate game show that not everyone behaves 
according to the assumption of rationality (Bierman and Fernandez, 1998; Dixit and 
Skeath, 2004).  Rather, small or spurious offers by A will be more than likely be rejected 
by B, almost as if B is ‘cutting off one’s nose to spite their face’.  Yet cooperative 50/50 
splits are invariable accepted.  The question remains as to why B would even consider 
rejecting A’s offer no matter how small?  Camerer (2003) suggest that this non-rational 
behaviour is based on emotion or more specifically a sense of moral fairness and equity, 
and that this sense of fairness is more pervasive than first thought.  Further, it is argued that 
often the problems facing exchange actors are moral or emotive issues (Hausman and 
McPherson, 1996), and that at times the passionate side overrides the rational or relational 
side to produce some unexpected responses.  Thus, extreme emotive behaviour is as 
destructive as extreme collaborative or opportunistic behaviours.   
Hence, it is suggested that under the Supply Chain Citizen theory, fairness or moral issues 
can override other dominate assumptions.  The term ‘citizen’ represents a socially 
responsible moral and fair actor who is capable of moderating their own extreme 
                                                 
59
 And the extreme form of the game – The Dictator game (2006).  
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behaviours for the benefit of the whole supply chain.  In other words, becoming a citizen 
carries with it a sense of duty and obligation to behave within accepted norms of the 
adopting population.  The third behavioural ideology of the Supply Chain Citizen theory 
holds that a sense of moral fairness for self and others can indeed moderate or delimit the 
extremes of the rational and relational school behaviours.  Ultimately, it is a deontological 
or ‘moral duty’ lens through which these two disparate schools can indeed be reconciled60 
(Donaldson and Werhane, 1999).  A similar approach can be seen in the Hunt-Vitell theory 
of marketing ethics where ethical behaviour is stressed over self gain (Vermillion et al., 
2002).  Thus, the moral and ethical fairness paradigm should be included in any model of 
intertemporal exchange behaviour choice, as such the Supply Chain Citizen model is 
conceptualised in Figure 7-11 below. 
Figure 7-11 Conceptual model of the Supply Chain Citizen theory 
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When examining the evidence of this research, the Supply Chain Citizen theory is perhaps 
best expressed by the composition of the ZOT established by each exchange actor.  As 
already noted, the ZOT is an amelioration of a multitude of perceptual assessments and 
cogitative biases.  Hence, it can be argued that ZOTs are the manifestation of rational and 
                                                 
60
 A more intensive review of ethical reasoning and moral duty is currently beyond the bounds of this research.  
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relational choices, a balance between utility and self-interest maximisation, and relational, 
moral and fairness obligations that stem from a sense of being a corporate citizen 
(Donaldson and Werhane, 1999), and a member of a linked group within a supply chain.  
As the edge of the ZOT or the bifurcation point requires a response, exchange actors are 
required to process all the information at hand and produce a response.  The Supply Chain 
Citizen theory argues that this cognitive processing is conducted not only through the 
rational and relational lenses, but also through the moral ethical lens as well.  The resulting 
actions or adaptations are thus manifestations of this choice model.  Therefore, the theory 
states that exchange interactions should be seen in a moral light as well as a rational and 
relational light.    
While the Supply Chain Citizen theory is helpful in reconciling the rational and relational 
schools, it draws much on as yet unexplored aspects of corporate citizen behaviour applied 
to supply chain exchange situations.  How to conceptually position supply chain 
behaviours within this paradigm is yet far from complete.  Nevertheless, this research has 
been able to empirically examine supply chain phenomena (such as ZOT’s and 
bifurcations) that could not be fully explained by either the rational or the relational views 
alone.  Rather, the explanation that makes most sense of this dualistic behaviour is the 
Supply Chain Citizen theory with its moral and ethical fairness lens to help understand the 
motivations and methods of ZOT formation and execution that underpin the DRD concept.  
While this idea is far from complete and more descriptive than prescriptive, one can ask 
whether one would “…rather be elegant and precisely wrong, or messy and vaguely right?’ 
(Thaler, 1992, p. 198).  Hence, it is hoped that this contribution has laid a useful 
foundation for future development.           
7.5.3 Managerial Implications 
While much research and practitioner emphasis has been placed on supply chain strategies, 
techniques, operations, technology and systems, it is clear that the major driver of supply 
chain management is not specific tactics and techniques, but people and human behaviour 
(Gattorna and Walters, 1996).  People interact across organisational boundaries by utilising 
different behavioural and communicative modes.  What should be of concern to 
management is the identification of those behaviours that help or hinder the ongoing 
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relationship.  As such, this research has focused on supply chain behaviours and has 
discovered those behaviours that are most valuable in promoting relationships, and also 
those behaviours that are the most destructive.  Once cognisant of the impact of the various 
behaviours, managers should be able to encourage more of the good and certainly less of 
the bad.   
By implication, this may mean changing the culture and attitudes of boundary spanning 
personnel in order to consistently elicit the desired supply chain citizen behaviours.  
Similarly, back-office personnel in all areas of a business have the ability to degrade or 
promote the relationship through meeting performance standards and expectations.  
Therefore, training given to supply chain personnel should include not only technical and 
operational duties but also cover the softer impression management responsibilities as well.  
By default, this has a direct impact on recruiting and selection criteria for such positions.  
For example, this research shows that positions with boundary spanning responsibilities 
need special attention as it is the execution of these duties that largely determines the 
reputation of the company.  Imagine the damage done to a valuable long-term relationship 
by appointing a procurement manager with underhanded opportunistic tendencies?  
Conversely, think of the value lost by a supply chain manager bent on collaboration in a 
negotiation when a harder stance is required against an opportunistic supplier?  Clearly 
what is needed is an intelligent and insightful approach to the management of a firm’s 
boundary space.  A competent supply chain manager should be able to judge in all 
situations what degree of collaboration is required and how to deter opportunistic 
behaviour.  In other words, the behaviour of the firm (actors) should reflect the fact that it 
is a member or a citizen of a wider supply chain community.  Ultimately, all actions should 
be filtered through the moral and ethical lens to examine proposed behavioural 
motivations, and if found wanting, then modified to achieve appropriateness.             
Understanding the impact of chain behaviours on the dyadic partner is also a critical 
managerial task.  Supply chain behaviours tend to be real interactions between individuals.  
The actions of one party are observed and then assessed against the other party’s 
perceptions and value system.  Geser (1992) argues that this value system consists of one’s 
own ‘goals’, ‘values’ and ‘traditions’, rather than psychological emotions.  In other words, 
Geser (1992) is suggesting that supply chain actors always react in a rational rather than an 
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emotional way.  Conversely, this research suggests that actors will react to their partner’s 
behaviour (both positive and negative) using both emotive and value based judgments, 
rather one or the other.  This is particularly true of the more subtle non-explicit normative 
based perceptions that regulate the relationship.  In essence, reactions are based on the 
degree and strength on the relational bonding, degree of mutual investments, costs and 
possibilities of switching and the depth of the psychological contract (Kingshott, 2003) that 
has been established between the two parties.  In a managerial context, the boundary 
spanning individual needs to ensure that their behaviour is not misinterpreted.  This in turn 
motivates the parties to establish trusted modes of communication and information sharing 
to reduce the chance of misinterpretation.  Interestingly, these communicative behaviours 
are collaborative in nature and signal a willingness to work together that could ultimately 
help the relationship overall.     
When building relationships, managers cannot ignore the nature of collaboration.  The 
structure of collaboration envisions an escalating scale of commitment over time as the 
social and relational norms develop between the exchange parties.  A similar sentiment is 
found in Gundlach’s et al., (1995) article on the nature of commitment in exchange.  As the 
scale of cooperation increases, the relationship develops through various stages eventually 
achieving higher level partnerships, or even formal ownership structures such as joint 
ventures or strategic alliances.  The compounding effects of collaborative behaviours can 
be observed, as the positive actions made in the present will reinforce the probability of 
long-term positive associations in the future.  As such, during development the ZOTs are 
dynamically updated and changed as the socio-psychological and commitment levels 
intensify.  Different patterns of tolerance are constantly shaped and reshaped according to 
the behavioural stimuli either directly observed or perceived in the actions of the exchange 
partner.  Hence, for management it is important to understand that supply chain 
relationships are self-generating, self-moderating and self-influencing and are the central 
force in the development of inter-firm industrial market exchange (Naude and Turnball, 
1998).   
Significantly for managers, this research has identified the existence of supply chain ZOTs, 
and in addition, it has also measured the point at which system changes or bifurcations 
occur.  This is practically relevant for two reasons.  Firstly, managers now know what 
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behaviours are critical to supply chain relationships.  They now have the ability to identify 
what particular behaviours comprise collaborative behaviours, and also the various shades 
of opportunistic behaviours.  Indeed, now that managers can differentiate between specific 
behaviours they will be in a better position to react or modify their responses accordingly.  
Managers will be in a better position to identify which particular behaviours are valuable 
and which are not, and by concentrating their limited resources on those behaviours that 
are valued, much economy is achieved.  Secondly, this research was also able to identify 
the point at which a relationship will bifurcate or change.  This is true of both positive and 
negative bifurcations.  With this knowledge, managers now have the ability to control or 
manipulate their particular relationships in a much more sophisticated way.  This will save 
both time and managerial effort when attempting to structure and manage a portfolio of 
supply chain relationships as not all relationships are equal.            
That managerial action is predicated on the perceptions of the observed behaviour, and that 
judgements are formed as a result seems unquestionable.  However, the consequences of 
any managerial decision based on perceptions must be grounded or shaped by the actual 
environment or situation (Dwyer and Welsh, 1985).  Hence, it is possible that actions or 
responses to supplier behaviours formed in the mind and intended by the supply chain 
manager may not actually be implemented because of resource, cost, power, dependence or 
cultural constraints.  In response, no outward action is ostensibly taken, yet the perceptions 
of the buyer are dynamically updated and tolerance levels may shift cognitively in 
response.  This lack of action may be motivated by survival instincts.  If a change to the 
channel relationships increases risk and uncertainty, or will jeopardise the supply of key 
resources, then a natural reaction would be to simply internalise the problems and 
difficulties and ‘put up’ with the issues without corrective or retaliatory action.  If the 
supply chain risks are high, then tolerance to poor behaviour or performance may increase, 
and a more cooperative attitude from the supplier more readily welcomed. 
Further, recognising the fact that each manager’s ZOT is unique and dynamic is important 
when managing relationships.  These ZOTs represent the tolerance levels of a relationship 
to the enactment of various behaviours.  ZOTs are adaptive and responsive to their context 
and are said to represent the freedoms and restrictions allowable under their specific 
structural and strategic situations.  This knowledge would be useful when formulating 
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competitive strategy, as an understanding of the strategic and contextual limitations and 
freedoms of the supply chain partner will allow a more directed and focused strategy of 
cooperation to be formulated.  Unfortunately, it can be argued that this same information 
could also be used opportunistically, and without the moral or ethical constraints implicit 
in the Supply Chain Citizen theory, it is suspected that it would.  Clearly, there are many 
useful managerial implications that have been or could be drawn from this research.   
7.6 Research Limitations  
All research projects have limitations, and all results must be interpreted in light of these 
limitations.  As such, while much useful information has been derived from this study, 
there are some theoretical and practical limitations that must be mentioned.   
One of the fundamental issues faced by this research concerns the methodological 
decisions stemming from the philosophical orientation adopted when formulating the 
theory.  The literature used in this research shows the development of thought from an 
epistemological reductionist perspective through to a more recent non-linear, 
Chaos/Complexity paradigm.  Some could effectively argue that these two disparate 
paradigms make poor partners when designing a methodology, and to some extent such 
issues were indeed faced in this research.  Decisions had to be made that allowed the 
operationalisation of the research constructs that also fitted within the more encompassing 
systems and complexity paradigms.  As a result, these decision points necessarily forced 
the researcher into adopting more of a reductionist approach than was initially desired, but 
completely necessary for parsimony, generalisability, and for practical reasons.  The result 
is essentially an empirical piece of research utilising some of the standard linear statistic 
tools of an empiricist such as the General Linear model.  Nevertheless, while the results 
have been recorded according to the conventions of this approach, they have been 
interpreted utilising the Chaos/Complexity and systems paradigms in order to more fully 
understand the effects and implications of such actions.  The blending of these two 
divergent paradigms clearly creates epistemological tensions, but it is exactly this balanced 
tension that creates new and emergent insights.   
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In using the dyadic relationship as the unit of analysis, there is some contention that any 
analysis at this lower level necessarily excludes some of the very complexities that this 
research seeks to address.  For example, a two-way dyadic exchange does not take into 
account the full complexities of multi-firm, multi-contact network exchanges.  Indeed, the 
ability to trace supply chain relationships beyond the first tier of suppliers and buyers is 
extremely limited in the first instance as the number of relationships multiplies 
exponentially (Ritter et al., 2004).  However, in defining the dyad as the unit of analysis, 
there are no reasons or constraints in assuming these same interactions would be any 
different for triadic or extradyadic relationships within a channel system (Achrol et al., 
1983).  Therefore, when interpreting dyadic analysis, four concepts need to be understood; 
1. A dyad is a two-part, two-way exchange and it does not have to be part of a formal 
channel.  As such, any two-way exchanges where direct social and economic goal 
orientated actions occur can be considered a dyad.  
2. A dyadic transaction is more than just an exchange of money for resources, it is also 
a social action system as well as proved in this research. 
3. The focal dyad should not be confused with the most important or powerful firm in 
the channel.  The focus could be directed to any chosen dyad in a channel, whether it 
includes the most powerful firm or not. 
4. As it is virtually impossible to survey an entire channel, the focal dyad then becomes 
important as a readily available research setting that represents the channel. 
Indeed, the incorporation of a complexity view tacitly allows the extrapolation of the same 
concepts to more complex ‘network’ structures.  In this sense, the dyadic unit of analysis 
allows a defined boundary from which to study these interactions, and any further 
additions such as the entry of a third or fourth party should perceived from the dyadic 
perspective, thus allowing analysis to proceed in the first instance.          
Another implicit assumption of this research is that the beginning state of the dyadic 
supply chain relationship investigated is assumed as being the current relationship 
equilibrium.  It is from this benchmark that perturbations were introduced and perceptions 
tested as to their level of tolerance to both positive and negative behaviours.  It is 
acknowledged that this equilibria assumption may not fully capture the respondent’s 
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historical or a priori attitudes towards past or near-past partner behaviours or reputations.  
Anecdotal comments from the respondents showed that some of the relationships tested 
were with supply chain partners who possessed excellent reputations, others where with 
partners who were currently on shaky ground.  Yet, there is a strong theoretical case to 
argue that the respondent’s previously held perceptions and their partner reputations have 
been captured within the construct of ‘zones of tolerance’.  These zones are a summative 
assessment by the respondent of all they know about the partner including previous 
actions, perceptions and reputations.  These perceptions were then translated into their 
responses to the survey questions, and tolerance levels to the various behavioural 
dimensions tested.    
Concerning behavioural motivations, this research did not specifically set out to explore an 
actor’s motivation as a cogitative process.  This was a deliberate methodological and 
theoretical decision as it would have added significant levels of complexity if it were to be 
achieved.  Hence, common questions like ‘what motivates people to behave 
opportunistically or collaboratively?’ have not been directly addressed.  The exception to 
this limitation is the adoption of Williamson’s (1985) generic ‘self-seeking’ motivation 
that is implicitly assumed as the basis for opportunistic behaviours under the Rational 
school paradigm.  Thus, this self-seeking attitude is the only motivational explanation 
offered in this research, while the reasons and formulation of other motivations await a 
further treatise on human exchange behaviour. 
Any research design will draw questions concerning the generalisability of the findings.  
Indeed, this research has three major limitations.  Firstly, the sample was drawn from an 
electronic database61, and it could be argued that this database was not wholly 
representative of the entire population.  Nevertheless, as subscribing companies can add 
their details to the database free of charge, it should therefore be as representative as 
possible.  This was further mitigated by randomising the design and evidenced by the 
resulting disparate industry sectors and activities included in the final sample. 
Secondly, the sample drawn from the database contained a smaller proportion of firms 
(47%) that are classified as small to medium sized enterprises or SME's (employing ≤  19 
                                                 
61
 Kompass™ (NZ) Ltd (January 2005 edition). 
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FTE’s) than the national average in New Zealand.  As the average is around 96.8% 
(Ministry of Economic Development, 2004), the number of SME’s  in this sample could be 
said to be somewhat underrepresented.  However, the same report also identified that 86% 
of these firms have less than five staff, and as it was decided that these firms would 
generally include simple owner/manager structures with insignificant operations, they were 
deliberately excluded from the sample frame (see Section 5.7.3 for further discussion).  
Hence, the resulting higher proportion of larger firms many not exactly represent New 
Zealand firms, but the results are no less applicable.  Other countries with a higher 
proportion of larger firms might also find these results useful. 
The third issue of generalisability concerns the proportion of nationally based supplier 
relationships as opposed to international relationships.  Identifying the geographical 
location of the supplier was added approximately midway through the data gathering phase 
(see Section 6.2.2.4 for a discussion), and as a result only 47% of the sample were 
surveyed (n = 94).  Out of this, only 3.2% of the relationships were internationally based.  
Hence, these results are really only generalisable to nationally based domestic supply chain 
relationships, and any further work in this areas should examine international relationships 
as a comparison.                 
One final limitation concerns the measurement of the opportunistic behaviours and scale 
used.  Whilst every effort was made to develop valid and reliable measurement 
instruments, the resulting distributions of at least three of the four opportunistic variables 
show positive skewness toward the ‘no threat’ end of the scale.  This gives an indication 
that the behaviour was under reported or under rated in the data as opportunism is an 
especially difficult construct to measure.  It is noted that opportunism is viewed as a 
negative construct, and as such has created problems when attempting to illicit responses in 
previous studies (Jap and Anderson, 2003; Joshi and Stump, 1999).  It is suggested that 
there are potentially three main reasons for this underreporting.  Firstly, reporting 
opportunistic acts or behaviours can create social awkwardness or embarrassment, and as a 
consequence most respondents tend to be reluctance to divulge instances where they may 
have been a victim.  Secondly, where respondents do report opportunistic acts by their 
supply chain partners they in reality can only report known or observed instances, and 
hidden or unknown acts of opportunism performed against them will remain unreported.  
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Hence, opportunism can only be measured by what is seen, and like an iceburg, there is 
sure to be activity that cannot be seen by the partner, and this leads to a level of 
underreporting for the construct as a whole.  Lastly, respondents may incorrectly attributed 
benign motivations to actual acts of opportunism and hence not report them (Carr and 
Brower, 2000).  Conversely, they may also attribute opportunistic motivations to benign 
acts and hence over report them.  While this may lead to some method variance, the two 
should essentially cancel each other out.  Given the problems of potential underreporting, 
and the fact that this research found significant levels of observed and reported 
opportunism, one could argue that the behaviour is much more prevalent than at first 
thought in channel relationships. 
While this research has endeavoured to develop a rigorous and generalisable model of 
dynamic supply chain movement, it is acknowledged that it is far from perfect.  Herbert 
Simon (1979) lamentably notes that “…in empirical science we aspire only to approximate 
truths; we are under no illusion that we can find a single formula, or even a moderately 
complex one, that capturers the whole truth and nothing else” (p. 510).  Given this, it is 
hoped that future research efforts might start to address these limitations.  
7.7 Future Research 
There are many potential and useful research directions to emerge from this research.  
Some of the major issues are noted as follows. 
Firstly, as this research was conducted domestically within one country, the question must 
be asked as to the likely impact that cultural artefacts would have on supply chain 
behaviours, the DRD concept and the Supply Chain Citizen theory.  It would be very 
useful to determine the impact of various dimensions of culture on the enactment of 
opportunism and collaboration?  For example, how does Hofstede’s (1983; Kolman, 
Noorderhaven, Hofstede and Dienes, 2003) dimensions of culture (such as strong versus 
weak uncertainty avoidance or individualism versus collectivism) impact on the enactment 
of collaborative and opportunistic behaviours?  It is possible that cultural differences could 
result in different perceptions being formed from observing the behaviour of others.   The 
influence of various cultural artefacts was not considered as achievable within the 
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constraints of this research, yet would be worth investigating in the future.  In particular, 
the issues that need addressing are: do different cultures have differing perceptions of 
opportunistic behaviours?  Do different cultures have differing instances or levels of 
opportunistic behaviours, and how do the different attitudes to law and order affect the 
instances of opportunistic behaviour and how it is viewed.  One example shows that there 
is indeed some evidence of a link between individualistic cultures and opportunism (Chen 
et al., 2002).  Also, are some cultures more predisposed to cooperative behaviour than 
others?  Hence, exploring the same behavioural dimensions cross-culturally would provide 
some valuable insights and extensions to the DRD concept and even the Supply Chain 
Citizen theory. 
Secondly, this research was also unable to delve into the motivational reasons for the 
supply chain behaviour tested, as the research concentrated on the impact that enacted 
behaviours have on relationship levels.  Apart from adopting Williamson’s (1985) ‘self-
seeking with guile’ rationalisation, no other motivational explanation was tested or 
theoretically offered in this research.  Clearly, supply chain behaviours cannot be separated 
from their underlying motivations if a full picture of the construct is to be provided.  This 
research has provided the first step by formulating and testing valid constructs to measure 
actual behaviours.  The next step is to match these behaviours with their various latent 
motivations to gain a complete picture.  Only then would a supply chain manager be able 
to fully master inter-organisational relationships.  
Thirdly, as noted in the limitations section, the number of international relationships 
included in the random sample was negligible.  Thus, the DRD concept can only really be 
generalisable to domestic exchange relationships.  Yet, much good work remains to be 
done by testing these behavioural dimensions and the DRD concept in a survey of 
international supply chain relationships.  This should provide either validating evidence, or 
more likely, important extensions to the DRD concept. 
Fourthly, this research was restricted to gathering data from only one side of the dyadic 
relationship.  It would be extremely interesting to gather the same data from both sides of a 
matched dyad to see if their perceptions of each other along the behavioural dimensions are 
convergent or not.  There is a good chance that they would not match.  Hence, it would be 
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very helpful to measure the differences between the perceptions of a behaviour, and the 
actual behaviour itself, and this would make a valuable addition to topic. 
Finally, while this research tested the levels of supply chain behaviours and also their 
ZOTs that were established around the reported relational equilibrium, it only really tested 
the bifurcation point of each behaviour in isolation.  Even so this is an important addition 
to theory because relationships can and do bifurcate predicated on only one behaviour or 
one instance.  For example research indicates that customers will switch banks after only 
one bad service encounter (Gerrard and Cunningham, 2004), or long-term contracts 
cancelled after the discovery of a single opportunistic act (Helper et al., 2000), or that one 
act can betray trust (Elangovan and Shapiro, 1998).  Nevertheless, while we can now 
understand at what level an individual behaviour could change a relationship, logic would 
suggest that supply chain behaviours are generally correlated, and as such, it would take a 
combination of behaviours to initiate a change.  In the banking example cited above, the 
study found that 75% of switching was caused after two or more incidents were 
experienced (Gerrard and Cunningham, 2004).  Thus, it seems that a combination of 
supply chain behaviours would probabilistically be the cause of the majority of 
bifurcations.  Yet, the design limitations of this research did not allow the testing of 
combinations or clusters of the behaviours.  Hence, any future research efforts concerning 
ZOTs and bifurcation events would do well to include in their design the testing of not 
only individual behaviours, but also various hypothesised combinations of behaviours.           
7.8 Summary and Conclusions 
Ultimately, this research is only but a small, next step contribution to what is a large and 
polymorphic body of literature on supply chain management and exchange relationships in 
particular.  It is hoped that the additions of the DRD concept, and also by extension the 
Supply Chain Citizen theory will add further insights to this body of literature. 
We find that whist the focus of the analysis was on the dyadic relationship, larger forces 
were in action contemporising the appropriate behaviours.  In this sense, we notice a 
number of different dyadic vector interactions and from this we can assume the presence of 
two wider organisationally based behavioural systems interacting.  These two systems have 
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been operationalised in this study under the dualistic collaborative and opportunistic 
behavioural paradigms.  Positioning these dualistic dyadic paradigms in their appropriate 
context, and we are forced to accept that organisational and strategic externalities impinge 
on the enactment of particular behaviours.  Thus, firm level and macro-environmental 
strategic and cultural forces moderate the effect that supply chain behaviours have on 
supply chain relationships.  This shows that dyadic interactions are extremely complex and 
dynamic, perhaps more so than first thought.  One small part of this complexity is the 
causal link between supply chain behaviours and the partner’s reactions to these 
behaviours.  In particular, how much of each behaviour would it take to change the nature 
of the relationship?  Or, how much would one actor be willing to put up with the antics of 
the other partner in the relationship?  This introduces the idea that each exchange actor 
would possess either a cogitative or explicit level of tolerance.  This tolerance is based on 
the socio-psychological assessment of the partner’s trustworthiness, fairness, reputation 
and propensity to defect.  At some point, the actor will set a limit or boundary beyond 
which overt action must be taken that would fundamentally change the nature of the 
relationship.  The level of tolerance is conceptualised in this research as a zone of tolerance 
or a ZOT.  This research effort is the first tentative study into the nature of this ZOT 
phenomenon, and has drawn on the theoretical and descriptive power of Chaos/Complexity 
theory to assist in the explanations.   
Social methods and techniques of dyadic measurement have been developed with the 
explicit purpose of affording a better understanding of the nature and underlying constructs 
that underpin supply chain exchange relationships (Iacobucci and Hopkins, 1992).  These 
methods are especially well suited to addressing research questions that are inherently 
relational in nature.  Thus, this research has developed a range of new typologies and 
behavioural constructs that have gone through rigorous validity and reliability checks.  
Necessarily, these new constructs and measures will need further qualitative and empirical 
validation before being considered sufficiently generalisable, and debate is welcomed on 
any point raised in this work.  
As a result, this study contributes several new theoretical and methodological offerings to 
discipline.  Firstly, the research provides a new theoretical continuum of opportunism, and 
also a new parsimonious continuum of collaboration.  Operationalising these new 
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continuums has resulted in several new measures that cover the majority of opportunistic 
and collaborative behaviours.  In consequence, researchers are now able to measure supply 
chain exchange behaviours in a holistic system wide sense.  These same scales have also 
been used to measure the levels or tolerance or the threshold effects in a supply chain 
relationship.  Thus, researchers are now able to measure the strength of individual 
behaviours and relationships across at least two different relationship archetypes.   
These contributions provide the basis for a new theoretical understanding of how supply 
chain relationships evolve and change their relationship archetypes over time.  These ideas 
have been summarised into the Dynamic Relational Development (DRD) concept.  This 
concept states that relationships will stay in relative relational equilibrium within a ZOT, 
until the level of behaviour changes (either positively or negatively) to such an extent that 
a relational bifurcation occurs and the relationship changes levels.  The DRD concept is 
operationalised through the collaborative and opportunistic behavioural paradigms.  Thus, 
dyadic actors behave in an almost schizophrenic and dualistic manner, switching between 
rational and relational assumptions when attempting to maximise value.  The resulting 
behavioural dilemma can produce uncertainty, conflict, suboptimal performance and 
inefficiencies in supply chain relationships.   
In response to the seemingly irreconcilable behavioural dilemma inherent in the DRD 
concept, this research concludes by offering a way forward through the Supply Chain 
Citizen theory.  This theory seeks to balance the competition versus cooperation paradox 
endemic in exchange relationships (Clarke-Hill et al., 2003).  Hence, the underlying 
philosophy of the Supply Chain Citizen theory is that the rational opportunistic school as 
well as the relational collaborative school must be filtered through some conjoint process 
whereby the most appropriate and contextually succinct response is formulated and 
propagated.  As a consequence, it is argued that filtering behaviours and reactions through 
a moral and ethical fairness lens assists exchange actors in breaking out of any destructive 
dualistic behavioural paradigms.      
Evidence for the theory is offered in this research as it is argued that the composition of an 
actor’s ZOT is a direct outworking of supply chain citizen behaviour.  Each actor will 
evaluate their own and others behaviours through a cognitive moral and ethical fairness 
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lens to evaluate various responses or reactions, similar to the models of corporate and 
individual social responsibility, fairness and justice (Fearne, Duffy and Hornibrook, 2005; 
Zadek, 2006).  Thus, implementing the ideas from the Supply Chain Citizen theory would 
assist firms in recognising the most appropriate behaviours and responses to each unique 
context.  The aim being to maintain the most appropriate supply chain arrangement with 
regard to on-going collaborative, mutually beneficial interactions.    
This theory is tentatively offered with the acknowledgement that much ongoing work is 
needed to define its conceptualisation.  Nevertheless, thinking of firms as being positioned 
in a supply chain network, with the understanding that they are part of a wider socio-
political value chain, should make it obvious that appropriate social, economic and 
relational behaviour is a necessary part of being a responsible supply chain citizen.  
Specifically, to fulfil their duties and obligations to the welfare of, not only themselves, but 
to the whole supply chain as well.     
Finally, the results of this research indicate that supply chain relationships are important to 
academic researchers as a theoretical discipline, and as a practical arena for studying such 
issues as dyadic decision making, exchange relational influences, and also where value lies 
in inter-firm transactions.  Also, the balance of power and cooperative interdependencies 
are important for any manager of supply chain relationships to understand (Iacobucci and 
Hopkins, 1992).  Hence, it is hoped that the new insights offered by this research will add 
to the existing body of distinguished literature, and also assist practitioners as they attempt 
to manage dynamic and complex inter-organisational supply chain relationships.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is good to have an end to journey towards, 
 but it is the journey that matters, in the end.  
Ursula Le Guin 
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Appendix 1 Statement of Philosophical Position 
The Problems of Complexity and Philosophical Approach to Research 
As a starting point, it is necessary to step back and distinguish at a more fundamental level 
the difference between epistemology and ontology.  Essentially, ontology is concerned 
with the matter of existence or of ‘being’ and looks at the fundamental nature or reality of 
the world around us (Davis, 1997; Maxwell, 1998).  While, epistemology concerns our 
knowledge of reality, or the current body of scientific knowledge of any given phenomena 
(Laudan, 1981; Phillips, 1987).  Hence, ontology is quite distinct from epistemology, in 
that a reality may exist (observed or unobserved) ontologically speaking, yet what we 
know about that reality epistemologically speaking, may or may not be complete.  This 
basic difference is fundamental to the interpretation of any scientific investigation or 
report, particularly when one’s own ontological position encompasses the thought that 
reality is much more complex than we initially think.               
A cursory inspection of the world around us would suggest that it seems to be large and 
complex with dense connections between its component parts (Checkland, 1993).  The first 
conclusion to be drawn is that we seemingly cannot cope with its current state without 
reducing it to some manageable form that can be studied separately.  Hence our 
epistemological knowledge of the world is thus, necessarily, divided into different subjects 
or disciplines, and it is easy to forget that these divisions are man-made and arbitrary.  
Often these divides become so ingrained into our thinking that it is difficult to perceive the 
unity that underlies these divisions.  Concerning this abstruseness, it is relevant to ask; is 
complexity “…an artefact of the world or of our understanding of the world?  What 
difference does it make?” [underlining in the original], a searching question posed by Lee 
McIntyre (1997b, p. 2).  Further, is complexity real, or an objet d'art of our limited ability 
to comprehend?  These dilemmas have spawned many streams of research as philosophers 
and academics adopt various positions that fit their own ontological and epistemological 
viewpoints.  The arguments proffered by each of these camps can often provide deep 
insights, yet the vitriolic offered in dogmatically defending ones position can at times 
marginalise the defendant and their position.  However, these debates are critical to the 
progress of philosophy and science (Easterby-Smith et al., 1991), and each position or 
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school of thought has given themselves reflective names such as logical positivism and its 
cousin logical empiricism, relativism, and scientific realism as examples (Hunt and Arnett, 
1999; Kuhn, 1981; McMullin, 1998; Phillips, 1987; Popper, 1998).  Each school holds to 
their own peculiar dogma, assumptions and methodological instrumentation, although it is 
impossible to draw a definitive line between them all.  Indeed, at times proponents of one 
school may offer ideas that are more closely associated with another school (Ray, 2000).  
Nevertheless, it seems that the schools form approximately two distinct groups, the 
positivists and the realists.      
Critique of Logical Positivism 
Until recently it was the positivistic paradigm that dominated much of the research 
philosophy, and still permeates much of the published literature on marketing and channel 
distribution theory (Jacoby, 1978; Malhotra et al., 1999).  In the field of logistics research 
Frankel, Naslund, and Bolumole (2005) note that 51 percent of articles published in the 
Journal of Business Logistics between 1999 and 2004 utilize positivist techniques.  
Positivism became widely accepted due to the rise of the German school of positivists62 in 
the 1920 and 30’s (Hans Reichenback and Richard von Mises along with Ruldolf Carnap, 
Friedrich Waismann and Moritz Schlick).  This approach highlighted the importance of 
discovering and justifying laws and law–like generalisations as universal conditions or 
truths (Ray, 2000).  The view held that laws were to be universal and observable, and that 
if condition X occurred then Y would also occur.  This line of reasoning held that in order 
for a law to be meaningful it must be shown to be conclusively either true or false, known 
as the verifiability principle (Hunt and Arnett, 1999).  However, this logic also proved to 
be the positivists undoing as all statements or laws cannot be conclusively verified as, 
disconcertingly for the positivists, multiple disconfirming phenomena were observed in 
many empirical studies.  Hence, the positivists were forced to relinquish their foundational 
verifiability principle (Phillips, 1987), thus much discrediting their position.  Subsequently, 
many scientists searched for an alternative and turned initially to relativism (in the 1950 
and 70’s), and later to scientific realism (Hunt and Arnett, 1999).  While this researcher is 
ambivalent towards positivism, it does provide a cluster of methods and techniques that 
                                                 
62
 Actually two separate schools held the same views around the same time, one based in Berlin and the other in Vienna. 
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should be adopted where the research context is appropriate, yet interpreted with an 
acknowledgment of their ontological limitations.   
Why Scientific Realism? 
It could be argued that one of the dominant philosophical paradigms (using the Kuhnian 
definition of the word paradigm) currently is that of scientific realism (Easterby-Smith et 
al., 1991; Feyerabend, 1981; McMullin, 1998).  This orientation asserts that the world 
exists independently from our observations of it63, thus allowing room for both observable 
and unobservable entities.  For example, in the early 1900’s a positivist would not have 
accepted the theory that subatomic particles existed as no one at that time had empirically 
seen one, yet these unobservable particles were later discovered, observed and 
documented, something a scientific realist would have said was possible all along.  
Although there can be many alternative views of a realist, generally, the position holds 
three major tenets (Hunt and Arnett, 1999); 
1. A theory must stand the test of time over a significant period for the postulated 
entities or structure espoused by the theory to be accepted. 
2. The success of a theory gives reason to believe, but not an absolute warrant to 
believe in the entities or phenomena implied by the theory. 
3. Finally, that a successful theory provides good reason to believe that something 
‘like’, but not exactly ‘like’ the postulated entities actually do exist. 
 
The desirability of scientific realism is that it does not suffer explicitly from rigid dogma, 
and that it is willing to use whatever methods and techniques that honestly attempt to 
pursue the truth as an object.  Yet it is also selective in that it does not accept that all 
methods are equally viable to warrant our trust, and is openly critical of some methods 
(Leplin, 1979; Newton-Smith, 2000).  Finally, the position holds that all knowledge should 
be subject to critical scrutiny, yet it rejects the nihilistic notion that knowledge and truth 
are impossible to achieve.  Conversely, scientific realism has been criticised by many who 
argue that since there are no absolute standards of assessing what is actually true, then a 
                                                 
63
 Note previous comments about ontology and epistemology being distinct from each other. 
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realist would never know if their theories are actually true or not, even when their theories 
are approximately true (Feyerabend, 1981; Hunt and Arnett, 1999).  A good point, 
however realism allows the provision that all knowledge should be subject to review upon 
future evidence and updated accordingly.  Concerning methods, while a positivist would 
most likely choose quantitative methods for an empirical examination as opposed to 
qualitative methods, a realist could choose from either, and would select the method that 
bests suits the research question.    
It is for these reasons that this researcher identifies more closely with the centralist 
scientific realist philosophy.  Paradoxically, yet consistent with the openness of a realist, 
positivist techniques have been employed in this research for the reasons have been 
explained in the Methodology Section. 
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Appendix 2 Scale Items Selected from Literature (Stage One) 
The following tables list the initial scales items (and sources) selected from literature for 
further purification. 
Table A2-1 Scale development stage one – Collaborative scales x 232  
 
Variable Scale Item from Literature Source 
Active 
Disclosure: 
Communication 
1. This supplier shares pricing changes with us (4). 
2. This supplier notifies our firm in advance of shipment (delivery) problems (4). 
3. This supplier notifies our firm of fluctuations in production that could affect 
product availability (4). 
4. Our firm solicits this supplier’s input for planning joint logistics strategy (4). 
5. Exchange of information between our firm and our supplier takes place as 
needed and not according to a prescribed agreement (4). 
6. In the course of our business dealings, our firm and our supplier will provide 
proprietary information to each other if it will help (4). 
7. In our relationship with the supplier, any information that might help them will be 
provided to them (4). 
8. Direct communications between our firm and supplier have been established 
using EDI (4). 
9. Our primary international logistics provider is informed in advance of impending 
changes in customer service requirements (4). 
10. Our primary international logistics provider is given inside information to help 
plan for our needs (4). 
11. Our primary international logistics provider is kept informed of distribution plans 
(4). 
12. Our primary international logistics provider is regularly provided with long-range 
forecasts of our distribution plans (4). 
13. Our supplier provides us with summary service and usage reports on a monthly 
or quarterly basis (4). 
14. Top management in our firm supports Logistics Information Systems (4). 
 
15. Top management in our firm understands the importance of Logistics 
Information System integration with our suppliers (4). 
16. Top management in our firm is involved in the development of Logistics 
Information Systems (4).  
17. Our firm benchmarks best practices/processes and shares the results with this 
supplier (2). 
18. It is expected that we keep each other informed about events or changes that 
may affect the other party (8). 
19. This party keeps us informed of new developments (6). 
20. This supplier communicates well its expectations for the performance of our 
relationship (6). 
21. We are quite involved in the planning efforts of our supplier (5). 
22. We actively seek advice and counsel from this supplier (5). 
 
23. We actively encourage improvement suggestions from this supplier (5). 
 
1. (Stank et al., 1999) 
2. (Stank et al., 1999) 
3. (Stank et al., 1999) 
 
4. (Stank et al., 1999) 
5. (Stank et al., 1999) 
 
6. (Stank et al., 1999) 
 
7. (Stank et al., 1999) 
 
8. (Stank and Crum, 1997) 
 
9. (Stank, Daugherty and Ellinger, 
1996) 
10. (Stank et al., 1996) 
 
11. (Stank et al., 1996) 
 
12. (Stank et al., 1996) 
 
13. (Stank et al., 1996) 
 
14. (Bardi, Raghunathan and 
Bagchi, 1994) 
15. (Bardi et al., 1994) 
 
16. (Bardi et al., 1994) 
 
17. (Stank et al., 2001) 
 
18. (Heide and John, 1992) 
 
19. (Knemeyer et al., 2003) 
20. (Knemeyer et al., 2003) 
 
21. (Anderson and Weitz, 1992) 
22. (Monczka et al., 1998) 
 
23. (Monczka et al., 1998) 
 
Active 
Disclosure: 
Information 
Sharing 
1. Our supplier provides us with production forecasts using EDI (4). 
2. We provide our supplier with point-of-sale demand information using EDI (4). 
3. Our supplier provides shipment tracking information on inbound shipments to 
our firm using EDI (4). 
4. Our supplier provides product availability information (eg, production schedules 
or inventory levels) to our firm using EDI (4). 
5. We place orders on this supplier orders using EDI (4). 
6. My firm views EDI applications with suppliers as essential to our 
competitiveness (4). 
7. My firm views real time communication capability as essential to increase our 
competitiveness (4). 
8. My firm’s current logistics information systems are satisfactory in terms of 
meeting our requirements (4).  
9. We have systems interface to manufacturing and marketing to provide accurate 
delivery performance (4). 
10. We have the ability to retrieve backorder status with this supplier (4). 
11. We have forecasting models linked to the manufacturing and purchasing 
systems of this supplier to minimize backorders (4). 
12. LIS is being used strategically by our organisation (4), 
13. New technologies are used in our Logistic Information System applications with 
1. (Stank et al., 1999) 
2. (Stank et al., 1999) 
3. (Stank et al., 1999) 
 
4. (Stank et al., 1999) 
 
5. (Stank et al., 1999) 
6. (Clinton and Closs, 1997) 
 
7. (Clinton and Closs, 1997) 
 
8. (Clinton and Closs, 1997) 
 
9. (Bardi et al., 1994) 
 
10. (Bardi et al., 1994) 
11. (Bardi et al., 1994) 
 
12. (Bardi et al., 1994) 
13. (Bardi et al., 1994) 
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this supplier (4). 
14. This supplier hesitates to give us much information (4) - R. 
15. This supplier provides us with the information we need to maximize our revenue 
(4). 
16. This supplier provides proprietary information about their future plans (2). 
17. This supplier provides information on a timely basis (2). 
18. This supplier gives us advanced notice of potential product shortages (2). 
19. Much progress has been achieved in my company regarding computer 
systems/EDI with customers, suppliers, and other channel members (4). 
20. Computers in our logistics area increasingly communicating with suppliers, 
customers, and other channel members (4).  
21. My firm effectively shares operational information externally with selected 
suppliers and customers (2). 
22. This supplier hesitates to give us needed information – R (6). 
23. Our firm shares confidential information with the supplier (5). 
 
 
14. (Maltz and Maltz, 1998) 
15. (Maltz and Maltz, 1998) 
 
16. (Maltz and Maltz, 1998) 
17. (Maltz and Maltz, 1998) 
18. (Maltz and Maltz, 1998) 
19. (Kohn, McGinnis and Kesava, 
1990) 
20. (Kohn et al., 1990) 
 
21. (Stank et al., 2001) 
 
22. (Knemeyer et al., 2003) 
23. (Gundlach et al., 1995) 
 
Common 
Objectives: 
Conflict 
Resolution 
1. Dealing with ____ benefits my company (4). 
2. In a conflict, this supplier emphases incorporating several positions to find a 
solution that is good for all (2). 
3. Problems that arise in the course of our relationship with this supplier are 
treated by the parties as a joint rather than individual responsibility (1).  
4. In our relationship with this supplier, we both expect to be able to make 
adjustments in the ongoing relationship to cope with changing circumstances 
(1). 
5. When some unexpected situation arises, our firm and this supplier would work 
out a new deal rather than hold each other to the original terms (1). 
6. Our supplier can readily adjust its operations to meet unforeseen needs that 
might occur (6). 
7. Our supplier is flexible in response to request (6). 
8. Our supplier handles change well (6). 
9. Our two companies anticipate and resolve operational problems together (1). 
10. Our two companies have opportunities for working out solutions for problems 
with each other (5). 
11. Our top managers encourage our two companies to work out any difference 
that arise between us (5). 
12. Our two companies proactively seek solutions to problems before they occur 
(5). 
13. Our two companies develop creative solutions for specific situations and 
problems (5). 
14. We are prepared to overlook occasional faults form this supplier (n/a). 
15. We are patient with this supplier when they make mistakes that cause us 
trouble (5). 
16. Our relationship with this supplier has survived some rocky periods (5). 
17. We have survived some rocky periods with this supplier (5). 
18. At one point, this supplier came close to terminating its relationship with us (5). 
19. This relationship is based on accommodating one another if special 
problems/needs arise (5). 
20. In future, differences of opinion between our supplier and me will probably be 
viewed as ‘just part of doing business’ (5). 
21. Our two companies proactively plan for contingencies and emergencies.   
22. We respect the judgment of the supplier when solving problems. 
23. The supplier assists in helping solve quality problems. 
24. The formal contract contains specific clauses and procedures to follow when 
resolving conflict – R. 
 
1. (Gaski, 1996) 
2. (Wong et al., 1999) 
 
3. (Stank et al., 1999) 
 
4. (Stank et al., 1999) 
 
 
5. (Stank et al., 1999) 
 
6. (Stank et al., 1996) 
 
7. (Stank et al., 1996) 
8. (Stank et al., 1996) 
9. (Stank et al., 1996) 
10. (Mollenkopf et al., 2000) 
 
11. (Mollenkopf et al., 2000) 
 
12. (Lynch et al., 2000) 
 
13. (Lynch et al., 2000) 
 
14. (Burchell and Wilkinson, 1997) 
15. (Anderson and Weitz, 1992) 
 
16. (Anderson and Weitz, 1992) 
17. (Anderson and Weitz, 1992) 
18. (Anderson and Weitz, 1992) 
19. (Gundlach et al., 1995) 
 
20. (Morgan and Hunt, 1994) 
 
21. New 
22. New 
23. New 
24. New 
 
 
Common 
Objectives: 
Goal 
Congruence 
1. Our firms make extensive use of joint written plans to help improve overall 
performance (5). 
2. Our firms use a continual joint planning process that incorporates feedback 
from past experience (5). 
3. Our firms use written short-range plans and budgets to manage and control 
operations (5). 
4. Your planning process formally evaluates firm resources and organisational 
goals (4). 
5. The supplier emphasises the importance of mutual goals (2). 
6. We focus on long-term goals in this relationship (2).  
7. We make joint decisions about ways to improve overall costs efficiencies (1). 
8. Our two companies achieve goals collectively (1). 
9. People are rewarded for acting in the best interest of the overall supply chain 
relationship (5). 
10. Performance evaluation is partly based on achieving the goals of the 
relationship (5). 
11. Rewards for our staff are partly based on achieving the objectives of the supply 
chain relationship with our suppliers (5). 
12. Our top managers emphasise the need for working together with our suppliers 
to meet our objectives (5). 
1. (Fawcett, Calantone and Roath, 
2000) 
2. (Fawcett et al., 2000) 
 
3. (Fawcett et al., 2000) 
 
4. (Fawcett et al., 2000) 
 
5. (Wong et al., 1999) 
6. (Wong et al., 1999) 
7. (Stank et al., 1996) 
8. (Stank et al., 1996) 
9. (Mollenkopf et al., 2000) 
 
10. (Mollenkopf et al., 2000) 
 
11. (Mollenkopf et al., 2000) 
 
12. (Mollenkopf et al., 2000) 
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13. Our two companies set goals that stress the importance of coordinating the 
activities of both parties (5). 
14. The managers of our two companies feel that our goals are in line with each 
other (5). 
15. This supplier is willing to ‘stretch’ goals and objectives to fit our needs (6). 
16. This supplier understands our vital performance targets and measurers (6). 
17. This supplier seeks our advice and counsel concerning its own efforts (6). 
18. This relationship is marked with a high degree of harmony (5). 
19. This supplier is genuinely concerned that our business succeeds (n/a). 
20. When making important decisions, this supplier considers our welfare as well 
as its own (n/a).  
21. We make joint decisions about improving the overall efficiency of the supply 
chain.      
 
 
13. (Mollenkopf et al., 2000) 
 
14. (Mollenkopf et al., 2000) 
 
15. (Knemeyer et al., 2003) 
16. (Knemeyer et al., 2003) 
17. (Knemeyer et al., 2003) 
18. (Monczka et al., 1998) 
19. (Doney and Cannon, 1997) 
20. (Doney and Cannon, 1997) 
 
21. New 
Joint Risk 
Taking: 
Relationship 
Specific 
Investments 
and Activities 
1. We have made considerable investment in tools and equipment in our 
relationship with this supplier (5). 
2. We have spent significant resources designing this component to make it fit 
with this supplier’s production system (5). 
3. The procedures and routines we have developed as part of our relationship 
with this supplier are tailored to meet their particular situation (5). 
4. Training and qualifying this supplier has involved a substantial commitment of 
resources (5). 
5. Our production system can easily be adapted to use components from a new 
supplier (5) – R. 
6. Gearing up with this supplier required highly specialised tools and equipment 
(5). 
7. This supplier has made considerable investment in tools and equipment in their 
relationship with us (5). 
8. This supplier has spent significant resources designing this component to make 
it fit with our production system (5). 
9. The procedures and routines this supplier has developed as part of their 
relationship with us are tailored to meet our particular situation (5). 
10. This supplier puts on helpful programmes designed to enhance our overall 
business (2). 
11. This supplier has gone out of its way to link us with its product line (2). 
12. This supplier has made significant investments in training our people (2). 
13. Our two companies assist in the development of joint procedures that help the 
two companies to work together (5). 
14. If this current relationship is terminated, there would be significant additional 
costs to both parties (7). 
15. If this current relationship is terminated there are significant sunk costs for both 
parties that cannot be recovered (7). 
16. If this relationship is terminated, we would have difficulty in disposing or 
reassigning the assets (7). 
17. If this relationship is terminated, it would take a considerable amount of time 
and effort to train the new supplier to perform to our satisfaction (7).   
18. The supplier works constantly to improve its overall performance capability (6). 
19. This supplier has gone out its way to link us with its business (6). 
20. This supplier has tailored its services and procedures to meet the specific 
needs of our company (6). 
21. This supplier would find it difficult to recoup its investment in us if our 
relationship were to end (6). 
22. We are quite willing to make long-term investments in using this supplier’s 
products (5). 
23. This supplier is quite willing to make long-term investments in helping us (5). 
24. This supplier is willing to dedicate whatever people and resources it takes to 
grow the relationship (5). 
25. If we switched to a competitive line, we would lose a lot of the investment we’ve 
made in this relationship (5). 
26. If we decided to stop using this supplier, we would have difficulty in redeploying 
our people and facilities use in the relationship (5). 
27. We have made a substantial investment in training personnel specifically for 
this suppliers product line (5). 
28. We have gone out of our way to align ourselves with this supplier (5). 
29. We have made a substantial investment to create a reporting and performance 
system with this supplier (5). 
30. We intend to allocate more resources to this relationship in the future (5). 
31. Establishing work teams or positions with the supplier. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. (Sharland, 1997) 
 
2. (Sharland, 1997) 
 
3. (Sharland, 1997) 
 
4. (Sharland, 1997) 
 
5. (Sharland, 1997) 
 
6. (Sharland, 1997) 
7. (Sharland, 1997) 
 
8. (Sharland, 1997) 
 
9. (Sharland, 1997) 
 
10. (Maltz and Maltz, 1998) 
 
11. (Maltz and Maltz, 1998) 
12. (Maltz and Maltz, 1998) 
13. (Mollenkopf et al., 2000) 
 
14. (Hanna and Maltz, 1998) 
 
15. (Hanna and Maltz, 1998) 
 
16. (Hanna and Maltz, 1998) 
 
17. (Hanna and Maltz, 1998) 
 
 
18. (Knemeyer et al., 2003) 
19. (Knemeyer et al., 2003) 
20. (Knemeyer et al., 2003) 
 
21. (Knemeyer et al., 2003) 
 
22. (Anderson and Weitz, 1992) 
 
23. (Anderson and Weitz, 1992) 
24. (Anderson and Weitz, 1992) 
 
25. (Anderson and Weitz, 1992) 
 
26. (Anderson and Weitz, 1992) 
 
27. (Anderson and Weitz, 1992) 
 
28. (Anderson and Weitz, 1992) 
29. (Anderson and Weitz, 1992) 
 
30. (Gundlach et al., 1995) 
31. New 
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Joint Risk 
Taking: Shared 
Risks and 
Rewards 
1. This supplier emphasises seeking joint benefits (2). 
2. My firm has supply chain arrangements with this supplier that operate under 
principles of sharing the risks and rewards (2). 
3. Any concession we make to help this supplier will even out in the long run (2). 
4. This supplier helps us reduce unnecessary waste and costs (2). 
5. Our firm and this supplier are committed to improvements that may benefit the 
relationship as a whole, and not only the individual parties (1). 
6. Our firm and this supplier don’t mind owing each other favours (1). 
7. This supplier participates in the development and design of new products (2). 
8. My firm’s compensation, incentive, and reward systems encourage integration 
(2). 
9. The relationship with this supplier has been productive (3). 
10. Has the time and effort spent in developing and maintaining the relationship 
been worthwhile? (3). 
11. This relationship with the supplier eliminates a significant amount of duplication 
of effort through shared systems and procedures (7). 
12. There is give and take in our relationship with this supplier (new) 
13. This party has made sacrifices for us in the past (6). 
14. In times of need this party has gone out on a limb for us (6). 
15. This relationship is based on mutual benefit (5). 
16. This supplier also shares in the risks of our relationship (1). 
17. This supplier shares the benefits and the burdens of our relationship (1). 
18. Participates in the development of new products (pg 181). 
19. This supplier has a high willingness to help us out in difficult situations to keep 
the relationship. 
20. Both parties in this relationship are willing to share the costs of rectifying 
mistakes and problems.  
 
 
1. (Wong et al., 1999) 
2. (Stank et al., 2001) 
 
3. (Wong et al., 1999) 
4. (Wong et al., 1999) 
5. (Stank et al., 1999) 
 
6. (Stank et al., 1999) 
7. (Stank and Crum, 1997) 
8. (Stank et al., 2001) 
 
9. (Ellinger et al., 2000) 
10. (Ellinger et al., 2000) 
 
11. (Hanna and Maltz, 1998) 
 
12. (Burchell and Wilkinson, 1997) 
13. (Knemeyer et al., 2003) 
14. (Knemeyer et al., 2003) 
15. (Gundlach et al., 1995) 
16. (Moore and Cunningham, 1999) 
17. (Moore and Cunningham, 1999) 
18. New 
19. New 
 
20. New 
 
Relational 
Commitment:  
Trust and 
Commitment 
1. People can make their own decisions without checking with anyone else (5). 
2. How things are done is left up to the person doing the work (5). 
3. People are allowed to do as they please (5). 
4. Dealing with a new supplier for this component would require only limited 
redesign and development on our part (5). 
5. My firm has developed extensive performance measurers that control this 
supplier (2) – R 
6. We expect to have a long-term relationship with this supplier (1) 
7. The relationship we have with this supplier is something we are very committed 
to (1). 
8. The relationship we have with this supplier is something our firm intends to 
maintain indefinitely (1). 
9. The relationship we have with this supplier is something we are willing to make 
long-term investments in (1). 
10. This supplier can be counted on to do what is right (1). 
11. This supplier has a high level of integrity (1). 
12. This supplier is honest about problems when they arise (1). 
13. This supplier has been certified to reduce/eliminate receiving inspection and 
count verification efforts (1) – R. 
14. We use a supplier rating system to improve this supplier’s performance (1) – R. 
15. This supplier is willing to dedicate whatever it takes to make us a satisfied 
customer (1). 
16. The relationship we have with this supplier deserves our maximum effort to 
maintain (5). 
17. Maintaining a long-term relationship with this supplier is very important to my 
firm (5). 
18. When some unexpected situation arises, the parties would rather work out a 
new deal to keep the existing relationship (8). 
19. The parties in this relationship are committed to improvements that may benefit 
the relationship as a whole and not only the individual parties (8). 
20. The parties expect this relationship to last a long time (5). 
21. The parties make plans not only for the terms of the individual purchase, but 
also for the continuance of the relationship (5). 
22. This supplier has an established reputation for fair trading (new). 
23. We trust this supplier to keep confidentiality (new). 
24. This supplier has a great deal of integrity (6). 
25. This supplier brings high ethical standards to its work (6). 
26. This supplier almost always delivers on the results it promises (6). 
27. This supplier is not on our side – R (6). 
28. We defend this supplier when others criticise the company (5). 
29. We have a strong sense of loyalty to this supplier (5). 
30. We are continually on the lookout for another product to add or replace this 
supplier for this product type – R (5). 
31. If a better product was offered by a different supplier, we would most certainly 
take them on, even if it means dropping this supplier – R (5). 
32. We both view the relationship with this supplier is a long-term alliance (5). 
1. (Mollenkopf et al., 2000) 
2. (Mollenkopf et al., 2000) 
3. (Mollenkopf et al., 2000) 
4. (Sharland, 1997) 
 
5. (Stank et al., 2001) 
 
6. (Stank et al., 1999) 
7. (Moore and Cunningham, 1999) 
 
8. (Moore and Cunningham, 1999) 
 
9. (Moore and Cunningham, 1999) 
 
10. (Moore and Cunningham, 1999) 
11. (Moore and Cunningham, 1999) 
12. (Moore and Cunningham, 1999) 
13. (Stank and Crum, 1997) 
 
14. (Stank and Crum, 1997) 
15. (Moore and Cunningham, 1999) 
 
16. (Daugherty et al., 1998) 
 
17. (Daugherty et al., 1998) 
 
18. (Heide and John, 1992) 
 
19. (Heide and John, 1992) 
 
20. (Heide and John, 1990) 
21. (Heide and John, 1990) 
 
22. (Burchell and Wilkinson, 1997) 
23. (Burchell and Wilkinson, 1997) 
24. (Knemeyer et al., 2003) 
25. (Knemeyer et al., 2003) 
26. (Knemeyer et al., 2003) 
27. (Knemeyer et al., 2003) 
28. (Anderson and Weitz, 1992) 
29. (Anderson and Weitz, 1992) 
30. (Anderson and Weitz, 1992) 
 
31. (Anderson and Weitz, 1992) 
 
32. (Anderson and Weitz, 1992) 
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33. This supplier sees our relationship as a long-term alliance (5). 
34. This supplier has a strong sense of loyalty to us (5). 
35. This supplier is not very committed to us – R (5). 
36. This supplier is willing to let us see their weaknesses and their strengths (5) 
37. This relationship is based on mutual trust (5). 
38. The terms of our relationship have been written down in detail – R (2) 
39. Our relationship is governed by an extensive, formal written contract – R (2). 
40. We find it necessary to be cautious with this supplier – R (?). 
41. Our relationship with the supplier is enduring. 
42. A comprehensive formal contact exists between us and the supplier – R. 
43. Long-term multi year contracts have been established with this supplier. 
44. The contract terms are minimal and allows for a wide variety of action. 
45. Supplier selection is based more on the hope that they will perform to 
expectations. 
46. The ability to negotiate lower rates is important in this relationship – R. 
47. Competitive rates are important in my firm’s choice of supplier – R. 
48. Keeping costs under control is important for my performance evaluations – R. 
49. This supplier deals with us in a straightforward manner that reveals their true 
motives and desired outcomes (6). 
50. This supplier trusts us to make the right decisions.  
51. Staying together in the face of adversity or challenges is very important to both 
firms (5). 
 
 
33. (Anderson and Weitz, 1992) 
34. (Anderson and Weitz, 1992) 
35. (Anderson and Weitz, 1992) 
36. (Anderson and Weitz, 1992) 
37. (Gundlach et al., 1995) 
38. (Mohr et al., 1996) 
39. (Mohr et al., 1996) 
40. (Doney and Cannon, 1997) 
41. New 
42. New 
43. New 
44. New 
45. New 
 
46. New 
47. New 
48. New 
49. (Knemeyer et al., 2003) 
 
50. New 
51. (Gundlach et al., 1995) 
Relational 
Commitment: 
Social and 
Relational 
Norms 
1. This relationship is based on a strong sense of loyalty to the supplier (1). 
2. This supplier only looks out for its self (1). 
3. I would recommend that my successor continue using this supplier (5). 
4. I approve of many of the things that this supplier does (4). 
5. ____ has been very fair with me (4). 
6. ____ helps me in getting the job done (4). 
7. ____ doesn't [does] seem to have my company’s best interests at heart (4). 
8. Our two companies work together as a team (1) 
9. Our two companies are developing a mutual understanding of each other’s 
responsibilities (1). 
10. Our two companies informally work together (1). 
11. Employees in our two companies get along well with each other (5). 
12. Employees in our two companies have regular contact with each other (5). 
13. Employees in our two companies have opportunities for informal discussions 
with each other (5). 
14. Employees in our two companies are comfortable calling each other when the 
need arises (5). 
15. Management in our two companies foster a positive attitude toward each other 
(5). 
16. Management encourage employees in our two companies to work together (5). 
17. Our two companies have opportunities made available for education in each 
other’s roles and responsibilities (5).  
18. The parties expect to be able to make adjustments in the ongoing relationship 
to cope with changing circumstances (8). 
19. Social exchanges in this relationship take place frequently and informally (8). 
20. Some social exchanges in this relationship take place above and beyond any 
formal agreement (8).  
21. We have established personal relationships with members of this suppliers firm 
(new). 
22. This supplier will honour informal understandings (new). 
23. This supplier adheres to an accepted set of operating principles (6). 
24. This supplier embodies the values we hold to be most important (6). 
25. This supplier cares for us (6). 
26. This supplier is like a friend (6). 
27. When communication with this supplier, informal and casual communication 
channels are often used (2). 
28. Our relationship has been extensively verbalised and discussed between each 
other (2). 
29. We often meet members of the supplier’s organisation out of work hours (?). 
30. We often talk about family, sports and other personal topics with our supplier 
(?). 
31. We often attend entertainment events such as sports and other functions with 
our supplier (?). 
32. The distinctions between our two firms seem to be blurred (less distinct) (1). 
33. The distinction between my role and duties and those of my supplier’s 
counterparts is becoming less clear (1). 
34. Adhering to the norms of this relationship partly restrains our actions. 
35. We look out for each other’s interests. 
36. The need for closer cooperation has fostered better working relationships with 
this supplier. 
 
1. (Moore and Cunningham, 1999) 
2. (Moore and Cunningham, 1999) 
3. (Daugherty et al., 1998) 
4. (Gaski, 1996) 
5. (Gaski, 1996) 
6. (Gaski, 1996) 
7. (Gaski, 1996) 
8. (Gaski, 1996) 
9. (Gaski, 1996) 
 
10. (Gaski, 1996) 
11. (Mollenkopf et al., 2000) 
12. (Mollenkopf et al., 2000) 
13. (Mollenkopf et al., 2000) 
 
14. (Mollenkopf et al., 2000) 
 
15. (Mollenkopf et al., 2000) 
 
16. (Mollenkopf et al., 2000) 
17. (Mollenkopf et al., 2000) 
 
18. (Heide and John, 1992) 
 
19. (Heide and John, 1992) 
20. (Heide and John, 1992) 
 
21. (Burchell and Wilkinson, 1997) 
 
22. (Burchell and Wilkinson, 1997) 
23. (Knemeyer et al., 2003) 
24. (Knemeyer et al., 2003) 
25. (Knemeyer et al., 2003) 
26. (Knemeyer et al., 2003) 
27. (Mohr et al., 1996) 
 
28. (Mohr et al., 1996) 
 
29. (Doney and Cannon, 1997) 
30. (Doney and Cannon, 1997) 
 
31. (Doney and Cannon, 1997) 
 
32. (McGinnis and Kohn, 1993) 
33. (Hanna and Maltz, 1998) 
 
34. New 
35. New 
36. New 
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37. This supplier looks after themselves first in this relationship – R. 
38. We work together as a team with this supplier. 
39. This supplier follows the established way of doing things when dealing with us. 
 
 
37. New 
38. New 
39. New 
Scale Notes: 
‘R’ Reverse coded item. 
1. 5 Point Scale, (1) Strongly Agree to (5) Strongly Disagree. 
2. 5 Point Scale, (1) Strongly Disagree to (5) Strongly Agree. 
3. 5 Point Scale, (1) Not at all to (5) A great extent. 
4. 7 Point Scale, (1) Always to (7) Never. 
5. 7 Point Scale, (1) Strongly Disagree to (7) Strongly Agree. 
6. 7 Point Scale, (1) Strongly Agree to (7) Strongly Disagree. 
7. 7 Point Scale, (1) Very Little to (7) A Great Deal. 
8. 7 Point Scale, (1) Completely Inaccurate Description to (7) Completely Accurate Description. 
 
 
 
Table A2-2 Scale development stage one – Opportunistic scales x 94 
  
Variable  Scale Item from Literature Source 
Social 
Opportunism: 
Breaching social 
and relational 
norms (previously 
agreed) 
 
1. This supplier will breach informal agreements to their benefit (1). 
2. This supplier will not always be sincere (1). 
3. This supplier will smooth over a problem when we expect it to be fixed (5). 
4. Harsh words are often used when dealing with the other party (5). 
5. We argue frequently with this partner about business issues (2). 
6. Our arguments with this supplier are very heated (2). 
7. To accomplish their own objectives, sometimes my supplier promises to do 
things without actually doing them (6). 
8. This supplier fails to provide us with the support that they are obliged too (5). 
9. Although operating within the rules of the agreement, this supplier has failed 
to inform us of changed circumstances that affected the nature of the 
relationship (na). 
10. This supplier does no act within the spirit of the contract (n/a). 
11. This supplier does not live up to our shared expectations (na). 
12. This supplier has done something that we thought was out of character (na). 
13. There are some things that I will do only if my supplier checks up and insists 
on it (2). 
14. I will do as promised because it’s my duty to do so – R (2). 
15. This supplier holds to its commitments – R (5). 
16. This supplier has benefited from our relationship to our detriment (3). 
17. This supplier makes false claims or promises (1) 
 
18. This supplier exerts social pressure on us to conform to their expectations. 
19. We deliberately avoid complying with the supplier’s expectations if it does not 
suit our needs. 
20. Our dealings with the other party are often acrimonious. 
21. This supplier has done something that we have specifically asked them not to 
do. 
22. This supplier has gone against our best advice. 
23. We feel like we don’t know what we are supposed to be doing. 
24. This supplier seems to be only concerned with themselves. 
 
 
1. (Moore and Cunningham, 
1999) 
2. (Moore and Cunningham, 
1999) 
3. (Monczka et al., 1998) 
4. (Monczka et al., 1998) 
5. (Mohr et al., 1996) 
6. (Mohr et al., 1996) 
7. (Morgan and Hunt, 1994) 
8. (Lancastre and Lages, 2004) 
9. (Wathne and Heide, 2000) 
 
10. (Wathne and Heide, 2000) 
11. (Wathne and Heide, 2000) 
12. (Wathne and Heide, 2000) 
13. (John, 1984) 
 
14. (John, 1984) 
15. (Bensaou and Anderson, 1999) 
16. (Skarmeas et al., 2002) 
17. (Moore and Cunningham, 
1999) 
18. New 
19. New 
 
20. New 
21. New 
 
22. New 
23. New 
24. New 
 
Commercial 
Opportunism: 
Exercising forms 
of power in the 
relationship 
(toughness) 
 
Focus on 
exercised power 
only, not 
1. Good faith bargaining was not the hallmark of this supplier’s negotiating style 
(5). 
2. This supplier did not give us an equitable deal (5). 
3. It would be easy for us to terminate this relationship (5).  
4. This supplier passes on problems and issues to us (5). 
5. This supplier has a significant influence on our operations (2). 
6. In the past six months this supplier has changed or influenced our programs 
or policies (2). 
7. This supplier can dictate how we can use their product (2). 
8. We generally have to yield to recommendations made by this supplier on 
general business practices (2). 
1. (Gundlach et al., 1995) 
 
2. (Monczka et al., 1998) 
3. (Monczka et al., 1998) 
4. (Monczka et al., 1998) 
5. (Mohr et al., 1996) 
6. (Mohr et al., 1996) 
 
7. (Mohr et al., 1996) 
8. (Mohr et al., 1996) 
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unexercised 
(1049, 1278). 
9. This supplier has requested that we follow their wishes on an issue, and has 
also mentioned the consequence of non-compliance (2). 
10. In future, my firm will likely comply with the policies that this supplier 
establishes (2). 
11. The supplier has the clout to get their way  
12. The supplier has forced us to modify our original agreement in some way 
(n/a). 
13. The supplier has taken some unfair advantage from us (n/a). 
14. I will use any situation to further my own interests at the expense of the 
supplier using whatever means in my negotiations with the supplier (6). 
15. This supplier will not adapt to changing circumstances (n/a). 
16. This supplier has forced us to renegotiate the terms and conditions of our 
agreement (na). 
17. This supplier has hinted that they would take certain actions that would 
reduce my profits (2). 
18. This supplier could withdraw certain needed services from our firm (2). 
19. This supplier has the ability to reward my firm in some way if we do as they 
say (2).   
20. Because I felt that going along with my supplier I would be favoured on some 
other occasion (2).   
21. This supplier will only do as promised because we point out a contract clause 
that obliges them to do as asked. 
22. This supplier attempts to be persuasive when dealing with us. 
23. We dictate the terms of the negotiations with this supplier. 
24. We can switch suppliers easily. 
25. This supplier does not have a say in this relationship – R.  
26. We dictate how this relationship will be run with this supplier – R. 
 
Forms of power (French and Raven, 1959): (from 1278) 
Reward / Coercive / Expert / Referent / Legitimate 
 
 
9. (Mohr et al., 1996) 
 
10. (Morgan and Hunt, 1994) 
 
11. (Morgan and Hunt, 1994) 
12. (Lyons and Mehta, 1997) 
 
13. (Lyons and Mehta, 1997) 
14. (Joshi and Stump, 1999) 
 
15. (Wathne and Heide, 2000) 
16. (Wathne and Heide, 2000) 
 
17. (Wathne and Heide, 2000) 
 
18. (Wathne and Heide, 2000) 
19. (Wathne and Heide, 2000)| 
 
20. (Wathne and Heide, 2000) 
 
21. (John, 1984) 
 
22. New 
23. New 
24. New 
25. New 
26. New 
 
 
Unconscionable 
Opportunism: 
Mislead, distort, 
disguise, 
obfuscate, 
confuse, or shirk 
 
1. This supplier will alter facts slightly to get what they want (1). 
2. This supplier will exaggerate needs to get what they desire (1). 
 
3. This supplier provided a completely truthful picture when negotiating – R (5). 
4. The other party is expected to keep us informed about events or changes that 
will affect us – R (5). 
5. It is expected that this supplier will not provide information according to pre-
specified agreements (5). 
6. We have needed outside arbitration to resolve any disputes with this supplier 
(5).  
7. To accomplish their own objectives, sometimes this supplier will alter the 
facts slightly (6). 
8. This supplier cannot be trusted (6). 
9. To succeed in this business, it is often necessary to compromise one’s ethics 
(6). 
10. This supplier has been known to make false claims or statements (n/a). 
11. I would exaggerate the extent of the damage caused to us by the supplier (in 
the event of a non-supply) in order to extract concessions from them (6). 
12. This supplier will shirk their responsibilities and obligations when it suits them 
(n/a). 
13. This supplier evades their obligations under the agreement (n/a). 
14. This supplier has reduced their quality or service levels to increase their own 
profits (n/a). 
15. This supplier has done something that we have explicitly prohibited (na). 
16. This supplier has performed additional work that was not necessary under 
this agreement (n/a). 
17. I would alter the facts slightly to drive a better deal for myself (5). 
18. I would not be completely honest with this supplier (5). 
19. I would supply this supplier a completely truthful picture of my intentions – R 
(5). 
20. I would exaggerate my needs in an attempt to force the supplier to deliver on 
schedule (5). 
21. I would lie to this supplier (eg that other suppliers were offering lower prices) 
in order to protect my own interest (5). 
22. This supplier would present the facts to us in such a way that they would look 
good (5). 
23. This supplier has wilfully misrepresented some issues (n/a). 
24. This supplier has deliberately underperformed their duties (n/a). 
1.      (Moore and Cunningham, 1999) 
2. (Moore and Cunningham, 
1999) 
3. (Gundlach et al., 1995) 
4. (Monczka et al., 1998) 
 
5. (Monczka et al., 1998) 
 
6. (Monczka et al., 1998) 
 
7. (Morgan and Hunt, 1994) 
 
8. (Morgan and Hunt, 1994) 
9. (Morgan and Hunt, 1994) 
 
10. (Doney and Cannon, 1997) 
11. (Joshi and Stump, 1999) 
 
12. (Wathne and Heide, 2000) 
 
13. (Wathne and Heide, 2000) 
14. (Wathne and Heide, 2000) 
 
15. (Wathne and Heide, 2000) 
16. (Wathne and Heide, 2000) 
 
17. (Joshi and Arnold, 1997) 
18. (Joshi and Arnold, 1997) 
19. (Joshi and Arnold, 1997) 
 
20. (Joshi and Arnold, 1997) 
 
21. (Joshi and Arnold, 1997) 
 
22. (Joshi and Arnold, 1997) 
 
23. (Bunduchi and Gerst, 2004) 
24. (Bunduchi and Gerst, 2004) 
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25. We expect that this supplier would withhold information from us. 
26. If I felt that this supplier was not truthful to me, I would not be completely 
candid with them in this situation (5). 
27. The supplier often does not do what we request (n/a). 
28. This supplier will attempt to baffle us in order to get their own way. 
 
25. New 
26. (Joshi and Arnold, 1997) 
 
27. New 
28. New 
 
Illegal 
Opportunism: 
Breaching 
contract / 
agreement 
(conditions and 
warrantees), theft, 
fraud, and other 
illegal acts 
 
Violation / 
Evasion / Refusal 
to adapt / Forced 
renegotiation 
(1076) 
1. This supplier will breach formal agreements to their benefit (1). 
 
2. When a formal agreement is made, we can always rely on this supplier to 
fulfil their obligations – R (5). 
3. This supplier has been known, or has been discovered to have engaged in 
unethical behaviour that has resulted in gain for themselves (6).  
4. This supplier over-commits themselves knowing that they cannot fulfil their 
contractual obligations to us (n/a). 
5. This supplier fails to make deliveries on time according to our agreement. 
6. The buyer fails to make payment on time according to our agreement (n/a). 
7. This supplier has failed to keep a commercial secret of ours (n/a). 
8. This supplier has failed to conduct a transaction according to the agreed rules 
(n/a). 
9. We have had to invest heavily in monitoring programmes for our suppliers to 
ensure that the comply with the contact terms and conditions (na). 
10. We have had to enforce the penalty clause provisions due to a breach of 
contract by this supplier (n/a)  
11. This supplier would do anything in their means to further their interests in any 
situation (5). 
12. Some of our technology has somehow found its way into the hands of this 
supplier without our approval (n/a). 
13. Ethical behaviour is stressed by this supplier – R. 
14. This supplier does not fulfil its obligations under the formal contract. 
15. This supplier will commit some criminal act to further their aims.  
16. It is likely that this supplier will act illegally to advance their own claims.   
 
1. (Moore and Cunningham, 
1999) 
2. (Monczka et al., 1998) 
 
3. (Morgan and Hunt, 1994) 
 
4. (Lyons and Mehta, 1997) 
 
5. (Lyons and Mehta, 1997) 
6. (Lyons and Mehta, 1997) 
7. (Lyons and Mehta, 1997) 
8. (Lyons and Mehta, 1997) 
 
9. (Wathne and Heide, 2000) 
 
10. (Wathne and Heide, 2000) 
 
11. (Joshi and Arnold, 1997) 
 
12. (Hill, 1990) 
 
13. New 
14. New 
15. New 
16. New 
Scale Notes: 
‘R’ Reverse coded item. 
1. 5 Point Scale, (1) Very High to (5) Very Low. 
2. 5 Point Scale, (1) Strongly Agree to (5) Strongly Disagree. 
3. 5 Point Scale, (1) Strongly Disagree to (5) Strongly Agree. 
4. 7 Point Scale, (1) Always to (7) Never. 
5. 7 Point Scale, (1) Strongly Disagree to (7) Strongly Agree. 
6. 7 Point Scale, (1) Strongly Agree to (7) Strongly Disagree. 
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Appendix 3 Qualitative Pretest Interview Protocols 
The following are the interview protocols and prompts that were used to help guide the in-
depth interviews with the five industry experts for the pretest. 
Qualitative Pretest Interview Protocols    Code: 
 
 
Pre-interview Information 
 
Firm Name:    __________________________________________ 
Respondents Name:   __________________________________________ 
Address:     __________________________________________ 
Contact Details:    __________________________________________ 
Interview Date / Time:   __________________________________________ 
Interview Location / Ambience: __________________________________________ 
      __________________________________________  
      __________________________________________ 
Preamble 
 
Firstly, I would like to emphasise that anything you say will remain confidential between 
us.  The information you provide will in future be identified only by a code number so that 
no link can be formed between your responses and you without our prior approval.     
 
What I would like to discuss during this interview are your thoughts, based on your 
experience, concerning the nature of the relationships that have occurred between your 
firm and some of your key suppliers.  
 
With you as the Buyer, I’m interested in how you would classify and describe the various 
relationships your firm has with your suppliers, and also, I would like to discover the types 
of behaviours or actions by the supplier that are associated with a particular type of 
supplier relationship.   
 
Finally, I would like to discover what behaviours or actions by the supplier would cause 
your firm to change or alter the type of relationship that you currently have with your key 
suppliers.  There may also be considerations that help or hinder that change process and 
these are of interest as well.  Please feel free to talk openly and frankly of those things that 
you consider important, even if they presently don’t appear to make much sense.    
 
To start, I would like to record some basic facts about your firm and yourself: 
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• What is the nature of the industry your firm works in?   
       __________________________ 
• What is you position title?     
 __________________________ 
• How long have you been in this position?  
 __________________________ 
• Years of experience in this industry?   
 __________________________ 
• Firm Turnover:       
 __________________________ 
• Number of FTE employees:    
 __________________________ 
• Would you say that you have the authority to select and  
change suppliers, and how you interact with them? 
 __________________________ 
In-Depth Interview Prompt Questions 
  
No. Prompt Code 
1 Can you describe how your firm interacts with its key suppliers? Rel 
2 How would you describe the nature of your relationships with key suppliers in 
general? 
Rel 
3 Can you describe the behaviours or the actions of the supplier that you 
consider are important? 
Col/Opp 
 
Action:    Show List of Supplier Behaviours  
4 Describe the behaviours / actions by the supplier that you find helpful? Col 
5 Describe the behaviours / actions by the supplier that you find unhelpful or 
destructive? 
Opp 
6 How tolerant of these behaviours are you? Dyn 
7 Would any of these behaviours force a change in the relationship? … Why?  Col/Opp 
8 Has the relationship with your suppliers changed in any way (for better or 
worse)? 
Dyn 
9 If yes, describe the reasons for the change? Dyn 
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10 Can you describe how the relationship changed over time?  Dyn 
11 How would you describe the competitive position of your firm in relation to your 
key suppliers? 
SB 
12 How easy or hard is it for your firm to change the nature of the current 
relationship with your key suppliers? 
SB 
13 Can you describe the factors that prevent you from changing the nature of the 
relationship? 
SB 
14 Can you describe that factors that allow you to change the nature of the 
relationship with your suppliers? 
SB 
15 Is there anything else about your firm’s relationship with your suppliers that you 
consider important that has not yet been discussed? 
 
 
Post Amble 
 
I want to thank you for your valuable time, and the information that you have provide is of 
great worth to my research.  Again I wish to emphasis that what was said in this interview 
will remain confidential.        
 
Could I have your permission to contact you in the future if I need to clarify any points 
made during the interview?  (business cards).  
 
Thanks   
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Appendix 4 Q-Sort Exercise Protocols  
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Part 1: Collaborative (Positive) Behaviours by the Key Supplier 
 
Behaviour  Sub-Dimension Sort Code Definition 
 
Communication 
 
A1 Active  
Disclosure 
Information Sharing A2 
A free exchange of information and data 
between exchange partners through various 
forms of communication and protocols (both 
formal and informal) with the purpose of 
improving the performance of the supply chain. 
 
 
Conflict Resolution 
 
B1 Common 
Objectives 
 
Goal Congruence 
 
B2 
The establishment and progress toward mutually 
common objectives, goals and conflict resolution 
processes that align the efforts of both parties so 
both parties achieve common aims. 
 
 
Relationship Specific 
Investments and Activities 
 
C1 Joint Risk  
Taking 
 
Shared Risks and Rewards 
 
C2 
The willingness to share the burdens and 
benefits between the parties and the allocation 
of resources and materials to exchange 
relationship specific investments so that both 
parties share in the risks of the partnership. 
  
 
Trust and Commitment 
 
D1 Relational 
Commitment 
Social and Relational Norms D2 
The commitment of both parties to the exchange 
relationship through the establishment of trust 
and commitment, relational and social norms 
that are established over time between the 
parties. 
 
 
Part 2: Opportunistic (Negative) Behaviours by the Key Supplier 
 
Behaviour Sort Code Definition 
Social 
Opportunism E 
The breaching of formal or informal social or relational norms 
of behaviour between the exchange partners that have been 
established through either agreement or expectations built on 
previous actions of the partner.   
No legal recourse. 
 
Commercial 
Opportunism F 
The use of bargaining or forms of power (coercive), in the 
relationship to appropriate some concession from the 
exchange partner, including forced renegotiations and 
holdouts.    
No legal recourse. 
 
Unconscionable 
Opportunism G 
Actions by one exchange partner that either misleads, distorts, 
disguise, obfuscate, sabotage or confuse the other partner 
concerning some aspect that materially affects the exchange 
relationship.  This includes acts of commission as well as acts 
of omission such as shirking or the withholding of effort.  
Questionable legal recourse. 
  
Illegal 
Opportunism H 
Any act or omission under the law deemed as illegal.  This 
includes breaching contract conditions and warranties, theft, 
fraud, violation and evasion and other illegal acts or omissions 
by one of the exchange partners. 
Full legal recourse.  
  
 
Not Applicable n/a This question does not fit into any of the above categories.  
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Please assign a code to each question below, and grade the strength of fit.  
 
Table A4-1 Collaborative (Positive) Behaviours of the Key Supplier 
 
Strength of Fit  Collaborative Questions Sort  
Code Very 
Weak 
Weak Neither Strong Very 
Strong 
1 This supplier expects that our two companies should achieve goals 
collectively. 
      
2 This supplier expects us to use informal and casual channels when 
communicating with each other. 
      
3 The supplier emphasises the importance of mutual goals.       
4 This supplier has a strong sense of loyalty to us.       
5 This supplier is quite involved in our planning efforts.       
6 The arrangement with this supplier operates under the principle of sharing 
the risks and rewards. 
      
7 This supplier effectively shares operational information with us.       
8 Our supplier provides shipment tracking information on inbound shipments to 
our firm using electronic data exchange. 
      
9 This supplier actively encourage improvement suggestions from us.       
10 This supplier hesitates to give us needed information.  (Reverse coded)       
11 This supplier pursues improvements that may benefit the relationship as a 
whole, and not only the individual parties. 
      
12 This supplier will honour informal understandings.       
13 This supplier notifies our firm of fluctuations in production that could affect 
product availability. 
      
14 Training and qualifying this supplier has involved a substantial commitment 
of resources. 
      
15 This supplier communicates well its expectations for the performance of our 
relationship. 
      
16 This supplier is willing to share the costs of rectifying joint mistakes and 
problems.  
      
17 The relationship we have with this supplier is something we are very 
committed to. 
      
18 We respect the judgment of the supplier when solving problems.       
19 This supplier helps us to make joint decisions about improving the overall 
efficiency of the supply chain. 
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Strength of Fit  Collaborative Questions (Cont) Sort  
Code Very 
Weak 
Weak Neither Strong Very 
Strong 
20 This supplier has a high level of integrity.       
21 This supplier has made a considerable investment in tools and equipment for 
this relationship. 
      
22 This supplier adheres to an accepted set of operating principles.       
23 This supplier expects that our two companies should anticipate and resolve 
operational problems together. 
      
24 This supplier shares the benefits and the burdens of our relationship.       
25 In a conflict, this supplier emphasises incorporating several positions to find 
a solution that is good for all. 
      
26 This supplier allows social exchanges to take place above and beyond any 
formal agreement.  
      
27 Our supplier provides product availability information (eg, production 
schedules or inventory levels) to our firm using electronic data exchange. 
      
28 This relationship is based on accommodating one another if special 
problems/needs arise. 
      
29 This supplier actively seeks our advice and counsel.       
30 This supplier provides opportunities for working out solutions for problems 
together. 
      
31 If this current relationship is terminated there are significant sunk costs for 
both parties that cannot be recovered. 
      
32 This supplier almost always delivers on the results it promises.       
33 If this current relationship is terminated, there would be significant additional 
costs to both parties. 
      
34 This supplier embodies the values we hold to be most important.       
35 This supplier also shares in the uncertainty of our relationship.       
36 This supplier is genuinely concerned that our business succeeds.       
37 This relationship is based on mutual trust.       
38 Our supplier provides us with summary service and usage reports.       
39 This supplier deals with us in a straightforward manner that reveals their true 
motives. 
      
40 This supplier emphasises seeking joint benefits.       
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Strength of Fit  Collaborative Questions (Cont) Sort  
Code Very 
Weak 
Weak Neither Strong Very 
Strong 
41 This supplier is prepared to overlook occasional faults from us.       
42 This relationship is based on mutual benefit.       
43 This supplier seeks our advice and counsel concerning its own efforts.       
44 This supplier has spent significant resources designing this component to 
make it fit with our production system. 
      
45 This supplier is honest about problems when they arise.       
46 This supplier expects us both to work together as a team.       
47 This supplier takes an informal approach to working together.       
48 This supplier is willing to dedicate whatever people and resources it takes to 
grow the relationship. 
      
49 This supplier follows the established way of doing things when dealing with 
us. 
      
50 This supplier expects us to make joint decisions about ways to improve 
overall costs efficiencies. 
      
51 This supplier provides us with the information we need to maximize our 
revenue. 
      
52 This supplier is willing to let us see their weaknesses and their strengths       
53 This supplier can be counted on to do what is right.       
54 This supplier provides information on a timely basis.       
55 Problems that arise in the course of our relationship with this supplier are 
treated by the parties as a joint rather than individual responsibility.  
      
56 This supplier is willing to make long-term investments in helping this 
relationship. 
      
57 This supplier provides proprietary information about their future plans.       
58 This supplier gives us advanced notice of potential product shortages.       
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Please assign a code to each question below and grade the strength of fit. 
 
Table A4-2 Opportunistic (Negative) Behaviours of the Key Supplier 
 
Strength of Fit  Opportunistic Questions  Sort  
Code Very 
Weak 
Weak Neither Strong Very 
Strong 
1 The supplier has forced us to modify our original agreement in some way.       
2 We can switch suppliers easily.  (Reverse coded)       
3 It is likely that this supplier will act illegally to advance their own claims.       
4 This supplier does not fulfil its obligations under the formal agreement.       
5 This supplier does not act within the spirit of the agreement.       
6 This supplier exerts social pressure on us to conform to their expectations.       
7 This supplier will alter facts slightly to get what they want.       
8 This supplier will breach informal agreements to their benefit.       
9 This supplier does not live up to our shared expectations.       
10 This supplier will smooth over a problem when we expect it to be fixed.       
11 This supplier over-commits themselves knowing that they cannot fulfil their 
contractual obligations to us. 
      
12 This supplier would do anything in their means to further their interests in any 
situation. 
      
13 This supplier has reduced their quality or service levels to increase their own 
profits. 
      
14 When a formal agreement is made, we can always rely on this supplier to 
fulfil their obligations.  (Reverse coded) 
      
15 This supplier has been known to make false claims or statements.       
16 The supplier has the clout to get their way.       
17 This supplier has deliberately underperformed their duties.       
18 This supplier will exaggerate needs to get what they desire.       
19 This supplier has done something that we thought was out of character.       
20 This supplier attempts to be persuasive when dealing with us.       
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Strength of Fit  Opportunistic Questions (Cont) Sort  
Code Very 
Weak 
Weak Neither Strong Very 
Strong 
21 This supplier has requested that we follow their wishes on an issue, and has 
also mentioned the consequence of non-compliance. 
      
22 We dictate the terms of the negotiations with this supplier.  (Reverse coded)       
23 The supplier has taken some unfair advantage from us.       
24 This supplier has failed to keep a commercial secret of ours.       
25 This supplier has done something that we have explicitly prohibited.       
26 This supplier makes false claims or promises.       
27 This supplier has deliberately misrepresented some issues.       
28 This supplier would present the facts to us in such a way that would make 
them look good. 
      
29 This supplier will breach a formal agreement to their benefit.       
30 This supplier has failed to conduct a transaction with us according to the 
agreed rules. 
      
                    (Total – 88 items) 
 
Comments and Suggestions 
 
If you have any comments or suggestions with regards to any part of this questionnaire, please note 
in the spaces below: 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Thank you very much for your valuable time and assistance. 
 
Mark M.J. Wilson 
PhD Researcher (Supply Chain Management) 
Commerce Division 
Lincoln University 
Po Box 84, Lincoln 
CANTERBURY 
wilsonm3@lincoln.ac.nz 
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Appendix 5 Q-Sort Results and Inter-judge Reliabilities 
Table A5-1 Results of the Q-Sort Exercise Showing the Final Items, Source, and Inter-judge 
Reliabilities 
 
Q-SORT - COLLABORATIVE BEHAVIOUR No. Rtns: 11
Top 3
# Scale Item Source Label Random Code Freq Fit Avg α α
1
...communicate its expectations for the performance of this relationship? (Bask, 2001) 3 15 A1 9 3.7 0.82 0.82
2
...notify our firm of fluctuations in production that could affect product availability? (Stank, et al., 1999) 1 13 A1 9 3.6 0.82
3
...expect us to use informal channels when communicating with them? (Mohr, et al., 1996) 56 2 A1 9 4.0 0.82
4
...provide us with summary performance reports? (Stank, et al., 1996) 2 38 A2 10 3.7 0.91 0.88
5
…provides us with needed information? (Knemeyer, et al., 2003) 14 10 A2 10 3.1 0.91
6
...share their operational information with us? (Stank, et al., 2001) 13 7 A2 9 4.4 0.82
7
…incorporates several positions to find a solution that is good for all in a conflict? (Wong, et al., 1999) 15 25 B1 8 3.9 0.73 0.64
8
...provide opportunities for working out solutions for problems together? (Mollenkopf, et al., 2000) 18 30 B1 8 3.3 0.73
9
...expect our two companies to resolve operational problems together? (Stank, et al., 1996) 17 23 B1 5 3.5 0.45
10
…work at attaining collective goals? (Stank, et al., 1996) 24 1 B2 10 4.3 0.91 0.73
11
...demonstrate that mutual goals are important? (Wong, et al., 1999) 22 3 B2 9 4.5 0.82
12
...make joint decisions with us to improve overall costs? (Stank, et al., 1996) 23 50 B2 5 3.0 0.45
13
...spend resources designing their processes to fit in with us? (Sharland, 1997) 30 44 C1 10 3.5 0.91 0.82
14
...invest in long-term assets to help this relationship? (Anderson and Weitz, 1992) 33 56 C1 9 3.8 0.82
15
...dedicate resources to grow this relationship? (Anderson and Weitz, 1992) 34 48 C1 8 3.4 0.73
16
...share in the risks of the relationship? (Stank, et al., 2001) 36 6 C2 11 4.4 1.00 0.94
17
...share in the benefits of the relationship? (Moore and Cunningham, 1999) 40 24 C2 11 4.0 1.00
18
...share the costs of rectifying joint mistakes? New 41 16 C2 9 3.7 0.82
19
...demonstrate their trustworthiness? (Gundlach, et al., 1995) 49 37 D1 11 4.3 1.00 0.91
20
...demonstrate their loyalty to us? (Anderson and Weitz, 1992) 47 4 D1 10 3.9 0.91
21
...do the right thing? (Moore and Cunningham, 1999) 43 53 D1 9 3.9 0.82
22
…think that social exchanges are an important addition to any formal agreement? (Heide and John, 1992) 52 26 D2 9 3.3 0.82 0.76
23
...adhere to the accepted set of operating principles? (Knemeyer, et al., 2003) 54 22 D2 8 3.6 0.73
24
...follow the established way of doing things when dealing with us? New 58 49 D2 8 2.8 0.73
81.06% % correct
Q-SORT - OPPORTUNISTIC BEHAVIOUR
# Scale Item Ref Label Random Code Top 3
1
...not live up to our shared expectations? (Wathne and Heide, 2000) 4 9 E 9 3.2 0.82 0.79
2
...do things that we thought were out of character? (Wathne and Heide, 2000) 5 19 E 9 3.2 0.82
3
…does not act within the spirit of the agreement? (Wathne and Heide, 2000) 3 5 E 8 3.5 0.73
4
...use their clout to get their own way? (Morgan and Hunt, 1994) 9 16 F 11 3.7 1.00 0.97
5
...dictates the terms of the negotiations? New 13 22 F 11 3.2 1.00
6
...attempt to be persuasive when dealing with us? New 12 20 F 10 3.5 0.91
7
...alter facts slightly to get what they want? (Moore and Cunningham, 1999) 15 7 G 9 3.9 0.82 0.82
8
...deliberately underperform their duties? (Bunduchi and Gerst, 2004) 22 17 G 9 3.7 0.82
9
...make false claims or promises? (Moore and Cunningham, 1999) 6 26 G 9 3.4 0.82
10
...act illegally to advance their own claims? New 30 3 H 11 4.1 1.00 0.76
11
...do things that we have explicitly prohibited? (Wathne and Heide, 2000) 19 25 H 7 3.6 0.64
12
...fail to keep commercial secrets? (Lyons and Mehta, 1997) 26 24 H 7 3.5 0.64
13
...breech contracts to their benefit? (Moore and Cunningham, 1999) 23 29 H 6 4.0 0.55
81.12% % correct
37 81.1% % correct
Correct CodeRandom No.
Correct Code
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Appendix 6 Survey Interview Protocols  
Survey Interview Protocols                  (Version 4.5) 
 
Section 1 – Introduction 
 
Opening salutations and ice breaker. 
 
Today, I would like to ask you some questions about the relationships that you have formed with 
some of your suppliers.  In particular, I am interested in how the supplier behaves in the 
relationship from your perspective as the buyer. 
 
Experience tells us that some suppliers are very cooperative and behave well in the relationship, 
while others behave according to their own self interests.  What I would like to know is how these 
positive and negative behaviours affect your perception of the relationship you have with them?        
 
 
Purpose 
 
The information you provide in this interview will be very helpful to me in gathering data on your 
perceptions of supplier relationships, and will be a key part of my research. 
 
Any information you provide will be held in the strictest confidence, and only used for this 
research.  No individual names or companies will be identified in any future publications.     
  
 
Instructions 
 
What I will do next is ask you some questions about your company, and the relationships that you 
have with your suppliers.  
 
Please answer the questions as accurately as you can.  If you cannot provide definite answers, then 
good estimations will suffice. 
 
If your answer involves a choice between two important responses, please choose the most 
important even it is only marginal more important than the second choice.    
 
Please feel free to ask for help if you don’t understand any of the questions.    
 
 
No Obligation 
 
You are under no obligation to participate in this interview if you don’t want to, for whatever 
reason.   
 
You are also free to refuse to answer any questions you wish, or to end this interview at any point 
for whatever reason. 
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Section 2 – Demographics         
 
Q In what primary industry does your firm operate? (cross check with Kompass database) 
 
Q What is your annual turnover in millions (NZD)?  For what year? 
 
Q How many Full Time and Equivalent (FTE’s) employees does your company employ? 
 
Q What is the title of your position? 
 
Q How long have you been involved in dealing with suppliers? (Actual Years) 
 
Q How many suppliers would you deal with regularly?  (%International / %Domestic?) 
 
 
 
Section 3 – Buyer-Supplier Relationships 
 
Most companies have different types of relationships with their suppliers.  Some can be basic, 
straight forward exchanges, while others can be very complex and dependent on joint action.   
 
I will next describe two major types of relationships that a buyer can have with their suppliers, and 
what terminating a relationship represents.      
 
• Describe a Transactional Relationship and Termination (cue card 1 & 3) 
 
• Describe a Partnership Relationship (cue card 2) 
 
 
While there are many different sorts of relationships and they can be defined in many ways, for the 
purposes of this interview, we expect that positive behaviours by a supplier could move a 
relationship to a higher level (i.e. from a Transactional to a Partnership), and that a decrease will 
move it from a higher level to a termination.   
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Section 4 – Transactional Relationships       
 
For the first set of questions I want to focus on a Transactional type relationship.  Can you: 
 
Q Think of a relationship that you currently have that fits the description of a Transactional 
relationship?  (refer to cue card 1) 
Q Confirm aspects with the respondent – get them to describe.  
 
 
CARD ODT:  Transactional Relationship – Details 
 
Q How long have you been dealing with this supplier?  (Years) 
 
Q How frequently do you deal with this supplier?  
 
Q Do you or this supplier have any ownership interest in each other?  (Y / N) 
 
Q If yes – what % of each?  
 
Q Is this a local (NZ) or overseas supplier? (if o/seas, record country)   
 
 
CARD SBT:  Strategic Behaviours - Transactional     
 
The following section asks you about other aspects of your relationship with your suppliers.  
 
Q The culture of my company emphasises…   
(cost first vs relationship first) 
 
Q For this supplier, our purchasing requirements in terms of monetary spend and total 
quantities…    
(very small vs very large) 
 
Q The product/service that we are buying off this supplier can be described as a…  
(commodity vs complex/critical) 
 
Q For the product/service that we are buying off this supplier, there are…  
(small number of suppliers vs large number of suppliers) 
 
Q The current relationship we have with this supplier is based on…  
(specific contract vs open ended agreement) 
 
 
(Many times a day, once a day, 
weekly, monthly, annually) 
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CARDS TC1-24:  Current Relationship - Transactional     
 
• Present Cards TC 1-24 (Positive behaviours).  
• Establish current levels of Positive behaviours in the Transactional partnership, by asking:  
 
Q “In your current Transactional relationship, how often does your supplier do…  
(behaviour 1, 2, … n)?” 
    
Test 1: Collaborative – Increase to Partnership 
Q “Would any increase in the frequency of this behaviour help to promote your current 
relationship to a higher level Partnership relationship?”  
Q “If yes, how by much more?” 
  
Test 2: Collaborative - Decrease to Termination (cue card 3) 
Q “Would a decrease or absence of this behaviour help terminate the relationship?”   
Q “If yes, how much less of this behaviour would you tolerate before ending the relationship?”  
 
 
Repeat Tests 1 and 2 for all Positive (Collaborative) behaviours. 
 
 
CARDS TO1-13:  Current Relationship - Transactional 
 
• Present Cards TO 1-13 (Negative behaviours). 
• Establish current levels of Negative behaviours in the Transactional partnership, by asking:  
 
Q “In your current Transactional relationship, how often does your supplier do…  
(behaviour 1, 2, … n)?” 
 
Test 3: Opportunistic – Increase to Termination (cue card 3) 
Q “Would an increase in the frequency of this behaviour help to terminate the current 
relationship?”   
Q “If yes, how much more of this behaviour would you tolerate before ending the 
relationship?” 
 
Test 4: Opportunistic – Decrease to Partnership 
Q “Would a decrease or absence of this behaviour help to promote your current relationship to 
a higher level Partnership relationship?” 
Q “If yes, how much less?” 
 
 
Repeat Tests 3 and 4 for all Negative (Opportunistic) behaviours. 
 
 
Note any comments as they arise. 
 
 
  
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
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Section 5 – Partnership Relationships      
 
For the second set of questions I want to focus on a Partnership type relationship.  Can you: 
 
Q Think of a relationship that you currently have that fits the description of a Partnership 
relationship?  (refer to cue card 2) 
Q Confirm aspects with the respondent – get them to describe.  
 
 
CARD ODP:  Partnership Relationship – Details 
 
Q How long have you been dealing with this supplier?   (Years) 
 
Q How frequently do you deal with this supplier?  
 
Q Do you or this supplier have any ownership interest in each other?  (Y / N) 
 
Q If yes – what % of each?  
 
Q Is this a local (NZ) or overseas supplier? (if o/seas, record country)   
 
 
CARD SBP:  Strategic Behaviours – Partnership      
 
The following section asks you about other aspects of your relationship with your suppliers.  
 
Q The culture of my company emphasises…   
(cost first vs relationship first) 
 
Q For this supplier, our purchasing requirements in terms of monetary spend and total 
quantities…    
(very small vs very large) 
 
Q The product/service that we are buying off this supplier can be described as a…  
(commodity vs complex/critical) 
 
Q For the product/service that we are buying off this supplier, there are…  
(small number of suppliers vs large number of suppliers) 
 
Q The current relationship we have with this supplier is based on…  
(specific contract vs open ended agreement) 
 
 
(Many times a day, once a day, 
weekly, monthly, annually) 
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CARDS PC1-24: Current Relationship - Partnership 
 
• Present Cards PC 1-24 (Positive behaviours).  
• Establish current levels of Positive behaviours in the Partnership relationship, by asking:  
 
Q “In your current Partnership relationship, how often does your supplier do…  
(behaviour 1, 2, … n)?” 
 
Test 5: Collaborative - Decrease to Termination (cue card 3) 
Q “Would a decrease or absence of this behaviour help to terminate the relationship?” 
Q “If yes, how much less of this behaviour would you tolerate before ending the relationship?” 
 
 
Repeat Tests 5 for all Positive (Collaborative) behaviours. 
 
 
CARDS PO1-13: Current Relationship - Partnership 
 
• Present Cards PO 1-13 (Negative behaviours).  
• Establish current levels of Negative behaviours in the Partnership, by asking:  
 
Q “In your current Partnership relationship, how often does your supplier do…  
(behaviour 1, 2, … n)?” 
 
Test 6: Opportunistic – Increase to Termination (cue card 3) 
Q “Would an increase in the frequency of this behaviour help to terminate the current 
relationship?   
Q “If yes, how much more of this behaviour would you tolerate before ending the 
relationship?” 
 
 
Repeat Tests 6 for all Negative (Opportunistic) behaviours. 
 
 
 
Note any comments as they arise. 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
X 
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Section 6 – Qualitative Field Notes  
 
 
Finally, I would like to ask you some general questions (Ask permission to record). 
 
Q Are there any other supplier behaviours not already covered today that you consider 
important? 
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Q What would cause you to terminate a relationship with a supplier? 
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Q What would cause you to enter into a more collaborative relationship with a supplier? 
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Q Under what circumstances would you be prepared to tolerate opportunistic behaviour by a 
supplier? 
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Q How easy is it to make changes to your supply relationships?  (Happen quickly or slowly?)  
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Q Difference between local and o/seas supplier behaviours? 
 
Q (Other questions?) 
 
 
 
Q Any thing else? 
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Interview Number: _______ 
 
Date:                       _______ 
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Appendix 7 Survey Instrument Cards 
The following Figures show the different configurations for the survey instruments.  There 
are four main sections; Section One captured the transactional relationship collaborative 
behaviours (x 24), Section Two captured transactional opportunistic behaviours (x 13).  
Sections Three and Four were repeats of the first two except they captured the Partnership 
relationship instead.  
Figure A7-1 Example Survey Instrument – Transactional Collaborative Behaviour TC1  
 
Positive Supplier Behaviours – Transactional Relationship 
 
Q.  Of all possible times, how often does your supplier... 
 
…work at attaining collective goals? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mark the Current % level with a: 
Mark any % Increase to a Partnership with a:     
Mark any % Decrease to Termination with a:  
 

X 
 
Never 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% Always
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 
 
 
Figure A7-2 Example Survey Instrument – Transactional Opportunistic Behaviour TO1  
 
Negative Supplier Behaviours – Transactional Relationship 
 
Q.  Of all possible times, how often does your supplier... 
 
…act illegally to advance their own claims? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mark the Current % level with a: 
Mark any % Increase to Termination with a:     
Mark any % Decrease to a Partnership with a:  

X 
No 
Threat
Low 
Threat
Medium 
Threat
High 
Threat
Very          
High 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% Always
0 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Not yet,                                                                                           
But a Potential Threat Exists Actual Negative Behaviour
 
 
 
 
Appendix 7 
 
377 
Figure A7-3 Example Survey Instrument – Partnership Collaborative Behaviour PC1 
 
Positive Supplier Behaviours – Partnership Relationship 
 
Q.  Of all possible times, how often does your supplier... 
 
…work at attaining collective goals? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mark the Current % level with a: 
Mark any % Decrease to Termination with a:     
 
 

X 
Never 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% Always
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A7-4 Example Survey Instrument – Partnership Opportunistic Behaviour PO1 
 
Negative Supplier Behaviours – Partnership Relationship 
 
Q.  Of all possible times, how often does your supplier... 
 
…act illegally to advance their own claims? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mark the Current % level with a: 
Mark any % Increase to Termination with a:     
 
 
 

X 
No 
Threat
Low 
Threat
Medium 
Threat
High 
Threat
Very          
High 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% Always
0 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Not yet,                                                                                           
But a Potential Threat Exists Actual Negative Behaviour
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Appendix 8 Survey Cue Card Prompts 
The following cue cards were used to assist the respondents in selecting the correct type of 
supply chain relationship, and as an aid whilst they were answering the questions. 
Figure A8-1 Cue Card Prompt – Transactional Relationship  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure A8-2 Cue Card Prompt – Partnership Relationship  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A8-3 Cue Card Prompt –Relationship Termination 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Transactional Relationship 
 
A Transactional relationship is a basic arm’s length relationship with a 
supplier that simply focuses on the exchange of goods for money.  Price, 
delivery, quality, and consistency of the supplier are most important 
factors, and everything else is subordinate to these.       
 
Key Themes: 
 
• One-way relationship. 
• Price and quality focused. 
• The bonds between the parties are loose and flexible. 
• Easily switched to another supplier. 
• Day-to-day operational issues are more important. 
 
A Partnership Relationship 
 
A Partnership relationship is where the relationship itself is considered 
important as it adds value.  The two parties rely on each other, and have 
many links between the firms.  While price and delivery are still 
important, preserving the ongoing relationship with the supplier is what 
counts.       
 
Key Themes: 
 
• Two-way relationships. 
• Cooperation is seen as more important than price. 
• The bonds between the parties are strong. 
• Not easily switched to another supplier. 
• Longer-term strategic issues are more important. 
 
 Termination of a Relationship  
 
Termination of a relationship is where the current relationship comes to 
an end.  All exchange links are severed for a period of time.  The 
termination must be due to behavioural issues with the supplier, not 
because of changes in the purchasing requirements.  
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Appendix 9 Key Informant Position Titles   
Table A9-1 Table of Frequencies of Key Informant Position Titles 
23 23.0 23.0 23.0
12 12.0 12.0 35.0
10 10.0 10.0 45.0
9 9.0 9.0 54.0
4 4.0 4.0 58.0
4 4.0 4.0 62.0
4 4.0 4.0 66.0
3 3.0 3.0 69.0
2 2.0 2.0 71.0
2 2.0 2.0 73.0
2 2.0 2.0 75.0
1 1.0 1.0 81.0
1 1.0 1.0 76.0
1 1.0 1.0 77.0
1 1.0 1.0 78.0
1 1.0 1.0 79.0
1 1.0 1.0 80.0
1 1.0 1.0 82.0
1 1.0 1.0 83.0
1 1.0 1.0 84.0
1 1.0 1.0 85.0
1 1.0 1.0 86.0
1 1.0 1.0 87.0
1 1.0 1.0 88.0
1 1.0 1.0 89.0
1 1.0 1.0 90.0
1 1.0 1.0 91.0
1 1.0 1.0 92.0
1 1.0 1.0 93.0
1 1.0 1.0 94.0
1 1.0 1.0 95.0
1 1.0 1.0 96.0
1 1.0 1.0 97.0
1 1.0 1.0 98.0
1 1.0 1.0 99.0
1 1.0 1.0 100.0
100 100.0 100.0
MD
Purchasing Officer
Production Manager
GM
Office Manager
Director
Operations Manager
Purchasing Manager
Workshop Manager
Contracts Manager
Parts Manager
Owner/Manager
Logistics Manager
Factory Manager
Technical Manager
Manufacturing Manager
Inventory Manager
Stores and Purchasing Supervisor
Manufacting Manager
Purchasing and Logistics Manager
Production Engineer
Information Systems Manager
Marketing Manager
Sales and Logistics Manager
Procurement Manager
Merchandise Manager
Harvesting & Distribution Manager
Sales and Production Coordinator
Production Assistant
Manager
Processing Manager
Assistant Manager
Purchasing and Planning Manager
Administration Manager
Contracts Engineer
Systems Engineer
Total
Valid
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
Notes: 
MD = Managing Director – a title often used by the business owner as well. 
GM = General Manager 
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Appendix 10 Data Analysis - Post Hoc Tests 
During the data analysis phase, it was necessary to conduct a number of post hoc analyses 
on a number of variables to provide additional insights into the nature of the data or the 
relationships amongst the variables.  The following tests extend and support the relevant 
sections in the thesis. 
Frequency of Contact 
A Chi-squared test was conducted to determine if there were any differences between 
transactional and partnership relationships along their frequency of contact.  The Pearson 
Chi-squared statistic is significant (p < .01, 2χ  statistic 35.828), thus there is clearly a 
difference between the two relationships in terms of frequency of contact (see Table A13-
1).      
Table A13-1 Chi-Squared test for frequency of contact with suppliers 
Chi-Square Tests
35.828a 3 .000b
39.844 3 .000
34.478 1 .000
200
Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correction
Likelihood Ratio
Linear-by-Linear
Association
N of Valid Cases
Value df
Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The
minimum expected count is 14.50.
a. 
Significant at the p < .01 level.b. 
 
Hypothesis H1b 
This section examines the post hoc testing conducted to validate any violation of the 
assumptions of the one-way ANOVA, in particular the homogeneity of variance.  The 
ANOVA assumes that the variances of the groups are equal, and this can be tested through 
the Levene test for homogeneity of variances.  If the Levene statistic is significant (p < .05) 
then one or more of the groups violate the assumption of homogeneity of variance.  Table 
A10-2 shows that seven of the twelve variables show a significant value, and thus casts 
some doubt over the adequacy of the ANOVA test. 
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Table A10-2 Levene’s test of homogeneity of variances  
Test of Homogeneity of Variances
24.656 1 198 .000
1.813 1 198 .180a
31.308 1 198 .000
25.425 1 198 .000
.889 1 198 .347a
21.414 1 198 .000
11.128 1 198 .001
13.543 1 198 .000
4.302 1 176 .040
.031 1 176 .861a
1.191 1 176 .277a
.020 1 176 .887a
Communication
Information Sharing
Conflict Resolution
Goal Congruence
Relationship Specific Investment
Shared Risks and Rewards
Trust and Commitment
Social and Relational Norms
Social Opportunism
Commercial Opportunism
Unconscionable Opportunism
Illegal Opportunism
Levene
Statistic df1 df2 Sig.
Statistic satisfies assumptionsa. 
 
If the assumptions of normality and homogeneity are violated, then it is important to 
conduct another test to establish the validity of the ANOVA results.  Hence, the data were 
tested with a non-parametric Kurskal-Wallis analysis of variance statistical test to confirm 
the ANOVA results.  This test does not rely on normality, and is based on the robust Chi –
squared distribution.      
Table A10-3 Results of Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance showing the differences in 
collaborative and opportunistic behaviours across transactional and partnership 
relationships  
Test Statisticsa,b
57.764 61.426 55.739 48.239 56.054 62.132 32.799 16.444
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
.000c .000c .000c .000c .000c .000c .000c .000c
Chi-Square
df
Asymp. Sig.
Communi
cation
Information
Sharing
Conflict
Resolution
Goal
Congruence
Relationship
Specific
Investments
Shared Risks
and Rewards
Trust and
Commitment
Social and
Relational
Norms
Kruskal Wallis Testa. 
Grouping Variable: Trans or Partnershipb. 
Significant at the p < .01 level.c. 
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Test Statisticsa,b
5.193 1.584 .964 2.675
1 1 1 1
.023c .208 .326 .102
Chi-Square
df
Asymp. Sig.
Social
Opportunism
Commercial
Opportunism
Unconscionable
Opportunism
Illegal
Opportunism
Kruskal Wallis Testa. 
Grouping Variable: Trans or Partnershipb. 
Significant at the p < .05 level.c. 
 
The results of the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test mirror those results of the parametric 
ANOVA test.  All collaborative behaviours are highly significant at p < .001 level, while 
Social Opportunism (p = 0.23, 2χ  statistic = 5.193) was the only opportunistic behaviour 
to reflect any significant differences (p < .05) across the two relationships.  The other three 
statistics for opportunistic behaviours were not significant.  These results are identical to 
the parametric one-way ANOVA test and show that even when the normality of the 
distribution and homogeneity of variance of assumptions are relaxed, the data still shows 
the same statistical properties and testing results.  Therefore, violations of the assumptions 
are immaterial for this data set, supporting the reliability and rigor of the initial GLM 
model and ANOVA test, and hypotheses testing can continue with confidence. 
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Appendix 11 H3a-d Paired Sample Correlation Coefficients 
Table A11-1 Paired samples Correlation Coefficients – Collaborative behaviours, current 
relationship equilibrium minus the upper ZOT (H3a) 
Paired Samples Correlations
100 .645 .000
100 .465 .000
100 .628 .000
100 .600 .000
100 .627 .000
100 .579 .000
100 .586 .000
100 .746 .000
Communication & Communication (upper ZOT)Pair 1
Information Sharing & Information Sharing (upper ZOT)Pair 2
Conflict Resolution & Conflict Resolution (upper ZOT)Pair 3
Goal Congruence & Goal Congruence (upper ZOT)Pair 4
Relationship Specific Investments & Relationship Specific Investemnts (upper ZOT)Pair 5
Shared Risks and Rewards & Shared Risks and Rewards (upper ZOT)Pair 6
Trust and Commitment & Trust and Commitment (upper ZOT)Pair 7
Social and Relational Norms & Social and Relational Norms (upper ZOT)Pair 8
N Correlation Sig.
 
 
Table A11-2 Paired samples Correlation Coefficients – Collaborative behaviours, current 
relationship equilibrium minus the upper ZOT (H3b) 
Paired Samples Correlations
89 .598 .000
89 .759 .000
89 .610 .000
89 .508 .000
Social Opportunism & Social Opportunism (upper ZOT)Pair 1
Commercial Opportunism & Commercial Opportunism (upper ZOT)Pair 2
Unconscionable Opportunism & Unconscionable Opportunism (upper ZOT)Pair 3
Illegal Opportunism & Illegal Opportunism (upper ZOT)Pair 4
N Correlation Sig.
 
 
Table A11-3 Paired samples Correlation Coefficients – Collaborative behaviours, current 
relationship equilibrium minus the upper ZOT (H3c) 
Paired Samples Correlations
100 .896 .000
100 .868 .000
100 .880 .000
100 .923 .000
100 .940 .000
100 .887 .000
100 .810 .000
100 .671 .000
Communication & Communication (lower ZOT)Pair 1
Information Sharing & Information Sharing (lower ZOT)Pair 2
Conflict Resolution & Conflict Resolution (lower ZOT)Pair 3
Goal Congruence & Goal Congruence (lower ZOT)Pair 4
Relationship Specific Investments & Relationship Specific Investemnts (lower ZOT)Pair 5
Shared Risks and Rewards & Shared Risks and Rewards (lower ZOT)Pair 6
Trust and Commitment & Trust and Commitment (lower ZOT)Pair 7
Social and Relational Norms & Social and Relational Norms (lower ZOT)Pair 8
N Correlation Sig.
 
Table A11-4 Paired samples Correlation Coefficients – Collaborative behaviours, current 
relationship equilibrium minus the upper ZOT (H3d) 
Paired Samples Correlations
89 .639 .000
89 .838 .000
89 .754 .000
89 .676 .000
Social Opportunism & Social Opportunism (lower ZOT)Pair 1
Commercial Opportunism & Commercial Opportunism (lower ZOT)Pair 2
Unconscionable Opportunism & Unconscionable Opportunism (lower ZOT)Pair 3
Illegal Opportunism & Illegal Opportunism (lower ZOT)Pair 4
N Correlation Sig.
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Appendix 12 Post Hoc Analysis – Behavioural Variables 
The flowing charts show the post hoc analysis of the unordered frequency of current 
collaborative behaviours within the relationship archetypes (A12-1), and also the new 
summary typology of four collaborative behaviours (A12-2). 
Figure A12-1 Differences between two the relationship archetypes – Collaborative behaviours as 
originally proposed (Ordered by Typology). 
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Figure A12-2 Differences between two the relationship archetypes – New typology of summarised 
collaborative behaviours.   
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